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Abstract 
References to the philosophy of logic and language are common in political theory to 
help justify certain styles of conceptual analysis. Yet such references are usually 
done in a relatively unsystematic way. I propose a new brand of conceptual analysis 
called 'destructive conceptual analysis' for political theory from a systematic 
engagement with the philosophy of logic and language. It involves a significant 
inversion where instead of defining terms we eliminate them. The brand is derived 
from the coupling of two-dimensional semantics with the thesis of reasonable 
rejection to rigorously describe the property of political argument. Two-dimensional 
semantics provides the only theory of language that I am aware of that can interpret 
the problem of rhetoric where linguistic conjuring tricks are used to hide 
inconsistencies in arguments. Such an interpretation distinguishes between instances 
where political argument has been suspended in conversation (i.e. hijacked) by 
demagogic word play and where it has not. 'Destructive conceptual analysis' is a 
complementary method to this distinction that decisively proves whether political 
argument has been hijacked or not regardless of the protests of conversers. When 
competent individuals cannot rephrase their argument under the linguistic constraints 
of elimination this is proof that their conversation - whatever it was - was not 
substantive political argument. 1 call the overall framework of my approach 'the veil 
of anal retentiveness' (as it is a genuine alternative to the 'veils' introduced by the 
likes of John Rawls and James Buchanan). The second half of the dissertation is 
devoted to applying this framework to the sort of conceptual debates in political 
theory and science that Robert Dahl describes as giant globs of oily ambiguity. These 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
A project of conceptual analysis is empty without an aim. Without an aim no project 
would have constraints and without constraints there would be no indication of the 
project 's success. 
The aims of political theorists have often come across as especially murky. In part I 
think this is because the theorist has not made their concern or aim explicit. So to be 
up front, this dissertation is concerned with disagreement that is due to differing 
views of the meaning of certain terms like 'power ' , ' f reedom' , and 'democracy' , 
terms that are - to use Robert Dahl 's (1957: 1056) expression - giant globs of oily 
ambiguity. My aim is to devise a method to overcome these glob debates in a way 
that is conducive to substantive and consistent agreement in political argument. This 
amounts to completing a framework for political argument. 
The success of the framework will depend on arguments that transfer the burden back 
to the disputants to explain why they still disagree. Perhaps they still do disagree and 
perhaps I have been too hasty in suggesting they would not. For example, they might 
disagree with the parameters of the social contract (although I will argue that these 
parameters are so weak that if they do they contradict themselves) or they might be 
able to rephrase their disagreement in a way in which 1 do not. Nevertheless my hope 
is that at least some might agree that they have been trivially arguing over words 
rather than over substantive points and that political theory and political science might 
get on with more progressive arguments. 
The introduction now is intended to give a philosophical background to this aim: 
where it comes from and why I think it is useful. This will involve a critical review of 
some of the important arguments in analytic political philosophy. It is not necessary 
that you agree with this background; all that really matters is that you find my 
constraint of substantive and consistent agreement compelling. 
In the second chapter I will introduce a problem that has been unwisely ignored in the 
literature. The third will outline the 'destructive' program of conceptual analysis that 
suggests itself from my interpretation of the problem. In the fourth and fifth I will 
criticize others for not making their aim explicit with their brand of conceptual 
analysis, not sticking to it, or having so many different and seemingly contradictory 
aims that it renders each deficient. I suggest that if they had not made these muddling 
moves an approach like mine would be a pragmatic choice. In part two, I apply this 
'destructive' brand of conceptual analysis to certain glob debates in political theory. 
The results are not definitive as they depend on my competence to rephrase 
disagreement - and so potentially the amateurish butchering of conceptual points -
however, in so far as a rephrase is not forthcoming from anyone else then we should 
provisionally discard the disagreement as far as the discipline of political theory is 
concerned. The conclusions then are more invitations to prove the analysis in the 
second half of this dissertation wrong (by falsifying my proposed hypotheses). 
1.1 Reference Group as Constraint 
Without a specified aim there is no way of determining the success of conceptual 
analysis. If we start out without one we will get nowhere; one false start will be 
followed by another. A project concerned with discovering the meaning of T is empty 
unless it also asks the meaning of T for what or for whom. To understand a 
theoretical constraint, in other words, you must first know who or what constitutes the 
theory's reference group. 
Say I were to brag to all my friends that I was going to go off to an isolated hut in the 
Black Forest for two years to 'discover the meaning of truth'. There is an argument 
that I think is a decisive rebuke to such boasts. If one of my friends piped up and 
asked me how I actually intended discovering the meaning of 'truth' given I have no 
idea what to look for in the first place, I would have no response. There is no way to 
know what 'truth' might look like given that is the very reason I desire to find its 
meaning - and if I do not know what it is, then I certainly cannot actively ' look' for it. 
This has been variously called the paradox of analysis (rather loosely) or 'Meno 's 
Paradox'. The point of having constraints to the analysis of concepts is to avoid such 
rebukes. Perhaps the saying 'I ' l l know it when I see it' suggests that such a constraint 
is unnecessary, but this just seems to be a case where the aim is not made explicit. 
The conclusion might simply be an uncritical restatement of the prevailing social 
opinion, some subjective and prejudiced intuition, or even a blatant lie. There is little 
point to such an undertaking since it would merely be a restatement of the author's 
disposition to assent to whether something was 'true' or not. The steps to arriving at 
an opinion are what is of interest not the opinion itself. These steps need to be made 
explicit so that readers might be able to retrace them. Otherwise, the persuasiveness 
of the opinion is completely down to an appeal to the author's authority and such 
appeals are not the slightest bit constructive to any academic discipline. 
A more fruitful task would be to abandon any longing for tranquil isolation and 
resolve to find the meaning(s) of the word truth, say, for my friends (assuming the set 
of my friends is non-empty). The assent of my friends to hypotheses is constraint 
enough for this sort of project, providing I also have certain methods to screen for 
lying and mistakes. Being clear on the reference group when analysing meaning 
therefore is necessary if you are going to be clear on its standard of success. Flouting 
this requirement is my quarry in Chapter 4. 
The following analysis though has no particular person or fixed group of people as its 
reference. It is not concerned with comparing what words like ' f reedom' mean in one 
culture and what they mean in another. No doubt this is often a worthwhile task, with 
a constraint readily available: the assent of the reference group. Of course the task 
gets somewhat more complicated when the individuals in one 's reference group are 
all dead, as is the case with most studies of conceptual history. It is still possible 
though to create theories that might be falsified when some primary source emerges 
which happens to use the word differently to that predicted by the theory. The aim of 
conceptual historians, then, might be to propose theories of a word's usage that defy 
easy falsification. Regardless, it is not the brand of conceptual analysis being pursued 
here. It is mentioned only to distinguish it from the following. 
Instead, my analysis has an unfixed group of individuals as its reference. They are 
those who are, will be, or have been engaged in a certain sort of activity. That is, the 
activity of political argument. It is analysis for those wanting to reach substantive 
agreement over political issues, particularly the academic discipline of such activity -
political theory. The groundwork section of this dissertation is devoted to analysing 
when we can describe individuals to be engaging in political argument and when we 
cannot. 
1.2 The Political 
At this point I dare say some might think I have already shot myself in the foot. I 
have just used the most contested term of them all and, what is more, used it 
uncritically. What does the predicate 'political' in political argument mean when I 
use it to state the activity of my reference group and how can it be justified that it is 
such when it is itself built into my constraint? Such a justification would surely be 
circular. 
To take the two questions in order, 'political' by my usage applies to anything that is 
concerned with the solution of a rather difficult sort of coordination problem. The 
problem is the problem of politics: figuring out a way we might peacefully coexist 
despite currently having different views of the good life. 
Categorizing the problem as such amounts to a theory of politics. It roughly follows 
John Rawls' (1993; 1995) delineation of the political from other doctrines like the 
religious and the moral.' It is discriminatory in a way that I suspect is intuitively 
' This delineation is similar to Rawls ' such that it almost could be a rough paraphrase: "I think of 
political liberalism as a doctrine that falls under the category of the political. It works entirely within 
that domain and does not rely on anything outside it. The more familiar view of political philosophy is 
that its concepts, principles and ideals, and other elements are presented as consequences of 
comprehensive doctrines, religious metaphysical, and moral. By contrast, political philosophy, as 
understood in political liberalism, consists largely of different political conceptions of right and justice 
viewed as freestanding. So while political liberalism is of course liberal, some political conceptions of 
right and justice belonging of right and justice belonging to political philosophy in this sense may be 
conservative or radical; conceptions of the divine right of kings, or even of dictatorship, may also 
belong to it. Although in the last two cases the corresponding regimes would lack the historical, 
religious, and philosophical justifications with which we are acquainted, they could have freestanding 
conceptions of political right and justice, however implausible, and so fall within political philosophy" 
appealing to most. First, the theory being proposed includes most arguments in 
favour of authoritarianism. Far too often theorists working from a largely liberal 
theory of politics assume that the theory naturally entails the liberal state. Yet there is 
nothing to rule out a solution to the political problem that selects one version of the 
good life (say, a Christian monarchy or Islamic Caliphate) and persecutes all those 
who do not subscribe to it until that one version reigns supreme. If everybody held 
the same view of the good life, one would suspect the issue of peaceful coexistence 
would be far simpler than if there were multiple and so the coordination problem 
would be by-and-large solved.^ Regardless, the fact that there are, at this moment, 
multiple views of the good life in circulation, does not mean a solution for peaceful 
coexistence needs to maintain this fact, only that it makes it much less feasible (in 
contrast with Rawls, 1993: xviii). Second, the theory excludes associations that do 
not have a mandate for a solution to the coordination problem. For example, fascism 
gets its mandate from a 'constant struggle' mantra that, if anything, actively tries to 
maintain the coordination problem instead of solving i t . ' We can therefore say that 
fascism is politically unconstructive or more simply that a fascist party just does not 
count as a political association. This seems to fit with some folk intuition. I will 
leave 'the political' at this short introduction for it is all that is required for now. 
After all, the substance of any theory is the possible cases to which it applies 
(Jackson, 1996) and I have given a quick sketch of the limits of case inclusion and 
exclusion for the political. 
Now to return to the second question: how can I justify this theory of the political 
when my analytical constraint cannot escape using the concept? The answer is that I 
cannot. At least, I cannot if I stick to the framework developed here. Hopefully there 
is some deductive merit to the dissertation, however this merit can only get going 
(Rawls, 1995: 133). The only difference I have is verbal - 1 think 'political theory' would be a more 
appropriate term here than 'political philosophy' . It seems that Rawls shares my concerns with 
confusing the project with substantive moves in philosophy - "The central idea is that political 
liberalism moves within the category of the political and leaves philosophy as it is" (Rawls, 1995: 134) 
- so I tend to think he would not have any problem with my position. 
^ You would suspect at least. If everybody held a view of the good life that did not include a view as to 
the just method for the distribution of scarce resources (perhaps scarcer than usual now that everybody 
wants the same thing), the possibility for peaceful coexistence would be all but dead. I want to steer 
clear of saying much about what exactly is required of a sustainable view of the good life when that 
view is the only one held in society. I think it goes without saying though that it will have to be robust. 
' Orwell (1944), for instance, says that it is usually assumed "Fascism is inherently warlike, that it 
thrives in an atmosphere of war hysteria and can only solve its economic problems by means of war 
preparation or foreign conquests." 
from those possible cases that are included within the extension of the concept I 
associate with the word 'political'. I could always eliminate the word 'political' and 
rephrase political argument as 'the particular form of argument that is concerned with 
solving the sort of coordination problem outlined in the introduction' but that is rather 
long-winded and confusing. So to be as clear, I retain the predicate 'political' for 
stylistic effect. If some want to challenge me on the verbal issue of whether or not 
politics means what I suggest it means here, then the subscript gambit (discussed 
further in Chapter 3) can be used and my concept associated with the word 'political' 
can be distinguished from that of my challenger by adding subscript. I am talking 
about politics2 and my challenger is talking about politicsi, say. Surely it is 
conceivable that in some whacky world 'political' means what I suggest it means. 
Just assume then that we live in this whacky world for the next 100,000 words or so. 
The same trick should be applied to any term the reader finds suspect in the first few 
chapters that outlines the dissertation's groundwork (this introduction and chapters 2 
and 3). 
1.2.1 Further Refinements 
Admittedly 'views of the good life' and 'peaceful coexistence' are probably 
ambiguous terms. They will have to remain grey areas, but a bit more detail is useful 
in order to couch the theory within a literature. 
Take a view of the good life to be a particular subset of an individual's preference 
schedule. It is not an individual's view o /h i s or her own preferences or what they 
believe their preferences should ideally be that constitutes their view of the good life."* 
Rather, it is a subset of their preferences as they actually are. While an individual's 
assertions might give a good indication as to their real preference, they might well be 
mistaken or they might be blatantly lying about them. As Leonard Savage (1972: 17) 
said, "I think it of great importance that preference and indifference b e t w e e n / a n d g 
be determined, at least in principle, by decisions between acts and not by response to 
Of course, an individual might have a preference for a different preference schedules to the one they 
currently have. Preferences for preferences might well be part of the subset; however they are still an 
individual's current preferences. A smoker trying to quit has a preference for a preference schedule 
that does not prioritise lighting up another cigarette so highly. 
introspective questions". So the stated introspective view one might have of 
themselves is off the table as a candidate filler for 'views of the good life ' . Luckily 
we do not have to methodologically rely on the stated opinions of individuals to 
discover their view either. Revealed preference analysis is probably the most popular 
method of discovering the preferences of individuals and it does so by way of 
analysing their choices rather than their opinions.^ 
The subset is the particular preferences an agent has for the (forced or unforced) 
conventions that coordinate aspects of both their behaviour and the behaviour of 
others. These conventions are coordinating constraints on social action. An 
individual's view of the good life, then, is equivalent to their preferences regarding 
the content of coordination. In other words, the subset of preferences relevant to the 
view of the good life is the agent's preferences for the conventions that are to make 
up the social contract. Social contract theory is the hallmark of analytical political 
philosophy (Pettit, 2012) and is the body of literature that best interprets the theory of 
politics described above. 
Could 1 avoid any misdirection if 1 just substituted 'views of the good life' for a more 
basic term like 'social wants' or 'social desires'? Perhaps. However, I want to stress 
that the relevant kind of desires and wants are directed to conventional content rather 
than specific events. An individual's social wants or desires could encompass 
particular events like 'individual i winning the lottery', but one's view of the good life 
could not - it would only encompass a certain event indirectly if the event was 
endorsed by a conventional norm that constituted part of the view of the good life. 
Any term that has an extension of the preferences an individual has for the 
conventions of coordination 1 would happily accept into the characterization of the 
political problem described above. 
Take peaceful coexistence to be a stable equilibrium point with respect to the grounds 
of coordination. Such ground will be a set of conventions, if we are to follow 
evolutionary theory's suggestion that the grounds of human coordination are naturally 
' See Samuelson (1948) and Sen (1971). Compare though Don Ross (2005). 
evolved conventions (Skyrms, 1996).® Rawls thought the outcome of political 
philosophy should be to "ensure stability from one generation to the next" (1987: 1) 
by reaching a "long-run equilibrium" (1987: 5) on the appropriate conventions of 
cooperation. Importantly, this is not just any old equilibrium. It must be a stable and 
lasting equilibrium and not subject to minute-by-minute fluctuation any less than 
generation-by-generation fluctuation. The preferred political outcome is an 
equilibrium because it is a state where it is common knowledge that there is no 
incentive to deviate from an agent's position, given the agent's knowledge (i.e. 
common knowledge) that just about everybody else equally has no incentive to 
deviate. It is a Nash equilibrium when the two strategies are the best replies to each 
other. 
For example, say there was a Nash equilibrium between two countries that had 
mutually opposed interests to nevertheless sign a treaty with one another. It happened 
that the diplomatic services of both countries were vast and efficient and so both 
recognised that their interests were opposed and recognised that the other recognised 
and recognised that the other recognised that they recognised (and so on and so forth 
in this circle), and a treaty suggested itself as the dominant strategy for both countries. 
The equilibrium would count as a case of peaceful coexistence by my proposed 
theory. (Of course it might not be a unique equilibrium, but that is a complication we 
will ignore for the time being.) Perhaps without a treaty the two countries would have 
been locked in a long and bloody battle with the outcome being mutual destruction. 
However, Rawls does not think such a treaty would count as a lasting equilibrium 
because there is no 'overlapping consensus' between the interests of the two 
countries. There is nothing to stop the interests of one of the countries, he argues, 
from arbitrarily changing at a moment 's notice away from a rational commitment to 
'' The logical difference between a social contract and a convention is nicely put in Lewis, 1969: 88-97. 
Some evolutionary theory though seems to assume the two are equivalent. This is a serious mistake. It 
can be quickly overcome (for our purposes) if we take the footnoted sentence strictly and define a 
social contract as a set of conventions but not a convention itself. As far as our goal is to institute a 
social contract, any candidate content is as good as any other providing it preserves the contract. Yet a 
candidate state of affairs other than one where the social contract exists is not equally as good. If we 
are to believe Hobbes, such a state of affairs is one where life is poore, solitary, brutish and short. It is 
definitional of a convention on the other hand that there is an equally good candidate available (Lewis, 
1969 and Lewis, 1975). Therefore, the social contract cannot itself be a convention, but it can be 
comprised solely of conventions, providing the population is analytically constrained to those engaged 
in political argument. 
the provisions of the treaty (1987: 11). I disagree. It is generally rare (if it occurs at 
all) that a country's interests will change in a way that is completely unpredictable. 
That is, in a way that is genuinely arbitrary or random. Part of the formulation of both 
countries' strategy surely must be to calculate whether they think the other country 
will maintain its current interests. In many instances there would not even be 
equilibrium were it not for the belief of both agents that the dominant strategy will be 
a lasting strategy. Part of the intelligence gathering in the diplomatic service will be 
concerned with working out the likely trajectory of their rival's interests. The 
equilibrium point's holding capacities, then, will depend on the quality of information 
available to the strategists, not necessarily on a set of shared beliefs and values like 
those that make up Rawls ' notion of an 'overlapping consensus'.^ 
Do solutions to the terms of peaceful coexistence ignore the plight of the oppressed? 
Does a society that reaches a 'long-run equilibrium' with the compliance of its 
members but that also actively endorses varieties of oppression such as slavery, 
patriarchal domination and class subjugation count as a peaceful coexistence? All 
sorts of grotesque acts of violence have been documented under such relations. The 
individuals on the receiving end cannot generally challenge the underlying 
coordinating conventions that make such relations possible (part of the problem is that 
the perpetrators think they can get away with such acts at minimal cost) and so they 
must conform into cooperation through fear of further sanction. Surely it would be a 
sick joke to call such relations a 'peaceful coexistence', if peaceful coexistence means 
a morally acceptable existence. Rawls can bypass this problem by invoking the 
'overlapping consensus' to suggest there is no overlap^ between the oppressed and 
oppressor concerning the terms of their specific relationship and so no ground for 
stable coordinating conventions over time (or what he calls 'a political conception of 
' R a w l s ' 'overlapping consensus' was presumably a variant of W.V.O Quine 's (see 1961 [1953]: 1-20) 
(his colleague at Harvard) logic of indeterminacy. More will be said on this logic of overlap in Chapter 
4. It might be noted here that the idea that individuals (or countries for that matter) have prepared 
idiolects that meaningfully communicate with other idiolects by way of sharing various fragments is 
disputed by Donald Davidson in 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs' (1986). He contends that any 
belief system we have remains untranslatable into any other (our prior theories) but that from each 
belief system we can create passing and momentary theories to come to a shared understanding with 
others. 
' Perhaps both oppressor and oppressed might accept the state of affairs when it is put to a vote. We 
have the example of some of ' the untouchable' Dalit Indians who actively accepted their position in 
society despite it being a terribly oppressed one. However, generally acceptance does not entail 
overlap. For there to be overlap, acceptance must be explained by a shared set of reasons. 
justice'). As argued though, I do not think the notion of 'overlapping consensus 
should be used at all. Since I do not think there is a better explanation of stability 
than the rational choice one outlined above as a stable equilibrium, this commits me 
to biting the bullet and saying that these oppressive conditions are peaceful. 
I agree, of course, that to equate certain sorts of peaceful coexistence (like those listed 
above) with morally acceptable states of affairs is a perverse thing to do. The two 
properties are not equivalent. With respect to societies that maintain peaceful 
relations among groups, moral criticism is still required; to think about what could be 
changed to better society by your view of the good life and if such change is feasible, 
execute it. For instance, as outside observers most contemporary moralities (except 
for perhaps the most ludicrous brands of postmodernism) would advise individuals to 
actively try and disrupt any stable equilibrium that led to the unequivocal acceptance 
of a slave trade even when the slaves themselves accepted the trade. While political 
theory does not have the analytical resources to explain why we should engage in 
moral actions, it certainly does not suggest that we should not act if such action is 
feasible. Indeed, I think Przeworski (1998) is right to say that political deliberation is 
not concerned with basic values but rather the means for instituting those values.® 
Yet it is hard to imagine a morally acceptable state of affairs that is not at the same 
time a state of peace. War might be fought for the moral cause however it is only a 
moral cause if the state of affairs fought for is a state of peace. The Union's wartime 
effort in the American Civil War is often considered moral not because of its war 
strategy but because of its ends to abolish (or at least reject) slavery in peacetime. We 
can conclude then that peaceful coexistence, or the goal of, is necessary for a morally 
acceptable existence, but at the same time not sujficient. If we were to say it was also 
sufficient we would strike Hobbes' radical conservatism in Leviathan where morality 
is cashed out in terms of stability and where the status quo is put on a pedestal. This 
' Przeworksi quips, "The large part of political discussion concerns not goals but means, not the 
question whether motherhood is good but whether the best way to promote motherhood is indeed to 
throw mothers and children on the street" (1998: 143). This position might also follow a loose 
interpretation of Christian List 's (2002: 73) argument that deliberation should seek a metaconsensus 
concerning the way our preferences should be arranged rather than a substantive consensus concerning 
the particular content of our preferences. 
is not a doctrine I think should be subscribed to'® and (whether you subscribe to it or 
not) it is distinct from the theory of poHtics so sketched. 
Nor should anyone working strictly from the theory of politics ignore oppression. 
They should take it very seriously. After all, even if you are on the more amoral end 
of the spectrum you must concede that oppressed groups are usually the most likely to 
rebel and disrupt the social equilibrium when circumstances change and political 
analysis that assumes circumstances will not change would be limited indeed. All I 
want to emphasize is that asking 'What is it to lead the good life?' is distinct from 
asking 'What features of the good life are feasible options for institutionalization 
given others have different views of the good life?' The latter question of feasibility 
is central to the theory of politics so stated because any acceptable answer is a 
candidate solution to the political problem. This dissertation is principally concerned 
with consistency and substantive agreement in the social contract irrespective of 
whether the contract is a just one or not. What I maintain though is that if we are 
interested in justice in the social contract we have to be first clear on the dynamics of 
social-contract-making, which has as its subject matter both just and unjust contracts. 
1 3 Political Argument 
Brian Barry's Political Argument (2011 [1965]), along with John Rawls' Theory of 
Justice (1971) ushered in what is now known as analytic political philosophy (Pettit, 
2012). Both books rejected the prevailing vogue of utilitarianism, which suggested 
values like ' freedom', 'equality' and even 'justice' were reducible to the single value 
of happiness." The thinking was that we only value, for instance, our freedom if we 
believe it adds to our overall happiness. Anything of interest in the area of politics 
therefore was puzzling only because it was not easily cashed out in terms of the 
For one, the position Hobbes ' concept of 'stability' has in his political philosophy is a serious case of 
overreach. Almost everything can be boiled down to stabilizing and destabilizing forces. It is used to 
explain meaning and knowledge, for example. After a while the danger is that in explaining everything 
it cannot explain anything. Sentences using the term therefore do not 'carve up ' the world in a 
meaningful way. 
" Of course, the labels and descriptions of that single value differ between utilitarians. Some do not 
think the base value is happiness and call it something else like 'utils ' or ' the minimization of pain ' . 
vocabulary of moral philosophy. Moral philosophy was the only game in town.'^ 
However, both Barry and Rawls argued that we could remain value pluralists and 
separate the study of the political from the moral in spite of the leanings of most of 
the academics at the time and furthermore suggested that there was important work to 
be done in the area. First, there is a need to work out the feasible trade-offs between 
values. For example, we will often have to make trade-offs between equity and 
efficiency in a market economy. That is, working out which value packages are 
feasible input for institutions. Second, with help from empirical science, there is a 
need to check the feasibility of institutionalizing these value packages given the way 
the world actually is. (These areas will divide up the content of the second half of the 
dissertation.) 
Each author is conspicuously silent though on one of the two words that make up this 
section's title. Despite Brian Barry's book literally being called Political Argument, 
he never tells us why his argument is 'political' as such. Perhaps it was just meant as 
a loose description of his subject matter, but for a book that is so strict with respect to 
the usage of other vocabulary, the silence is strange. Rawls on the other hand goes to 
great lengths to distinguish his work as distinctly 'political' - defined in a way similar 
to the previous section - but does not say much on the notion of argument. Instead 
Rawls thought we seek a 'reflective equilibrium' that is in isolation from the interest-
prone arguments of the day. Rawls suggested that it happily turns out that we arrive 
at the same equilibrium as that of our fellow countrymen on the matter of a political 
conception of justice for any given society. Since 1 have mostly taken Rawls ' 
conception of the political and run with it in the previous section, the same will be 
done here in the first half of this section with Barry's interpretation of argument and a 
reconciliation of the two terms in the second. 
Barry begins Political Argument endorsing Jacob Viner 's account of the so-called 
'third kind of rhetoric'. 
This was in stark contrast to Hobbes ' 1651 argument in Leviathan that instead considered political 
stability as the only game in town. In a sense, the utilitarianism of Bentham might be therefore thought 
to be the contrary counterpart to Hobbes with analytic political theory cutting in between the two 
arguments as middle ground. 
"'Persuasion' The effective crusader for good causes will in any campaign of persuasion 
deliberately or by temperament or in ignorance select for emphasis as supreme above all 
others at least in the existent circumstances a single general principle, or a small number of 
presumptively harmonious general principles, and will leave to those hostile to his cause the 
search for intellectual or practical flaws in his argument. There is a third kind of rhetoric 
which also has the logical and practical claims to merit and to utility, whose task it is to 
explore the conflicts between principles, to search out the importance of degree, relation and 
proportion, to discover for particular values their appropriate place in the process for 
persuasion." (Viner, in Barry, 2011: 1) 
This 'third kind of rhetoric' is precisely the activity of analytic political theory: 
working out the feasibility of institutionalizing various value packages. However, 
Barry believes persuasion is too broad a term to describe it. He goes on, 
"The process of persuasion' is presumably any means by which one man gets another to 
change his mind, and though it is perhaps ironic to include overt threats, appeals to 
unconscious fears and wishes would certainly be part of the process, as would be outbursts of 
passion or rage, flattery and similar arts. No doubt this 'process of persuasion' might be 
studied by a psychologist, but I think philosophers are better adapted to dealing with only the 
part of the process which consists in providing reasons for thinking that some policy is 
desirable or undesirable. This may well have been what Viner had in mind in the passage 
quoted, but if so, the choice of 'persuasion' and, to some extent, 'rhetoric' was unfortunate." 
(Barry, 2011: 2) 
Persuasion here is not equivalent with argument. For example, yelling at somebody 
to do something does not count as an argument but it certainly could persuade them to 
do it by way of fear or surprise. A study of argument is instead concemed with the 
reasons individuals can give for assenting or dissenting to various proposals and 
decisions. While argument may be a process of persuasion, it is a specific process 
that excludes other processes like threats, hunches and flattery. Reasons are not 
simply the conclusions of evaluations either, for such evaluative conclusions might 
rest on hunches or intuition and surely a hunch or intuition does not make for much of 
an argument. To count as having reasons, then, individuals must be able to express 
the reasons in some language. That is, for someone to qualify as having reasons that 
can be used to justify their position, they must be in a position to assert them. 
Individuals might well have un-articulable beliefs that explain their support for some 
action, but they cannot be said to have reasons ready to go for justification if they 
cannot assert these beliefs in some commonly understood language. 
Giving reasons is an exercise of assertion. Barry distinguishes reason-giving, as the 
appropriate area of study for philosophy rather than evaluation broadly conceived 
because "the limits of language are also the limits of philosophical analysis." He goes 
on, "It is no doubt frustrating that nothing can be said in detail about those elements in 
evaluating which are not susceptible of verbal presentation, but there is no help for it 
- as Frank Ramsey said, 'what we can't say we can't say and we can't whistle it 
either'" (Barry, 2011: 3). Any sentence we can meaningfully assert, then, is a 
candidate for being given as a reason. As Brandom (1994: 148) puts it, "Overt 
assertions are the fundamental counters in the game of giving and asking for reasons -
they can be offered as reasons and themselves stand in need of such reasons". 
Individuals engaging in argument therefore presuppose that a reason S given is 
framed by the presupposition 'S is reasonable in the context of the prior 
conversation'. Throughout this dissertation 1 use the character 3 to symbolize the 
presupposition of political argument. 
In this sense argument is an activity that tries to gamer the acceptance of certain states 
of affairs given the acceptance of reasons for it. Following Rawls' terminology 
(again) we can say that it is like a theorem, where a theorem is, to quote the Oxford 
Dictionary, "a general proposition not self-evident but proved by a chain of reasoning; 
a truth established by means of accepted truths." For all intents and purposes I treat 
"accepted truths" as consistent reasons. Just what this entails will be outlined in 
chapter 2. 
We can now join this interpretation of argument with Rawls' conception of the 
political, roughly sketched and expanded upon in the previous section: Argument is 
political argument when the reasons it gives are concerned with aspects of the 
political coordination problem. When an argument's subject-matter includes giving 
up or accepting the institutionalization of value packages because the acceptable 
packages are feasible solutions to the political problem and the rejected packages are 
not for reasons x, y and z, then this counts as political argument. Thinking and 
arguing about which values should be institutionalized is, in effect, making 
judgements and decisions concerning the social contract and ways to ensure peaceful 
coexistence. In fact a necessary condition for the feasibility of institutionalizing 
certain value-packages is that they are accepted as feasible by those affected by that 
institutionalization. There may well be an individual who desire a particular value-
package to be implemented in public policy and agree with all the technical decisions 
the government has drafted to implement it, but all the same reject it in argument 
because they do not think a sufficient number will accept its feasibility for it to be 
feasible. For example, in a democratic system with regular elections, you might 
reasonably reject the institutionalization of a value-package you strongly desire (say 
one that privileges equality over freedom, see Chapter 8) because you think a 
significant proportion of the voting public will not accept the party's justifications and 
vote the incumbent party out of office before it had enough time to implement the 
policy. 
1.4 Inconsistency and Reasonable Rejection 
Reasons given for political solutions are acceptable so long as they are believed 
consistent with the predetermined common ground of conversation. Again, the 
analysis of consistency will have to be deferred to later (chapters 2 and 3). For now, 
its role as a constraint of political argument will be expanded on. I take what has 
been called a thin criterion of rationality in political arguments to be equivalent to a 
criterion of consistency. 
In A Theory of Justice Rawls proposes a methodological approach to constrain his 
analysis of a political conception of justice. He was in some sense engaging in 
conceptual analysis. Yet Rawls' constraints were unusually strong. They involved 
restricting the knowledge of the personal circumstances of individuals in the original 
position. Individuals are supposed to decide what kinds of laws they would want for 
society behind a 'veil of ignorance' where they do not know who they are in the 
society, what culture they belong to, what talents they have, what gender, ethnicity, 
job, etc. they have. The methodological approach is one that I agree with and will 
come back to. However, criticisms that Rawls' constraints are too strict and abstract 
are difficult to overcome. Not least from Barry himself who argued that such 
restrictions ignore the distinctiveness of individuals (1995: 59). It is after all 
ludicrously difficult and perhaps impossible to abstract completely from one 's own 
This is perhaps not a strict example, but I think it adequately captures the point. Such reasoning 
leads to a significant collective action problem for when there is a sufficient level of non-strategic 
acceptance to carry the policy but when those who would otherwise accept do not because they think 
the others (if they believe there to be others) will be thinking exactly the same way as they are. 
circumstances. The real-world extension of Rawls' reference group then, if these 
criticisms hold, would be zero. 
Rawls assumes that individuals in the original position are both rational and risk-
averse. The latter assumption has been heavily criticized, but my focus is on the 
former. I take Rawls' understanding of rationality to be what John Elster calls a 'thin 
theory of rationality', 
"[Rationality is] thin in that it leaves unexamined the beliefs and the desires that form the 
reasons for the action whose rationality we are assessing, with the exception that they are 
stipulated not to be logically inconsistent. Consistency, in fact, is what rationality in the thin 
sense is all about: consistency within the belief system; consistency within the system of 
desires; and consistency between beliefs and desires on the one hand and the action for which 
they are reasons on the other hand." (Elster, 1985: 1) 
On this understanding the predicate 'is rational' says nothing about various systems of 
belief and desire other than whether or not an action is consistent by those systems. 
There is nothing (thinly) irrational, so the saying goes, with desiring the destruction of 
the world over the scratching of your finger (Hume, 1896: 416). 
So long as individuals are thinly rational in the original position, their beliefs are 
constrained to such a degree that they will supposedly arrive at the same solution 
whoever they happen to be. The solution is a choice that works out to be a stable 
social equilibrium when it is used to fill out the coordinating content of society. 
Arriving at a political conception of justice does not require any social interaction, 
only the private consideration of such interaction once one has left the cushy confines 
of the original position and bringing it in line with their i n t u i t i o n s . S o we have a 
methodological abstraction from the beliefs of individuals (the veil), an assumption 
about desires (risk-aversion) and the assumption of consistency that make up Rawls' 
constraint for his analysis of a political conception of justice. 
A quick qualifier: communicating with one another often solves political problems. Yet Rawls ' 
principles of justice are arrived at by way of private reflection f rom the original position. His solution 
to fundamental political problems is not the particular content derived from the original position but 
that such content was an equilibrium point under (seemingly) acceptable constraints. In so far as he 
can justify these constraints to others and convince them of the significance of the equilibrium, then he 
is well on his way to solving many a political problem. It is this justification that constitutes political 
argument. See Barry, 2011: 58. 
In Justice as Impartiality Barry offers a far less abstracted approach to a just state of 
affairs. He gives us a guide for interpreting whether a non-abstracted society is just or 
not. To do this he does not propose a 'veil of ignorance' or any kind of restriction on 
the beliefs of contracting parties. Individuals are aware of their identities. Yet his 
constraint cannot be as simple as the assent of his reference group either - he cannot 
ask his reference group whether or not their situation is a just state of affairs or not 
since assent here would tell us very little other than the reference group likes to think 
of themselves as acting according to the principle of justice. 
Barry's constraint comes from Thomas Scanlon's thesis of reasonable rejection 
(1982; 1998). The thesis was originally proposed as a definition of moral behaviour, 
which is behaviour stemming from "the desire to be able to justify one's actions to 
others on grounds they could not reasonably reject" (Scanlon, 1982: 116). Barry 
thinks this principle can be extended to social groups in order to give a standard of 
social justice. Societies propose contractual rules to be institutionalized and discard 
them if they can be reasonably rejected. If no reasonable criticisms can be made 
regarding the proposed rules, then their institutionalization might be interpreted as a 
socially just one. When a criticism cannot be reasonably rejected, it must be 
accommodated institutionally into the constitutional framework or else we can 
interpret the constitution to not make provision for social justice. Barry's major 
contribution to the thesis was to avoid a charge of circularity by purging the notion of 
'reasonableness' of any moral "tinge".' ' Instead of following the 'mutual advantage' 
canon he suggests we should "suppose that the parties are solely motivated by the 
desire to reach agreement. Under this version we would not impute to them any 
substantive views at all about the acceptability of one outcome over another" (1989: 
425). By supposing we desire agreement of this sort we suppose political argument 
is a pure co-ordination problem whose solution is chosen from a number of different 
candidates. By my account of political argument this assumption can be relaxed and 
replaced with the weaker assumption that agent's simply desire to engage in political 
argument (whether or not they jointly desire substantive agreement from it) to sort out 
or prove whether proposed rejections can be justified as reasonable. They do not have 
" It would be circular because the burden would then be for us to employ the 'reasonableness' criteria 
to explain the very moral tinge that makes up the concept of ' reasonableness ' . 
to inwardly desire agreement, but they probably have to desire to appear to desire 
agreement. 
Rejection is reasonable only if it is consistent (see Dowding, 2013). That is, if the 
rejection is not thinly rational it is not reasonable. So long as societies that are 
bounded by their culture and tradition can prove that there is no inconsistency in their 
legal framework or social practices given their beliefs, we can interpret things as 
being socially just by Barry's criteria. If they simply refuse to listen to suggestions 
that their framework is inconsistent or listen but refuse to accommodate reasonable 
rejections, then they do not engage in political argument and they do not aim to 
achieve social justice. Other desires like their own self-interest might well trump 
their desire for agreement. In so far as observers cannot fault the consistency of a 
political argument defending a certain society's conventions, then they seemingly 
must accept those conventions. When individuals give a reason 5 in a political 
argument there is the necessary presupposition that ' 5 can be consistently inferred 
from the context of the prior conversation'. Interpreting social justice out of a 
disposition to engage in political argument is perhaps contentious (and has proven to 
be in the literature). 1 suggest political argument is a means to solving political 
problems and in so far as agents are unwilling to engage in such argument, they are 
unwilling to coordinate in order to solve the problems. This lends itself to a neutral 
interpretation of political argument: it sorts through competing conceptions of the 
good without building in a privileged position for any one conception in particular. 
1 find it difficult to fault the set-up for interpreting reasonableness in political 
argument. I take the reference group of political argument to be non-abstracted 
individuals, contra Rawls. We therefore must devise a method that helps individuals 
engaged in political argument reach some form of substantive agreement with one 
another with no restriction on the information available to them. Through word play 
and the abuse of language, arguments can be accepted as consistent even when 
substantively they are not. We need a way of discriminating between merely verbal 
consistency and genuine consistency. A consistent argument is not in itself a 
sufficient condition for an interpretation of 3 : 'S can be reasonably inferred from the 
context of the prior conversation' and, in turn, a decisive interpretation of political 
argument. To be reasonable, arguers must not only be substantively consistent, they 
also must be open to proving this consistency. Substantive agreement, then, is the 
particular type of agreement that follows from genuinely consistent (not just 
seemingly consistent) reason giving. It is the sort of agreement that will hold despite 
significant changes to the agents' environment and interests - be it changes on the 
stock market, changes in the international balance of power, or changes in day-to-day 
life - providing agents are constrained by a framework for political argument. 
The methods so far proposed for proving substantively consistent agreement in 
political argument come up high and dry. Ideally, we would charge a rejection as 
unreasonable whenever an agent asserts both A and not-A. Yet the propositions A and 
not-A will be couched in a vocabulary that is full of ambiguous terms. This is 
particularly the case with political vocabularies where there is something to be gained 
from such ambiguous terminology. Even when participants have the best of 
intentions (as in Habermas' ideal speech conditions, say) they are liable to be led 
astray by language. Since it is rare that somebody will explicitly utter a sentence and 
then a few sentences on explicitly utter the negation of that sentence, interpretation 
and translation of utterances will usually be necessary to make inconsistencies (i.e. 
unreasonableness) perspicuous. Yet such interpretation can be just as contested and 
debated as the original subject of the argument (Gallie, 1955; Connolly, 1983: 10-41). 
This is roughly what I call the problem of rhetoric, which will be technically 
described in Chapter 2. I propose a method that is conducive to both substantive and 
consistent agreement with respect to reasonable rejection. It is conducive to such 
agreement whether or not political argument is a pure coordination problem and in 
spite of the problem of rhetoric. In claiming this I think I can also claim that my 
interpretation of political argument overcomes Alasdair Macintyre's (1988: 351) 
critique of liberal political theory, that 
"each tradition can at each stage of its development provide rational justification for its central 
theses in its own terms, employing the concepts and standards by which it defines itself, but 
there is no set of independent standards of rational justification by appeal to which the issues 
between contending traditions can be decided.". 
I believe there is such a standard. I will summarize it in the following section and 
elaborate on it in chapters 2 and 3. 
The Problem of Rhetoric and a Solution 
A problem with the account of political argument sketched above is that rhetoric can 
convince an audience that, in principle, any reasonable rejection can be met without 
obvious inconsistency. There are seemingly never any full stops to political argument 
because a skilled demagogue can always, in principle, ' idiom skip' their way around 
sensible rejections of their position. This is especially the case with the rise of 
professional political theorists who take time (and are compensated with a salary for 
their time) to think up possible ways around reasonable rejections. Argument is not 
constrained by the quick thinking capacities of public speakers because, when backed 
into a comer, lobby groups can fall back on old dogma trumpeted in a recoated guise 
of academic respectability. If we pay no heed to how acceptance is wrangled then our 
standard of consistency really has no clothes and the prospects of a neutral 
interpretation of political arguments begin to unravel. 
Consider a society that has just legislated a law to force everybody to only wear 
clothing sanctioned by their dominant religious text. Say that the society had also 
written freedom of expression into its constitution. I could raise the seemingly 
reasonable rejection that the proposed legislation is inconsistent. If there were some 
in that society who wished to maintain that their society was still defensible by way of 
political argument, but who did not wish to accommodate my rejection by vetoing the 
legislation, they might challenge my interpretation of 'expression' or ' f reedom' in 
'freedom of expression'. Say they choose 'expression'. They could retort that one 's 
choice of clothing is not in fact any form of 'expression' by their understanding. I 
mistakenly interpreted their constitutional proviso to exclude authorities having any 
sort of control over what one wears, but they argue that is my problem and not theirs. 
Say you call their bluff and return fire by asking them to define 'expression'. They 
might suggest that 'expression' is the act of communicating one 's thoughts. 
Alternatively, they could be even more obscure and say that it is something like 
'being artistic' or some such in which it is easy to see how we would encounter an 
arbitrary account of case inclusion and exclusion. You might suggest that what one 
wears is one way to express one 's thoughts. After all many people judge others to be 
carefree, particular, rebellious, etc. by the way they dress. The defendant is 
seemingly in trouble here. There is still, however, a way out. They might suggest 
that this sort of expression is not really communicating one's thoughts at all, but 
rather communicating one's feelings or values. We might want to call the interlocutor 
out on his use of feelings and values but I think he can play the same ruse there as 
well. In fact, there is always a way out. 
Such dodge-ball tactics were treated as virtues by the classical humanists (Skinner, 
2004: 19-26). There comes a point though where the philosopher's interest would 
wane with the interlocutor since this regress of definitions is proof enough that they 
do not have anything interesting to say on the subject (or at least, will not say it). 
Somebody charged with keeping vigil over political argument, however, cannot 
dismiss the string for there is no pivot point where they can interject, pound their 
gavel, and bellow 'inconsistent!' If they tell the interlocutor to shut up, the 
interlocutor has won and to suggest political argument is simply a matter of stamina is 
surely unacceptable. Such accusations of the impossibility of decisive full stops to 
political argument are (to my mind) the best and most subtle argument 
communitarians have in their critique of liberal political theory. 
This is the problem this dissertation seeks to address. Every description of a term will 
involve terms that themselves are substitutable for descriptions, and these descriptions 
will contain terms that are also substitutable, and so on. Agents can always meet 
attributions of inconsistency with attributions of bad linguistic interpretation. W.V.O. 
Quine thought that such a process with respect to any natural language would be 
circular, with definitions eventually relying back on terms that they are being 
employed to define. If any policy position can be rendered consistent by a skilled 
demagogue (which is possible in principle if this circularity is accepted) then we have 
to look to something other than consistency to give the standards for political 
argument. Brandom (1994: 28) calls this objection (or at the very least, a close 
associate) the 'gerrymandering objection': "There is simply no such thing as the 
pattern or regularity exhibited by a stretch of past behaviour, which can be appealed 
to in judging some candidate bit of future behaviour as regular or irregular, and hence, 
on this line, as correct or incorrect". Without such a mechanism for linguistic 
behaviour it seems impossible to decisively reject arguments. Connolly (1983: 40) 
says the problem occurs "when reasoned argument and coercive pressure commingle 
precariously in the endless process of defining and resolving issues" and that seems 
about right. 
This problem frames the groundwork section (chapters 1, 2 and 3). I offer what I 
think is a solution. We can overcome the objection by claiming or assuming our 
opponent had an inconsistent position from the get-go (we have, after all, already 
called them out) despite our inability to reasonably reject their string of re-
descriptions. The burden is on them then to explain why their position is consistent, 
not for us to prove that it is inconsistent. By assuming their inconsistency we do not 
take over their argument with our own; instead we wait for their position to unravel 
on its own terms. 
Yet if the arguer continues to re-describe their way around the allegation forever and 
a day, how can we ever maintain our charge? My answer is that we make the 
theoretical assumption that two dimensions of meaning are at play. By this 
assumption, consistency has nothing to do with the first dimension but everything to 
do with the second: if what my opponent said is true according to the facts that make 
up the common ground between us (i.e. the second dimension), then we render their 
utterance to be consistent. They might have to do a bit of work establishing this 
common ground before we interpret the reason's consistency, especially if we come 
to the conversation with very different beliefs about the way the world is, but such toil 
is not impossible. The first dimension comprises the facts that determine what is 
actually said rather than the facts that determine whether what is said is true. Perhaps 
one way to think about the difference is that the second dimension ranges over facts 
about the subject matter, whereas the first concerns facts about the tools used to 
discuss this subject matter. This is a distinction in the philosophy of logic and 
language that has a fair bit of contemporary backing (Soames, 2005). It makes sense 
of two philosophical curveballs: the necessary aposteriori sentence and the contingent 
apriori sentence (see Kripke, 1974). Chapter 2 will go into the distinction in some 
detail along with a rationale for using it. 1 bring it up in the introduction only to use it 
to cash out the accusation we can hurl at our opponent: they are tinkering around with 
the first dimension to stall ascriptions of inconsistency rather than doing anything 
about the second and arguing their way through our reasonable rejection with 
substantive reasons. Their reasoning is non-substantive which is to say it is purely 
verbal. Any disagreements that come of it are pointless and any agreements are 
unstable. 
A theoretical assumption is all well and good, and a rigorous one all the better, but it 
is not sufficient for an accusation of rhetorical fudging: we need proof. My proposal 
is to impose constraints on the first dimension of argument. We restrict the available 
resources agents have to determine what is said, but in a way that does not restrict 
what can be said. Instead of asking, forcing or letting the agent substitute an 
ambiguous term for a description of the term's referent (a definition), we ask them to 
eliminate the term and substitute the whole sentence for a new one. For the remainder 
of the argument, the eliminated term cannot be reused. The opponent might well 
substitute the sentence for another that is just as rhetoric-laden, but then we play the 
elimination card once again. 'Gently, gently' we will eliminate terms and settle on 
more austere vocabularies. This austerity is an abstraction, but a piecemeal 
abstraction that I think is more appealing than Rawls' artificial information 
constraints in the original position, Buchanan's veil of uncertainty or even Habermas' 
ideal speech conditions. Crucial to my position here is the assumption that not even 
the most deceptive of demagogues will be able to argue around reasonable rejections 
if they are forced to do so in a strict logical vocabulary (since they will not be able to 
construct rhetorical or verbal rejections to substantive reasonable rejections). If 
individuals cannot rephrase their inferences, then this is the proof we are after that 
licenses us to interpret their reasoning to be non-substantive and conclude they cannot 
consistently argue around our rejection if that is the only resistance they are going to 
give. This position will be expanded in chapter 3 with the help of David Chalmers' 
(2011) analysis of verbal disputes and vocabulary exhaustion. 
1.5.1 Stability and Coordination 
This solution begs two questions. First, if we can theoretically argue our way around 
any jam without such a solution as the one proposed, given such a solution has not 
been hitherto rigorously applied, why all the stability? Second, even if we have 
substantive agreement, why should it promote stability any more than non-substantive 
agreement? It is obvious that non-substantive tiwagreement is destabilizing given 
agents will not coordinate in Pareto-efficient ways when there is no belief except 
largely irrelevant beliefs about verbal convention that would suggest otherwise. 
However, the destabilizing character of non-substantive agreement is less clear-cut 
and it seems worthwhile to elaborate on in order to establish some framework 
essentials. 
Starting with the first, it is true that if individuals could argue their way out of any 
legal predicament, the law would be trivial and we might as well all be at each other's 
throats in the state of nature. Yet we are not. This is simply because we are not the 
mythological orators aspired to by the classical humanists of yonder. They hero-
worshipped those like the Greek Cameades who one day (or so the story goes) argued 
for Roman justice at the Athenian acropolis, convincing everybody unanimously, then 
came back the next day and argued against Roman justice and was once again greeted 
with unanimity (Skinner, 2004: 9-10). Perhaps some of us have read How to Win 
Friends and Influence People by Dale Carnegie, passed the bar exam (and so are 
schooled in the language best equipped for getting people off the hook), and are under 
the general impression that we are better at arguing our way out of tight spots than 
others. Yet it is unlikely that any of us will be able to argue our way out of all the 
accusations that will be thrown our way over our lifetime. From experience it is 
doubtful that Cameades could have argued his way out of a parking ticket in some 
city councils. Furthermore, it is doubtful that all our social conventions are arbitrary 
since tangible evidence and strict reasoning is often (often) the best means to persuade 
an audience. We can take some solace from the fact that it is likely many social 
conventions are rigged (though not perfectly) according to tangible evidence rather 
than elite deception. The aim of the dissertation is to suggest strategies to rig it 
further in this direction. 
The second question is more difficult. It is the objection that the distinction between 
substantive and non-substantive agreement makes little difference to overall stability. 
It is argued that either way the outcome is ultimately agreement and that is all that 
matters. This is the strong sceptical position that can be traced back to Hobbes (1985 
[1651]) and can also be plausibly associated with Hayek (1944) and de Jouvenel 
(1957).'® It holds that non-substantive agreement in the contracting situation is no less 
stable than substantive agreement. That is to say, even when what is thought is being 
agreed on is in fact not being agreed on because of miscommunication between the 
conversers, the fact that the conversers think they agree on something is good enough 
since they will shut up and produce a constitution that institutes government. At least 
this is the Hobbesian view: political argument is just window dressing for the 
centralization of power in the sovereign.'^ After a period of time some individuals 
might realise that they have been duped but by then it will be too late. Once 
instituted, the government could rage a propaganda campaign and alter the beliefs of 
individuals to make them think they contracted with completely substantive 
reasoning. People can accept anything if the conditions are right or - more to the 
point - wrong. All that matters is that initial monopolization of resources that makes 
such a propaganda campaign feasible. 
The view can be extended to modem social contract theory, despite few modem 
theorists accepting it. If contractors are behind something like Buchanan's 'veil of 
uncertainty' (1987, 1988 and 1991) there is no reason why substantive agreement will 
be any more lasting than non-substantive. Behind the veil of uncertainty political 
argument is framed in a general and non-specific way such that there will presumably 
be unpleasant consequences for a few agents once the contract situation ceases 
without the agents themselves realising it during the negotiation (had they realized 
they would have exercised their 'no questions asked' veto). Even if everything was 
perfectly substantive during the negotiations and there were no linguistic conjuring 
tricks there is nothing to stop the adversely affected parties claiming that there were 
once they realised how the contract ends up affecting them. There is no decisive 
mechanism we can use to reasonably reject this sort of after-the-contract-situation 
manipulation. After all, it is a standard trick when the outcome of an argument turns 
" S e e Barry, 2011:54-55 . 
" Hobbes had a particularly sophisticated account of language that was quite attentive to the problem 
of interpretation. There are many passages in Leviathan and even De Corpore where he addresses the 
regress of definitions. All political argument was to Hobbes was the interpretation of the sovereign's 
will. Of course, linguistic quibbles can creep in over the terminology the sovereign uses to express its 
will and lawyers and bureaucrats can debate these quibbles forever and a day with an increasing array 
of definitions. The sovereign is the only one who can end this dispute, but they can end it decisively 
(see Hobbes, 1996: 111). Modem liberalism does not yet have such a decisive mechanism, as critics 
like Alasdair Macintyre have latched onto (see for e.g. Macintyre, 1988: 349). This dissertation 
attempts to develop just such a mechanism for liberalism. 
out to entail and license unintended and unwanted actions for the affected agents to 
complain 'but that is not what I meant! ' since it is almost impossible to argue with 
somebody about their intention (though we might note here and see in Chapter 2 that 
intention is not necessarily synonymous with meaning). It would be a blatant 
oversight to say this sort of thing does not happen in politics. Yet if this is always 
going to be the case, where the losers in a contract can claim verbal trickery or 
ignorance, then whether or not the veil of uncertainty yielded substantive argument in 
the first place should be of no great matter. 
Despite the sceptical position'^ (which is undoubtedly strong) I maintain substantive 
agreement in the social contract is the more stable type of agreement and leads to 
more durable social equilibriums. It is, after all, the position more attune with 
common sense. The way to sell it theoretically is to say we are not after stability tout 
court, but stability with respect to agents' belief about solutions to the bargaining 
problem. 
The supposed agreements to come from contracting are not necessarily pure 
coordination games, but are defined in terms of a preference all agents have for 
agreement over non-agreement. There may well be partial and significant conflicts of 
interest. This triggers the Nash bargaining problem: working out the rational 
strategies that are the best replies to each other in a game of coordination where non-
coordination is Pareto-inefficient. A standard example is the coordination game 
called 'battle of the sexes' where the man wants to go to the football and the woman 
to the opera, both will go to one, but both would prefer going to their second choice 
event than to go to either without the other (and it is just as lousy going to their 
preferred event without the other as it is to go to their non-preferred event without the 
other). The payoff matrix looks like so, 
Football Opera 
^ Football 3, 1 0 , 0 
It might turn out that this sceptical position is a brand of non-cognitivism (see Oppenheim, 1981) 
since there is no real regard for the truth conditional interpretation of what is said, but this would 
require some detailed investigation. 
Opera 0 , 0 1,3 
[Football, Football] and [Opera, Opera] are pure Nash equilibriums since they are the 
best replies to one another in a one-shot game. If there is no coordination beforehand, 
then the rational strategy (given the assumption that the other will be equally rational) 
is to randomize one 's behaviour conditioned by the payoffs: each should attend their 
preferred event with a probability of '74. This leads to a decidedly sub-optimal 
outcome. If, however, the two can decide beforehand on a randomizing device (a 
coin flip, say) in order to correlate their strategies in the game, then the outcome will 
be optimal (Skyrms, 1996: 69). This is a correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974; 
1987). However, the most inefficient result is if the woman and man's beliefs about 
the other's beliefs about which device is going to play this correlating role - or how it 
is to play this role - are wrong. This stops them playing their rational strategy, which 
was sub-optimal, but not as sub-optimal as unstable beliefs about the randomizing 
device. In coordination over political affairs such a device is typically (though not 
always) played by the running total of political argument. In one sense the device is 
random. Individuals coordinate with respect to the states of affairs they think are 
justified. If they think different states of affairs (represented by propositions) are 
justified, then the coordination will be less fruitful as it would have been and indeed 
less fruitful than if there had been no assumptions about justification in the first place. 
The social contract might be thought of then as the running total of arguments, a 
position, or a cluster of positions concerning the feasibility of solutions to the political 
problem that could not be or have not been reasonably rejected by anybody (including 
those who would strategically benefit from rejecting them). It must also be common 
knowledge that this is the case and can therefore be presupposed in most conversation 
and argument. To call the social contract a collection of presupposed policy positions 
(or, more accurately, presupposed unacceptable policy positions) might well water 
down social contract theory to naught. For example, some might think it necessary 
that there is some reference to explicit consent for there to be any point to the theory. 
So be it. I defend destructive conceptual analysis in what is typically thought to be 
the social contract tradition but, if anything, it is a boon if it waters it down to such an 
extent since it could perhaps be a means to bridge divides across philosophical 
literatures. What is clear though is that 'reasons all could accept' is the wrong frame 
for the contract and political argument more broadly. The correct frame is, rather, 
'reasons all do accep t ' " and the investigation of the relations these reasons have with 
one another. Even if we have never before articulated these reasons or even thought 
about them we will either accept them or not as a presupposition of conversation. I 
have always believed that my conversers accept, and believe that I accept, and believe 
that I believe that they accept, and so that aardvarks cannot whistle Beethoven's 
9"' despite myself never having thought about it up until writing this very sentence. 
That is, acceptance does not imply explicit assent or consent to some sentence; what it 
implies is a disposition to such assent or consent to the sentence if there is a demand 
to. 
The specifics of a social contract discussed in political theory will vary depending on 
the particular population that is the reference group for the conversation. 
Philosophically the question should always be posed 'The social contract for whom?' 
For instance, the upper classes might have an especially snobby social contract. The 
standard population though - at least in analytic theory - is anyone counted within a 
particular legal jurisdiction. 
1.6. Conceptual Analysis 
The subject of conceptual analysis in political theory has traditionally concerned itself 
with a different method to the one proposed in 1.5. The way around loose language in 
political argument has been to ensure that everybody adheres to the maxim of defining 
one's terms. Definitions (i.e. descriptions) have been considered the tonic for 
demagoguery. I suggest instead that such tonic is the method of elimination. 
^^  This distinction was (to my knowledge) first proposed by Bohman and Richardson, 2009. 
This circle is requisite for common knowledge as defined in Lewis (1969). 
Defining terms was a central concern in Political Argument and subsequently for 
much of analytic political theory. It has been considered (sometimes explicitly, 
sometimes implicitly) the exact methodology needed to make sure that the constraint 
of consistent reasoning has any clout. 
Following this consideration and often actively promoting it are what 1 call 'political 
dictionaries'. These dictionaries are books that detail the author's preferred 
descriptions of a selection of political terminology. Discussions of terms like 
' f reedom' , ' interest ' , 'equality' and 'power' are stock chapters. The styles range from 
Felix Oppenheim's precise definitions that aspired to scientific rigour, all the way to 
William Connolly's historical descriptions of the baptisms and re-baptisms of 
political terms as used in ordinary discourse. Authors posed descriptions they thought 
could be substituted for political terminology in a way that preserved the truth 
conditions of what was said in the sentences in which the terms were used. The hope 
was that by making these descriptions explicit, political vocabularies would become 
more respectable as a frame for argument and that arguers would be held accountable 
to them. In other words, political terms were not just (to use A.J. Ayer 's wonderful 
quip) "emotive ejaculations". 
Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to a critique of these political dictionaries. My principal 
objection is that (with little exception) each book has a foggy aim or goal for its 
analysis, getting dangerously close to the precipice of Meno's Paradox. They fudge 
any accountability by claiming their descriptions promote understanding or 
clarification without telling the reader why this is so and when they do get around to 
mulling over their aims they do so vaguely and in the very terms they are set on 
defining. With such fudging it is difficult to have any standard to critically evaluate 
each description and so their recommendations have the suspicion of infallibility 
about them. 
The second half of this dissertation then is concerned with actual disagreements in 
political theory that can be put down to differing attributions of meaning to political 
vocabulary. As far as the goal of substantive agreement is concerned, any alternative 
description of a term is arbitrary and not overly constructive. In fact, the political 
dictionary tradition seems to have confused questions about the political worid further 
rather than remedied them for the better. For example, many of the disagreements 
concerning Dahl's famous question, 'Who governs?' turn on different definitions of 
social power rather than on genuine empirical patterns. Different answers to the 
feasibility of the trade-off between liberty and equality also seem to depend on 
varying ascriptions of meaning. When this is the case those involved do not 
necessarily disagree on the way the world happens to be or how it might be, just the 
appropriate method of expressing how the world is or how it might be. 
This is needless disagreement that can be overcome with the method of elimination. 
Analysis using this method of elimination can easily be falsified. If anybody can 
continue to rephrase the disagreement in spite of the elimination of stock terms, then I 
readily concede that there is something substantive to disagree over and any 
suggestion to the contrary probably ignores an important facet of the political world. 
The aim then is to unsettle some dogmas. These dogmas seem to have led to a real 
stagnation in political theory. It is arguable that seminars and journal space often 
crumble into debates over the appropriate meaning of a certain word rather than 
anything of substance; when this is the case we have no well-defined method to call 
participants out. A good demagogue quickly becomes a good theorist in such 
settings. John Maynard Keynes' criticism of the Moorean school of ethics seems to 
ring true for some contemporary political theorists: 
"In practice, victory was with those who could speak with the greatest 
appearance of clear, undoubting conviction and could best use the accents of 
infallibility" (Keynes, 1951: 433). 
Instead of relying on "direct unanalysable intuition about which it [is] useless and 
impossible to argue" (Keynes, I95I: 433), we should subscribe to some perspicuous 
methodology that renders the arguments fallible. My claim is that the method of 
elimination introduces the accent of fallibility to conceptual analysis in political 
argument and, in turn, political theory itself. 
Chapter 2 
The Problem of Rhetoric 
So we have a general concern for the consistency of reasons given in political 
argument. This concern forces us to attend to the problem that arguers can just 'play 
with words' to make their arguments appear acceptable even when they are flat out 
inconsistent. For political argument to have any academic clout we need a way of 
holding these charlatans to account. However, it is not immediately obvious what we 
are trying to hold them to account for. For example, some might argue they are 
perverting any determination of the meaning of what they say and others might 
disagree and suggest that the perversion is part of the meaning of what they say. 
'Who cares? It 's perversion either way!' may be the immediate retort. Answer: 
anybody who is after a way to call these charlatans out. To devise a method in which 
to do this we first need to have an explicit interpretation of what the problem is. 
Unless we are clear here we will have no starting point to distinguish between 
genuine political argument and the more bogus varieties. This chapter will sift 
through the terminology of the philosophy of logic and language to set up the 
problem. This chapter is not concerned with overcoming the problem; it is concerned 
with conceptualizing it precisely enough to work out a non-arbitrary solution in the 
next chapter. 
The problem serves as constraint for the interpretation of the sentence 'S can be 
consistently inferred from the context of the prior conversation', which is a necessary 
condition for the interpretation of the presupposition of political argument, i.e. ' 5 can 
be reasonably inferred from the context of the prior conversation'. The interpretation 
of the latter sentence will be closed off in the next chapter. 
1 should first stress that not everyone who masks his or her inconsistency will be 
doing so deliberately. Most (I imagine) do it with no intention to mislead their fellow 
arguers. Their endeavour is to defend their position by giving it the best airing they 
can and sometimes will unintentionally muddle their language in the process or have 
muddied language to begin with. The problem of rhetoric should be thought of as the 
abuse of language in argument irrespective of whether the arguer intended it or not. 
So individuals might have made genuine attempts to engage in proper political 
argument but failed and this failure could well lead to unstable agreement or pointless 
disagreement. These observations should apply then not just to agents using political 
argument as a smokescreen to get what they want, but also to Viner's "crusader of 
good causes". We want to screen for blunders just as much as for sham.^' 
The problem of rhetoric is tripped when language is misused. I will argue that this 
occurs when the facts that determine what is said are ambiguous, not when the facts 
that determine the truth-value of what is said are ambiguous; a seemingly subtle 
difference in print, but a rather significant one in practice. It is a problem of context 
rather than content where the vehicle of meaning is the crux of the problem, not 
meaning itself. To make any sense of this claim requires a formal apparatus known as 
two-dimensional modal semantics, which strongly suggests a theory of substitution a 
bit like the descriptivists of old. This poses a difficulty concerning methodology 
(already sketched in 1.5), but it will be set aside for the next chapter. 1 repeat though 
that the two-dimensional apparatus is only utilized in order to pose the problem in a 
formal way, not solve it in one fell swoop. 
2.1 The Problem Described 
The problem is the rotten underbelly to the virtue of rhetoric prized by the classical 
humanists. Often words are creatively used in a way that engages an audience and 
where the content of what is said is perfectly clear. This is the first sense of rhetoric 
as defined in the Oxford English Dictionary^ "the art of effective or persuasive 
speaking or writing, esp. the use of figures of speech and other compositional 
techniques." Such art is generally encouraged and praised. The second sense of 
rhetoric, however, is not: "language designed to have a persuasive or impressive 
effect on its audience, but often regarded as lacking in sincerity or meaningful 
content: all we have from the opposition is empty rhetoric:' What this sense of 
Hence why H a b e r m a s ' ideal speech condi t ions will not solve the p rob l em a lone . Ensu r ing 
part icipants have no incent ives to lie (pe rhaps by hook ing them up to a lie de tec tor ) or be d i s i n g e n u o u s 
does not change the fact that they migh t wel l be foo l ing themse lves or o thers un in ten t iona l ly . 
rhetoric amounts to, at least by the OED definition, is being persuasive for reasons 
relating to language but unrelated to meaningful c o n t e n t A t first blush, this might 
strike the reader as contradictory, but it deserves serious attention since it 
problematizes the method of reasonable rejection and seems to pop up regularly in 
political and academic discussion. For example, it is more or less what George 
Orwell concerned himself with in his legendary 1949 essay 'Politics and the English 
Language' , where the arguer "either has a meaning and cannot express it, or he 
inadvertently says something else, or he is almost indifferent as to whether his words 
mean anything or not", calling it nothing more than a procession of "swindles and 
perversions".^' My concern is that competent demagogues can theoretically utilise 
these "swindles and perversions" to deftly avoid accusations of inconsistency for any 
possible argument no matter how ridiculous. This concern constitutes the problem of 
rhetoric. 
I am not so much concerned with giving a precise definition of rhetoric. Perhaps it 
will be possible to glean a candidate update to the OED definition from this chapter's 
argument, but I will only come back to it in passing. What we can do though is 
describe the problem associated with it. 
THE PROBLEM OF RHETORIC: The intentional or unintentional misuse of 
language by a speaker, which has a persuasive effect on its audience, but 
which makes consistency ascriptions of the speaker's utterances 
indeterminate. 
This description seems to me to best capture the problem associated with the second 
sense of rhetoric in the OED (language that is persuasive but not because of its 
meaningful content). Ascriptions of inconsistency are often impossible when 
individuals do not pay due regard to the semantic accuracy of the language in which 
they frame their reasoning. When an audience accepts inconsistent reasoning or 
^^  It is therefore a different phenomenon to the ambiguity studied by argumentation theorists such as 
Toulmin (2004). These theorists investigate ambiguities in the way sentences are strung together to 
form arguments but assume that the meaningful content of these sentences is obvious (Toulmin 
explicitly assumes the claimant has a well-defmed claim from the get-go). 
He goes on to say that most political words are meaningless since "they not only do not point to any 
discoverable object, but are hardly ever expected to do so by the reader". However, all Orwell ' s 
recommendations amount to, after a wonderful essay bristling at humbug, is to be stricter with 
grammar and avoid pretension. This is rather a disappointing conclusion given the gusto with which he 
starts. Indeed, such recommendations do not overcome the problem of rhetoric. 
cannot reasonably reject a seeming inconsistency because the arguer is exploiting 
ambiguous or misleading language - what 1 term having 'a persuasive effect ' in the 
above description - we have a paradigm instance of the problem of rhetoric. I think 
the problem is what William Connolly was getting at in Terms of Political Discourse. 
He says that it is "when reasoned argument and coercive pressure commingle 
precariously in the endless process of defining [and re-defining] issues" then we 
"cannot expect knockdown arguments to settle these [issues], we must come to terms 
somehow with the political dimension of such contests" (1983: 40). Connolly's 
analysis of the problem of rhetoric and his scepticism towards knockdown arguments 
seems to constitute a resignation that the problem cannot be overcome. I disagree 
with Connolly (see section 4.1), but he certainly seems to appreciate the problem 
more than most and, indeed, more than most liberal political philosophers. To my 
mind it is one of the largest oversights of liberal political theory that it has only ever 
engaged the problem of rhetoric in its margins. 
We need knockdown arguments for those who are in a position to reasonably reject 
policy. We cannot have the beneficiaries of certain states of affairs being able to 
contest any reasonable rejection to those states of affairs by exploiting rhetorical 
loopholes. Yet such loopholes encompass a special sort of ambiguity that is actively 
tolerated within a lot of political analysis. It is argued that ambiguity does not always 
imply confusion with this ambiguity being instead logically entailed by 'essentially 
contested concepts' (Gallic, 1957; Connolly, 1983; Collier, et al, 2006). Appraisive 
political terms like 'democracy', 'justice' and ' freedom' supposedly pick out these 
concepts. They are not just essentially contested words but essentially contested 
concepts, so whenever we are talking about democracy and freedom (whether or not 
we actually use the words 'democracy' and ' freedom' to do so) we are describing the 
world in a way that is going to "inevitably involve endless disputes" (Gallie, 1957: 
169). These concepts supposedly have a common core but also have a number of 
different but equally sufficient conceptions or interpretations of that common core 
(Swanton, 1985: 812). Contending parties also supposedly recognise this difference 
(Gallie, 1957: 172; Collier, et al, 2006: 212). Such reciprocal recognition gives a 
vague nod to a brand of pluralism (Connolly, 1983: 125-6): given there are no 
arguments that can reasonably resolve such differences, reasonable institutions must 
be designed to tolerate these differences (otherwise they face swift rejection). 
The problem though is how to institutionalize this pluralism given the concepts 
traditionally used to conceptualize such an institutional demand - namely, democracy, 
freedom, rights, etc. - are just those concepts that were hijacked by the perspectives 
constituting the pluralism and creating the problem in the first place. Such 
institutionalization seems doomed to circularity and, indeed, failure. While 
reciprocally recognizing essential contestedness gives individuals the leeway to reject 
policies in their own idiom rather than in, say, the dominant idiom (since the 
dominant idiom might well reinforce the status quo with selective interpretations of 
political concepts) it does not provide a standard for judging between the two idioms 
when, say, one is used to consistently reject the status quo and the other is used to 
consistently reject all the alternatives to the status quo. 
Furthermore, there is nothing to stop arguers changing their conceptions of essentially 
contested concepts ad hoc to accord with whatever suits their interests. If the 
beneficiaries of the status quo were suddenly confronted by a group that could 
consistently reject the management of the existing economic institutions, there is a lot 
of latitude to adjust and reciprocate with a consistent rejection of the alternatives 
proposed by tweaking a few of their conceptions. In 1996 the then Australian Prime 
Minister John Howard reneged on his promise to refrain from cutting the previous 
government's social policy initiatives. As McMullin (2007) reports, "During the 
1996 campaign Howard was asked whether this pledge was qualified in any way, 
whether he may have to modify it in response to unforeseen contingencies that he 
might encounter in office. Not at all, he insisted. The guarantee was absolute and 
unconditional". After he was elected he did not re-word his guarantee but instead re-
interpreted it. Howard argued that there was a distinction between 'core' promises 
and 'non-core' promises and 'core' and 'non-core' mandates where his pledge to 
leave the legacy of Keating's social policies in tack was plainly 'non-core' . Such 
definitions (or re-definitions) offered leeway for Howard to appear - to many, at least 
- to be perfectly consistent with his election commitments. Of course it is possible to 
be charitable to Howard and assume that he always interpreted the terms 'promise' 
and 'mandate' with this distinction in mind, but I think it is just as plausible (if not 
more so) to assume he changed it ad hoc to ensure his narrative continued to appear 
consistent. Howard's Prime Ministership was littered with such re-definitions (with 
the change in the definition of 'unemployment' being foremost in my mind).^'' Such 
poHtical moves can have lasting effects on the way political argument is conducted. 
For example, the merchants in Elizabethan England tried to redefine their punctual, 
strict, and industrious behaviour of profit-seeking as 'religious' rather than self-
serving (Skinner, 1974: 298-9; Skinner, 1989: 21). Some of our contemporary 
positive connotations typically attributed to entrepreneurship could well be partially 
derived from this linguistic sleight-of-hand rather than substantive argument. 
Connolly (1983: 201) describes another example of such a sleight-of-hand with his 
story of a group of black activists introducing the term 'institutional racism' to refine 
the conventional term 'racism' "to revise the old requirement that 'racist' actions with 
adverse consequences for blacks must reflect personal prejudices, and to apply the 
culpability for such consequences to bureaucratic organizations rather than merely to 
individuals". Of course, such a revision might complement substantive argument, but 
Connolly maintains that the argument turns on the introduction of the term 
'institutional racism'. 
My claim is that such linguistic moves exist just as much in political theory as they do 
in the 'real-worid' wheeling and dealing of politics. Some might argue that political 
theory is a realm unto itself where the virtue of sincere and substantive argument is 
preserved. Yet there are incentives in-built for the same sorts of moves. New 
arguments that seem to be consistent get published and are points towards an 
academic career. Such arguments constitute either a new defence of an old political 
position or a new defence of a novel political position. This involves proving that 
such positions cannot (at least currently) be reasonably rejected, which usually 
involves arguing around the current stock of rejections in the literature. This process 
usually invites various responses from that stock. Such responses typically argue 
their argument was 'misconstrued' and try and 'clarify' it in a particular way by 
defining and re-defining their crux terms, much like Howard and the Elizabethan 
merchants. The longer a theorist's argument reigns supreme, the longer they will 
have a readership and so the more they have an incentive to epicycle. There comes a 
point where both sides must concede with the cop-out, 'well that 's your definition and 
this is mine' and sometimes, 'don't you even try and interpret inconsistencies in my 
^^  More recently, the Gillard government tried to re-define the notion of 'responsible i 
management' with varying degrees of success (Walter and Uhr, 2013). 
reasoning because you have already proven yourself to misunderstand the language 
that I use and so are inevitably going to caricature me. ' Such a refrain amounts to the 
suspension of political argument. 
Such a stalemate kills political argument and with it the prospect of reasonable 
compromise. This is a difficulty that is perspicuously captured by Gallie (1957: 172) 
when he says essentially contested concepts are "open" in that they admit to 
"considerable modification in the light of changing circumstances; and such 
modification cannot be prescribed or predicted in advance" [italics mine]. The 
changing circumstances referred to here might simply be to a new political argument 
popping up sporting a consistent rejection of a state of affairs one holds dear. It also 
might constitute your financial stocks taking a plunge and your policy preferences 
changing as a consequence. It is not obvious how to constrain which circumstances 
are to affect such modifications. 
What is more, there seems to be no cap on which terms pick out essentially contested 
concepts. Waldron (2002: 148) suggests ascriptions of essential contestedness have 
"run wild".^' It would not surprise me, for example, if deconstructionists like Derrida 
and Foucault would not only have been willing to ascribe essential contestability to all 
our political terms, they would also be willing to ascribe it to our most basic logical 
terms. Indeed, some even charge that Gallie's idea is iVie//essentially contested and 
different conceptions of it amount to differing sets of concepts falling within its 
domain.^® The implication here is that ascriptions of essential contestedness seem to 
be arbitrary in so far as they are described as 'open' ascriptions. In the next chapter I 
suggest a strategy for closing ascriptions of essentially contested words (i.e. bedrock 
terms) but not essentially contested concepts. What we can conclude for now though 
Waldron ran a Westlaw check for articles in legal theory that ascribed essential contestedness to 
terms. The list is staggering, "alienation, autonomy, author, bankruptcy, boycott, 
citizenship, civil rights, coherence, community, competition, the Constitution, corruption, culture, 
discrimination, diversity, equality, equal protection, freedom, harm, justification, liberalism, merit, 
motherhood, the national interest, nature, popular sovereignty, pornography, power, privacy, property, 
proportionality, prosperity, prostitution, public interest, punishment, reasonable expectations, religion, 
republicanism, rights, sovereignty, speech, sustainable development, and textuality" (2002: 149). It is 
almost certain that a definition of an agent 's conception of any one of these terms will rely in part on 
others f rom the list. 
See Connolly, 1983: 227-231 for discussion. 
is that accepting the openness of these concepts makes it impossible to call out skilled 
demagogues using them to disguise inconsistent arguments. 
The problem of rhetoric is tripped by the open nature of our language. When we are 
ambiguous or liable to modify the interpretation of the words we use at a whim^' in 
argument, there is going to be indeterminacy with respect to the consistency of the 
reasons we give. While run-of-the-mill ambiguity is actively weeded out in political 
theory, the seemingly endless modification of political vocabulary is tolerated and 
even, at times, encouraged. Swanton (1985: 815) puts it nicely saying "political 
theorists are always in the habit of adding to the c h a f f with the chaff being the 
varying interpretations of political terms. 
Of course it is of the utmost importance that our language evolves to track our 
changing circumstances: we do not want to be forced into a permanently depleted 
vocabulary like 'Newspeak' in Orwell 's Nineteen-Eighty-Four. However, as it 
evolves the ability to be looser and looser with our arguments increases to the point 
that it is impossible to interpret whether or not we really are being consistent. Certain 
groups will adopt various patterns of language that are significantly different to the 
patterns adopted by others. This adoption is often politically motivated and the 
differences are therefore likely to be even more pronounced with our political 
vocabularies. These linguistic habits seep into our day-to-day conversation and we 
can trip the problem of rhetoric even when we have the best of intentions. We need a 
way to close this open-ended nature of language when we engage in political 
argument. To do this though we need to interpret the problem with respect to a theory 
of language. We need to know what exactly it is about language that makes the 
problem a 'misuse of language' in order to work out a way to overcome it in political 
argument. Before this though I will contrast the problem with the phenomena of 
bullshit to place it conceptually. 
This is technically a type of ambiguity. I separate it here to distinguish it from run-of-the-mill 
ambiguity like 'put the box on the table in the kitchen'. This could mean either 1) 'put the box (which 
IS in the kitchen) onto the table' or 2) 'put the box (which is on the table) in the kitchen' . However, it 
would be a stretch to say it could mean anything else. With the special type of ambiguity associated 
with essentially contested terms, there is no limit to the number of possible interpretations it could 
have. 
2.2 The Problem Contrasted 
At first glance, Harry Frankfurt 's essay 'On Bullshit' seems to pinpoint the problem 
of rhetoric with his interpretation of 'bullshit ' . He makes a neat distinction between 
lying and bullshitting, 
"What bullshit essentially misrepresents is neither the state of affairs to which it refers nor the beliefs 
of the speaker concerning that state of affairs. Those are what lies misrepresent, by virtue of being 
false. Since bullshit need not be false, it differs from lies in its misrepresentational intent. The 
bullshitter may not deceive us, or even intend to do so, either about the facts or about what he takes the 
facts to be. What he does necessarily attempt to deceive us about is his enterprise. His only 
indispensably distinctive characteristic is that in a certain way he misrepresents what he is up to" 
(Frankfurt, 1988: 130). 
Since bullshitters are unconstrained by the truth or falsity of what is said, reality is no 
constraint on their arguments. Bullshitters give descriptions of states of affairs 
"without genuinely submitting to the constraints which the endeavour to provide an 
accurate representation of reality imposes" (Frankfurt, 1988: 125). The problem of 
rhetoric has similar repercussions. Yet what this entails with respect to bullshit is not 
immediately obvious since the examples Frankfurt uses seem to run against this 
description. 
For instance, Frankfurt tells the anecdote of Ludwig Wittgenstein who once called up 
to see how a friend was getting on after they had had their tonsils out. When his 
friend told him she felt "as sick as a dog" Wittgenstein abruptly replied, "But how do 
you know how a dog feels?" Frankfurt suggests Wittgenstein thought his friend was 
talking bullshit given her statement (when taken literally) did not pinpoint a precise 
state of affairs for anyone other than an English speaking dog. Bullshit, by this 
example, is an interpretation an audience can give to the utterances of speakers when 
they cannot determine the truth conditions of what was said. It is fundamentally 
dependent on the beliefs (and tolerance) of the audience, given anyone other than 
Wittgenstein would probably have believed (tolerated) that the phrase conveys that 
the speaker is in pain and accepted it as an answer to how their friend felt. However, 
the danger by this account is that whenever the audience does not understand an 
utterance they have license to call bullshit on it. This is counterintuitive. We would 
not want to say that bullshit is synonymous with misunderstanding because often the 
fault is with the audience, not the speaker. For example, a student falling behind in 
class does not have license to call bullshit on everything their teacher says. 
Frankfurt gets around the problem by positing that bullshit is precipitated by 
"misrepresentational intent" and that the bullshitter must "attempt to deceive" an 
audience about his or her enterprise if what is said is to be counted as bullshit. Yet it 
is hard to imagine Wittgenstein's friend had any intention to deceive Wittgenstein 
about her enterprise. More to the point, somebody with good intentions might 
endeavour to air an argument as favourably and accurately as possible but slip up and 
use misleading language to do so. The friend's fault was that she used misleading 
language for the overly sensitive Wittgenstein, not that she was unconcerned with the 
truth or falsity of what she was saying. The problem was purely linguistic rather than 
factual (she was, after all, intending to state an easily comprehensible truth). It is 
puzzling that Frankfurt conflates linguistic scrambling with factual disinterest because 
they seem to play very different conceptual roles. Perhaps he got carried away with 
the ordinary use of the word 'bullshit' for it is often used in a way that ranges over 
both senses. However, this descriptive point does not overcome the counterexamples 
(the failing student, etc.) so we either have to accept a counterintuitive theory or a 
contradictory one. 
At the very least, linguistic mishaps and factual disinterest have different roles to play 
in the problem we are seeking to clarify. The former scrambles consistency 
ascriptions while the latter does not. When somebody cooks up facts on the spot -
botched statistics can be very persuasive - they are bullshitting their audience since 
they have no concern for the truth or falsity of what they are saying. They are not 
lying because/or all they know the statistics could be true. Yet we still have many 
ways to call out their disingenuous fact claims and force them into either revision or 
inconsistency. We can still interpret the truth-conditions of what is said even though 
the arguer was not directly concerned with the truth of what they were saying. In 
other words we can reasonably reject their statements. We could ask them for their 
references or provide counter-evidence from other sources and ask them to give 
reasons why we should accept their version over our own sources. We can show, say, 
that they are being inconsistent if they concede a certain book of statistics to be 
authoritative and yet maintain that their stats are correct despite the book clearly 
stating otherwise. We can demonstrate inconsistency because we know what was 
said. Wittgenstein on the other hand could not impute consistency or inconsistency to 
his friend because he could not (or at least pretended he could not) adequately 
interpret what she was saying. 
Frankfurt 's theory of bullshit, then, cannot plug the hole for political argument since it 
does not pinpoint the phenomenon that does the scrambling. Bullshit sometimes 
scrambles consistency ascriptions, but often does not. Anticipating this chapter's 
conclusion, it scrambles such ascriptions when the bullshitter is bullshitting in the first 
dimension of discourse, but not when the bullshit is exuding from the second (say, 
where the bullshitter uses phoney statistics). Furthermore, bullshit requires hostile 
intent whereas the problem of rhetoric does not. Arguers genuinely motivated by 
agreement over descriptions of the world with definite truth-conditions can trip the 
problem of rhetoric just as easily as those with "misrepresentational intent". At times 
1 co-opt the term 'linguistic bullshit' for the phenomena that trips the problem of 
rhetoric, but the reader should be aware that I am not strictly adhering to Frankfurt 's 
terminology. 
To be as specific as possible with respect to alternatives, the problem should also be 
contrasted with the rhetoric described by Alfred Hirschman (1991) in his book 
Reactionary Rhetoric. The rhetoric that social reform will put society into jeopardy, 
lead to distinct perversities, or ultimately prove futile is often used in political 
argument to stifle progressive movements. If the claims are inconsistent or do not 
mesh with the empirical data I do not see any problem for the political theorist - they 
can reasonably reject the position by demonstrating the position's inconsistency. The 
dissemination of false or indeterminate information is either a lie, bullshit, or a 
mistake, all of which can be easily identified so long as the arguer does not engage in 
linguistic gerrymandering. 
23 The Problem Interpreted I 
The problem of rhetoric serves as a constraint for a sufficient interpretation of 
political argument's framing presupposition 'S can be reasonably inferred from the 
context of the prior conversation'. I will drop the stricter condition of 'reasonably' 
here and replace it with 'consistently'.^^ In the next chapter I will revert back to the 
stricter condition of reasonableness, but for now it makes sense to concentrate on 
consistency, given it is a necessary condition for reasonableness (see 1.4). So we can 
say the problem of rhetoric serves as a constraint for a sufficient interpretation of 'S 
can be consistently inferred from the context of the prior conversation'. A 
philosophical account of language would be rather lousy if it could not fill out what a 
consistent inference from the context of the prior conversation amounted to. Indeed, 
most do. My selection criteria though will be to ascertain which interpretations of an 
utterance's context-bound consistency can also yield an interpretation for the problem 
of rhetoric. It seems to me that this is the true test of the worth of a theory of 
language's ability to complement political argument and, indeed, political theory. 
References to the philosophy of language are common in a lot of political theory. 
However, there is a tendency to do it in a rather unsystematic and blotchy way with 
little justification given for the use of various - and often disputed - insights about 
language. This section looks to reverse this tendency. 
Theories of language should be able to yield an elaborated account of the problem of 
rhetoric described above since the problem is essentially a problem of language. 
Non-linguistic rhetoric is just a combination of factual bullshit and emotive appeals,^' 
which does not scramble consistency ascriptions. It can quite easily be weeded out of 
argument by way of reasonable rejection (as interpreted by Barry and Scanlon). 
Linguistic rhetoric is a special case of rhetoric that problematizes reasonable 
rejection. This is the problem with rhetoric: it renders the traditional interpretations 
of reasonable rejection linguistically indeterminate. If the presupposed framework of 
political argument cannot interpret this problem, then it will go unaddressed and there 
will always be a hitch or 'get out' clause to reasonable rejections of even the most 
ludicrous arguments. We need a theory of language that can adequately interpret the 
above definition of the problem of rhetoric. If a theory can also interpret 'S can be 
As discussed in 1.4, consistency is a necessary condition for reasonableness but not a sufficient 
condition. Being reasonable means that, in addition to 5 being a consistent inference, you are open to 
proving that it is. 
No matter how upset somebody is when they plead the case for A and not-A. they are still being 
mconsistent, even if we are more likely to accept their inconsistency than when they are not so 
emotional. 
consistently inferred from the context of the prior conversation', then it is ripe for 
filling out a necessary component for the framework of political argument. 
In scouring the philosophical literature for a theory I have adhered to Rawls' 
requirements of liberal political theory. He says, "The central idea is that political 
liberalism moves within the category of the political and leaves philosophy as it is" 
(Rawls, 1995: 134). It is nevertheless mandatory to select certain philosophical 
theories from the literature to establish conceptual points, which is my rationale for 
selecting a theory of language that already exists within the literature. This selection 
should not be arbitrary. This section is a cleaning up exercise but a necessary one if 
my interpretation of the problem of rhetoric is not to be shouted down by rival 
accounts randomly using alternative theories of language: I need to show how we can 
be discerning with our choice rather than random. This requires a comprehensive 
demonstration of the rejection process, which also serves to nip certain protests in the 
bud before too much ink is spilt. I do not wish to suggest that somebody partial to 
one of these theories could not introduce a caveat that subsequently renders it 
appropriate, only that I haven't been able to do so for our current purposes. 
23.1 Use Theories of Meaning 
We can start the rejection process with Wittgenstein's unhelpful suggestion in 
Philosophical Investigations that language "has not the formal unity that [we] 
imagined, but is [a] family of structures more or less related to one another" (2001: 40 
[§108]). Such suggestions have led some to lump him into the deconstructivist camp, 
suggesting that he along with the likes of Derrida think there is no boundary between 
what we call ' language' and what we do not call ' language' (Staten, 1984: 21). 
Whether you agree with the lump is no great matter (I do not, for what it is worth). 
What matters is that there is a wealth of philosophical literature following 
Wittgenstein that would pour scepticism on my hope that the description of the 
problem of rhetoric can pinpoint any practice with much accuracy given the 
description's use of the word ' language'. If it cannot then the goal of a 
methodological process towards clear ascriptions of consistency in political argument 
is hopeless. We would not be able to detect when ascriptions of consistency have 
been scrambled?" In theory it would be possible to stretch 'language' to cover many 
social interactions and the 'misuse' of such interaction would take on strong 
overtones of moral universalism. Yet surely we need a theory that can clearly 
distinguish between stealing a loaf of bread and using obscurant metaphors. There is 
no issue concerning consistency ascriptions with the former, but there is with the 
latter and this is the distinction we are trying to get at. 
Wittgensteinians consider the meanings of most words to be their use. Just like we 
look to the way a spanner is used rather than mulling over its intrinsic nature, we 
should look to how words are used rather than trying to find their essence 
(Wittgenstein, 2001: 36 [§90]). As Soames (2003: 5) explains, "Mastery of the 
numeral 'five' is not explained by finding some unique object for it to name; rather, 
mastery is a matter of engaging in certain sorts of routine that govern its application". 
The activity of speaking a language then should be no more mysterious than the 
activity of tightening a screw with a spanner. Wittgenstein accordingly thought 
philosophical puzzles (which turn out to be nothing more than linguistic tricks) should 
be deflated to the same level. It is this deflation that leads him to loosen his 
demarcation of the word 'language'. However, if the meanings of words are to be 
determined by their use, then the notion of misusing language is dubious at best. If 
we use our words in a way to obscure inconsistent political reasons, then this forms 
part of their very meaning and so there is no way to hold demagogues to account 
other than by some particular moral standard, or at least some standard independent of 
linguistic considerations. We have to judge the routine that governs the application 
of the word, not the particular use of the word itself. Since the whole point to political 
argument is to mediate between particular judgements and moral points of view, we 
cannot commit to one in order to conceptualize the problem of rhetoric. It seems to 
me that all 'use ' theories of meaning need to turn on theories unrelated to language to 
In fact, there are many so-called 'left Wittgensteinians' still mulling around in political theory who 
suggest social criticism is always underdetermined by reason and that we should therefore abandon the 
'argumentative' ship altogether, focusing instead on a better understanding of these societies (see 
Williams, 2005: 34 for discussion). I agree that we should understand societies and cultures better than 
we currently do (of course: and I have trouble understanding why this is a novel discovery worth 
publishing), but not that we have no rational grounds to critique societies other than our own. I intend 
on filling out the dots and showing that it is quite possible to ensure reasoned criticism in terms of the 
concepts of consistency and reasonableness in the next chapter. 
make sense of what is happening with rhetoric. They therefore do not fit our 
(technical) bill and should be discarded for our purposes. 
2.3.2 Causal and Behavioural Theories of Meaning 
Continuing with our purge, it is also impossible to interpret an assertion as being 
either consistent or inconsistent in light of the problem of rhetoric by way of 
behavioural theories of meaning (at least in their classical guise). In its most naive 
sense, the theory amounts to the ascription of meaning to linguistic tokens in terms of 
the response those tokens would evoke in an audience, 
"A sign's disposition to affect a hearer is to be called a 'meaning ' . . . only if it has been caused by, and 
would not have developed without, an elaborate process of conditioning which has attended the sign's 
use in communication." (Stevenson, 1944: 57 in Barry, 2011: 17) 
We understand language and meaning like we understand Pavlov's dog salivating 
when he hears the bell that 'means ' its dinner is ready. The theory does not provide 
adequate conceptual resources to distinguish (in terms of language) between rhetoric 
and non-rhetoric or between brute acceptance and meaningful acceptance. If a 
rhetorical statement's effect on its audience is for the audience to accept the same 
state of affairs, to the same degree, and in the same way as the effect of a distinct non-
rhetorical statement, the meaning of the two utterances are, for all relevant purposes, 
equivalent in that particular context. Appealing to a behavioural theory of meaning, 
then, cannot interpret the problem of rhetoric. 
Quine's 'meaning scepticism' shares a number of features with behavioural theories. 
1 will take the investigation further in chapter 4, but a few provisional comments need 
to be made here. Quine's most important and systematic work is generally considered 
to be Word and Object where he attempts to make sense of languages with scientific 
theories for translation. That is, he tries to make sense of language using 
"theories which attempt to translate the words and sentences of one language into the words and 
sentences of a different language. Like all scientific theories, translation theories are tested against 
observational data - in this case, observations about the linguistic behavior of the speakers of two 
languages." (Soames, 2003: 226-227). 
By this scientific approach to semantic problems "a language is viewed as a set of 
verbal responses to verbal and non-verbal stimuli" (Soames, 2003: 226). This could 
be interpreted as a behavioural theory of meaning. The idea that translation of one 
language into the next is underdetermined by such stimuli is one of the principle 
arguments in Quine's book. For every translation guide that can fit all the data there 
will be another translation guide that is incompatible with the first but can likewise fit 
the data equally well. The exact reference of what somebody is saying will therefore 
always be indeterminate in principle. We will never be able to tell whether what we 
are accepting is rhetorical since one of two equally acceptable translation manuals 
will render what is said rhetorical and the other will not. The main problem here is 
that Quine does not think it possible to distinguish between facts of language and 
empirical facts about the world. Donald Davidson's notion of radical interpretation 
(see Davidson, 2001) likewise stresses that there is no decisive way to distinguish the 
two types of fact and that a theory of language should not try. He therefore 
encounters the same problem. Philosophically and even scientifically Quine and 
Davidson might be right to stress this point. However, if we are going to be in any 
position to have a description of political argument that distinguishes between cases 
where political argument has been hijacked by verbal bullshit and when it has not we 
must assume that it is possible to separate linguistic and empirical facts when filling 
out that description. 
2 J.3 Speech Act Theory 
A 'perlocutionary act' is an act performed by saying something (Austin, 1962: 118). 
It is not the act performed in saying something - that act is called an illocutionary act 
(Austin, 1962: 107). Getting an audience to accept my argument, then, is a 
perlocutionary act. Persuading in general is a perlocutionary type of speech act (at 
least, when the persuading is done because of what was said) because it is what 
happens as a consequence of my saying something. Urging somebody, on the other 
hand, is an illocutionary act since it is unclear that the urging has been successful. A 
useful way of understanding the difference is that we can urge somebody by saying T 
urge you to clean your teeth', but we cannot persuade them by saying T persuade you 
to clean your teeth' (Mitchell, 2009). It is still up in the air whether I am successful in 
persuading you since acceptance is something that happens after the assertion is 
made, whereas urging is an attempt that is made during the very assertion. At first 
glance this distinction seems quite helpful in making sense of the problem of rhetoric. 
We could say when there is no fact of the matter about what the illocutionary act 
actually was (no fact of the matter concerning what was done in saying S) and yet 
there is still perlocutionary force (the audience was affected by the act of saying 5 in a 
way that was dependent on the audience thinking there was an illocutionary force to 
the utterance where in fact there was not) then the problem of rhetoric is tripped. 
Getting an audience to accept your reasonable rejection, say, is a perlocutionary act: 
the variable up for grabs in whether they accept it because of the illocutionary force of 
what you are saying. Austin's terminology gets tantalizingly close to a thorough 
going interpretation of the problem of rhetoric. The catch though is that by Austin's 
terminology the illocutionary force of some sentence full of, what Orwell calls, 
"swindles and perversions" is considered no different to a sentence without such 
humbug. We can perhaps distinguish between the way somebody utters a sentence 
(e.g. in a way that was full of emotion, with pained expressions, etc.) and the actual 
content of that utterance, but linguistic rhetoric will still comprise that content. What 
we are after is a theory with terminology that can distinguish between rhetorical and 
non-rhetorical content and for the reasons stated above 1 doubt Austin's can do this. " 
23.4 Intentional Theories of Meaning 
Another candidate is an intention-based theory of meaning (also known as 'intention 
based semantics', henceforth ITMs). These theories typically interpret the meaning of 
S as the belief x produced in an audience by the audience's recognition of the 
speaker's intention for them to believe x by way of that very recognition (Grice, 
1957). Accordingly, consistency is simply communicating compatible beliefs about 
the world in such fashion. I should add a quick caveat on my use of intention in 
describing the problem of rhetoric since it is relevant to the following discussion. The 
description is cluttered by the disjunction 'The intentional or unintentional misuse of 
John Searle 's speech act theory (1969; 1976) hits the same problem. Despite his useful distinction 
between illocutionary force and propositional content, the "swindles and perversions" of linguistic 
bullshit constitute propositional content just as much as perfectly substantive assertions. 
language...' since it is possible to engage in rhetoric without intending to. I think this 
possibility needs to be emphasized. There are plenty of turns of phrases, dead 
metaphors, memes and the like that are common in everyday conversation (see for 
example, Orwell, 1946). The referents of these terms or the ways in which the 
referents are determined are often far from obvious. Nevertheless, the terms stick. 
Well-intentioned agents can often unintentionally pick up imprecise and misleading 
linguistic habits indirectly from self-serving demagogues. Ambiguity scrambles our 
ability to ascribe consistency to others. Yet it would surely be ridiculous to claim we 
cannot be unintentionally ambiguous or that we cannot meaningfully accept reasons 
that use ambiguous terms. Terms that are precise enough to us might be extremely 
baffling to our audience and it is ridiculous to assume we always know exactly how 
our utterances affect our audience. 
ITMs generally analyse what 'meaningful communication' entails. We can substitute 
'language' in the description of the problem of rhetoric for 'meaningful 
communication' without any substantial change. We get, 
(A) The intentional or unintentional misuse of meaningful communication by 
a speaker, which has a persuasive effect on its audience, but which makes 
inconsistency ascriptions indeterminate. 
The question from (A) then is, if we are communicating with one another 
meaningfully how can we be said to be misusing language? (A) seems clumsy but I 
think sense can be made of it with the framework developed in the final two sections 
of this chapter. However, I do not think an ITM can. We need to be able to 
substitute something for 'meaningful communication' that preserves an ascription of 
rhetoric regardless of the agent's intention. Given this, we can prove the inadequacy 
of ITMs in filling out the framework of political argument. 
If we substitute 'meaningful communication' in (A) for 'an utterance where the effect 
of that utterance is what the speaker intended it to have on their audience by virtue of 
their audience's recognition of that intention' (a rough-and-ready ITM) then we get, 
(B) The intentional or unintentional misuse [by a speaker] of an utterance 
where the effect of that utterance is what the speaker intended their utterance 
to have on their audience by virtue of their audience's recognition of that 
intention, which has a persuasive effect on its audience, but which makes 
inconsistency ascriptions indeterminate. 
The phrase "which has a persuasive effect on its audience" is now redundant since we 
are already assuming that the speaker has been successful in persuading their 
audience and so the phrase can be dropped. Now, removing the disjunction 'or ' in 
(B), the burden is on the ITM to make sense of the following puzzle if it is to remain a 
candidate theory for political argument, 
(C) The unintentional misuse [by a speaker] of an utterance where the effect of 
that utterance is what the speaker intended their utterance to have on their 
audience by virtue of their audience's recognition of that intention, but which 
makes inconsistency ascriptions indeterminate. 
To suggest a speaker who intended to produce some belief in their audience through 
their utterance, and who ultimately succeeded, unintentionally misused that utterance 
is bizarre. The only way I can think of doing this would be to appeal to some 
standard that is independent of any theory of language - something like a moral claim 
about what is morally right to assert. With such an appeal we are forced into saying 
that the speaker misuses their utterance because it is an immoral or bad action to utter 
whatever they happened to utter. If the speaker is using their linguistic means 
correctly, we have to instead condemn their ends. Condemnation of ends has nothing 
to do with the sort of raw consistency we are trying to interpret in the presupposition 
of political argument and if this is what an ITM commits us to, then so much the 
worse for ITMs as candidate theories to complement political argument. 
23.5 Brian Barry's 'Gricean Hodgepodge' 
This is as far as political theory has got (despite for a few brief and overly superficial 
excursions, see chapters 3 and 4 for review) with candidate theories of language. 
Brian Barry outlined a couple of these (naive behavioural and intentional theories) 
back in 1965 in the second chapter of Political Argument. The literature in political 
theory has not got very far since. Hopefully this chapter will serve as something of a 
literature review since Barry's analysis is insufficient for what is now required. He 
comes to a 'Gricean inspired' theory of meaning to make (what was then, much 
needed) sense of the prescriptivist/descriptivist division in political terminology. 
Accordingly, the content of a speaker's statement is the effect the speaker intends to 
produce in the hearer by means of the hearer's recognition of that intention (2011: 
22). Barry distinguishes between two methods used to interpret this content: 
linguistic and social. An audience that knew the dictionary meaning of the words 
'large' and 'spoon' might not know exactly what somebody meant when they asked 
for a 'large spoon', since the meaning of the phrase depends on the culinary context 
(which is part of the social context) in which one is speaking, 
"The meaning of ' large' is (roughly) "larger than the average member of the class in question" 
where the class in question depends of course on the noun which ' large' modifies". Someone 
who knew that ' large' meant this and also knew the meanings of the other words in a certain 
uttered sentence would be able to understand its linguistic content, but he might still not know 
its complete normal content; and it is to cover this contingency that one has to introduce the 
idea of social content." (Barry, 2011: 23) 
Roughly, linguistic content is conventional content (which can usually be looked up 
in a dictionary) and social content is everything else that is relevant to the intention 
that the audience is supposed to recognize in the speaker. 
Barry concludes that words are neither prescriptive nor descriptive in their own right, 
but rely on the social context in which they are utilised for their evaluative purchase. 
The conventions that ground the normal usage of a word do not in and of themselves 
render it a descriptive or prescriptive word. For example, saying that something is 
'good' is not simply describing that something as what is normally described with the 
use of the term 'good' in itself nor is it the prescription that the general use of 'good' 
should include that something. Consider the evaluation that a dozen eggs are all 
'good' . In most contexts this means that the eggs are edible (i.e. not rotten). A grocer 
is justified then to contest somebody telling him that the eggs he sold them were not 
good if those eggs were not rotten. The grocer contests this on descriptive grounds; 
the term 'good' in this context is almost always used with the intention to 
communicate that 'the eggs were not ro t ten ' . " It is the context that determines the 
" This amounts to a description of 'the property of not being rotten' . 
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nature of the justification required " Perhaps the justification would take on a 
prescriptive hue if it were discussed in a philosophy seminar with a title something 
like 'The Ethics of Egg Selection' but that is certainly not the case with the grocer 
example. So, Barry (2011: 31) concludes, "Instead of thinking of some words as 
evaluative rather than descriptive, "we should think of some words requiring less 
contextual information before we can know that they occur in an evaluative utterance, 
and others as requiring more". He makes sense of the division between prescriptive 
(evaluative) and descriptive statements in terms of social content. He therefore sets 
his task for the remainder of Political Argument to describing the different senses of 
political terms that are used in different social contexts. 
Social context is obviously an important component in meaningful communication. 
Barry's book described these differing contexts lucidly and led the flight away from 
the greedy reductionist tendencies of utilitarianism. However, social content can be 
used to scramble inconsistency ascriptions and a description of that social content will 
not in itself overcome the issue. The problem is that we have no tool to work out 
what sort of content is permissible and what sort is not. Furthermore, descriptions of 
this content will themselves depend on social content, which cannot itself be 
guaranteed to be immune from rhetoric. This critique will be expanded in chapter 5. 
Barry's descriptive endeavours do not overcome the problem of rhetoric in political 
argument. When they are backed into a comer arguers can simply claim their accuser 
misinterpreted the social content of their assertion. Indeed, Barry's theory of 
language - which is just another ITM - cannot conceptualise the problem of rhetoric. 
The division between social and linguistic context is only a salient division because 
they constitute two different sorts of facts relevant to working out the speaker's 
intention. Once you have worked out the content of an agent's intention, Barry 
supposes their reasons can be interpreted without difficulty. While his use of this 
ITM seems to make sense of the prescriptivist/descriptivist division, it does not make 
sense of the problem of rhetoric. We need to continue the search for a theory of 
language that can do both. 
" I might ask, 'Which word? ' Given there is usually more than one word in a sentence; does the 
context determine which word the justification turns on? Surely the grocer has pick here and can 
choose any word to show the accusation was ill-founded (or, as I might argue, ill-worded). 
2.3.6 Molecular Accounts of Meaning 
Michael Dummett construes language to be one big lattice of interconnected concepts. 
To know the meaning of certain words one must master a certain fragment or 
'molecule' of that lattice. He says, "on a molecular account, one knows the language 
by knowing the meaning of each sentence of the language taken separately" 
(Dummett, 1978: 378). The account is a counter to the holism advocated by Quine 
(see chapter 4) who argued that perfectly understanding a single sentence of a 
language technically required understanding the whole language since every concept 
was connected to the broader web of collective concepts that make up the language. 
For Dummett language is some sort of external social good with which individuals 
can master the use of certain fragments or 'molecules' of it. Such an interpretation of 
language cannot distinguish between linguistic bullshit and non-bullshit. Linguistic 
bullshit might be a genuine and stable pattern embedded within the social institution 
of language. There is nothing here to rule out that mastery of a word or phrase might 
be mastery of bullshit and therefore nothing to help overcome the problem of rhetoric. 
2.3.7 Brandom's Theory of Assertion 
It would be remiss to ignore Robert Brandom's influential book Making it Explicit 
(1994) in this (albeit brief) review given the support and interest it has had in political 
theory particularly from Habermas (2000) and other deliberative democrats (see for 
example, Bohman, 2003). While Brandom pays close attention to conceptualizing the 
misuse of language, he does not continue the story of the problem of rhetoric and 
explain how such misuse might scramble consistency ascriptions. Brandom does not 
distinguish between reasoning that is acceptable (or accepted by the common opinion) 
and reasoning that is consistent. For all (of his) intents and purposes, they are the 
same thing. He does not have a standard of consistent and inconsistent reasoning, 
only acceptable and non-acceptable reasoning. As argued, acceptance can be 
wrangled through all kinds of non-rational means (brainwashing and torture come to 
mind as the more unsavoury) and we would not want to equate the property of 
consistency with such tactics. We need a theory that can distinguish between the 
different sorts of persuasion and I do not think that Brandom's can do this. 
He takes assertion rather than belief to be the primitive concept to understanding 
language. He quotes Michael Dummett (1973: 362) that assertion is "not the 
expression of an interior act of judgment; judging, rather, is the interiorization of the 
external act of assertion". Brandom explains that an assertion is like a ticket in that it 
licenses us to do something but requires license (say, an authentic watermark) in the 
first place to count as a ticket. Consistency in this respect would presumably be using 
these tickets as one was entitled to use them by a community of speakers and not 
using them out of place. If one asserts that 'All Republicans hate freedom' 
consistency would involve assigning hatred of x to Republicans when x falls under the 
extension of ' f reedom' in the community. 
Brandom's analysis is distinctly one-dimensional in that he takes an assertion as 
essentially the expression of a belief.'" We could imagine a piece of paper that counts 
as a ticket in one possible world not being counted as a ticket in another. The 
watermark might not have the same significance in one world that it does in the actual 
world. It is perhaps counterintuitive to imagine a belief being exactly the same 
mental-state in a possible world but it not being a belief due to differing significances 
placed on it by a community. Consistency here would be using assertions - be they 
inner-assertions or socially expressed - as one is entitled to and only as one is entitled 
to. The standard of entitlement is distinctly normative and one that would depend on 
acceptance profiles, whether or not individuals accepted the norms of entitlement for 
substantive reasons or not . ' ' 
Following Wittgenstein, Brandom argues that we do not explain the correct or 
incorrect use of language independently of the way in which a community of 
language users employ it. The validity of various discourses is therefore something 
"The leading idea of the account to be presented here is that belief can be modeled on the kind of 
inferentially articulated commitment that is undertaken or acknowledged by making an assertion" 
(Brandom, 1994: 157). Compare this with Stalnaker's notion of acceptance in Inquiry (\98A). 
' ' It is perhaps worth mentioning that this interpretation of language would be in strong opposition to 
the method of elimination sketched in the next chapter. In such a case, my proposal to remove terms 
from a conversation would be tantamount to conversational lobotomy. In certain contexts it would 
destroy the normative force of one ' s belief. 
internal to each discourse. The problem is that if the validity of political discourse is 
something that is internal to it, then how might we criticise bullshitters or 
demagogues using it with no regard for the way they are representing the world to be? 
What a skilled demagogue can do is make their arguments seem valid and if they 
seem valid then they accord with the normative practice of a community and cannot 
be faulted. On Brandom's account there is no room to distinguish between 
substantive and non-substantive agreement. 
23.8 No Fit 
None of the above theories of language fit the bill with respect to the problem of 
rhetoric. It should be noted, however, that this argument by fit does not say anything 
about the philosophical credentials of each theory, only that they are inappropriate for 
the demands of liberal political theory. 
In sum then, appealing to the following concepts as candidates to interpret the 'misuse 
of language' in my description of the problem of rhetoric will lead to conceptual 
tension: the causes of an utterance, the intentions behind an utterance, the type of 
force of an utterance, or the use (broadly construed) of an utterance. We should also 
avoid conflating belief with assertion for it appears to render the notion of consistency 
redundant. More should be done to emphasise this tension in political theory, but for 
now it serves as justification for why 1 have turned away from such concepts and the 
theories of language in which they are used and towards a more discerning choice. 
We are after a way in which we can interpret meaningful utterances to be consistent 
or not and not just seemingly consistent. The outcome of genuine consistency in a 
resolved argument is substantive agreement, i.e. agreement that could hold firm 
despite significant changes to the environment. Surprisingly then, as far as 1 am 
aware, traditional theories of language cannot conceptualise the important concept of 
substantive agreement for political argument given we cannot make any sense of its 
bugbear (the misuse of language) while retaining a notion of consistency. 
2.4 The Problem Interpreted II 
We are after a way of interpreting the misuse of language that leads to the problem of 
rhetoric, then, without falling back on ascriptions of intention, act-type, use, cause, or 
the conflation of belief and assertion without further qualification. I suggest that 
individuals instead trip the problem of rhetoric when their argument is accepted 
because of a particular sort of defection with what is called the 'context-sef. In this 
section (2.4) I demonstrate that formally specifying this particular defection gives a 
sufficient interpretation for the problem of rhetoric and therefore also for the sentence 
'S can be consistently inferred from the context of the prior conversation". This 
defection is described in terms of belief and acceptance rather than intention, use, act-
type, cause or with terminology that conflates beliefs and assertions. Robert 
Stalnaker introduced the notion of the context-set and the particular kind of defection 
of it that we are interested in to overcome the implication of Kripke's necessary 
aposteriori sentences for interpretations of possibility and possible worlds. This 
amounted to an interpretation of the formal apparatus of two-dimensional modal 
semantics. As I shall argue, this interpretation gives us the best chance to make sense 
of the problem of rhetoric in political argument by introducing distinctions pertinent 
to distinguishing between rhetoric and non-rhetoric. Before explaining this rationale, 
I will expand first on what is meant by the context-set, which is a useful formalization 
of what constitutes the common ground between individuals in conversation. I make 
no attempts to depart from Stalnaker's interpretation in this section aside from 
drawing out relevant implications. 
2.4.1 The Context-Set 
Modem semantics typically relativizes meaning to possible worlds. It is a dominant if 
not unanimous assumption in analytic philosophy. There are three preliminary points 
to note on what is entailed by this assumption. First, the unit of semantic meaning is 
the sentence rather than the word. Words do not in and of themselves represent the 
world. Second, the meaning of a sentence is captured by its truth-conditions. As 
Soames (2010: I) puts it, "for S [where S is a sentence] to be meaningful is for it to 
represent the world as being a certain way, which is to impose conditions that the 
world must satisfy, if it is to be the way S represents it". These conditions are S's 
truth-conditions. Third, these conditions are possible worlds and so a meaningful 
sentence involves a function (i.e. its proposition) that divides possible worlds into 
those that would render S true and those that would render S false. Following from 
these three points, Stalnaker described an assertion as a proposal to exclude all those 
possible worlds in which the proposition asserted is false from conversation, or as 
Stalnaker puts it, from the context-set. 
When somebody asserts a particular policy position <j) and is willing to defend or 
justify it with reasons, they are engaging in political argument.^® They enter into a 
conversation with others where they have to go from the presupposed context-set that 
it is believed all accept and which grounds the conversation to a narrowed context-set 
that renders their policy position ^ explicitly acceptable. This narrowing occurs with 
the discarding of all possible worlds in which the accepted sentence comes out false. 
Stalnaker puts it accordingly, 
"It is common ground that ^ in a group if all members accept (for the purpose 
of the conversation) that (j), and all believe that all accept and all believe that 
all believe that all accept that (f), etc." (Stalnaker, 2002: 716). 
Imagine a deck of cards where each card represents a possible world (perhaps with a 
complete description of that world on the card). This deck of cards stands as a good 
metaphor for the context-set. Every meaningful assertion will make a single split in 
the deck, dividing those cards that represent worlds where the assertion would turn 
out true from those where it would turn out false. If an audience accept the assertion, 
those cards in the false pile will be discarded from the rest of the conversation. The 
remaining cards constitute the context-set for the rest of the conversation. With each 
accepted assertion the pile of cards shrinks. The longer an argument goes for, then, 
the narrower and more precise the context-set will become. 
Providing there is no dissent to any of the steps in the argument, the reason-giver will 
be in a position to believe that the context-set that they share with their audience has 
updated so that their policy position <!> is now accepted. That is, any rival positions 
^^  I will assume that any policy position touches on the problem of politics. 
56 
would have been discarded in thie reasoning process and it is accepted (though not 
necessarily believed) in the context-set that those rival candidates and your own are 
exhaustive of all possible positions regarding the policy. Furthermore, your audience 
must also believe that you believe that they accept (j) and you must believe that your 
audience believes that you believe that they accept <j), and so on... This regress is 
what is known as the Gricean circle and is a common heuristic amongst philosophers 
of language to describe meaningful communication. The modem flourish of the 
theory is the distinction between belief and acceptance, which distances it from any 
reference to Gricean style 'intention'. 
At some point reasons in political argument have to be substantive in the sense that 
they represent the world as being a certain way. We can think of truth-conditions and 
the representational nature of reasons and language more broadly as the partitioning 
of possible worlds (or possibilities) into those in which a proposition is true and those 
in which it is false. ' ' Propositions, then, are functions from possible worlds into 
truth-values. However, as yet this does not distinguish a reason from any old 
sentence. A sentence becomes a reason when it serves a certain function in 
conversation. A sentence is only a reason if it is for some end. In terms of political 
theory, that end is the audience's acceptance of the speaker's position {<j)). Political 
argument takes the form of a theorem as it is defined in the OED: "a general 
proposition not self-evident [as conmion ground] but proved by a chain of reasoning; 
a truth established [as common ground] by means of accepted truths." 
Given the concept of acceptance is doing a lot of work here, it is important to also be 
explicit with respect to its interpretation. Indeed, acceptance plays an important role 
in replacing the concept of intention. Acceptance is a propositional attitude. To 
accept a proposition "is to treat it as true for some reason. One ignores, at least 
temporarily, and perhaps in a limited context, the possibility that it is false" 
(Stalnaker, 2002: 716). It is therefore a broader concept than belief: if you believe 
something you also accept it, but you can accept something for the sake of an 
argument even if you don't believe it. People don't necessarily believe idealizations. 
" Soames takes 'S' to stand for sentence rather than proposition. This is technically very important 
and will be addressed later. 
They have quite a different structure to that of the sentence and so do not preserve the Orwellian 
"swindles and perversions" that were preserved in the speech act theory of Austin and Searle. 
but accept them into conversation for various reasons. Keep in mind though that the 
common ground is not simply a description of what is accepted and what is not, it is 
the shared beliefs over what is accepted and the beliefs concerning the beliefs about 
what is accepted and the beliefs about the beliefs about the beliefs about what is 
accepted, etc. There is a flourishing literature on belief revision that gives strict and 
formal interpretations of consistency. Consistency over one 's beliefs, however, is not 
the type of consistency being analysed here. We are concerned with consistency over 
what is accepted in conversation. 
The context-set also gives the interpretation for utterances in conversation. So it is 
updated by utterances and simultaneously interprets them. An utterance U needs an 
interpretation <pt,x> to qualify as a sentence (ergo reason) otherwise it will lack any 
communicable meaning. Here stands for a sentence's mood. A mood can range 
from an assertion to an imperative, an interrogative, a commisive, a permissive and so 
on.'® The representative quality of U is cashed out by x where T is the set of possible 
worlds in which U is true and appropriate with respect to (Lewis, 1969: 162-163). 
Say I utter gibberish like 'Hurm waddle pongolia gavagai'. An interpretation is not 
forthcoming because we do not have any common ground that gives us rules for such 
an interpretation. That is, there is no card in our current deck that describes rules for 
giving the utterance truth-conditions: with all interpretable utterances there must be 
such cards in the context-set with cards advising to the contrary having been already 
discarded.'"' So the precise way the deck is to be split depends upon instructions from 
the deck itself (the pre-split deck). 
The context-set will not simply assign blanket interpretations to sentences; it will 
assign interpretations relative to the possible occasions of utterance. Indexicals like 7 
am here now^ and demonstratives like ''That thing over there ran over my foot ' have 
different content in different possible occasions of utterance. The only way we can 
make sense of these kinds of statements is by assuming the context-set updates 
See Lewis for the game theoretic analysis. He expands on the moods by the 'making true' 
convention. Somebody uttering an assertion will communicate an intention to 'make t r u e ' t , somebody 
uttermg an imperative will communicate to their audience that they expect them to 'make true' i , etc 
My use of intention here is secondary to my use of communication: the intention is what is being 
communicated, not what is doing the communicating. 
® If there are a few cards still advising to the contrary, the utterance might still be interpretable but it 
will be ambiguous. 
passively, not just via the overt acceptance of assertions. Possibilities will be being 
discarded from context-sets during interaction irrespective of whether assertions are 
being made. I believe that somebody I am talking to has much the same belief about 
the current time, location and speaker as I do and a belief that I accept this belief in 
the conversation, and believe that they accept it, and so on. If a car just ran over my 
foot, I would also assume that we both accept a car just ran over my foot (it was quite 
the event, where I crumpled up into the foetal position while howling in agony). 
Under such circumstances the context-set would be well placed to give precise 
interpretations for T , 'here', 'now', and 'that'. 
In sum then the context-set can be "explained in terms of the contents of the beliefs 
that define the common ground" (Stalnaker, 2002: 720)."' We have beliefs about the 
deck of cards (i.e. the context-set), which are just as much beliefs about our 
conversers' beliefs about the deck and their beliefs about our beliefs, etc. Utterances 
can be interpreted, then, by appealing solely to the contents of belief and beliefs about 
the beliefs of others rather than intention, cause, convention, acts, uses or by 
conflating belief and assertion. Stalnaker's framework of discourse therefore avoids 
the pitfalls (outlined in 2.3) encountered when trying to jointly interpret the problem 
of rhetoric and the sentence 'S can be consistently inferred from the context of the 
prior conversation'. The phrase 'the context of the prior conversation' can simply be 
substituted for the context-set. The interpretation for 'consistently inferred' will be 
described in 2.5. The task now is to demonstrate how this framework can precisely 
interpret the problem of rhetoric, since showing that it avoids the snares that led me to 
abandon the other theories does not mean it will not hit snares of its own. 
I note that Stalnaker is not strict in making no reference to intention, use, causality and whatnot. In 
fact, after the last quote he goes on to say, "If we understand contexts, and the speech made in contexts, 
in terms of the speakers ' beliefs and intentions, we have a better chance of giving simpler and more 
transparent explanations of linguistic behavior" (2002: 720). I do not think we need to bring intention 
into the argument though. We can talk of context-sets and the interpretation and consistency of 
utterances without mentioning the word 'intention' at all. 
2.4.2 Two-Dimensional Modal Semantics 
The aim of a sincere conversation is to refine the context-set through various 
possibilities relevant to the subject matter being discarded so that fewer possibilities 
are contained in the shared context-set once the conversation ceases. Refining the 
context-set is the whole point of communicating. The possible worlds that are 
incompatible with what is asserted will be eliminated providing what is asserted is 
accepted (Stalnaker, 1999: 86). In an argument the conversational subject matter is 
the position being defended. Yet especially in political argument it is common that 
the context-set is refined in terms of possibilities regarding the conversation or 
argument instead of the possibilities about the way the argument is representing the 
world to be. As Stalnaker (2002: 708) notes, "Even the most closed-minded party to a 
conversation - one who is unmoved by the arguments of his interlocutor to change 
any of his beliefs about the subject matter of the conversation - will still change his 
beliefs about the ongoing conversation itself: when something is said, he will come to 
believe that something has been said." Sometimes it is quite appropriate to be close-
minded to what somebody is saying and not accept any of it - not even for 
conversation's sake. Few would accept assertions by a bigot trying to justify the 
virtues of slavery for instance. Yet we would all accept that the bigot had said what 
they had said and believe that they believe that we accept that they had said it, and so 
on. The context-set is certainly updating in such a case but not in the way that it 
would have updated if we had accepted the content of what the bigot was saying. 
There is a difference here in the way the status of a conversation updates. We accept 
facts about the conversation but do not necessarily accept what was said during the 
conversation. This difference constitutes two separate dimensions of the context-set. 
This difference is an important logical difference with respect to determining the 
truth-value of an assertion. It is modelled by two-dimensional formal semantics. The 
generality of this formal apparatus is considered one of the major fault-lines in 
modem philosophy (see for example, Soames, 2005: 1-3). The two-dimensional 
framework, along with its interpretation in terms of the context-set, solves the puzzle 
of Kripke's (1974) necessary a posteriori sentences for possible worlds semantics, 
which was the motivation behind its introduction. Those who question its generality 
suggest that its resolution of the Kripkean puzzle comes at too great a cost. I am 
unconcerned here whether Stalnaker's interpretation is general enough to capture all 
communication, only whether it is general enough to capture what I describe as 
political argument. 
The Kripkean puzzle is as follows. The sentence 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' expresses 
a truth in all possible worlds because both Hesperus and Phosphorus refer to one and 
the same body - the planet Venus. However, the Ancient Greeks who named the 
morning star Hesperus and the evening star Phosphorus did not know they were the 
same planet. An Ancient Greek astronomer would therefore greatly benefit from a 
conversation with a modem astronomer and find the sentence 'Hesperus is 
Phosphorus' very informative. However, the statement is a necessary truth and so 
when uttered in a conversation seemingly would not narrow the context-set at all. It 
seemingly would not discard any possibilities and we would not have updated the 
context-set with any new information. Such an account suggests that we would be in 
exactly the same epistemic position with the Ancient Greek astronomer as before we 
uttered the sentence. Saying 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' would seemingly be 
equivalent to uttering something useless like 'A peanut is a peanut'. Yet this is 
patently false. The former sentence is informative while the latter is not. So the 
puzzle is that there seems to be a point to such astronomical conversation but nothing 
has happened to the conversation such that there could be a point. This appears to be 
the case with all identity statements like 'water is H2O', 'lightening is electricity', 
'63,124 X 7= 441,868' , etc. There are also contingent apriori statements like 'I am 
here now' that have the same structure only in reverse: one can know they are true 
without knowing anything about the world, but the statement is not true in all possible 
worlds (I could have been somewhere else). The two-dimensionalist solution to the 
puzzle is to posit that the context-set of conversation is made up of two dimensions 
and is altered on the first, but not on the second by such an assertion. Instead of 
positing two different kinds of possibility (two different kinds of content-type or 
'card-type') as Kripke (1974) did, two-dimensionalism posits two different 
conversational functions. The first being all the shared facts that determine what is 
said and the second all the shared facts that determine whether what is said is true or 
not (with respect to what has been accepted for the sake of conversation)."*^ 
On this view, acceptability can be cashed out in terms of truth-conditions. 
The distinction is mapped formally on a two-dimensional matrix. Consider O'Leary 
and I are engaged in a conversation which is overheard by Daniels. i,j, and k are sets 
of possible worlds, where i is the world as it actually i s j is the world O'Leary thinks 
we are in and k is the world Daniels thinks we are in (you could say i j and k are our 
belief-states). I utter the prepositional concept D, You are a fool to O'Leary. 
D i j k 
i T F T 
j T F T 
k F T F 
The story represented in D is as follows. O'Leary is a fool, but he himself does not 
think so. Daniels overhearing the conversation thought that my utterance was 
directed at him. Yet he is no fool and he knows it. Therefore, both O'Leary and 
Daniels think I said something false. Yet their disagreement with me is different. 
O'Leary disagrees with me about the way the world is, though shares my 
understanding of the utterance. Our disagreement is therefore substantive. Daniels 
agrees with me over the way the world is but misunderstands my utterance. He 
disagrees (though not overtly and would probably be ready to be corrected) with the 
facts that determine what is said. Our disagreement is therefore non-substantive. He 
thinks the facts are such that the utterance was directed at him. This is false. We 
'dispute' Daniels on the first dimension (the vertical axis) of the matrix and O'Leary 
on the second (the horizontal). The vertical axis represents the possible worlds with 
respect to the proposition expressed by D. This is the first dimension of an 
utterance's meaning - the context or the facts that determine what is said. As I shall 
argue, this is the domain a political theorist tries to restrict in order to ensure 
substantive agreement. The horizontal axis determines the truth-value of the content 
of what is said. This is the domain of substantive agreement and the domain a 
constraint of consistency ranges over. The propositional concept D (in the above 
matrix) is therefore a function from a pair of possible worlds to a truth value: the 
possible world that determines which proposition was in fact said and the possible 
world that determines whether the proposition that was in fact said is true or not. 
Say the bigot claims that they have won the argument and proved the virtues of 
slavery. Any sort of claim like this is a claim with respect to the first dimension of 
discourse, just as much as definitions and identity statements are (despite this 
dissertation being mostly concerned with the latter two given its subject is conceptual 
analysis). It is an assertion about the conversation rather than an assertion about the 
subject matter of the conversation. The bigot is not establishing a fact that contributes 
towards determining whether what was said is acceptable or no t , /o r they supposedly 
think it is already acceptable since they have already claimed victory. They are 
claiming that the shared facts that determine what was said should be adjusted so that 
it is accepted in the context of the conversation. The claim is that if they were 
interpreted in the way they believe is reciprocally accepted, then their substantive 
position is acceptable. Pre-empting Chapter 3, we might say the bigot is appealing to 
its audience to be reasonable. As we will see by the end of this chapter though, it is 
not altogether obvious how we can constrain the bigot's appeals to reasonableness. 
Contrast this first-dimensional assertion with bullshit statistics (see 2.2). If the bigot 
claimed that 4 out of every 5 slaves enjoyed their serfdom, they are presumably 
making this statistic up on the spot. However, they are bullshitting in the second 
dimension of discourse since if we were to accept their assertion, it would narrow the 
possibilities that determine whether what is said is true or not (in the context of the 
current conversation) rather than the possibilities that determine what is said. 
2.4.3. Two-Dimensional Modal Logic's Interpretation 
With Stalnaker's pre-semantic distinction in mind we can turn back to the problem of 
rhetoric. Since I will deal with consistency in the next section, the concern here is 
what this benign brand of two-dimensionalism tells us about the misuse of language. 
When the first dimension is not sufficiently interpreting what is being said and yet the 
second dimension is seemingly being updated (the assertions are being accepted) then 
language is being misused. This is a way of describing the misuse of language 
irrespective of intention, cause, convention, action, or use. The three concepts that 
make this benign two-dimensionalism float are belief, acceptance (which can be 
analysed in terms of truth), and possibility. Sometimes context-sets will be defective. 
Individuals will believe their audience accepts certain things that they in fact do not. 
That is, the interlocutors can have differing beliefs about the makeup of the deck of 
cards that constitute the conversation's context. They may accordingly reject reasons 
they perhaps should accept and vice versa, they might accept reasons they perhaps 
should reject. Their standard for acceptance should be consistency within the context 
of the conversation, which will be expanded upon in the next section. What is 
important for now is to be clear on what a defective context-set looks like. We have a 
non-defective context set when (to re-quote), 
"It is common ground that ^ in a group if all members accept (for the purpose 
of the conversation) that <j), and all believe that all accept (j), and all believe that 
all believe that all accept that <!>, etc." (Stalnaker, 2002: 716). 
So when some individuals wrongly believe all members accept (j), then the context-set 
is defective. The necessary and sufficient conditions for a non-defective context-set 
are when all conversers' beliefs about the acceptance of propositions relevant to the 
subject-matter and beliefs about the beliefs about such acceptance, and the beliefs 
about the relevant subject-matter are all true. The necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a defective context-set, then, are when any of these beliefs are false. 
When a conversation ends in disagreement - or agreement for that matter - the 
disagreement may simply be down to the fact that the context-set is defective. This 
was the case with Daniels in the example above. At a party I might say 'The man 
over there drinking the martini is a philosopher' and then to my shock my audience 
disagrees. I had meant the man directly opposite us, but was unaware that he was in 
fact drinking water, not a martini. Another man (a mechanic, say) to the right of the 
water-drinking philosopher was in fact drinking a martini and was therefore whom 
my audience believed I took to be the philosopher. I had believed that my audience 
accepted (if not believed) the man was drinking a martini. Even if they had known 
that he was drinking water, 1 would have believed they would have accepted that he 
was for the sake of the conversation. I was wrong, and as a consequence, our 
registered disagreement can be explained by a defective context-set. That is to say, 
the registered disagreement was concerning something irrelevant to the information I 
was trying to convey. I was trying to narrow the accepted context set to one that 
excluded (by predicating falsity to) all possible worlds in which the man in front of 
me was not a philosopher. The important point though is that there was nothing 
substantive about the information I was trying to communicate that my audience 
disputed, only facts unrelated to the subject matter - namely, what was in fact said. 
Flipping this example on its head and applying it to a case of acceptance rather than 
non-acceptance, we might say: there was nothing substantive about the information I 
was trying to communicate that my audience accepted; they only accepted it because 
of differing beliefs over what was actually said. 
A defective first dimension can be utilised by an inconsistent demagogue to get off 
the hook. We can accordingly rephrase the problem from the way it was put in 2.1. 
THE PROBLEM OF RHETORIC: Occurs when assertions (which are perfectly heard/read) 
update the second dimension of a context-set with respect to the subject matter of the 
conversation despite the first dimensional content interpreting the utterance being 
defective, which make consistency ascriptions of the assertions indeterminate. 
The defective first-dimension makes ascriptions of consistency indeterminate because 
what was actually said is not fixed. We attribute the problem to problems with the 
first dimension of discourse. So the dimension that makes necessary aposteriori 
sentences informative on Stalnaker's model of discourse also trips the problem of 
rhetoric. When somebody dabbles in factual bullshit, by cooking up facts and figures 
on the spot, but does so clearly, this updates the second dimension of discourse in a 
way that is relevant to the subject matter of the conversation and is therefore 
susceptible to ascriptions of inconsistency. Given the second dimension is updating, 
the assertion is persuasive, however it is not persuasive because of its meaningful 
content because it has no content since the rules that frame the conversation's context 
are insufficient to determine it. An important feature of the problem is that it is not a 
defect isolated to either the speaker or audience; it is a defect of the conversation in 
which both the speaker and audience are engaging. 
Since we have not yet specified a description of consistency (and use the problem to 
justify the particular description chosen) it is worth trying to interpret the problem 
without appealing to it. So: the problem of rhetoric is tripped when an assertion is 
perfectly heard or read and updates, or will update, the second dimension of 
conversation, but where all the while the first dimension is defective in a particular 
way. This needs to be unpacked. The first dimension of the context-set is defective 
in the 'particular way' that there are not enough facts in it to interpret the assertion 
into the second dimension. There will be insufficient facts in two situations. Both 
occur where conversers have defective beliefs about the accepted rules for the 
assertion's interpretation. In specifying these two situations I depart from Stalnaker's 
explicit writing on two-dimensionalism but nevertheless take it to be tacit. 
2.4.3.1 Different Interpretations 
The first is where conversers update their beliefs about the accepted facts that 
determine the truth of what is said in conversation differently, leading to a defective 
second dimension. This occurs when the conversers have different beliefs about the 
facts that determine what was said. This could well lead to inexplicable disagreement 
concerning the acceptability of future reasoning within the context of conversation. 
What is more, there will be no fact of the matter as to which party is correct. They 
accept the offending assertion (it is persuasive) but not because of any shared 
interpretation of its content. All believe that all accept the same interpretation of the 
assertion, but some do not. This is a description of one of the two circumstances 
without the notion of consistency, but it is worth now asking, how exactly this 
circumstance makes ascriptions of inconsistency indeterminate. When an audience 
calls out a speaker for being inconsistent the speaker can acknowledge that their 
audience finds what they are saying unacceptable but accuse their audience of 
'misinterpreting them' at some prior point in the conversation. If they can get back 
onto solid ground (a non-defective second dimension) by defining what they meant 
and eliciting a response something like 'oh by 7 you meant A:, I see now and realise 
you were consistent after all ' , then charges of inconsistency can be reversed. 
However, the issue is whether charges of inconsistency can be made to stick not 
whether they can be reversed. Any arguer can play this definitional manoeuvre over 
and over continually claiming that their audience have misinterpreted them. My 
example of John Howard in 2.1 serves as an example, but there are countless like 
instances. What is more, in a long string of reasoning, it is often impossible to 
identify which is the offending sentence. Who can then say they are being 
inconsistent rather than, as claimed, misinterpreted? Nobody. 
2.4.3.2 No Interpretation 
The second situation is where there are insufficient facts shared by the conversers to 
interpret the assertion into the second dimension at all. Say O'Leary cannot interpret 
the sentence 'All democracies are socially just ' . O'Leary may well have beliefs 
concerning certain necessary conditions for such an interpretation, but his current 
beliefs are insufficient to interpret it into the second dimension. Given the assertion 
has been accepted into the conversational score, there is a shared belief that the 
assertion does update the second dimension, just that more clues are needed in order 
to update it. It is 'banked' into the first dimension of conversation in its uninterpreted 
guise. It then plays the role of a wildcard in conversation. It functions a bit like the 
blank tile in Scrabble. The blank tile is used to fill in for any letter the player needs to 
make a word. The rhetoric-laden sentence slots in to discard any possibilities that 
need to be discarded for the truth (framed within the context of the conversation) of a 
follow up reason. If this follow-up reason accords with some weak first dimensional 
beliefs about what sorts of reasons appropriately follow from such an assertion, the 
follow-up reason is accepted without scrutinizing the way such reasoning is 
representing the world to be."' 
This is the phenomenon of presupposition for accommodation (Lewis, 1979; 
Stalnaker, 1999: 47-63; Stalnaker, 2002). The phenomenon is described accordingly, 
"If at time t something is said that requires presupposition P to be acceptable, and if P 
is not presupposed just before t, then - ceteris paribus and within certain limits -
presupposition P comes into existence at r." (Lewis, 1979: 340). Say I were to utter to 
somebody 'I hope my sister will be able to proofread this chapter' , if they did not 
know that I had a sister, they should accommodate this fact into the presupposition of 
the conversation. Otherwise a perfectly informative sentence would be rendered 
meaningless. While accommodation is usually a benign phenomenon in sentences 
Notice that this is a bit like mathematical proofs. We derive conclusions from axioms following 
formal rules that we are not necessarily interpreting into the second dimension. Indeed, by Stalnaker's 
f ramework, mathematical truths are all first dimensional (1999: 237-238). Mathematics though is 
strict and its terminology relatively unambiguous. Political terminology, on the other hand, is not and 
this is the problem. 
designed to inform, it is more insidious in sentences designed as reasons in an 
argument. The question is then where the "certain limits" in Lewis' description of 
accommodation fall. The first dimension of discourse will set these limits for the 
'banked' wildcard sentences that trip the problem of rhetoric. The facts that 
determine what is said include facts that determine what kinds of assertions count as 
follow-up assertions from these wildcard sentences. While we may not be able to 
interpret these sentences we accept that they have nothing to do with representing 
certain possible worlds. For instance, the sentence 'democracy is the will of the 
people' will presumably not accommodate for 'there is more annual rainfall in the 
north of Australia than in the south' since even in their uninterpreted senses we all 
know the two sentences have nothing to do with one another. Sentences utilizing the 
word 'democracy' and 'the will of the people' are almost never used to prove a point 
about rainfall. Yet when two sentences are commonly used in the same argument 
accommodation will often occur. As Lewis says (1979: 347), "conversational score 
does tend to evolve in such a way as is required in order to make whatever occurs 
count as correct play". In a political argument this sort of 'wild card' accommodation 
is cheating.'"' 
2,5. Consistency 
An explicit account of consistency is now possible. Providing we are held to this 
constraint of consistency we have grounds for substantive agreement. That is, 
agreement that will hold firm despite changing circumstances. 
Lewis argues that the main difference between a baseball score and a conversational score is that the 
latter involves accomtnodation: 
"Suppose the batter walks to first base after only three balls. His behavior would be correct play if 
there were four balls rather than three. That 's just too bad - his behavior does not at all make it the 
case that there are four balls and his behavior is correct. Baseball has no rule of accommodation to the 
effect that if a fourth ball is required to make correct the play that occurs, then that very fact suffices to 
change the score so that straightway there are four balls. Language games [and conversation isl 
different" (Lewis, 1979: 346-347). 
My hope is to make political argument less like conversation on this front and more like baseball. 
Consistency gives the standard by which statements are accepted given past 
statements in a relevant conversation. In terms of the accepted propositions of the 
context-set, we can follow Stalnaker and define consistency as adherence to the 
following conditionals, 
CI .If P is a member of a set of accepted propositions, and P entails Q, then Q 
is a member of that set. 
C2.If P and Q are each members of a set of accepted propositions, then P&Q 
is a member of that set. 
C3.If P is a member of a set of accepted propositions, then not-P is not a 
member of that set. 
(Stalnaker, 1984: 82). 
Now, to be sure, consistency does not entail that individuals have to believe or desire 
P just that they are willing to commit to or accept P for the sake of the argument. 
This set of accepted proposition are propositions in the second dimension of the 
context-set, not the first (see next paragraph). C I , C2, and C3 all rely on the notion of 
a 'set of accepted propositions'. This set is my interpretation of 'the context of the 
prior conversation' in the sentence 'S can be consistently inferred from the context of 
the prior conversation'. With each consistent and meaningful assertion the 'set of 
accepted propositions' will narrow. 
Following my analysis of the two-dimensional theory of discourse in the previous 
section, we can describe this set as constituting the running conversational status in 
the second dimension of discourse. That is, the running total of different 
representations of possible worlds that are true/acceptable inferences in the 
conversational context. By this interpretation, C I , C2 and C3 constitute conditions 
for substantive consistency and substantive agreement over reasons in political 
argument not just some loose and easily gerrymandered sort of linguistic or verbal 
agreement. The first dimension on the other hand does not have anything to do with 
this sort of consistency. It functions at once as a means to communicate information 
(not to be confused for a proxy of that information), but at the same time is a firewall 
between such information and the pure content of a statement. By the 'pure content' 
of a statement I mean a function from possible worlds into truth-values or the 
statement's propositional content. The running conversational status in the second 
dimension will be the deck of cards, with the firewall preventing a pure and noiseless 
interaction with that deck. Codes for breaking down this firewall will be written into 
the cards in the deck, but if there is a lot of noise distorting information of the card 
deck in the first place, then these codes will not always help. It is this noise that 
makes it tricky to ascribe consistency conditions to political argument. When there is 
a defective context-set in the first dimension, then it is easy to make consistency 
ascriptions indeterminate. 
We do not want to equate acceptance with consistency. Yet C I , C2 and C3 are quite 
passive conditions. They are like the economist's notion of consistency in that any 
proposition that has been accepted can be explained in terms of these conditions, just 
like any choice a consumer has can be explained by beliefs and desires that make it 
consistent.''^ This constitutes a significant chunk of the problem of rhetoric: any 
statement can be interpreted as being consistent if one makes enough adjustments to 
their assumptions about the meaning of terms. The economist just has to change their 
assumptions about the consumer's tastes or desires to interpret consistent choice. 
They re-configure the dials and switches of their hypothesis to make sure they keep to 
this theoretical constraint - if too much needs to be rejigged though the hypothesis 
fails. Likewise, the heavy theoretical lifting in political argument comes from 
adjusting and toggling the dials and switches to make reasons and positions 
consistent. For example, Rawls adjusted the dials on the information available to 
agents to create an environment where agents could come to consistent (thinly 
rational) decisions. Since 1 have already rejected the Rawlsian adjustment for 
political theory (see 1.4) the burden is to draw up a new set of dials and switches for 
the interpretation of reasons in political argument. 
The problem of rhetoric serves as the principal methodological problem to ensuring 
consistency. Roughly, any assertion can be made out to be consistent with enough 
interpretative accommodation. Where do we set the limits? Just as much as 
somebody can charge the economist for a narrow-minded refusal to update 
assumptions about belief and desire when interpreting consumers to be inconsistent 
In epistemic logic the closure condition ' If P is a member of a set of accepted propositions and P 
entails Q, then Q is a member of that set' (CI) is quite controversial. Nevertheless, I do not think such 
controversy renders CI any less passive, since the consistency conditions we are concerned with here 
have nothing to do with entailment with respect to individual knowledge. Their scope is instead 
restricted to acceptance in the context of conversation and any difficulty adhering to it in political 
argument will presumably be because of first-dimensional complications. 
with their choices, a demagogue can accuse their audience for narrow-mindedness in 
their assumptions about meaning if their audience accuses them of inconsistency. 
As Macintyre (1988: 380) puts it, 
"Examples of . . . incommensurability can be drawn from the beliefs expressed in rival schemes of 
naming. The translator from language-in-use A to language-in-use B of such a scheme will have to 
explain the scheme of naming in A to those whose language is B in terms of the beliefs of the members 
of this latter community. The scheme of naming in A, that is, will have to be explained in terms of its 
differences f rom naming in B, but so to explain will be to exhibit A ' s scheme of meaning as lacking in 
justification, as in some ways defective. To understand the translation-plus-explanation into B will 
entail for those whose language is B rejecting the beliefs so explained." 
So simply defining terms does not help the situation if somebody claims a clash of 
traditions is afoot. If a demagogue is accused of inconsistency, they can just return 
that they have been misinterpreted and that - if they cannot cut it with definitions -
they will always be misinterpreted on the point even if they were to try and define 
their terms. The demagogue's assertions remain banked in the first-dimension and 
their audience is expected to accommodate it as a permanent wildcard. The 
demagogue therefore has a permanent 'get out of jail free' card from reasonable 
rejection. 
This is a problem that dogged the early descriptionists in analytic philosophy. They 
could give various descriptions of a term but it was always an arbitrary decision 
which descriptions were necessary and/or sufficient to give the meaning of that term. 
The name Aristotle usually substitutes for the descriptions 'the teacher of Alexander 
the Great ' , 'the student of Plato' , 'the founder of the Lyceum', and 'the author of the 
Nicomachean Ethics' but precisely which descriptions are necessary and which 
cluster of descriptions are sufficient to give the meaning of the name Aristotle and 
how these necessary and sufficient conditions are to be chosen was a hotly debated 
philosophical quandary. As Searle (1958: 171) writes. 
"Referring uses of 'Aristotle' presuppose the existence of an object of whom a sufficient but so far 
unspecified number of [descriptive] statements are true. To use a proper name referringly is to 
presuppose the truth of certain uniquely referring descriptive statements, but it is not ordinarily to 
assert these statements or even to indicate which exactly are presupposed.. . The question of what 
constitutes the criteria for 'Aristotle ' is generally left open; indeed it seldom in fact arises, and when it 
does arise it is we, the users of the name, who decide more or less arbitrarily what these criteria shall 
be." 
Which descriptions to keep as definitional and which to drop can turn into a deeply 
divided political issue as the essential contestedness theorists made plain around the 
same time these descriptionist positions were being formed. Definitions of this sort 
are the conventional way to repair a defective context-set, according to Stalnaker 
(2007: 258). To take Stalnaker's example: when somebody is under the mistaken 
impression that the word 'optician' refers to a specialist dealing with diseases of the 
eye, they might get worried if I told them 'I am going to the optician this afternoon' . 
The first-dimension of our conversation is defective, but it can be repaired by telling 
them something like, "An optician fits glasses, they are not doctors dealing in eye 
disease". This amounts to defining your way out of a defective context-set. Repairs 
for ambiguous terms in political argument though are not always as clear-cut. This is 
because agents are not primarily trying to convey information; they are trying to win 
the argument. There are genuine incentives to attaching certain criteria to political 
terms that have nothing to do with informative communication. Each cluster of 
descriptions for a political term chosen by the user of the term is likely to betray their 
conception of the good. The question of which criteria to use in these 'cluster 
concepts' therefore quickly descends into a political argument in its own right. This 
cluster is not simply limited to the certain descriptions that are supposed to count for 
the term in question, but also those terms used in the descriptions (as we saw in 1.5). 
These terms (the definiens) are often equally as ambiguous as their definiendum, e.g. 
"A democracy is a political association governed by the will of the people". 
Defective first-dimensions are not as easy to repair when somebody is not simply 
trying to convey information but is also trying to win an argument. 
Conceptual analysis is one approach to 'repairing' defective first dimensions of 
context-sets. Yet when somebody is skirting inconsistency by repairing the first 
dimension from an equally defective context-set, there is a problem. For example, 
J.S. Mill 's definition of liberty as 'the absence of tyranny' does not necessarily get 
any closer to repairing the first dimension since ' tyranny' is probably just as 
ambiguous as liberty. The idea that through each repair we are using less value-laden 
terminology will be criticized in chapters 4 and 5. If we accept a repair from a 
defective first dimension, we are no more the better than if we had just accepted the 
initial reason in the first place - and we can go on asking for repairs ad infinitum 
without getting anywhere in our analysis of the argument. Individuals can 
intentionally or unintentionally play the 'conversational defect ' strategy to avoid any 
charge of inconsistency. Political theorists are in the business of repairing defective 
context-sets in science and everyday conversation, yet if their ruse is to substitute 
complicated terms for definitions, then there is no way to ensure they are doing this 
with a non-defective context-set. This licenses the political theorist to dabble in 
professional demagoguery by cooking up new ways around reasonable rejections. 
The result is a collection of clever conjuring tricks and not necessarily anything 
substantive. The tactics engaged in by the early-descriptionsts and (to a degree) 
Stalnaker in his analysis of the context-set are not sufficient to meet the demands of 
political argument. We have a solid theoretical framework but still no method to 
overcome the problem of rhetoric. Our only alternative is to change tactic. 
The answer to this tactical demand comes by flipping the issue. While non-consistent 
assertions are still seemingly consistent with some artful fudging of language, can 
consistent assertions nevertheless be judged to be non-consistent? If we were having 
a perfectly polite conversation, with you asking how I was, and then suddenly I 
started barking 'WOOF GROAR ROWWWAR' at you, you would be quick to 
dismiss it as non-consistent (let alone inconsistent) and quick to check me into a 
mental institution. Yet say I believed that these words translated into English as 'I 
feel fine'. I was being perfectly consistent but my belief (genuine or not) that you 
should interpret what I said into the second-dimension of conversation was 
unreasonable. I was unreasonable even if I was consistent. Indeed, an attempt at 
rejecting a policy position by barking would count as an unreasonable rejection in any 
political community (that I am aware of) even if it were consistent barking. 
When somebody is seemingly consistent, what is a reasonable way to prove that they 
have not hijacked substantive argument with rhetoric? We can interpret the problem 
of rhetoric now, but this does not mean we have a real-world method for holding 
agents to substantive consistency. If there were a real-world method to check this it 
seems like it would fill out what reasonable argument is. We can be both consistent 
and unreasonable if we are not willing to subject our arguments to this method. So 
consistency is not sufficient for reasonableness. We can obviously be inconsistent 
and unreasonable. However, I think that it is impossible to be both inconsistent and 
yet reasonable when facing a scrupulous audience. In such a situation, the 
demagogue will be unable to produce a reasonable rejection. 
As I shall argue in the next chapter, such a method exists. The method is one of 
elimination: eliminating offending terms from an argument and then rephrasing the 
depleted sentences in a way that preserves their disagreement and/or agreement 
profiles (i.e. the acceptance or non-acceptance of the sentences by the audience and 
speaker) without re-using the eliminated terms. This process shrinks the first-
dimension of the context set without affecting the second dimension, and makes 
pivoting with the first-dimension to avoid ascriptions of inconsistency impossible. It 
does not restrict what we can say. Rather, it restricts the way in which we say it, 
leading to a more austere language in a piecemeal and structured way. This is a tonic 
for political theory that can constrain the conjuring tricks that are used to avoid 
reasonable rejection. 
Chapter 3 
Destructive Conceptual Analysis 
"It's a beautiful thing, the destruction of words 
It is a common platitude that good political theorists concern themselves with two 
basic tasks. That is, (1) to make the vocabulary of politics respectable for 
philosophical analysis in order to (2) assess the coherence of trade-offs between 
political values and unambiguously interpret empirical questions about such values. 
We should surely take (2) as a given. Such assessment is necessary in order to 
ascertain the logical and empirical feasibility of institutionalizing these value-
packages (see 1.3). However, doing this does not require that we do (1) first, in fact 
quite the reverse. 
As good political theorists we should ruthlessly eliminate political vocabulary when it 
is unhelpful to the end of substantive agreement. This does not imply we are greedy 
reductionists with political values like the utilitarians of old. It is just to put great 
faith in the expressive power of more austere vocabularies to fill the conceptual boots 
of such higher-order terminology. Linguistic sensitivity in political argument is only 
helpful in two specific contexts: during the opening stages of political argument and 
when agents are not in a position''' to engage in dialogue (and we have to work out 
their claims without their involvement). In all other contexts of political debate we 
should be open to eliminating words whenever, wherever and with whomever we 
choose. Very few words are sacred in political argument. As I will argue in this 
section, the only way to call out and reject reasoning that trips the problem of rhetoric 
as it was posed in the previous chapter is to shrink the first dimension of the context-
Syme telling Winston about 'Newspeak' in George Orwell 's Nineteen Eighty-four. 
" Just what this 'position' entails is not especially mysterious. Probably the most obvious position 
where this applies is when the agent is dead. Some might suggest that competence in the dominant 
language is a prerequisite for meaningful argument and they are usually right. However, this does not 
mean 'linguistic sensitivity' should be a one-way street. Communicating, eliminating and rephrasing is 
a practice just about all human beings can engage in, and the burden should not be solely designated to 
minority groups. Majorities must accommodate likewise. 
set in a piecemeal way that does not restrict what can be expressed in the second 
dimension. This is a solution that can be formalised in terms of the two-dimensional 
modal semantics in which the problem was posed. 
This is a particular brand of conceptual analysis. Standard conceptual analysis 
involves substituting words in a sentence for descriptions or synonyms in a way that 
preserves the meaning (or truth-conditions) of that sentence. What is peculiar to my 
brand is that we substitute the whole sentence, not just the single word. Certain words 
are picked from the initial sentence that are to be eliminated from further analysis and 
then, with these constraints in mind, the sentence is substituted for another sentence 
that shares the same relevant truth conditions (i.e. it would come out true in the same 
possible worlds relevant to the subject-matter). In so far as speaker or audience 
cannot give a reciprocally acceptable substitute sentence without using the words that 
have already been eliminated, then any posture (be it acceptance or contestation) they 
took towards the initial sentence was of no substance. Any disagreement over the 
sentence is pointless and any agreement is unstable. 
Instead of giving definitions for suspect terms then, which leads to the rhetorical 
regress (as in 1.5), we eliminate them from further argument and rephrase any 
statements that happened to use them in the past. Coupling this method with 
Scanlon's reasonable rejection thesis we fill out the requisite constraints of political 
argument, and bottom out at substantive and stable agreement. This method 
overcomes the problem of rhetoric. With it we can decisively interpret the sentence 
3 : 'S can be reasonably inferred from the context of the prior conversation'. Such a 
sentence (3) is presupposed with every assertion (S) in political argument and so a 
decisive interpretation of it gives us a decisive interpretation of the framework of 
political argument. 
The brand closely follows David Chalmers' (1996, 2011 & 2013) analysis of verbal 
disputes and vocabulary exhaustion but is chosen more for practical reasons than 
philosophical. By the piecemeal elimination of terms in an argument the first 
dimension of an argument's context-set contracts. The fewer terms and phrases 
arguers have to draw on, the less opportunity there is for them to fudge their 
arguments by way of defective context-sets. By removing tricky terms the means 
arguers have to mislead themselves and/or their audience will be restricted. The rub 
is that we do not constrain what we can say, just the manner in which we say it. One 
of the most important features of the two-dimensional framework is that it clearly 
distinguishes between the vehicles of meaning (which we are trying to restrict) and its 
content (which we are not). The position arguers find themselves in after dabbling 
with this sort of conceptual analysis resembles the straitjacket of Rawls' original 
position, but unlike the original position there is no artificial restrictions on 
information or any sort of dubious hypotheticals at play. Contractors reach their 
position gradually"*^ and methodically (they strap and buckle their jackets themselves) 
in a way that is almost as natural as the procession of any old conversation. 
The method leads to an inversion for political theory. In the face of confusion and 
disagreement, many political theorists have given great store to the explication, 
clarification and reconstruction of political terminology (1). The argument in this 
chapter, on the other hand, gives great store to its destruction. 
3.1 The Right Sort of Abstraction 
There are currently three dominant approaches to abstraction in political theory. Each 
is used to "facilitate the potential bridging of the difference between identifiable and 
general interest" (Buchanan, 1987: 247) in argument. John Rawls' original position 
(1999 [1971]) bridges this difference by imposing artificial constraints on information 
so that contractors are unaware of their own identifiable interests. Jiirgen Habermas 
(1984) does the bridging by imposing 'ideal speech conditions' that ensure an equal 
footing and amicable intention for all arguers regardless of their social positions."® 
Finally, James Buchanan's 'veil of uncertainty' (1987, 1988 and 1991) abstracts from 
This is my problem with the scientific theory-building approaches to conceptual analysis (see 
Chapter 4). They claim that certain schemes , possessed by certain well- informed arguers, are superior 
to other arguers, which I think is assumptive at best. 
Habermas suggests these condit ions ensure that "the structure of the ideal speech situation (which 
means that the discourse is) immunised against repression and inequality in a special way . . . The 
structures of a ritualised competi t ion for the better a rguments . . . The structures that determine the 
construction of individual arguments and their interrelations" (1984: 25). It should also be noted that 
Habermas does not align himself with the contractarian tradition however I still find his arguments 
relevant to the discussion at hand. 
the actual effects of constitutional choice to a level of generality where arguers cannot 
be sure of the choice's specific impact on their identifiable interests. 
These abstractions are ideals only and are usually practically unrealizable. While 
there is nothing wrong with it as such it does give opponents of liberal theory grist to 
work with. Incompletely meeting the ideals can often rig the abstractions to serve 
certain interests at the expense of others. Restricting information on an arbitrary 
basis, generalizing to uncertainty only some of the time and removing only a few 
special interests from the speech situation will rig the choice situation arbitrarily in 
favour of the certain lucky interests that are served by such an arbitrary distribution of 
information (Lukes, 1972; Nagel, 1973; Pettit, 1974; Sen, 2009), certainty (Muller, 
1998) and representation (Sanders, 1997; Przeworski, 1998; Mouffe, 1999; Young, 
1996, 2000, 2001). Accusations that the mechanisms rig the deck in favour of 
'Western individualism' (Macintyre, 1988; Taylor, 1989; Sandel, 1998) that typically 
get hurled over from the communitarian side of the fence are therefore not altogether 
easy to overcome. 1 call this (rather loosely) the communitarian critique. 1 must note 
though that many of the authors cited in this paragraph strongly reject the 
communitarian critique of liberalism. However, 1 suspect they would concede that 
the particular critiques referenced could, in isolation, be used to bolster the 
communitarian position. 
My proposal is a fourth type of abstraction for political theory that functions within 
the scope of reasonable rejection. On top of other benefits like precision I do not 
think it leaves the door open to a communitarian critique. In fact, I think it overcomes 
all the criticisms of abstractionist strategies in liberal political theory referenced 
above. What is more, it completes the thesis of reasonable rejection that has been 
frequently criticized for not abstracting and makes it ripe for application in political 
theory. Indeed, as the thesis of reasonable rejection has so far been developed 
(Scanlon, 1982 & 1992; Barry, 1996; Dowding, 2013) there has been no candidate 
abstraction to supplement it with. This has left the thesis incomplete. The critic can 
charge anybody waving the reasonable rejection card with simply imposing his or her 
own biased interpretation of 'reasonable' onto the argument. Indeed, Phillip Pettit 
suggests such a complaint is common, 
"A problem for Scanlon's approach that is often raised is that he needs to be able to explain 
what it is that makes an objection or complaint reasonable, without appealing to non-
contractual matters; otherwise, his theory won ' t be a properly contractual account of what 
rightness or justice is. A similar difficulty arises for Barry. He doesn't ever explain how to tell 
if a complaint is reasonable, and this means that the heuristic he claims to use is 
underspecified. Good as his discussions of particular issues are, it is not unequivocally clear 
that they are governed by an independent heuristic. In leaving the notion of what is 
"reasonable" undefined, he gives himself a suspect degree of freedom in developing his 
views; he leaves himself free to go where intuition leads, bending the heuristic to his 
purposes." (Pettit, 1996) 
Rawls, Buchanan and Habermas used their abstraction devices as analytical constraint 
to fill out the specification of reasonableness and rationality in a way that did not just 
rely on their intuition. Reasonable rejection theorists are yet to offer such constraint. 
Where Rawls and Buchanan's contractors could exercise a 'no questions asked veto' , 
the reasonable rejection thesis maintains that any veto exercised in the contract 
situation must be justifiable in political argument. This is a strategy to ensure vetoes 
could only ever be exercised in the general interest rather than in self-interest. Yet if 
somebody were to completely bullshit me with fine-tuned obscurant rhetoric I might 
have to cave and accept their position as reasonable because they say it is and I have 
no way to call them out on it. The so-called general interest supposedly preserved in 
argument can quickly become the demagogue's own self-interest. What we need is 
some sort of device that we can constrain the demagogue with to make sure they do 
not impose their particular interests into considerations of reasonableness. 
Dowding (2013) has suggested Barry's interpretation of 'reasonable' in Justice as 
Impartiality can be filled out by the notion of consistency developed in Barry's earlier 
work Political Argument. As I have suggested in the previous chapter though this 
account of consistency is quite complex especially when it relies on a Gricean theory 
of meaning (as Barry does, see 2.3.5). If we update it to fit with benign two-
dimensionalism things start to look more promising. Consistent conversation is 
conversation constrained by C I , C2 and C3 in the second dimension of discourse. 
Yet individuals could still circumvent any decisive interpretation of inconsistency by 
gerrymandering the first dimension. They can re-define their way out of trouble and 
claim they were simply the victims of faulty interpretation. If we cannot determine 
what has been said, then we cannot determine whether what was said was consistent 
or not. 
This is a problem that does not warrant giving up on the thesis of reasonable rejection. 
In fact, it gives us the hook we need to pursue the proposed fourth type of abstraction. 
What we need to abstract from in order to overcome the problem is the opportunity 
for arguers to idiom skip their way around reasonable rejection. That opportunity 
comes in the first dimension of discourse. We are therefore not concerned with any 
sort of abstraction on the second dimension, unlike Rawls, Habermas and Buchanan 
who all abstract from the second. With their abstractions, the common ground 
between arguers over the facts that determine whether what is said is true is being 
restricted.^" I suggest we should instead restrict the facts that determine what is said. 
So this fourth kind of abstraction must be abstraction in the first dimension (unlike the 
other three) to overcome the principal objection to reasonable rejection. If we can do 
this in an acceptable way I see very little prospect for any sustained critique of this 
interpretation of political argument: the thesis of reasonable rejection will be 
complete. 
3.2 Verbal Disputes and Non-substantive Reasoning 
While benign two-dimensionalism has so far provided the machinery of the account, 
it is still missing its key. We have located the problem of reasonable rejection in the 
first dimension of discourse but so far have not argued for any method to overcome it. 
The context-set discussed in the previous chapter gives the interpretation of context of 
the prior conversation in the sentence can be reasonably inferred from the context 
of the prior conversation' however a decisive interpretation of 'reasonably' and 
reasonable inference is still blowing in the ether. This section proposes a decisive 
interpretation, which serves as the key to the machine. 
I suppose Habermas' ideal speech conditions do not technically restrict what can be acceptably said 
and rather restrict the position from which something is said. Some might suggest then that he shares 
my lack of concern with respect to abstracting in the second dimension. However changing the 
conditions from where a speaker is speaking from does not change the facts that d^e rmine what was 
said. Perhaps what was said would not have been said (or said very differently) if there were greater 
inequalities present, but nothing has changed with respect to the facts that determine what was said 
What It does is increase the level of trust that what somebody « saying « true (especially when they 
are talking about themselves) or at least concerned with the truth. This is a function on the facts that 
determine whether what is said is true or not and acceptable or not. Ideal speech conditions therefore 
pertain to the second dimension of conversation rather than the first. 
Definitions will not start the engine. If a term is being hijacked for political gain and 
we think we can strictly constrain the first dimension by asking the hijackers to give 
us a definition, we are being naive. We can be led in circles quite easily. William 
Connolly (1983: 85-139) suggests the term 'social power' is given an inflated 
definition when arguers want to attribute responsibility to agents and deflated when 
agents want to avoid responsibility (with the deflated version usually being the one 
trumpeted by authorities). The terms that are added and removed might include 
persuasion, manipulation, coercion, deterrence, anticipatory surrender, force and so 
on. Yet none of these terms have a hard and fast definition either (especially 
manipulation and coercion) and so can likewise be inflated and deflated to serve 
political interests. The statement, 'All those with social power must be held 
accountable in ways a, b and c' might therefore be quite empty despite seeming to be 
a well-formed and meaningful sentence. In theory, a political leader could make this 
statement and - if their demagoguery and linguistic gerrymandering is good enough -
avoid the inference with no inconsistency that they, despite being a political authority, 
must be accountable in ways a, b, and c. Of course there will be some constraint and I 
am by no means suggesting that it would not help if a politician defined some of the 
terms they were using, but it is not strict constraint in a way that is aspired to by most 
(most) political theorists. Given academic discourse usually aspires to more rigorous 
and precise discourse than parliamentarians, the linguistic gerrymandering problem is 
more pronounced in academia. I will further critique this strategy of 'description 
finding' or definition giving for political terms in the following two chapters and so 
will leave the discussion here for now. 
The key is not in finding descriptions that preserve the truth conditions of sentences 
when they are substituted for political terms, but to find candidate sentences that can 
be substituted for the initial sentence in a way that preserves agreement profiles. By 
agreement profile I mean the sentence's acceptability with respect to the second-
dimension of the context-set - whether or not the sentence is still true given the 
presupposed facts (see 2.4.2). Political theorists should therefore subscribe to the 
mantra of 'sentence finding' rather than 'description or definition finding'. This 
strategy has been adopted by David Chalmers (2011 & 2013) to identify a set of 
pointless disputes in philosophy. Instead of substituting a political term T for a 
description, we eliminate T and substitute the whole sentence in which T was used. 
We rephrase the sentence in a way that preserves its truth-conditions but which does 
not re-use the term T. Crucially, the term 7 i s then eliminated from the remainder of 
our argument. Slowly our vocabulary will be diminished and we will start speaking 
in increasingly austere ways. If we cannot rephrase the sentence 3 without using T in 
a way that preserves 3 ' s agreement and disagreement profiles then this is evidence 
that the agreement or disagreement was purely verbal in nature and not at all 
substantive. The agreement or disagreement we register over 3 is explained "in 
virtue" of our agreement or disagreement over some trivial linguistic fact (Chalmers, 
2011: 523). This trivial linguistic fact is part of the first dimension of discourse so we 
ideally shrink the first dimension by removing that fact from the context-set and with 
it the possibility of disagreement over important political subjects being explained in 
virtue of that trivial disagreement. While Chalmers does not explicitly utilize 
Stalnaker's framework, his analysis fits neatly within it. 
An agreement profile catalogues each agent's disposition to agree or disagree with the 
sentence 3 . Say the set of agents in an argument contains i,j and k. A complete 
agreement profile for a sentence 3 used in the argument would look something like 
the following. 
Agent i agrees with 3 , agent j disagrees with 3 , agent k agrees with 3 . 
When argument takes the guise of justification the subject sentence 3 of the 
acceptance profile is not directly representing anything about the argument's subject 
matter. Instead 3 contains an embedded sentence S where S directly concerns the 
argument's subject. The profile would contain the agents' agreement to the sentence 
3 : ' 5 can be reasonably inferred from the context of the prior conversation", rather 
than their agreement with the truth of S itself. Agents do not have to agree or disagree 
with the truth or falsity of what is said with respect to the subject matter (i.e. S). They 
only need to agree or disagree over whether or not what is said (S) follows from what 
has been said ("the context of the prior conversation" or in other words the context-
set). In political theory we must therefore substitute the embedded sentence S for 
another without using the eliminated term and see whether we can preserve our 
agreement or disagreement over the embedding sentence 3 : "5" can be reasonably 
inferred from the context of the prior conversation'. That is to say, to see whether the 
supposed second dimensional function of S can be preserved once the first dimension 
has been adequately constrained (i.e. shrunk). This way we can make it increasingly 
difficult to tolerate the two first-dimensional defects to the context-set described in 
sections 2.4.3.1 and 2.4.3.2. 
This is no doubt a complication that is not needed in Chalmers' philosophical account 
- which focuses more on factual claims independently of argument and justification -
however 1 do not think it should dent the plausibility of my account. The correct 
interpretation of the embedding sentence 3 has been one of the principal concerns for 
the dissertation so far. The proposed interpretation suggests individuals must be open 
to substituting the embedded sentence S for another in a way that preserves the 
agreement profile of the embedding sentence 3 and also does not contain the chosen 
word T eliminated from S. Unless this occurs there is no adequate interpretation of 
'reasonableness' that I can think of and the whole process of political argument is left 
in the theoretical doldrums. This proposed interpretation is what I call destructive 
conceptual analysis. 
Destructive conceptual analysis is the proposed fourth type of abstraction for political 
theory. It ties off the interpretation of reasonableness in the thesis of reasonable 
rejection. The sentence 3 ' 5 can be reasonably inferred from the context of the prior 
conversation', which is the presupposed sentence framing all reasons that are given in 
political argument, therefore has a precise and methodological interpretation. 
We tie the interpretation of reasonableness off by introducing the elimination 
constraint on top of the three conditions of consistency introduced in 2.5. If political 
theorists cannot rephrase their point then we can assume there was not much of a 
point to begin with. If they nevertheless maintain that their point should be accepted 
into the second dimension of the context set then they are simply being unreasonable 
and their proposed justification can be rejected as unreasonable. Arguers must be 
willing to engage in elimination if they are to frame their argument in a way that is 
open to reasonable rejection. In the same way that scientists propose falsifiable 
hypotheses, political theorists must propose rejectable argument and to do this they 
must be willing to eliminate. What is more the process of elimination proceeds 
gradually (word by word, rephrase by rephrase). In this sense it does not leave the 
door open for the communitarian critique outlined in the previous section. It is a 
different brand of abstractionism that can sidestep the criticisms hurled at the ideal 
abstractions of Rawls, Buchanan and Habermas. This brand occurs gradually and by 
piecemeal. It pays heed to Simone Chambers' (1995: 250) suggestion that 
"consensual agreement, if and when it does emerge, emerges gradually and is 
fragmentary and partial". It does not restrict information, generalize to uncertainty or 
represent particular interests in an arbitrary way but still aims towards an ideal where 
there is no room for self-serving rhetoric or unequal bargaining positions. 
3 3 . Bedrock, Formality, Subscript and Competency 
This section will follow Chalmers' paper "Verbal Disputes' to defend the method of 
elimination against potential philosophical qualms. It is not to defend the method in 
philosophy per se, but to defend its philosophical respectability for use in political 
argument. In particular, the austerity aimed at encourages the charge of 
'reductionism' that has developed into an insult in many academic departments, 
particularly in the social sciences, and one that has (in my mind, hastily) been directed 
at my approach. Frankly, I am not sure why my proposed abstraction could be 
construed as reductionist and, for instance, Habermas' could not but the only way to 
defend the account from such a charge is to explain the philosophy behind it as best 
one can and show that there are no unappealing assumptions lurking in the fog. 
The set of pointless disputes Chalmers is concerned with is what he calls verbal 
disputes. He defines them accordingly. 
"A dispute over D is (broadly) verbal when, for some expression Tin D, the parties disagree about the 
meanmg of T, and the dispute over D arises wholly in virtue of this disagreement regarding T' (2011: 
Where I use D Chalmers uses S. I have changed the symbols here to accommodate the differences 
between political and philosophical argument and maintain the usage of S for the embedded sentence 
as per the previous section. 
For example, Frank says to Jill in conversation 'I got to the bank this afternoon' but 
Jill does not accept the assertion. Jill knows Frank did not go because she was there 
all day trying to take out a mortgage on her house. Frank however meant that he had 
finally been able to swim from his jetty to the riverbank on the other side of the river. 
The disagreement is entirely verbal and would be overcome by eliminating the term 
'bank' since there are no other words that range over both the financial institution and 
the land that slopes down to a river. The quote seems to imply that disagreement has 
to be dependent on one term Tand one term alone. However, I see no reason not to 
allow for there being multiple terms in the contested sentence that are sufficient to 
render the disagreement verbal. 
While Chalmers focuses on philosophical disputes and disagreement, he suggests (in 
passing) that acceptance and agreement can also be merely verbal (Chalmers, 2011: 
526). So if agents accept 3 in virtue of some disagreement over the meaning of some 
term Tin 3, then this acceptance is just as non-substantive as a verbal dispute. As 
suggested in the introduction (1.5.1) this sort of non-substantiveness is plausibly even 
more destabilizing than non-substantive disagreement. Take another example: Frank 
and James are getting ready to go camping. Frank finishes loading the car and 
exclaims loudly 'Let ' s go camp!' James nods but then returns to his room. An hour 
later he returns dressed completely in drag. Verbal agreements can lead to 
inefficiencies (to the tune of an hour for the campers) just as much as verbal 
disagreements. With the addition of purely verbal agreement and acceptance some 
might query whether Chalmers' definition applies to reasons that are accepted in 
discourse but have no interpretation from the first-dimension into the second-
dimension (see. 2.4.3.2). This query demands an innocuous revision to Chalmers' 
definition, 
A dispute over or acceptance of D is (broadly) verbal when, for some expression Tin D, the parties 
have defective beliefs about the meaning of T, and a necessary condition for the particular dispute or 
acceptance over D is the defective beliefs regarding T. 
Since there need not be any genuine "disagreement regarding T ' to trip the problem 
of rhetoric, this revision is mandatory for my interpretation of political argument but 
does not seem to significantly alter Chalmers' position. The above definition 
generalizes the phenomenon of verbal disputes into a large (possibly exhaustive) class 
of linguistic gerrymandering that, as I have defined it, constitutes the problem of 
rhetoric. Without the benign two-dimensional framework's interpretation of defective 
beliefs about the meaning of T (a defective first-dimension of the context-set) I doubt 
such a generalization would be possible. It captures both scenarios that trip the 
problem of rhetoric, as described in 2.4.3.1 and 2.4.3.2. 
The principal philosophical qualm with this account is probably with respect to the 
idea of vocabulary exhaustion. If we are so ruthless with our elimination of words 
surely there will come a point where we can no longer say anything at all given we 
have eliminated every possible candidate word for making our point. If somebody 
has eliminated all their words (and the first dimension is completely empty) they 
obviously cannot say anything more because they have nothing with which to say it. 
The question then becomes where the stopping point is along with the caution that if 
we specify a stopping point we have to explain why it is not an arbitrary and non-
neutral stopping point. Another way of putting this is that the first dimension of the 
context-set cannot be shrunk to such a degree that it removes the possibility of 
making proposals to discard certain possible states of affairs from the context-set's 
second dimension. 
There are terms that cannot be eliminated. There are terms where we have to say 
something like, 'No, this one's bedrock.' This begs the question though, if there are 
certain words that cannot be eliminated then why not claim terms like 'freedom' and 
'equality' are bedrock? Surely they are important terms with important histories that 
take on conceptual distinctions that cannot be captured with other words. Political 
terms have, perhaps more than any other set of terms, stood up to "the long test of 
survival of the fittest" in our ordinary discourse, as J.L. Austin put it, and are 
therefore "more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonable practical matters, than 
any that you or I are likely to think up in our armchair of an afternoon" (1970: 182). 
They are important terms with important histories, but I maintain any conceptual 
distinctions that they capture can be described with alternative 'non-political' terms. 
Perhaps these terms might require more complicated sentences that are far from 
elegant, but elegance and complication are not the concern of the political theorist. 
The privileged set of non-eliminable terms does not include any of the stock political 
vocabulary. They are not 'bedrock terms' that are used in, what Chalmers calls, 
'bedrock disputes'. If we were to eliminate bedrock terms on top of every other term 
we would lose our ability to make substantive distinctions concerning our subject 
matter in the second dimension of conversation. If we were say to eliminate all moral 
terms like 'right' , 'ought' , 'good', etc. then we may agree on all the non-moral facts 
but still disagree on what the right thing to do is and have no way of stating our 
disagreement. It would be philosophical overreach to say all moral agreement and 
disagreement is non-substantive. Eliminating all our moral terms aside from 'the 
good' gets us to bedrock: "a substantive dispute involving a concept so basic that 
there is no hope of clarifying the dispute in more basic terms (Chalmers, 2011: 543). 
We can play the 'bedrock' card (which might be considered argumentative trumps by 
some) only rarely. Some might suggest that there is no hope of clarifying disputes 
using political terminology in more basic terms. They might suggest that there is no 
reason to attribute the predicate 'verbal' to certain disputes in political argument 
anymore than there is reason to attribute them with the 'bedrock' predicate. Such a 
claim implies a theoretical indeterminacy to Chalmers' account and suggests that the 
bedrock card can be played indiscriminately - thus stagnating my hope of a decisive 
method to judge reasonable political argument. Given we cannot rephrase moral 
disagreements without the term 'good' and its cognates, why say that these are 
bedrock disagreements whereas when we cannot rephrase disputes once we drop the 
term 'social power', for example, we say that they are verbal disputes? 
One answer I think is to simply point to instances where disputes between competent 
speakers have or could have been explained by using more basic terms. Cranking up 
the competency metre, assume arguers take their interpretation of 'social power' from 
one of the prominent interpretations in the academic literature. One arguer might be 
shocked to hear the other assert that S: 'the owners of capital have just as much - if 
not more - social power in modem liberal democracies as voters do' and register 
strong disagreement. Say they have been reading Chalmers (or this chapter) and 
suggest the method of elimination to sort out this odd disagreement. They find it odd 
because they were agreeing on everything up to this point. So they eliminate the term 
'social power' and attempt to find an acceptable rephrase but to no avail. Arguer i 
rephrases the dispute as A: [the owners of capital have just as strong - if not stronger 
- an ability to overcome resistance (Weber, 1978, Barry, 2002; 2003) in modem 
liberal democracies as voters do] whereas arguer j rephrases it B: [the owners of 
capital have just as strong - if not stronger - an ability to deliberately alter the 
incentive structures of others (Dowding, 1991) in modem liberal democracies as 
voters do]. Neither accepts the other's rephrase which proves that their original 
disagreement was verbal. Yet why is this not a bedrock dispute? The answer is that 
competent users can give candidate rephrases whereas with bedrock disputes they 
cannot. 
3.3.3 Conceptions of the Good as Bedrock 
Consider again a moral dispute. Agent i says 'It is morally wrong to eat meat ' , which 
arguer j disagrees with. I do not think this dispute can be put in more basic terms 
other than more specific descriptions for 'to eat' and 'meat ' . One intuitive way to 
bring this out is by eliminating 'morally wrong' and trying to rephrase the 
disagreement. If we bar rephrasing in terms of cognates of 'morally wrong' like 
' immoral ' , 'should/ought not' and of course 'good/bad', I do not think arguers i and j 
could even propose candidate rephrases. After 'social power' was eliminated i and j 
proposed A and B respectively, but neither one accepted the other. The very ability 
for i and j to propose A and B is enough, I suggest, to render their disagreement over 
S as being verbal. On the other hand, once the moral primitives are eliminated the 
possibility of proposing candidate rephrases - whether or not they are accepted - is 
off the table. This inability of competent language users to propose candidate 
rephrases is a consequence of attempting to eliminate bedrock expressions. Such a 
consequence is not explicitly sketched in Chalmers' account but I think it follows 
quite naturally. A dispute is verbal when there is a set of candidate rephrases, where 
to be a candidate one of the arguers has to deem it acceptable (a condition of it being 
proposed in the first place!) A dispute is bedrock if the set of candidate rephrases 
among competent arguers is empty. This puts any suggestion that essentially 
contested concepts are bedrock expressions on the wrong track (this will be pursued 
further in 5.1). 
Some might accuse me of fudging my way around their philosophical qualms by 
introducing the term 'competency' to explain the difference between bedrock and 
verbal disputes. I suppose this might skew some armchair political arguments. 
However, as I hope I have made plain, the method I am proposing is for academic 
discussion more than parliamentary discourse or pub debate and so a degree of 
competency can be assumed (at the very least, it is usually assumed by the broader 
public). If somebody can state a rephrase for a dispute that was assumed to be 
bedrock once the assumed bedrock expression had been eliminated, then the 
assumption of bedrock was obviously wrong. Questioning the platitudes of bedrock 
ascription is one of the jobs of philosophy. Other disciplines (like political theory) are 
well served to assume such ascriptions are the most competent ascriptions humankind 
can produce and so the use of the term 'competency' is here justified. 
There is one problem left over. If political terms are appraisive (i.e. they praise 
certain states of affairs as 'good') why not rephrase disagreements over 'the good' in 
terms of political terminology rather than vice versa? 1 think the latter - which is my 
suggestion - is certainly the more intuitive, but to bolster this intuition we need a 
technical justification. A thought experiment fits the bill. A linguistic community 
without a simple expression referring to freedom but with a robust natural language 
would still be able to meaningfully refer to the same property (with a conjunction or 
disjunction of other terms) and represent the same possible worlds as those 
communities that possessed the expression. That is, they would still be able to 
describe the property of freedom with a complex of other expressions including some 
expression for the good. A linguistic community without an expression for the good 
on the other hand might be able to talk about 'social justice' and ' freedom' but they 
would not be able to describe these properties as appraisive and accordingly explain 
why they count for points in political argument. Somebody who disagrees with their 
arguments would be able to swiftly reject them by demanding an explanation why 
such properties serve any function in justifying their position. The individual would 
be able to reasonably reject the community's political arguments whenever they so 
chose. Another way to put the distinction is that political terminology is 'essentially 
contested' (as far as Gallie is concerned) in so far as individuals have different 
definitions for the terms whereas conceptions of 'the good' might be construed as 
essentially contested in so far as individuals pick out different extensions with the 
term despite being unable to give a definition for it. Chalmers does not (to my 
knowledge) subscribe to this rationale for breaking the indeterminacy between 
bedrock and non-bedrock disputes/expressions and seems to rely on intuition to make 
his case, but we share the same conclusions concerning the method of elimination's 
analytical prowess and the existence of these bedrock expressions. 
Chalmers draws up a rough and provisional list of suggestions for these bedrock 
expressions. One of the powerful things about his account is that "the question of 
which concepts are bedrock is a successor to the question: what are the concepts in 
terms of which all other concepts can be defined or analyzed? But unlike that 
question, it does not require that definitions and analyses are possible" (2011: 550). It 
flips old philosophical debates about the interpretation of primitive expressions on 
their head. A laundry list of primitives will do with no definition necessary. Unless 
someone can come along and propose candidate rephrases of bedrock disputes 
without using any of the proposed primitives, the list stands. 
Here is a candidate list gleaned from Chalmers' article, 
1) 'Consciousness'^^ 
2) The 'good' (and cognates like 'moral ' , ' r ight ' , 'better than' , etc.) 
3) Existential and universal quantifiers ( 'There is an x such that' and 'For all x 
such that') 
4) Basic indexicals ( T , 'me ' , 'here ' , 'you') and demonstratives ( ' that ' , ' this ') 
Possible additions might include, 
5) 'Possibility' and 'necessity' 
6) 'Wor ld ' o r ' s t a t e of affairs' 
Some might note that I have not included sentential connectives like negations, 
conditionals, conjunctions, disjunctions, etc. in the above list of primitives. Sentential 
connectives can be interpreted in terms of Stalnaker's model of discourse, so they 
have not been included (Chalmers does not include them either). The above list 
exhausts the extension of 'essentially contested concepts' and therefore closes the 
Although note Dennett 's retort in Intuition Pumps (2013: 310-318). 
open-ended nature of language in political argument that otherwise rendered Gallie's 
thesis so inclusive that it was meaningless (see section 2.1). 
There is one set of bedrock expressions that are especially important for my 
interpretation of political argument. They are the set of moral cognates introduced in 
this section's opening paragraph. Different conceptions of the 'good' are treated as 
basic along with its cognates like 'moral ' and 'better t han ' . " This mirrors the 
bedrock nature of the 'good' in liberal theory and the political problem introduced in 
the introduction (1.2), namely, how can we peacefully coexist given we have different 
interpretations of the good? We should avoid focusing on what these conceptions of 
the good ought to be^" or what the correct interpretation of the word is and instead 
focus on what can be done given these differing conceptions exist - which are 
bedrock disputes for all intents and purposes. Destructive conceptual analysis shares 
with liberal theory an agnosticism towards conceptions of 'the good'. It is 
accordingly a perfect fit: we can use it to complete the thesis of reasonable rejection 
without violating any of the liberal assumptions that led to the thesis in the first place. 
Say we agree on all the relevant empirical facts but 1 claim it is morally wrong to eat 
meat and you disagree. The political question is not who is correct, but rather how to 
ensure a peaceful coexistence given this difference of opinion over the good. It might 
happen that there is no way to peacefully coexist if one interpretation is tolerated. We 
can quite meaningfully talk of our conceptions of the good and therefore which 
conceptions can be tolerated and which not, but we cannot expect to be able to change 
such conceptions with the mechanism of political argument. It is the job of political 
argument to justify to those whose interpretations of the good are not tolerated why 
their conceptions had to be chopped and why they should tolerate the compromise. 
That is, pre-empt any candidate rejections from the losers' conceptions of the good. 
When we remove the term 'good' and its cognates like 'moral ' , the verbs 'should' and 
'ought ' , and the two-place predicate 'x is better than y' it seems highly unlikely that a 
" For example, budding economists might prefer to use the two-place predicate 'x is better than y ' that 
is a rough cognate of the term 'good ' . 
^^  The circularity of this statement is hopefully obvious. The 'should' here implies a conception of the 
good to interpret other conceptions of the good, which is of little interest (presumably) to adherents of 
the other conceptions. 
candidate rephrase of a sentence that initially used those terms could be proposed. 
We can still give reasons for and defend our conception of the good, but there is no 
room for a decisive reasonable rejection of that conception because we cannot hold 
such reasoning to account through the rephrasing constraint. We cannot constrain 
them accordingly simply because they will not have the linguistic resources needed to 
rephrase. They cannot rephrase irrespective of whether other arguers could accept a 
rephrase (if a rephrase were possible) or not. 
3.3.1 The Subscript Gambit and Tradition 
Arguers may not wish to drop eliminated terms from their argument altogether. The 
process of elimination might be - despite yielding a decisive result - messy and 
pedantic to maintain over the course of an ongoing conversation. This is especially 
the case when there are large numbers of participants (as there usually is with political 
arguments). For example, arguers might wish to retain the word 'justice' in 
conversation even though they accept they have different interpretations of the word. 
In such a case we introduce subscript for the different interpretations: arguer i is 
talking about 'justicei' and arguer j is talking about 'justice2', say (Chalmers, 2011: 
532). Ideally, we would be aware of all such subscripts and how they link up with 
one another. That is, we would ideally be able to draw up classifications of 
homonyms. This roughly amounts to the Cambridge School's programme of 
historical exegesis (see chapter 4). 
A set of subscripts attached to their respective political terms seems like it would 
specify what Macintyre refers to by 'tradition' or at least be an acceptable alternative. 
He says, "Names are used as identification for those who share the same beliefs, the 
same justifications of legitimate authority, and so on. The institutions of naming 
embody and express the shared standpoint of the community and characteristically its 
shared traditions." (Macintyre, 1988: 378). Identifying different naming schemas 
amounts to identifying different traditions. Such schemas might look a bit like the 
following, 
1. Augustianian Christianity 
/ lust icei \ 
Rationality2 
Freedomi 
Equal i ty , 
RightSi 
\ / 
2. The Scottish Enlightenment 
/ ]ustice2 \ 
Rationalityi 











The listed words can be translated into their equivalents in other natural languages 
(like French, Chinese, Arabic, etc.) so long as their subscripts are preserved. That is, 
if we were to translate the above three traditions into Arabic, there must be no change 
in the classifications given above. Certain schemas might not utilize a word that is 
typically used to demarcate traditions, in which case we just have to denote the word 
with the subscript 0, as in 'Equalityo'. 
By my interpretation, such schemas should not constrain political argument. Arguers 
do not have to use a tradition as their guidebook on 'how to argue'. That is a horribly 
conservative idea. All these schemas are good for is to track the verbal disputes that 
would arise if these traditions were to encounter each other for the first time. 
Provided argument has a method to deal with verbal disputes, nothing more needs to 
be made of it (contrary to Macintyre, 1988; Taylor, 1991). 
3.3.2 Semantic Externalism and Specialization 
Consider the following infamous quote, 
"Hee that in his actions observeth the Lawes of his Country, make but one Name, equivalent to this one 
word,y»jf" (Hobbes, 1996: 103). 
Hobbes thinks that justice is whatever the Sovereign wills. Bureaucrats and lawyers 
can squabble over what they think justice is, but they will be either right or wrong 
depending on their guess of the sovereign's decision. When there is irresolvable 
conflict, the Sovereign steps in and decides the issue: 
"[N]o one mans Reason, nor the Reason of any one number of men, makes the certaintie; no more than 
an account is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And 
therefore, as when there is a controversy in an account, the parties must be their own accord, set up for 
right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge" (Hobbes, 1996: 111). 
One might say that the man on the street in Hobbes's Commonwealth is a layperson 
on matters of justice, the bureaucrat or lawyer a junior specialist and the Sovereign 
itself the only bonafide specialist. When non-chemists talk about 'gold' they do so in 
a way that allows chemists to be the ultimate arbiter of the term's extension. I may 
well think what 1 have in my hand is gold and assert just that, but 1 would stand 
corrected and admit that what 1 said was false if a chemist came along and assessed its 
chemical composition and it turned out to be fool 's gold. Millikan (2010: 47) 
explains, "there is a 'division of linguistic labor', whereby certain experts are in 
charge of really knowing the meaning of certain words while the rest of us take out 
loans from experts". We accept that what we say can be determined as true or false 
by reference to authorities in the matter. That is, we might be communicating 
perfectly with our audience from a non-defective context-set but all the while be 
unable to perfectly determine the extension of what we are saying (see Kripke, 1974; 
Putnam, 1975: 448; Stalnaker, 1999 [1978]: 78-96; Millikan, 2010). An individual in 
Hobbes' Commonwealth accepts that only the Sovereign can decisively determine the 
extension of the word 'justice', but this does not stop the individual meaningfully 
talking about justice. If the reader is finding such talk of justice too antiquated, think 
of the way in which we talk of 'the law' and 'valid law'. We cannot determine the 
extension of the law in all cases and often rely on judges and other legal experts to do 
so. 
This tangent is designed to dodge a possible counter to my interpretation of 'tradition' 
in 3.3.1 and to give a theoretical underpinning to my appeal to competency in this 
section (3.3). Some say (and Macintyre appears to hint at it from time to time) that 
the dominant texts in a culture are also necessary to filling out a tradition. For 
example, the bible was central to determining the extension of the word 'justice' for 
the tradition of Augustinian Christianity. Especially in the pre-reformation period, the 
bible remained in Latin and the layperson was forced to "take out loans" (Millikan, 
2010: 47) from the educated elite, the Latin-speaking clergy. It is not just religious 
texts that ground traditions - all kinds of literature (legal, philosophical, political, etc.) 
have had influence over traditional patterns of justification. Yet I still maintain that a 
schedule of subscripted terms can capture this phenomenon. If the Sharia 'tradition' 
of Islam looks to the Quran to determine the extension of their word for 'justice' and 
the Hobbesian realist 'tradition' looks to the Sovereign, then the Sharia tradition uses 
'justice]' and the Hobbesian tradition uses 'justicei'. 
The way the extension of the word is determined is a first-dimensional matter. It is a 
fact that determines the content of what is said rather than a fact that determines 
whether what is said is true (in the context of the conversation). If I were to claim 
'The just response is to avoid subsidizing healthcare essentials' in a Hobbesian 
Commonwealth, I am making a claim the content of which I expect the Sovereign to 
corroborate, but if the Sovereign does not, then I admit that my statement was false. 
If somebody disagreed and retorted, 'It is the just response to subsidize healthcare 
essentials', with the expectation that some Ayatollah somewhere would interpret the 
Quran accordingly, then we are having a purely verbal dispute (see also Hirsch, 2005; 
2009). We would be unable to rephrase the disagreement without the word 'justice'. 
This is not to say that verbal disagreements do not occur within traditions as well. 
Often disagreements will turn on mistaken views of a linguistic community's 
determination of a word's extension and such mistakes will also constitute verbal 
disputes (Chalmers, 2011: 519-521). 
3.3.3 Political Theory as 'Hair-splitting Pedantry' 
If the extension of 'justice' is to be determined by the Sovereign, say, 'the law' by 
certain judges, and 'equality' by the broader linguistic community, what is the point 
of political theorists? This is a pressing question even if you do not buy into Hobbes' 
authoritarianism. What justifications can political theorists give for being 
authoritative over political terminology? As I shall argue in the following two 
chapters: none. Political theory is tasked with analyzing the feasibility of 
institutionalizing certain value-packages (both with respect to their logical coherence 
and in setting the parameters to assess their real-world practicality). However, if it 
does not determine the extension of the vocabulary used in value trade-offs or the 
vocabulary used in the questions that frame political science, how can it? Indeed, if it 
cannot, is there any point to the discipline? 
By my interpretation of political argument there is a point to political theory so long 
as it is characterized by hair-splitting pedanticism. We can only be confident of 
substantive policy positions if our agreement and disagreement has been thoroughly -
to the point of pedantically - subjected to the method of elimination. If political 
theory subjects justifications of trade-offs and empirical questions to the destructive 
brand of conceptual analysis, we can say there is much import to it. Political theorists 
would be specialists in whether particular political arguments are substantive or not. 
Philosophers, political scientists, commentators and the broader public all lodge 
claims to the political theorist, who then assesses their feasibility, much like an 
accountant assesses their client's financial records. Furthermore, we can only be 
confident in our ascriptions of verbal disputes if we assume competency with respect 
to the activity of rephrasing (see 3.3.3). Political theorists would ideally spend 
countless hours wracking their brains for possible falsifications of ascriptions of non-
substantiveness. If they cannot find any, then it is a good working hypothesis that no 
one can. We need to be able to assume that some people are competent rephrasers 
and I think that political theorists seem to fit the bill better than anybody else. The 
political theorist complements my interpretation of political argument then not by 
being the trailblazer, but by being the nit-picking pedant. 
3.3.4 Cut Off the Author's Head! 
The original intention of an argument's original author quickly becomes redundant 
when this sort of framework is properly adhered to. Rephrases might be proposed 
that lead to the same conclusions from the same premises but which have implications 
in areas the original author might not have wanted to broach. Too bad for the author. 
If the argument would otherwise wither away under the pressures of elimination, then 
the rephrase becomes the argument or perhaps, more precisely, replaces it. If there is 
an argument that can reasonably defend a conclusion from the same set of 
assumptions it should obviously replace arguments that cannot. One should be open 
to the original author being included in the rephrasing process, but others can take the 
author's place - as suggested in 3.3.3 - and need not worry too much about 
preserving the author's original intention. The second half of the dissertation does 
engage in some textual interpretation to try and distil how the original authors would 
have rephrased their assertions, but texts are limited and the expansion of points 
usually and thankfully constrained by the anticipated attention span of readers. Most 
of the pioneers of modem political theory are now unfortunately dead, but that 
certainly doesn't mean we should try and preserve their points if they fail the 
elimination test. To be content with "rolling the classics round the tongue like old 
brandy" (Barry, 1965: 203) would lead to a highly regressive and ultimately 
redundant field of inquiry. 
Success with conceptual analysis is often judged with respect to whether or not the 
intention of the author has been preserved. A good definition, for instance, is a 
description the original author would have substituted for the term had they been 
around to do so. The next two chapters critique the substitutionist strategy in general, 
but it should also be noted that intention isn't a particularly good standard of success 
in the first place. What should replace it then? The previous chapter (especially 2.4) 
gives the clue: we should replace the concept of intention with the concept of 
acceptance. The rephrases 1 propose in the second half of the dissertation then are 
adequate if proponents of the conclusions and assumptions accept them. If they do 
not - and no other rephrase is to be found - then the argument should be rejected. 
There is no deductive method to determining the rephrases' acceptability, only 
guesswork to be subsequently confirmed, much like the guesswork involved with a 
scientific hypothesis that can only be subsequently confirmed by its non-falsification. 
3.4. Gently Does It 
Destructive conceptual analysis does not force every political argument to be boiled 
down to the formal language proposed above. That would be a long-winded and 
bothersome way to resolve some relatively simple arguments. It would probably lead 
many to give up on argument simply because they resent the pedantic meanderings. It 
does, however, propose the formal language as an ideal, an ideal that we verge 
towards the longer we engage in destructive conceptual analysis. It is an ideal much 
like Habermas' ideal speech conditions or John Rawls' original position and even, in 
some sense, Buchanan's veil of uncertainty. Despite quoting a passage from Nineteen 
Eighty-four about Newspeak in the chapter's epigraph, my approach is very different 
to Syme and Big Brother's in that I do not want to rid English or any other natural 
language of the words that make useful and significant conceptual distinctions; and it 
may well turn out that all words are useful and significant. It is just plain wrong to 
say that I am advocating for all claims to be framed in the sort of bedrock language 
proposed above. That would be a perverse Nineteen Eighty-four-esque suggestion to 
make. What I do maintain though is that all substantive claims could he framed in 
terms of it and that as an argument (or any conversation, for that matter) proceeds, if 
it begins to carefully eliminate certain terms, it will become increasingly difficult for 
demagogues to flex their rhetorical muscle. Ultimately though, if a claim cannot be 
framed in terms of the bedrock language then it is not substantive. 
Traditions give input to the argumentative process. They frame new questions and 
provide the vocabulary to make important claims. If a government does not want to 
address such claims in policy, the burden is on them for a justification if they want to 
claim any sort of 'legitimate authority'. As individuals from different traditions 
engage in argument Macintyre (1988: 384-285) says their 
"conceptions of truth and rationality become not part of a presupposed frameworlc of beliefs to which 
the author appeals in addressing an audience who shares that same framework but are relegated to an 
explanation to an audience characterized as not possessing any such framework. The particular history 
out of which the author wrote and which it is his or her purpose to carry one stage further also 
disappears from view as the presupposed context of the work and appears instead, as an explanatory 
appendage to it." 
He suggests that in trying to translate such a text into an 'internationalized language 
of modernity', an argument is "turned into a text which is no longer the author's, nor 
such as would be recognized by the audience to whom it was addressed" (Macintyre, 
1988: 385). He then suggests that such translation renders the speaker's argument 
into a text that would be neither recognized nor accepted by audience or speaker 
alike. The former claim however is patently false. We accept and reject arguments 
across traditions all the time from the internet forum to the seminar room to the pub to 
parliament or congress. The rephrasing required by destructive conceptual analysis 
keeps the translation in the speaker's own court. They can utilize their framework to 
rephrase in any way that they wish. The burden is on them to use their tradition - or 
update their tradition - in a way that is consistent with the conversational context (i.e. 
the argument up to that point). 
Destructive conceptual analysis does not translate a tradition's claims and 
justifications into another tradition's vocabulary. I agree with Macintyre that such an 
approach could well distort the claims being made. What it does instead is put a 
conversational straitjacket on individuals to search the resources of their traditions to 
rephrase under increasingly tightening constraint. Under such constraints positions 
that have relied on rhetorical tricks for their coherency will begin to unravel in their 
own terms. If this rephrasing occurred with no time limit then all argument could be 
conducted in the bedrock language - or what Macintyre calls the 'internationalized 
language of modernity' - but given the patience of arguers and the pressing time 
limits of politics (especially now with the 24 hour news cycle) this can hardly be 
expected. Nevertheless, it remains as an ideal and academic deliberation can certainly 
approximate towards it. 
As words are eliminated, the conversation does not begin to rig itself towards certain 
interests. It does not privilege any particular intuitions (as per Scanlon and Barry's 
incomplete theses of reasonable rejection), certain states of knowledge (as per Rawls 
and Buchanan) or participation (as per Habermas). It simply becomes harder and 
harder to rhetorically gerrymander the acceptance of inconsistent argument. The 
interests that are served by ambiguities and inconsistencies will gradually drop out of 
argument piecemeal. 
If we were to accept Macintyre's account of tradition and translation then his 
indictment of liberalism is certainly plausible. He says, 
"[S]o liberalism, beginning as a repudiation of tradition in the name of abstract, universal principles of 
reason, turned itself into a politically embodied power, whose inability to bring its debates on the 
nature and context of those universal principles to a conclusion has had the unintended effect of 
transforming liberalism into a tradition." (Macintyre, 1988: 349) 
Accordingly, liberalism is exactly that which it repudiates. Yet this is only if we 
accept Macintyre's account of tradition and translation and my suggestion is that in 
political argument we should not. According to this account, straightforward 
translation between traditions is often incommensurable, 
"Examples of such incommensurability can be drawn from the beliefs expressed in rival schemes of 
naming. The translator from language-in-use A to language-in-use B of such a scheme will have to 
explain the scheme of naming in A to those whose language is B in terms of the beliefs of the members 
of this latter community. The scheme of naming in A, that is, will have to be explained in terms of its 
differences from naming in B, but so to explain will be to exhibit A ' s scheme of meaning as lacking in 
justification, as in some ways defective. To understand the translation-plus-explanation into B will 
entail for those whose language is B rejecting the beliefs so explained." (Macintyre, 1988: 380) 
As such, 
"There is no standing ground, no place for enquiry, no way to engage in the practices of advancing, 
evaluating, accepting, and rejecting reasoned argument apart from that which is provided by some 
particular tradition or other." (Macintyre, 1988: 350) 
Instead of explaining the scheme of naming involved with each claim or attempted 
justification - which in many cases will trip the problem of rhetoric - we should just 
eliminate the names that need explaining and rephrase. 
Of course, Macintyre and fellow communitarians might cry afoul given I started the 
analysis with what could be considered a liberal interpretation of the political problem 
(see 1.3). After all, I interpret 'views of the good life' in terms of individual 
preferences. However, my claim is that such an interpretation can be supplemented 
by a brand of conceptual analysis that completes an explicit picture of how political 
arguments can be brought to a reasonable conclusion in a way that does not privilege 
one conception of the good life over another. By taking the thesis of reasonable 
rejection, coupling it with Stalnaker's account of context and consistency and 
finishing it off with the method of elimination, I think my claim holds. Taking these 
philosophical arguments as a bundle we have a decisive interpretation of the sentence 
that frames all reasons given in political argument 3 : "S' can be reasonably inferred 
from the context of the prior conversation'. Such an interpretation overcomes the 
communitarian critique of the liberal approach and also the various qualms directed at 
specific attempts at abstraction. Robert Frost once wrote that a liberal was someone 
who can't take their own side in an argument; if this is to say liberalism is its own 
tradition and therefore cannot remain impartial to other traditions, the above 
interpretation of political argument demonstrates that Frost is mistaken. 
3.5 Recap 
Before criticizing other brands of conceptual analysis, the destructive brand needs to 
be put plainly: when there is a mysterious term in political argument that seems to be 
important but is ambiguous, we try and substitute the assertion in which it was used 
for another assertion that does not re-use the term, but which preserves the assertion's 
argumentative function and acceptability. We do not need to clarify the particular 
term, understand it, or re-construct it, which is to say we are not after a definition of it 
or a description of its meaning. All we need to do is to eliminate it from the argument 
and rephrase. 
Once it has been eliminated we cannot reuse it. As we eliminate words from our 
arguments the first dimension of conversation gets smaller and smaller. When we say 
'Water is H2O' or 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' we discard the possible worlds where the 
conventions of language governing the application of 'water ' , 'H2O', 'Hesperus' and 
'Phosphorus' do not pick out the same object. When we eliminate words we discard 
all the possible worlds from the first dimension of conversation where that word has 
any purchase in the context of the argument. If it turns up in argument again it has no 
interpretation since there is no possible world arguers believe the other believes that 
they accept and there is no possible world arguers believe the other believes that they 
believe they accept (and so on and so forth in the Gricean circle) where that word has 
an interpretation. The context particular to the argument has been restricted in a way 
that the word no longer has any interpretation with respect to the argument. 
So long as destructive conceptual analysis is adhered to a standard of consistency is 
readily apparent for political argument. That is. 
CI .If P is a member of a set of accepted propositions, and P entails Q, then g is a 
member of that set. 
C2.If P and Q are each members of a set of accepted propositions, then P&Q is a 
member of that set. 
C3.If P is a member of a set of accepted propositions, then not-P is not a 
member of that set. 
Typically liberalism has been criticized for not being able to establish sufficient 
platitudes to inspire decisive political arguments - too much has been in flux.'^ This 
standard (CI , C2 and C3) gives liberal political theory a method to establish at least a 
few platitudes that might constrain political discourse. 
People in different times and in different places may well count considerably different 
justifications as reasonable. The accepted arguments from one tradition to the next 
might well vary even when both traditions adhere to the above standard of 
consistency. What this standard ensures though is that members of respective 
traditions will be able to constructively argue with each other by reasonably rejecting 
inconsistent justification, and reply to Foucault's (1980: 114) warmongering - "The 
history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than that of a 
language: relations of power, not relations of meaning" - with a fiddledeedee. 




"Philosophers of many persuasions are prone to talk of conceptual schemes. Conceptual schemes, we 
are told, are ways of organizing experience; they are systems of categories that give form to the data of 
sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures, or periods survey the passing 
scene. There may be no translating from one scheme to another, in which case the beliefs, desires, 
hopes and bits of knowledge that characterize one person have no true counterparts for the subscriber 
to another scheme. Reality itself is relative to a scheme: what counts as real in one system may not in 
another." (Davidson, 2001: 183) 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous three chapters have been concerned with devising a brand of conceptual 
analysis that is falsifiable. When an audience suspects the problem of rhetoric has 
been tripped in a political argument they can ask the speaker to prove that it has not 
and that the speaker is arguing genuinely. The audience might have a provisional 
hypothesis that the speaker is bluffing their way through the argument with a series of 
linguistic tricks and this provisional hypothesis is confirmed if the speaker cannot 
rephrase once certain terms are eliminated. The more this provisional hypothesis is 
tested (by competent and rigorous political theorists, say) the more confident we can 
be that the speaker was being non-substantive. 
With all this talk of provisional hypotheses and falsification it would be easy to think 
of political theory as a kind of science. If W.V.O. Quine investigates semantic 
interpretation from a scientific point of view (see 2.3.2), then why not do the same for 
liberal political argument? For two reasons. First, it concedes too much to critics of 
liberalism by dabbling in what is pejoratively described as 'scientism'. Second, it 
seemingly dissolves the distinction between political science and political theory.'® 
This is an important distinction that needs to be reclaimed from a number of salient 
arguments in political theory. Proponents of arguments with these kinds of 
As mentioned in 2.3.2, Quine does not admit a distinction between language and empirical fact and if 
we are to make any sense of political argument we need this distinction (and this was the reason I could 
not use it to interpret the problem of rhetoric). 
conclusions tend to fiddle erroneously with Quinean conceptual schemes to fill out 
their position. Davidson's quote in the epigraph above roughly describes such 
schemes (section 4.2 does so more thoroughly). The respective positions of the 
proponents amount to methods for substituting political terms for descriptions to 
'clarify' the sentences in which they are used. Substitution is possible back and forth 
between the political terms and their descriptions in a way that is not possible for the 
asymmetrical method of elimination. The term 'freedom' is substitutable for the 
description 'the power or right to act ' , say, in so far as both phrases can be substituted 
for the other in a way that preserves the meaning (or truth-conditions) of the sentences 
in which they are used. The controversy between the 'substitutionists' is, of course, 
which descriptions are to be chosen (see 2.5). In this chapter I want to go some way 
to demonstrating that such controversy is debilitating by linking one group of 
substitutionists to a fallacy concerning conceptual schemes. I call this fallacy the 
'magnitude fallacy'. It has been typically used to brush over what are otherwise 
evidently messy and incompatible aims. 
Quine's study of meaning and science has had considerable influence over the social 
sciences. More so, I think, than is often acknowledged. Both Giovanni Sartori and 
Felix Oppenheim, for instance, appear to use a distinctly Quinean framework to 
advance particular brands of substitution. They themselves have had considerable 
influence over the direction of conceptual analysis in political science and, in turn, 
political t h e o r y A critique of their respective brands is therefore the subject of this 
chapter. Three conclusions are reached. First, both tacitly use the logic of Quinean 
conceptual schemes. Second, both commit what I call the magnitude fallacy when 
trying to connect empirical political science with the normative questions it is trying 
to address. The third is that any analysis that relies on Quinean conceptual schemes 
will not be able to approximate either towards value-freeness nor value-neutrality. I 
will use Oppenheim's book Political Concepts: a reconstruction (1981, hereafter PC) 
and Sartori's collected works in Concepts and Method in Social Science (Collier and 
Gerring (eds.), 2009, hereafter C&M) as primary sources for my exegesis.^^ I will 
sum up with a rundown of why destructive conceptual analysis is the superior position 
" The two were important in the estabUshment of the IPSA research committee Concepts and Methods 
- formerly Icnown as COCTA. 
^^  All references to C&M in this chapter are references to Sartori 's principle works contained in the 
edited volume. For brevity's sake I have departed from conventional referencing. 
and how it in fact bolsters scientific claims. This rundown justifies my philosophical 
pedanticism in bothering with what amounts to rather finicky analysis. 
4.2. Quinean Conceptual Schemes and the Magnitude Fallacy 
If my accusations are to hold any weight it needs to be shown that Sartori and 
Oppenheim's analysis can be neatly subsumed by the logic of Quinean conceptual 
schemes. Just what a Quinean conceptual scheme (hereafter QCS) is needs to be 
described first. This section elaborates on my description started in 2.3.2. 
One of the first descriptions of QCS came in Quine's article 'Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism'. The article is now widely considered to be one if not the most important 
philosophical paper of the 20th Century (Godfrey-Smith, 2003). It posed a strong 
counter to Camapian semantics, the doctrine that all meaningful statements could be 
logically reduced to basic units of empirical significance. Quine (1980: 42) instead 
argues that "the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science" rather than 
isolated sense-data. If we were working from basic units up to complexes using 
logical constants, we might say we were working analytically or even a priori. The 
first half of Quine's paper is to show that attempts to elucidate the family of terms 
containing 'analytical' (by the analytic/synthetic distinction), the a priori, 'necessary', 
'meaning' and even 'synonymy' are circular. Each term depends on another for their 
definition, in a way that (if probed far enough) would rely back on the very term 
being defined. The family of terms cannot therefore be described or explained "using 
terms outside the family" (Soames, 2003: 244). Given the unit of empirical 
significance is the whole of science a family of terms distinct from the rest is grounds 
for suspicion. Indeed, Quine rejects the notion of analyticity because it cannot be 
grounded by a scientific explanation. There is no distinction between language and 
fact then because we cannot distinguish between truth in virtue of meaning alone 
(analyticity) and truth in virtue of corroborated empirical theories (see 2.3.2). 
Quine connects his conclusions in the first section of the article to his argument 
against reductionism.' ' Given the rejection of analytical and a priori statements, 
Quine (1980: 43) believed that no statement was immune from revision and that "any 
statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments 
elsewhere in the system". This system is what (for the purposes of this article) I call a 
conceptual system or QCS. It is precisely what Davidson describes in this chapter's 
epigraph. The conceptual system is the object of knowledge and belief. It is 
constructed entirely out of reactions to, and the sorting of, sense data. All concepts 
are created and revised to help order the world as it is presented to our senses. 
Consequently, there are no a priori rules (rules prior to experience). All rules have 
some connection to other rules, which are connected (usually indirectly) to 
propositions about sense data. However, Quine (1980: 43) thought that "no particular 
experiences are linked with any particular statements in the interior of the field, 
except indirectly through considerations of equilibrium, affecting the field as a 
whole". The "interior of the field" means just those propositions that are more 
immune to revision (like logical and mathematical axioms) than others (like 
observation statements). The descriptions we give of empirical observations will 
constitute the periphery of the conceptual scheme as they are less immune to revision 
than those logical observations that constitute the core. Yet the way we describe these 
peripheral observations will, in turn, depend on our core concepts and propositions. 
For instance, describing the sun as "especially hot today" relies on assumptions about 
thermodynamics and neurology, which also rely on basic laws of inference, and so on. 
Sorting empirical data within conceptual schemes is all there is to rational 
deliberation on the Quinean account. 
So why do we deliberate? Why must we sort the sense data presented to us? Quine 
(1980: 44) gives a strong empiricist response: "I continue to think of the conceptual 
scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of 
past experience". We sort data in order to increase our ability to predict the outcomes 
of our own actions and other events. Our knowledge is a "man-made fabric which 
impinges on experience only along the edges" (Quine, 1980: 42), but which is entirely 
guided by the ability to predict what follows from what. It is through this process that 
we can engage in purposive action. By this process, we rationally alter or create 
' ' M i c h a e l Dummet t thinks the first half of Q u i n e ' s paper is in fact only supp lementa ry to the s econd 
(Dummet t , 1976). 
concepts if they are used to enhance our predictive prowess. Following Quine, Daniel 
Dennett (1991) calls this the scientific point of view. So far as we can talk of the 
reality of concepts (like 'centres of gravity', 'median voters', 'states', etc.), what counts 
as real are concepts that are useful for prediction. By this view prediction is linked 
with interpretation. As Dennett (1991: 29) puts it, "Without [folk psychology's] 
predictive power, we could have no interpersonal projects or relations at all; human 
activity would be just so much Brownian motion; we would be baffling ciphers to 
each other and to ourselves - we could not conceptualize our own failings... 1 claim 
that our power to interpret the actions of others depends on our power - seldom 
explicitly exercised - to predict them". When the chemist forms a belief about which 
chemicals will react with each other they are placing mental bets on what will happen 
if these chemicals were actually mixed. This, according to both Quine and Dennett, is 
equivalent to our everyday ability to interpret what an individual's action means - we 
predict what will happen, and what had to happen. The action's significance/meaning 
is determined by its role in our prediction manuals. 
In QCS everything is subordinated to the goal of predictive prowess. Even seemingly 
analytical truths - statements that are true in virtue of their meaning alone - can be 
tinkered with in order to make stronger bets. Therefore, seemingly analytical truths 
are in fact not analytic at all. As Quine (1980: 43) puts it, "It becomes folly to seek a 
boundary between synthetic sentences which hold contingently on experience, and 
analytic statements which hold come what may. Any statement can be held true come 
what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system . . . no 
statement is immune to revision". In rejecting the analytic/synthetic distinction, the 
scientific point of view distinguishes itself from Camap's conceptual analysis. 
Yet Quinean skepticism no longer has much influence in analytic circles (Soames, 
2010: i). His trivialization of meaning is largely considered one step too far. There 
are a number of lines of attack in the canon. I want to focus in on one (less known) 
technical criticism because it appears to pinpoint the fallacy committed by some 
political theorists playing the scientific trump card. By no means do I want to suggest 
science is not a trump - it is - just that some uses of the trump can be reasonably 
rejected. It is important to discard these uses in order to bolster the claim of genuine 
trumps. The criticism amounts to the accusation that Quine arbitrarily expands and 
then arbitrarily shrinks the QCS as he sees fit (Dummett, 1978: 425). If we are to 
think of QCS as balloons, he seems to infer they can be either inflated or deflated in 
order to suit pragmatic purposes. The problem then is this: analysis in an expanded 
QCS is not applicable with analysis in a smaller QCS since each QCS is 
incommensurable with the next. To think that they are compatible is to commit the 
magnitude fallacy. 
Sometimes Quine talks of QCS in terms of language as a whole, at other times in 
terms of the natural sciences®" specifically, other times in terms of paradigms within 
physics, and at other times'"' in terms of the individual. This leads to problematic 
applications of his logic in the sciences, especially social science. Does QCS apply to 
the individual, models, science generally or language generally? Another way of 
posing this is asking how normative questions are resolved - whether the questions 
are answered at the level of the individual, model, science or natural language. QCS 
are used in order to provide predictions for events (past, present and future). When 
there is a grey-area in QCS's explanation of the world that individuals have questions 
about, we deliberate. They deliberate by formulating a theory from their other 
theories making up the QCS in order to make bets about this grey-area. Such 
deliberation only occurs when the agent has or group of agents have normative 
questions about the grey-area, otherwise there is no incentive. The magnitude fallacy 
comes into play when the question is posed at one level and then resolved at another. 
If the unit for conceptual construction keeps arbitrarily expanding and then arbitrarily 
deflating it seems impossible to pinpoint where and in what sense problems are being 
addressed. 
A conceptual problem leading to questions for an individual might be unexplained 
phenomena, with no prior predictive theory ready at hand. A conceptual problem 
leading to questions for natural language might be contested and incompatible 
concepts (like freedom or justice) with no theory to adequately resolve the 
disagreement. For both, the problem disrupts the equilibrium of the whole body and 
leads to a whole host of questions requiring answers to maintain order. The two 
different QCS will have two distinct, often opposed, solutions even if both were to 
™ For example, see his paper 'Epistemology naturalized' (in Quine,! 969) 
For example, see Word and Object (2013 11960]) pp. 23-66. 
have equivalent data sets in forming their solution. Thinking a little more politically 
these solutions will boil down to the interests attached to the QCS. When the QCS is 
a natural language, then the relevant interests are all users of that natural language. 
When the QCS is the individual's belief-system, then that individual's interests are the 
only interests that need consideration. A solution to the question of appropriate 
government policy will almost definitely differ depending on which QCS is selected 
(the larger communal version or the smaller individual version) because the optimal 
solution according to one set of interests is likely to be different to the optimal 
solution to another set of interests, especially when there are significant disparities in 
information. 
As will be argued, both Oppenheim and Sartori fit comfortably within the QCS 
framework. QCS were developed more for natural science than social science 
though and they are accordingly difficult to mobilize to answer normative questions 
on a broad societal scale (though extremely good to optimize predictive success). 
While they can solve normative problems posed within the conceptual scheme itself, 
it cannot solve those exogenous to it because the concepts used in the exogenous 
idiolect may be different to its own. Yet resolving social problems, rather than 
simply problems inherent to particular conceptual schemes, should be the precise 
point of doing political analysis. I find it hard to believe that anyone would disagree. 
As a result, both approaches have no normative framework to respond to a challenge 
from wider society - by a layman, politician, or whoever - that their conclusions need 
not be taken seriously since they were only produced by a mish-mashing of 
definitions or by definitions that imply a value-system unacceptable to the wider 
public. Both Sartori and Oppenheim think that conceptual analysis done in a subset is 
acceptable to conceptual demands exogenous to that subset. This is a mistake and is 
glossed over with the magnitude fallacy. 
4 3 . Giovanni Sartori and Conceptual Travelling 
Three aims underpin Sartori's efforts to systematise concepts for comparative analysis 
of political systems. They are (1) to ensure a favourable normative assessment of 
political science, (2) to make sure concepts do not 'stretch' too far within models and 
to (3) stabilise concepts central to anchoring our historical identities. These are his 
constraints. Sartori thinks these aims can be achieved via imposing a single revamp 
of the conceptual systems within political science - what he calls models - using his 
'ladder of abstraction'. He argues that such a ladder clarifies the political concepts 
being investigated. Yet, as with Quine, in pursuing these three aims the conceptual 
system appears to be stretched and then shrunk indiscriminately to avoid 
incompatibility. 1 will first describe (1), (2) and (3) before explaining why I take 
them to be incompatible. 
With respect to (1), Sartori is concerned with distinguishing a way to positively 
evaluate the state of political science (see Sartori, 1984: 9-11; C&M: 64-65). He 
regrets what LaPalombara (1968: 66) calls "indiscriminate fishing expeditions for 
data", which he thinks have increasingly become normal practice for the political 
scientist. Sartori (C&M: 20) thinks these expeditions lack taxonomical backing. This 
'indiscriminate fishing' might work well for handling private research problems, "but 
remains a very inconvenient strategy from the angle of the additivity or comparability 
of. . . findings" (Cc&M: 20). While the individual researcher might be able to optimise 
their own predictive theories by slightly altering the meaning of the terms they use, 
Sartori thinks that explaining the significance to others becomes an issue because 
there is no set translation manual to translate the meaning into a model with which 
other researchers can interpret the significance found in the data. 
He thinks this indiscriminate alteration of meaning usually comes by 'stretching' a 
concept. To stretch a concept is to increase its extensional coverage all the while 
retaining its intensional precision (C&M: 118-119). In other words, to stretch a 
concept is to botch its analysis. The legalistic institutionalism took political concepts 
to be given by the legal framework of the particular state in question before the so-
called 'new' political science of the behavioural revolution got its foot in What was 
meant by 'power ' , 'party' , 'politics' and 'freedom' could simply be read off from 
legal convention. Conceptual analysis was simply an interpretation of what legal 
authorities meant when they used certain terms, nothing more. Sartori calls the post-
1950's behavioural revolution a renovatio ab imis to this way of thinking, where 
political analysis was granted legitimacy to reconceptualise political terms, regardless 
of their interpretation in the courts (C&M: 14). According to Sartori (C&M: 16) this 
was a reaction to the 'expansion of polities', since now - given more participation, 
mobilisation and state intervention, coupled with a tendency to study everything that 
was not just actually political, but also 'potentially political' - like the potential 
mobility of certain social groups - concepts needed to travel further than ever before. 
Using terminology sketched in chapter 2 we might say that there were demands for 
political concepts to be modally profiled.®^ The behavioral revolution also sought to 
utilise concepts that could travel across legal jurisdiction and culture. Political 
parties, for instance, could now be cross-compared over different cultures and legal 
systems because they were defined in terms of behavioural dispositions common to 
all, rather than legal definitions common to few. 
The revolution gave great stock to increasing the extensional coverage of concepts. 
Yet this imperative was "matched by losses in connotative precision" (C&M: 15) -
the intension associated with a term. An intension is decreased by chopping out 
properties - e.g. 'black cat' cut down to just 'cat ' obviously broadens the set of things 
the concept refers to (i.e. its extension) but overall the term is less precise. 
Conceptual stretching is "an attempt to augment the extension, without diminishing 
the intension." In short, stretching a concept is to make the intension confusing in 
order to license greater scope without a loss of normative precision. This normative 
precision is needed if the research is going to help answer pointed normative 
problems and puzzles. Removing the precision (by reducing the number of attributes 
associated with a concept's meaning/intension) makes findings and comparisons 
insignificant to normatively pointed arguments. The principal standard for a 
normative assessment of political science is surely how well the discipline addresses 
the normative questions the discipline is demanded by the broader public to answer. 
Conceptual stretching is therefore the bugbear to achieving (1). 
^^  This is to say, the truth-conditions are relativised to possible worlds. To use Quine 's famous 
example, 'creatures with kidneys' (renates) and 'creatures with hearts' (cordates) have the same 
extensions in the actual world. The terms 'renates' and 'cordates' can, in effect , be substituted one for 
the other and preserve the truth-value of the sentences in which they are substituted, providing the 
domain of the sentence is restricted to the current actual world. However, it is conceivable that in 
some future possible world some creatures with hearts will not have livers and vice versa. The 
sentence, 'It is possible that in the future some creatures with kidneys will not be creatures with hearts' 
is true. Yet in this sentence 'creatures with kidneys' cannot be substituted for 'creatures with hearts' 
despite sharing the same real-world extension. The difference is that the domain of the sentence is not 
restricted to the current actual world, but to a number of possible worlds. We say, then, that while the 
terms share their extensions, they do not share intensions. 
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Sartori's solution to this stretciiing is to place all concepts used within a model on a 
'ladder of abstraction'. The ladder is a bit like the taxonomical ladders of biology that 
separates flora and fauna into species and then classifies them in decreasingly abstract 
groups, starting from 'kingdom' all the way down to 'genus ' , 'species' and 
(sometimes) 'sub-species'. A corresponding motif running through much of Sartori's 
work is a desire to place political science on the same footing as the natural sciences. 
The ladder of abstraction ensures a strict inverse relation between the intension and 
extension of political concepts - when the intension goes up the extension decreases 
and vice versa. By systematising concepts in this strict taxonomy Sartori thought the 
tendency to 'stretch' (2) will be curbed. All concepts will have other concepts 
forming their intension with many concepts also acting as attributes for the intension 
of other - more abstract - concepts. At the top of the ladder will be the most 
generalized and abstract of concepts, like 'politics' and 'society' . Beneath them (on 
the second highest rung of the ladder) will be those attributes that are used to define 
them - e.g. 'market ' , ' law' , 'people' , etc. This ladder will descend in a way that will 
supposedly dictate the proper place for concepts both in a normative and comparative 
sense. The ladder provides a guide for substituting these terms in sentences in a way 
that preserves the meaning of those sentences constructed by the model. 
By systematising these concepts it was thought that (3) concepts would no longer be 
stretched from their etymological anchorage in our historical understanding. As 
Sartori (C&M: 62) claims, "The behavioral revolution, with its ahistorical training 
and emphasis, has severed another kind of anchorage - our understanding that 
meanings are not arbitrary stipulations but reminders of historical experience and 
experimentation... [Words] are often misused, i.e. their historical substance and 
message is ignored". A benefit of the legalistic institutional approach was that this 
was never a problem since concepts were borrowed from historical institutions. Even 
if terms are used differently in different contexts, by rigidifying our use of them it was 
thought that we could understand their relation to our own historical experiences more 
clearly. 
However, (1), (2), & (3) are incompatible as aims if the framework of QCS applies. 
As I shall argue in the next section, what Sartori means by 'political science' (in 1), 
'model' (in 2) and 'etymological anchorage' (in 3) are in fact Quinean conceptual 
systems at different magnitudes. By Quine's logic, concepts cannot be swapped from 
one system to another given they rest on their systems as a whole for their meaning -
i.e. however low on the ladder of abstraction, no concept will be systematically 
cointensional with concepts in another system. Those concepts that make up our 
common historical experience, those that are used to assess how well comparative 
political science as a whole addresses normative questions, and those that are used to 
buttress the predictive power of models are functioning at incommensurable wave-
lengths. 
4.4. Incompatible Aims 
Researchers often break concepts like democracy and politics down into different 
attributes and connotations. Sartori thinks the major disagreements over which 
attributes best fit these high-end concepts constitute their own distinct taxonomies or, 
as he sometimes puts it, their own 'semantic fields' (C&M: 124). He calls these 
taxonomies 'models' . According to this view, all comparative work is (or should be) 
bound by the model/taxonomy in which the researcher is working. In order to achieve 
(1), (2) and (3) concepts are systematised along a ladder of abstraction in ways 
specific to particular models. It is at the modeling stage where we have license to 
manipulate concepts in ways we choose; that is to say, we can create and alter 
concepts so long as they adhere in some way to a models' ability to explain the world. 
Sartori (C&M: 66) says, "While I do not praise the freedom of unsettling the 
vocabulary, nor the freedom of disregarding logical rules, I believe the acid test of 
real creativity comes in the modelling stage. That is, the model-paradigm level". 
4.4.] The Model-Paradigm as QCS 
Now, this "model-paradigm level" is a QCS if we are to follow the description given 
in 4.2. Explanation is taken to be equivalent with prediction.®^ Somebody working at 
' I.e. being able to predict phenomena in retrospect. 
this level engages in systematic conceptual analysis so long as it is directed at 
maximising predictive prowess.®'' A model is "a key that opens hitherto closed doors" 
(Sartori, 1993: 10). It does "more than ordinary concepts, more than humble 
variables: they unveil, they cut through the fog, they decipher" (Sartori, 1993: 10). In 
other words, models are guides for predicting the future and explaining the past with 
all conceptual analysis being delimited to this project. This is the barebones of a QCS 
(see 4.2). These barebones are filled out into an industrial-strength QCS by Sartori's 
'positional' account of meaning. 
The meaning of concepts within a model of the sort Sartori described depend on their 
position vis-a-vis all other concepts contained within the model's field. Sartori wants 
to shape the equilibrium of the field by imposing the ladder of abstraction fit. 
Concepts on the ladder of abstraction are connected by links going vertically down 
the hierarchy, yet also have connections to neighboring concepts horizontally. The 
meaning of the concepts or attributes that make up a higher-end concept's intension 
will depend on their position in relation to the other concepts in the model/ ladder 
overall. As Sartori says, "If we alter the meaning of a key term, then a whole 
constellation of neighbouring terms needs reallocation and redefinition" (C&M: 65). 
He then goes on to say that all terms in "the semantic field" come in "strings" (C&M: 
65). Lower-rung properties are dependent on their position with respect to their 
neighboring concepts. Their meaning only makes sense when they are clumped 
together and joined together in a string. If one were to change their definition of a 
'conservative party', for example, one would assume that this would probably impact 
upon the definition of a 'progressive party'. Changes to the concept of labour will 
often require accompanying changes to the concept of capital. Changing the meaning 
of participation will often impact upon the meaning of mobilisation, and so on and so 
forth. There are countless examples of this 'string' function. The function seems 
mandatory since it is hard to believe that any concept could be altered completely in 
isolation 
A model perfectly predicting the world is theoretically possible although realistically impossible If 
we had perfect knowledge, such models would be perfect predictors. However, given the inevitable 
imperfections of our knowledge we need to make pragmatic trade-offs to maximize predictive 
usefulness overall (see Dennett, 1991). 
' ' ' If we were to follow David Lewis' article 'How to Define Theoretical Terms' (1970) we would need 
to explicitly use the other terms to introduce and/or alter these concepts in a Ramsey-Sentence The 
Ramsey-Sentence is a sentence that specifies all the existing terms in relation to the introduced/altered 
These neighboring concepts will themselves have neighbors, and a whole string of 
concepts will consequently need adjusting. Now, concepts on this string will range 
from concepts at the lower-end of abstraction, to those at the higher. There is no strict 
hierarchy of independence, where concepts on one level cannot be affected by the 
alteration of concepts on a lower. Concepts on the higher rungs therefore do not 
necessarily supervene over concepts on the lower rungs in the way that density 
supervenes over mass and volume (see Jackson, 1996). The vertical arrangement of 
the ladder of abstraction ascends or descends according to property inclusion and 
property exclusion, nothing else. The further we descend the ladder, the more 
properties will be specified including the initial higher-order properties to pick out 
the concept and narrow the extension. Lower-level concepts are therefore dependent 
on higher-order concepts because the former literally contain the latter. Changing the 
meaning of 'cat ' will obviously change the meaning of 'black cat' on the lower rungs. 
Changing the concept of 'democracy' is likewise going to change the concept of 
'participatory democracy'. Given this vertical connection and given the connections 
concepts have to their neighbours the holding capacities of a model's equilibrium 
depend in part on the position of every term within the system. One small conceptual 
tweak could well set off a chain-reaction that spirals the whole model into conceptual 
disarray. The meaning of every concept depends on its relation with every other 
concept in this holistic web. Even the basic interpretation of data is just as conceptual 
as higher-order analysis of terms like 'democracy' and 'power ' , "data are nothing but 
information and observations collected within and processed by ad hoc 'conceptual 
containers'" (C&M: 69). This is the logic of holism that is the hallmark of a QCS. 
Sartori's paper 'What is Politics?' demonstrates this point well. The conclusion runs 
accordingly, "[T]he current predicament of politics is reflected in at least three 
term. If we were to get our normative questions at the top rungs of our ladders of abstraction, we 
would introduce additional theoretical terms for the lower rungs (amenable to the behavioural 
revolution, say) in terms of those used in the questions. The terms used in the questions (as will be 
discussed) are presumably value-laden and therefore those existing on the lower rungs will be likewise. 
Sartori has to introduce terms starting from the top. If we were to engage in elimination in political 
argument first though and reduce the ambiguity of the initial question before we start building our 
scientific theory (see 4.8), we can start our scientific endeavours from an austere vocabulary and 
introduce theoretical terms f rom the bottom rungs of a ladder. As Lewis (1970: 427) says, "My 
proposal could be called an elimination of theoretical terms [in scientific theories], if you insist; for to 
define them is to show how to do without them". 
discordant views... iieteronomy, or outright extinction... autonomy, primacy, or 
outright triumph; and.. . dilution emasculation, and eclipse" (C&M: 57). These three 
views are described by the interplay between the concepts 'polities' , 'society' , 's tate ' , 
'ethics', ' law' and 'market ' . A stable equilibrium is posited at three different points of 
conceptual interplay. Throughout most of Western political history the concept of the 
'market' was well below, say, ' law' and 'the state' on the ladder of abstraction, but 
with the rise of the "outright extinction" view it has risen to be a close neighbor for 
'politics' itself in a stable equilibrium (the Virginia School of public choice springs to 
mind as a modem-day exemplar). In sum, a stable equilibrium of conceptual 
interplay amounts to a stable model. This is QCS logic to a tee.®® 
So concepts used by a particular model are dependent on the position of all other 
concepts for their meaning (or as a strict Quinean might say, their 'significance'). The 
only way to really understand the meaning/significance of a concept - and be 
welcomed into the lofty ranks of Sartori's 'conscious' thinkers (C&M: 13) - is to 
understand everything going on in the model as a whole. To know the meaning of a 
more abstract concept's intensions, the conscious thinker has to understand its 
position in relation to neighboring concepts, which have connections to higher-end 
and lower-end concepts leading to the requirement that individuals understand the 
whole lot if they are to understand any at all.®^ The important point to make is that if 
we keep breaking down concepts into their intensions, we will not find basic units of 
analysis that can be swapped between models - units that Carnap thought were the 
building blocks of science. 
A diluted version of this argument has been taken up by David Collier and James 
Mahon (1993). Their main argument is that Sartori employs his 'ladder of 
abstraction' too strictly. Often conceptual categories should be made where there is 
no common set of intensions that constitute its use. For example, the term 'mother ' 
'•''There are a number of places where Sartori puts this quite explicitly (see C&M: 6 8 , 7 0 , 9 2 , 124). 
For instance, he says, 
"Any science is required to be 'systematic. ' We endlessly ask: what do we call this [property], and 
why"! The answer lies in systematic considerations which in turn relate to a given semantic field. Since 
words come in strings, any allocation or reallocation of meanings entails a systematic arrangement or 
rearrangement guided by logical considerations" (C&M: 70). 
Compare this with Michael Dummett 's 'molecular ' account of meaning sketched in section 2.3.6. 
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has a lot of attributes that seem sufficient for their intention, but not necessary. The 
central category of mother - 'true mother' - is a woman, contributes to half the child's 
genetic makeup, bears the child, is the wife of the child's father, and nurtures the 
child. Yet there are also radial categories like 'stepmother' that still count as a mother 
of some sort, yet do not require to have any genetic link, bear the child or even 
nurture the child. Other radial types include 'genetic mother', 'birth mother', and 
'nurturing mother'. None of these descriptions are necessary to the concept of mother 
(not even that the mother be a woman), though many of them, especially when 
clumped together, are sufficient. Ostiguy (1993) has suggested that democracy is a 
concept that ought to be broken down in terms of radial categories like 'participatory 
democracy' and 'popular democracy'. Another type of conceptual category in 
political science is a family resemblance category. This category, much like radial 
concepts, consists of a set of concepts that have many similarities with each other, but 
that do not necessarily have a single common attribute. As Collier and Mahon put it, 
"A category, defined in a particular way, may fit a number of cases reasonably well, 
but on close examination it can become clear that for most cases the fit is not perfect. 
Nonetheless, the category captures a set of commonalities considered by the 
researcher to be analytically important" (1993: 847). The literature on corporatism 
might be thought of as a family resemblance concept. Despite having different 
corporative structuring, subsidies and control of groups, it was still reasonable for 
Collier and Collier (1991) to call the labor relations of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico corporatism. There was no distinct commonality, but the grouping was 
important because the normative questions it addressed presupposed the commonality. 
The point here is that concepts are formed and altered if the researcher finds them 
useful in advancing their interests. This of course begs the question: what are their 
interests? In other words, what is the aim of the researcher? The logic of the QCS 
gives a partial answer. The researcher is after predictive accuracy concerning the 
concepts employed in normative questions. Answering 'Why is there a big long 
shadow here?' involves predicting that a long flagpole in its observed position, 
coupled by the position of the sun and various assumptions about optical theory and 
geometry (that are at least tacitly incorporated into most QCS) will cast a 'big long 
shadow' of the sort described in the question. This is all well and good for the 
individual (and presumably science in general) if the scientists can work out which 
"big long shadow" the questioner is referring to. The problem with political science 
though is that the referents (i.e. extension) of, for example, 'participatory democracy' 
is quite often different model to model and person to person. When there is the 
demand for political science to answer questions like 'Does participatory democracy 
cause economic development?' it is quite likely that the discipline will produce rival 
and incommensurable answers (with rival answers producing rival policy solutions). 
4.5.2. The Fallacy Played Out 
The problem is that in travelling down Sartori's ladder of abstraction there are no 
concepts that we arrive at with intensions in common with any other model. The 
intensions at the bottom rungs are dependent on intensions at the top, which are in 
turn linked to all their neighbours. 
This is problematic for Sartori's aim to normatively evaluate political science as a 
single body (1) since there are technically no shared concepts we can use to assess the 
different models that constitute the discipline as a whole (see Davidson, 1973). One 
model may well predict better than another, but it is difficult to be sure whether it is at 
the expense of conceptual stretching. What is more, if 1 were to call out another 
researcher for a case of conceptual stretching, there is nothing to stop them 
model/idiom-skipping and claim that my accusation merely came from a different 
taxonomy and misses the normative distinctions they believe to be important. My 
claim is that if we insist on rebooting the discipline by diagnosing particular cases of 
conceptual stretching in such a way we trip the magnitude fallacy. 
If anything, imposing a ladder of abstraction stresses the differences between the 
meaning of concepts in different models rather than their similarities. Sartori's 
strategy to achieve (1) seems to be to have a 'bottom rung' vale-free vocabulary with 
which the empirical conclusions of political science can be judged to answer 
normative questions that can similarly be described in such a vocabulary. This relies 
on the question-asker being first able to map their terminology onto a ladder of 
abstraction (Sartori hints that this constitutes a condition for being a 'conscious 
thinker') and second that the vocabulary can be interpreted distinct from their higher-
order value-laden terminology. We should be sceptical of both. 
Sartori avoids admitting such reliance by arbitrarily inflating and deflating the unit of 
conceptual analysis. The first expansion is from the model/paradigm level to the level 
of political science in general to meet the demands of (1). Overcoming conceptual 
stretching (2) by imposing the ladder of abstraction allows social scientists the chance 
to finally set "the cards of the game" with which to play science (and mimic its older 
siblings, the natural sciences) and rectify the tendency to instead "invest more and 
more of our energies simply in altering the cards'" (C&M: 64). The idea seems to 
involve reducing a number of different normative questions down to different 'card 
combinations' where each card is perfectly translatable from model to model. To 
deal with (2) Sartori shrinks the QCS down to the level of the model. He wants to 
encourage flexibility with language in order to maximise predictive efficiency and 
address normative questions as accurately as possible. He does not want to have to 
explicitly admit that calling out conceptual stretching essentially involves the whine, 
'your set of concepts are not the orthodoxy!'. The whine would be necessary because 
otherwise such accusations could always be met by the accused claiming they are 
dealing with a different model to that of their accusers. So Sartori sets the logic of a 
QCS to the level of the model-paradigm. However, to deal with (1) he inflates the 
QCS to the level of political science in general, where each model is just another tree 
of the broader ladder of political science, with each tree eventually meeting up at the 
value-free and shared rungs (cards) at the bottom. Conceptual stretching by this 
account involves the conservative whine. Logically you can do one or the other, not 
both simultaneously. To randomly inflate and deflate the QCS to hide such 
conservative implications is to commit the magnitude fallacy. 
Banning the fallacy also rules out any possibility of providing what Sartori calls 
etymological anchorage to our political language more broadly (3). He thinks that 
language has fragmented to an extent that we are now facing a Tower of Babel-type 
situation: 
"Over the years our mutual understanding and lines of communication have not improved, but 
mightily deteriorated... The stabilizing and constraining force of this anchorage, of this 
semanlic viscosity, can hardly be overstated... [The behavioral revolution in political science 
has severed] our understanding that meanings are not arbitrary stipulations but reminders of 
historical experience and experimentation" (C&M: 62). 
Normative questions are formulated out of our historical understanding. Problems 
about politics that arise in conversation are the problems political science gets its 
mandate to answer. The idea that political science has been severed from such a 
conversation is no doubt troubling and cause to raise questions what its mandate or 
aim is if not that. A political argument is hijacked if scientific terms are forced in and 
superimposed over the language in which the argument initially arose. As I stressed 
in this chapter's introduction, political argument is not a scientific theory.®^ The 
ladder of abstraction is a device for scientific theories working out how we might 
predict phenomena; it is not a device for political argument. And yet Sartori not just 
content with imposing his ladder of abstraction heuristic on political science broadly 
speaking seeks to inflate the logic of QCS further to encompass the very natural 
language we use to argue with in order to reverse the severing of our own ""reminders 
of historical experience and experimentation" with the discipline of political science 
(3). Again this is arbitrary and again this trips the magnitude fallacy. Sartori 
essentially implies that all argument should be conducted in terminology that has been 
already mapped on the ladder of abstraction and that anybody not submitting to it 
rejects "the cards of the game" of empirical evidence. 
Sartori starts with a seemingly small QCS - the model/paradigm - and thinks we can 
rigidify it in the name of science. In so far as this overcomes the tendency of 
'conceptual stretching' for individual scientists it is plausibly a worthwhile exercise 
for scientists after analytical precision. However, he also thinks we can then inflate 
this newly-rigidified QCS to the level of the discipline as a whole and then, further, to 
the linguistic community that constitutes society. This inflation allows him to pursue 
(1), (2) and (3) simultaneously. This is to impose a particularly rigid scientific 
outlook on units (like natural language) that should not be rigidified. If such an 
outlook is to be superimposed over liberal political argument then 1 think we can 
conclude that this is an unjustified use of the scientific trump card and the pejorative 
label of 'scientism' is appropriate. Destructive conceptual analysis skirts such a label 
Even Rawls seems to have missed this point, with his account of justification suspiciously 
resembhng Quine's (his colleague at Harvard) account of scientific theory (see 1999: 506-517) At 
times Ronald Dworkin (e.g. 2004: 18). also buys into the dogma of political theory as a conceptual 
scheme at equilibrium. 
by disagreeing that "the juncture at which we fruitfully diverge [from ordinary 
language] is the model-paradigm level" (C&M: 65) and that we need to "define the 
cards of the game". We fruitfully diverge at the level of political argument. That is, 
the level of conversation with all its historical anchorage and semantic viscosity. 
Instead of imposing and describing certain connections and relations between political 
terms by constructing a ' ladder of abstraction' destructive conceptual analysis finds 
no need for such impositions and instead advocates a ' jump into abstraction' with no 
conventional definitions required (see 4.8). 
4.6. Oppenheim's Value-Neutral Conceptual Analysis 
In PC Oppenheim, like Sartori, is concerned with systematising political concepts so 
that they are conducive to scientific research. For concepts to be conducive he 
thought it essential that all researchers in political science agree to use a single set of 
definitions in their research. The unit of political science here is broader than 
Sartori's models/paradigms. As I shall argue though, Oppenheim also describes the 
unit in terms of a QCS. The difference is that in PC Oppenheim argues that 
individual researchers are responsible to the scientific discipline as a whole for 
conceptual use, rather than a model existing within the discipline. His work is 
therefore explicitly concerned with overcoming taxonomical difference between 
models rather than describing and rigidifying that difference. This is not just limited 
to differences with respect to scientific models, but also with respect to the scientists' 
normative viewpoints. The point to doing this work is to make it possible for "fruitful 
communication" between scientists with different normative views (Oppenheim, 
2001: 218). Prima facie, then, the agenda in PC appears to overcome the problem of 
indeterminancy between Quinean conceptual schemes by expanding the conceptual 
system to encompass all values and taxonomies in political science. Starting at this 
magnitude, it might at first glance appear plausible that Oppenheim can regenerate the 
normative point to the discipline as a whole. As we have seen, Sartori could not 
regenerate it without committing the magnitude fallacy. 
Oppenheim believed it possible to give a broad set of value-neutral definitions for 
salient political concepts. Where different researchers might have different 
definitions for a term liice 'political power ' , Oppenheim thought we could re-define 
(or as he puts it 'reconstruct') the term to encompass as many of the definitions as 
possible. In so doing we supposedly stress the similarities involved with the various 
definitions and, likewise, the similarities of the different normative positions in a way 
that encourages agreement conducive to scientific endeavor. Instead of specifically 
refining a term by adding definitional properties (e.g. T is x and y and z) Oppenheim 
thought we should broaden the definition to encompass all the refined definitions that 
have been made in the literature (e.g. T is x or y or z). His project of value-neutrality 
would therefore have probably been condemned and described as conceptual 
stretching by Sartori. I follow Carter's definition of value-neutrality, which 
distinguishes it from the value-freeness aspired to by Sartori. Carter (forthcoming: 2) 
defines the two accordingly, 
Value-freeness: a concept is value-free if it is defined in such a way that the 
definiens contains no ethically evaluative terms (where a definiens is 
understood as specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing 
to be covered by the concept). 
Value neutrality: a concept is value-neutral if it is defined in a way that is 
acceptable from any substantive ethical point of view. 
If political terms are not value-neutral then it is difficult to see how different 
normative frameworks can reach agreement over their correct definition. If such 
moves are not value-neutral then they imply a particular point of view that might be 
easily dismissed by another agent if it is not their point of view. Yet the argument in 
PC seeks to define these concepts as broadly as possible so that all normative 
viewpoints might agree to them in order to engage in constructive research in spite of 
their differences. 
The reconstructionism in PC was aimed at political philosophers just as much as it 
was at political scientists. For instance, Oppenheim says that his analysis of power 
and related concepts should be acceptable to both "defenders as well as critics of 
existing power structures... [as well as] political scientists engaged in describing and 
explaining power phenomena independently of normative considerations" (PC: 152). 
While Sartori seems to stress science more than philosophy, his whole project 
revolves around making the conclusions of science susceptible to philosophical 
treatment. Nevertheless, the methodological implication is to broaden the definition 
of contested terms to include as many of the properties involved in the debates as 
possible. While I have rejected Sartori's apparently 'value-free' primitives since they 
rely on their meaning only by the grace of the position of value-laden concepts 
(relative to their position), this does not mean that the value-neutral goal in PC should 
be dismissed out of hand. 
Terrence Ball (2001) has criticised the conceptual systematising in PC for making 
'normative moves' despite Oppenheim's insistence that his concepts are value-neutral. 
Ball thinks Oppenheim makes a move to a particular point of view - namely, a 
scientific one - which discounted the normative distinctions individuals have found 
worth making throughout history. While this 'scientific' tag is appropriate (as will be 
discussed), the criticism is misplaced. Making a move from a non-neutral concept to 
a neutral concept is value-neutral, despite potentially being value-laden (i.e. not 
value-free). It is hard to deny that neutrality is itself a value and so any move towards 
it will be value-laden. However, it is just about a contradiction to say a move 
motivated by neutrality is not a neutral move. 
This assumes though that Oppenheim does in fact reconstruct concepts to accord with 
a neutral viewpoint. My claim is that he does not devise a programme to 
systematically achieve value neutrality. The first sign of confusion is that he links the 
project in PC to the early-Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico Philosophicus rather than 
and in contrast to the later-Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (PC: 177).® I 
believe this particular link to be fallacious, a fallacy that makes the arguments in PC 
seem more respectable than they actually are. For one, PC espouses a method for a 
scientific programme and not a philosophical one (despite the scientific programme 
being tailored for philosophical respectability), whereas the analysis in the Tractatus 
is certainly philosophical. Ultimately the logic behind the conceptual arguments in 
PC can be linked back to the logic of Quinean conceptual schemes. That Oppenheim 
believes he has achieved value-neutrality in a systematic sense comes down to his 
' ' Wi t tgens te in had somet l i ing of an intel lectual mid- l i fe crisis where Philosophical Investigations is 
o f t en cons idered a cr i t ique and re fu ta t ion of the Tractatus. 
arbitrary inflation and deflation of the QCS. 
4.7. QCS not Tractatus 
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein is concerned with resolving broad philosophical 
problems for all users of language. We might accordingly think of his project as the 
value-neutral reconstruction of language since it was not intended to advance a 
particular viewpoint, but to instead demonstrate that certain problems were the result 
of a misuse of language irrespective of the viewpoint adopted. Wittgenstein is dealing 
with the logic for all language, not the specific language of a certain subset of the 
whole community, a taxonomy, or an individual. The project of the Tractatus is for 
any sentence uttered in a philosophical argument that does not strictly conform to 
philosophical logic should be reconstructed to do so, if philosophy is to get anywhere. 
The arguments in the Tractatus recommend an ideal logical language distinct from 
everyday language to solve the problems of philosophy. Wittgenstein thought 
philosophical problems arise because of the abuse of natural language. The typical 
example is Russell's analysis of the phrase, 'the present King of France is wise'. The 
phrase seems to have some kind of meaning and yet it is neither true nor false since a 
King of France no longer exists. If a statement could not be proved either true or 
false, the prevailing opinion was that it lacked meaning (see also 2.4). Since the term 
'the present King of France' seemingly lacks a referent it cannot be proved true or 
false and yet it still seems to mean something. Russell argued that while 'the present 
King of France' might be grammatically correct, it was not a legitimate referring 
expression. It does not express the proper logical form of the proposition(s) it 
contains. Instead, the phrase is actually shorthand for three propositions: 1) There is a 
King of France, 2) there is only one King of France, and 3) that this King of France is 
wise. Since 1) is false, then the shorthand for the three propositions is false - i.e. it is 
not the case that (I & 2 & 3) and therefore 'the present King of France is wise' is 
false. Russell thought it the task of the philosopher to reformulate the propositions in 
ordinary language into this precise (logical) form in order to deal with philosophical 
problems thoroughly. Ordinary language - with its imprecise and ambiguous 
reference - creates these kinds of problems, the problems themselves need not exist. 
This is the programme Wittgenstein largely endorsed in the Tractatus and therefore is 
also the programme Oppenheim aligns himself with. 
This alignment is mistaken. Some consider the Tractatus to be an early version of 
possible worlds semantics. A statement's meaning is given by separating those states 
of affairs (i.e. possible worlds) that the statement is true in from those in which it is 
false. Propositions are what we usually call the meaning of a sentence, or the thought 
behind the sentence - as opposed to the written or uttered sentence itself. The 
Tractatus argues that objects exist in these possible worlds and a description of a 
possible world involves predicating relations between sets of objects (see 2.4). 
Nothing meaningful can therefore be said of terms like 'the good' and 'the bad' 
because, according to Wittgenstein, they do not refer to objects. He did not think that 
the details about the good and the bad are nonsensical in themselves, but the attempt 
to say anything about them is: "They are, indeed, things that cannot be put into 
words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical" (Wittgenstein, 
2010 [1922]: 111).™ They are mystical and language is being misused in so far as it is 
trying to represent these mystical properties. Wittgenstein thinks that they have no 
place in the domain of logical conceptual analysis. This domain seeks to map 
tautologies and contradictions. The Tractatus argues that tautologies and 
contradictions are the scaffolding upon which the world is based - the logic of 
language, but also the logic of the world itself. It is only by language sharing this 
logic with the world that Wittgenstein thought propositions could accurately picture 
states of affairs. Consider a trial where a man is convicted of manslaughter for 
running over a pedestrian. The prosecutor uses stick figures and a toy car to play out 
the death to make it clear to the jury what happened. This demonstration is supposed 
to picture the actual event. The demonstration does this by virtue of sharing the same 
logic as the actual state of affairs, in the same way that a proposition shares the same 
logic as the state of affairs it pictures. 
™ It is tempting to appropriate Wittgenstein liere for my interpretation of political argument. We might 
likewise say 'the good' and ' the bad' are "mystical" in the context of a political argument. Of course, 
Wittgenstein's is a much more general point than mine and applies to philosophy and all conversation, 
not just the particular subset I am concerned with. We can certainly express what our conceptions of 
the good are still, just not evaluate them or evaluate around any problems that might arise about their 
content in political argument. 
4.7.1 Explicative Definitions 
While the analysis in PC tries to reconstruct our vocabulary in order to solve 
analytical difficulties - just like the Tractatus - things are not so simple as saying the 
similarities between the two programmes make them equivalent. In whole they are 
miles apart. A telltale sign that Oppenheim is mistaken in grouping the two together 
is that an 'explicative definition', the reconstructionist's main tool, is assessed in PC 
by a criteria of good and bad, not one of truth and falsity. Explicative definitions are 
"appraised as good or bad in terms of their suitability for scientific communication" 
(PC: 179) not in terms of their ability to preserve the truth and falsity of sentences 
when substituted for the defined word. Explicative definitions do not report the way 
in which terms are currently used (reportative definitions), nor do they attempt to 
group a number of pre-existing expressions under a new definition (stipulative 
definitions). If we were to go around knocking on doors to ask people what 'justice' 
meant to them and then formulate a definition which best reports the response given, 
then this would be an instance of reportative definition. This is the type of description 
given by conceptual analysis taking the 'contextual turn' (see chapter 5). A stipulative 
definition is like Dahl's definition of a 'polyarchy' - introduced as a watered down 
version of democracy - which he says refers "to political systems with widespread 
suffrage and relatively effective protection of freedoms and opportunities" (Dahl, 
1976: 81). Objects falling under the pre-existing concepts of 'political system', 
'widespread suffrage' and 'relatively effective protection of freedoms and 
opportunities' are classified as polyarchies. Stipulative definitions are a bit like a 
marker to represent a group of statements by shorthand - there is really no 
justification for this grouping outside of convenience. 
Explicative definitions are the third type of definition. According to Oppenheim, 
recognising explicative definitions as a relevant third type of definition distinguishes 
the reconstructionist project of PC. He describes them accordingly, "Like stipulative 
definitions, explications are not verifiable as either true or false; but unlike the former, 
they can be appraised as good or bad in terms of their suitability for scientific 
communication" (1981: 179). There is an ambiguity with his three definitions, namely 
that the difference between stipulative and explicative definitions appears thin at 
best. I think the correct reading of the distinction is that a stipulative definition 
introduces a new word into the vocabulary and fixes it with a certain description (or 
perhaps even directly fixes it with a referent)^ ' An explicative definition instead 
takes an existing word with a contested usage that nevertheless is relevant to the 
subject matter of scientists or philosophers and redefines it in a way that will 
overcome any tendency users might have to ignore significant results from other 
scientists who use the term in a way they do not like. That is, explicative definitions 
stress the commonalities rather than the differences between different uses of political 
terms. For example, Oppenheim's definition of 'power ' is probably the broadest 
definition of agential power in the literature, 
"P exercises power over R's doing x iff. . . P influences R to do x or coerces R to do x or punishes R for 
not having done x. P exercises power over R's not doing x iff P influences R not to do x or restrains R 
from doing x or punishes R for having done x" (1981: 10-11). 
This disjunction^^ encompasses just about all the extensions of agential power in the 
literature and tries to encourage scientists to look for the commonalities between 
them. A doctor advising their patient that they should eat more vegetables is, by this 
definition, an exercise of power in as much as a highwayman coercing someone to 
surrender their wallet is. The theorists reviewed in the next chapter stress the obvious 
difference between these two types of events, but Oppenheim stresses the 
commonalities arguing that we "need a single concept bringing together all 
relationships in which one actor determines another actor's behavior" (Oppenheim, 
1978: 594). The intuition here seems to be that scientists will agree to a definition so 
long as the definition includes what they think is power, no matter whether or not it 
contains what they do not think is power (see Chapter 6 on the problems specifically 
associated with this intuition). 
4.7.2 The Aim of Predictive Efficiency 
Yet this all begs the question in a big way, why are explicative definitions that stress 
commonalities good for scientific communication? The only way we can answer this 
question is to ask a further one: what is the aim of political science? Fruitful 
" See my discussion of Kripke's baptisms of rigid designators in 5.2. 
Oppenheim thinks the more disjunctive properties (x o r y or z) there are, the more neutral the 
definition is. Descending Sartori's ladder of abstraction on the other hand involves increasing the 
number of conjunctive properties {x and y and z). 
scientific communication is only helpful if it helps achieve what science - and more 
specifically for our purposes, political science - aims at. It is a weakness of the 
arguments in PC that such an aim is never explicitly given. 
From time to time in PC Oppenheim refers casually to what might be construed as his 
take on the ends of scientific research. A charitable reading demands that we try to 
fill out his position. Otherwise we cannot attribute a point or aim to his conceptual 
analysis and accordingly cannot render his programme anything more than a bunch of 
arbitrary definitional suggestions. He references Feinberg's belief that conceptual 
analysis should aim at coherency (PC: 80). This 'coherency' though is coherency of 
the scientific community, with no broader aim for that community being given. The 
(vague) impression Oppenheim's conceptual analysis gives is that it is tailored to 
maximising predictive efficiency for the political scientist. Oppenheim thinks that 
there is, as a matter of fact, substantial similarity between the standard criteria for 
constructing good explicative definitions and for constructing good empirical theories 
(PC: 181). This passage gives us the requisite prompt that Oppenheim's conceptual 
analysis was, in the end, in aid of maximising the scientist's predictive capabilities. 
He quotes Kuhn's standard for a 'good empirical theory' - "accuracy, consistency, 
scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness" - which were checks to ensure predictive 
efficiency. If an explicative definition aids the overall agenda of predictive accuracy 
by picking out common nodes upon which political scientists can share their data and 
conclusions, then political science's predictive prowess will be maximised as opposed 
to individual scientists working in isolation. 
Note though that Kuhn does not conflate a 'good empirical theory' with a 'relevant 
empirical theory'. A theory can be accurate (by making accurate predictions), 
consistent (in not yielding inconsistent predictions), large in scope (by covering a 
large domain of events), simple, and fruitful (by leading to further discoveries) and in 
sum be a good empirical theory without answering any pressing questions exogenous 
to the science itself from, say, those wondering how to make a profit out of it or trying 
to resolve an argument. The same goes then for good explicative definitions. 1 
believe this reading of the conceptual analysis in P C is correct. By this reading 
political science aided by such conceptual analysis is a QCS par excellence. 
Everything is judged and arranged in the 'web ' of political science in order to produce 
predictive theories to explain political phenomenon. To use Sartori's phrase, it is a 
key to deciphering the grey areas of our social world. 
My problem now is with the relevance of political science if we were to accept 
Oppenheim's brand of conceptual analysis. If it 're-constructs' the terminology 
typically used in the questions we want answered by way of explicative definitions, 
then it is difficult to maintain that political science is actually answering the questions 
we want answers to - namely, answers that will sort out political argument. If it 
cannot serve such a function I do not think there is much justification for engaging in 
political science let alone financing it. The QCS deciphering the social world with 
fine-tuned predictions might itself need deciphering if there is no inbuilt mechanism 
to anchor the cipher to the ordinary language in which we formulate our questions. 
The QCS might well explain a broad range of political phenomena, but not the 
phenomena that is brought up and contested in political argument. Oppenheim's 
programme hijacks genuine questions that could resolve genuine deadlocks in 
political argument with a terminology that is so broad that it rules out any hope for 
political science to decisively dissolve pointed deadlocks. Oppenheim's 
reconstructionism therefore actively serves the interests of those who benefit out of 
such deadlocks (usually the beneficiaries of the status quo). In this sense it is non-
neural. 
It seems that Oppenheim thinks that every language-user should subscribe to the QCS 
of political science when asking questions. That is, political terms in our everyday 
political argument should substitute for the descriptions designated as the best fit for 
the QCS of political science. This is an even more ambitious attempt to superimpose 
science on political argument than Sartori's programme. The magnitude fallacy is 
tripped by inflating the QCS of the political scientist to the level of ordinary 
discourse. Such inflation is scientism at its worst. Political argument seeks to work 
out reasonable compromises between different conceptions of the good. Often what 
is reasonable will depend on science's ability to predict and explain political 
phenomena. Political science gets its mandate by explaining phenomena relevant to 
the argument, not phenomena that can best show off the scientist's predictive prowess. 
Oppenheim avoids this implication with his allegiance to the Tractatus and his 
obscure references to the aim and mandate of political science. Whereas Wittgenstein 
dealt with the logic of all of language - which would apply as much to normative 
questions and political argument as scientific explanations - Oppenheim deals with 
the logic of the language for political scientists. Conflating the two trips the 
magnitude fallacy and allows Oppenheim to suggest all of political discourse should 
be rerouted to the broad explicative definitions he gives for political terms. 
The appeal to scientific authority in PC is something that is not properly explained -
it would have been explained, however, had it been consistent with the 
Tractatus. Wittgenstein's logic was meant to resolve all conceptual problems for all 
users of language. As it stands, however, Oppenheim's reconstructionism appears to 
resolve conceptual problems for only a subset of language users, namely political 
scientists. Sartori's reconstructionism was (initially) intended to resolve conceptual 
problems within models, while possibly creating more problems between models by 
pushing them further apart. Conceptual problems addressed in PC, on the other hand, 
are resolved not between science and society overall, but within the QCS of political 
science. There is still the normative dilemma left over then concerning why society 
and/or parts of society (including legislators and contractors) should pay any mind to 
the conclusions reached in political science. That Oppenheim does not think this is an 
issue - or at least did not feel it an issue needing justification - can be explained by his 
failure to see that his conceptual system is far more restricted than that proposed in 
the Tractatus. His proposed system is of a completely different magnitude to 
Wittgenstein's. 
4.8 Conclusion 
Sartori and Oppenheim simply get things the wrong way around. They think that 
science informs individuals and renders the arguments of those individuals more 
reasonable as a consequence. Sartori and Oppenheim think science provides the 
information to make reasonable agents and - once reasonable - the agents go forth 
and air their opinion in political argument. Those conspiracy theorists among us are 
unreasonable, for example, because they denounce established scientific facts, as are 
Young Earth Creationists who argue the earth is only 10,000 years old and reject 
Darwinism as 'just a theory' rather than fact. Sometimes it seems this dismissal is 
swallowed up as a platitude of liberal theory. Yet it is the wrong way to think about 
the division between political argument and science and one that leads to indefensible 
attitudes. The worst is that liberals sometimes think it impossible to argue with such 
individuals because the individuals are 'unreasonable' or, at the very least, so different 
ideologically that they are impossible to have a meaningful conversation with. Even 
the reasonable rejectionists flirt with this attitude (e.g. Scanlon, 1982: 111; Barry, 
1995: 68-69, 114).^^ If liberals dismiss the 'antiscientific unreasonables' out of hand, 
those 'unreasonables' are well justified in believing the liberal position cannot reject 
their opinions in political argument. 
Of course I do not think (most) conspiracy theorists and those claiming religion as 
trumps over science have a reasonable argument (i.e. in the sense of the property 1 
describe in chapter 3). But that is exactly my point: they are unreasonable because 
they cannot present a consistent political argument when they try and justify their 
position, not because they do not use scientific facts or method to inform their 
position. Reasonableness is a property only indirectly related belief. The burden is 
on those dismissing the Young Earth Creationists to prove that the Young Earth claims 
are unreasonable and the best (even only) proof involves the Creationists floundering 
but floundering only once they have been given the chance to justify their claims in 
political argument. They might claim that teaching that the Earth is no older than 
10,000 years is reasonable because 'It is the truth!' , but policymakers can easily reject 
this argument by saying something like 'but others - indeed the vast majority - have a 
different conception of the truth and should not have it institutionally imposed on 
them just because you think they should'. The Creationists would then be hard-
pressed to give reasons why the majority should accept their testimony as 
authoritative aside from restating their claim 'because our truth is the actual truth!' 
Re-stating the initial claim does not update the context-set in any substantive sense 
and is therefore no argument for their claim. 
Accordingly, political argument comes before political science. The latter 
complements the former rather than vice versa. We argue and in so doing we 
" Scanlon (1982: 111) puts the point strongly, "The idea of ' in formed agreement ' [which is a 
requirement for reasonable rejection] is meant to exclude agreement based on superstition or false 
belief about the consequences of actions, even if these beliefs are ones which it would be reasonable 
for the person in question to have." Such a requirement cannot be presupposed by a neutral description 
of political argument . Barry (1995: 114) is even more explicit, "Since justice as impartiality requires 
the parties not to have false beliefs , it is hardly surprising that there should be people to whom it is not 
accessible, given their existing beliefs". 
formulate questions which demand empirical investigation. This is where political 
science gets its hook; it is where it meets a demand. It quantifies over terms central to 
the political arguments that demand an empirical response. In doing so political 
science might need to introduce technical terms like Tsebelius' influential 'veto-
players' (2002) to give greater flexibility for prediction and explanation, yet these are 
stipulative rather than explicative definitions. Contrary to Oppenheim the former is 
the main tool of the political scientist rather than the latter. Stipulative definitions 
introduce new terms - ideally according to Lewis' (1970) technical prescriptions -
that are given in terms of the existing theory. The existing theory is bestowed to the 
scientist from political argument. If the terms in the theory are inadequate then the 
scientist will have to get their hands dirty and engage in conceptual analysis within 
the context of the argument itself io refine the questions being asked. I assume the 
austere vocabulary that results from the method of elimination is a vocabulary that is 
easier to quantify over than the ambiguous vocabulary most political arguments 
initially start with (for instance, a bedrock conversation would involve quantification 
over properties in t roduced/or quantification).'" This refinement, however, occurs 
within the parametres of argument rather than within the parametres of science. In a 
sense the austere bedrock language could be described as Camapian, but it is a 
language strictly refined in argument rather than (as Camap and Sartori would have 
put it) in science. In Chapters 6 and 7 I demonstrate specifically how this method 
works. 
By inflating what is conceptually good for models and/or political science into what is 
good for political argument, Sartori and Oppenheim commit the magnitude fallacy. 
They take scientific success as argumentative success. As suggested, this is to 
conflate an important distinction between political science and political theory. 
Somebody might know the truth but that does not imply they are reasonable.'^ Sartori 
aimed for a value-free vocabulary and Oppenheim for a value-neutral one but both 
impose a scientific logic on an argumentative one. In other words, they advanced the 
^^  Again I encourage the reader to consult Lewis (1970). 
For example, Barry (1995: 142) says, "Suppose you were to say: 'The reason why I should be able to 
practi^se my rehgion but you should not be able to practise yours is that mine and yours is wrong. ' You 
would, obviously, reject a claim made in similar terms by somebody else with opposing ideas about 
what was ri^ght and what was wrong. In rejecting that claim you would be acting reasonably. But then 
it follows that you cannot reasonably object when others reject your claim. The argument here appeals 
to a certam notion of consistency [not truth per ie]." 
view that if you do not accept what is good for science you are hijacking political 
argument. What they are doing amounts to systematically defining around the 
possibility of being fallible in argument: If somebody disagrees with scientific 
evidence for reasons x, y and z, redefining their reasons in terminology amenable to 
scientific explanation makes it impossible to maintain the disagreement (since the 
reasons presuppose their negation). This is a subtler version of the toy example of the 
absurd idiom skipping given in 1.5. 
Conceptual analysis that is genuinely value-free and value-neutral is impossible if you 
are imposing your own conceptual scheme on others by way of forcing them to accept 
your definitions and descriptions. If you straitjacket potential interlocutors with the 
maxim 'Either you conform to my terminology or I will not argue with you and 
assume you do not have an argument to offer' you rig the deck against opinions that 
vary from your own. You are the one hijacking political argument. Destructive 
conceptual analysis however is both value-free and value-neutral. It does not force 
one arguer's conceptual scheme onto their opponents. Both arguers eliminate terms 
from their own schemes when called to. If this elimination has an effect an arguer's 
position will begin to unravel in their own terms according to their own values. Such 
analysis then is surely both value-free and value-neutral. Some might protest that it 
assumes that arguers value political argument, but that is just one of my empirical 
assumptions. It seems to me that individuals want to be seen to have a political 
argument to defend their position but if they do not then they do not. 
Chapter 5 
Ordinary Language Analysis 
There has been a turn in political theory towards analysing political argument by 
studying the contexts in which speakers use political terms. The turn is strongly 
opposed to attempts to rigidify political discourse (surveyed in the previous chapter). 
The argument tends to be that such rigidification ignores the subtle normative 
distinctions that have been made through the natural evolution of our ordinary 
language. Instead of re-structuring the definitions of political terminology to 
accommodate a broader range of interests, as per Sartori and Oppenheim, the 
contextual turn advocates leaving political terms as they are and instead describing 
the different ways the distinct interests use them. Such descriptions were thought to 
clarify the debates in which the terms are used.^® As with the scientific theories 
reviewed in the previous chapter though the contextual turn under-describes just what 
'clarifying debates' is supposed to do. The historical descriptions are supposedly 
substitutable for the terms themselves but how this changes the status of a political 
argument goes unexplained. 
It is common among political theorists to accuse other theorists of hijacking crucial 
words to bolster their arguments. The accusation is then often followed by what some 
(especially those who have taken the contextual turn) consider a winning move. The 
move is to claim they have used the term as it is ordinarily used in the relevant 
context and that therefore theirs is the superior position. However, it should by no 
means be a winning move. There should be at least three more. First, some solid 
work is needed to demonstrate that it is indeed the predominant way the word is used 
in the relevant (presumably fixed) reference group. Second, an explanation is 
required as to why any deviant use of the word by, say, minorities is ignored. Finally 
and crucially, they need to keep on arguing. Squabbling over whether or not the 
theorist is hijacking a word to justify their position does not resolve the initial 
disagreement. This chapter investigates whether the turn to the study of rhetoric and 
Fol lowing Oppenhe im (1981) , one might wish to call such descr ip t ions ' repor ta t ive de f in i t ions ' (see 
political ideologies in political theory covers these three mandatory moves. A 
selection of the seminal works in the turn will be discussed, including William 
Connolly 's interpretation of essentially contested concepts and the Cambridge 
School 's methodology of historical analysis. Both encourage the theorist to go soft 
on the last requisite move. They do this by skirting the issue of what their analysis is 
supposed to achieve. 
5.1 Terms of Political Discourse 
William Connolly's Terms of Political Discourse (1983 [1974]) was one of the first 
books to take the turn. Taking prompts from ordinary language philosophers like 
Strawson and the later-Wittgenstein, he argued that unpacking the varying uses of 
terms like 'power ' , f reedom' , 'interest' and 'politics' would clarify political 
disagreements. Again though he does not specify for what end the political 
agreements are being clarified: one person's clarification is another's obfuscation. 
The best interpretation 1 can give is that he was after clarification that encouraged 
individuals to agree to disagree when agreement was not initially forthcoming.^^ This 
seems to be an implication of the following passage (and many others, especially in 
the first and last chapters). 
We often cannot expect knockdown arguments to settle these matters [in debates featuring 
political vocabulary]. It is possible, and I believe likely, that the politics of these contests 
would become more enlightened if the contestants realized that in many contexts no single use 
can be advanced that must be accepted by all reasonable persons. The realization that 
opposing uses might not be exclusively self-serving but have defensible reasons in their 
support could introduce into these contests a measure of tolerance and a receptivity to 
reconsideration of received views. Politics would not be expunged, but its character would be 
enhanced. (Connol ly , 1983: 40) . 
Connolly thinks we should tolerate the differences in our terminology that lead to 
disagreements in our political discourse. We will inevitably commit to certain sides 
of the contest (Connolly, 1983: 205), but we must tolerate differences for there is no 
fool-proof method by which to trump one interpretation of a political term with 
" And if we are to believe Aumann (1976) (and assume common priors) it is irrational to agree to 
disagree. However , when the initial disagreement can be partly explained by the means of 
communica t ion (the terms of discourse), then the rationality of agreeing to disagree becomes more 
plausible. Indeed, A u m a n n ' s theorem assumes that the mode of communicat ion with which 
individuals communica te their probabilities to one another is a perfectly transparent. 
another. As theorists it is supposedly not our place to accuse others of misusing 
words, with it instead being to just describe how those words are being used to 
'enlighten' our opponents of the differences between us. The end of such 
enlightenment or clarification can be described as a perspicuous agreement 
concerning our disagreement. Yet while we can specify the end of such description-
giving, it is difficult to specify the means and therefore why the means gives us any 
special clout in political argument. 
Describing the different ways in which individuals use political terminology is all 
well and good, but the question is whether we can rely on this practice to overcome 
rhetoric in political argument and I think the answer is a resounding 'no ' . Yet 
Connolly's analysis towards enlightenment seems to - at first glance - fall under the 
framework of political argument that 1 have developed in the first two chapters. The 
goal of such descriptions of ordinary usage is still agreement - even if it is agreement 
to disagree - and this assumingly means substantive agreement. Furthermore, 
Connolly is at pains to stress that his practice of description-giving is itself part of the 
political process. He says, "To examine and accept, or to examine and revise, the 
prevailing terms of political discourse is not a prelude to politics but a dimension of 
politics i tself (Connolly, 1983: 3).''^ Such passages suggest Connolly's brand of 
description-giving constitutes political argument rather than discussion about the 
means of political argument. If it is indeed the former, we can classify Connolly's 
project of 'enlightenment' as political argument. If it were the latter though we would 
not. 
If Connolly's project is indeed a series of political arguments, then his doctrine of 
toleration is a doctrine for tolerating verbal disputes. It forces points of contention 
into pointless holding patterns that makes things impossible to resolve. That is, he 
suggests we should agree to disagree over political issues where this disagreement is a 
He goes on to put the case even stronger, 
•The controversies, moreover, are unavoidable for anyone who seeks to comprehend our politics and 
who IS willmg to announce his findings to us. For one can hardly study our politics without staking out 
a position on some of these contested concepts, and the position one endorses will not be neutral in its 
political import. To enunciate a public position on these issues is to implicate oneself to some degree 
m our politics. In the political sphere, intellectual work and political work, embodying somewhat 
different standards of craftsmanship and excellence, are nevertheless bound intimately together" 
(Connolly, 1983: 205). 
purely verbal sort of disagreement. I obviously have some major qualms with this 
position. However, it is completely above board to tolerate disagreement over the 
terms of political argument if we are upfront that this is all we are doing and the 
disagreement we have is over linguistic convention rather than (non-linguistic) 
political matters. If this is all Connolly is claiming, he avoids error. He just adheres 
to the first two moves after an accusation of verbal hijacking has been tripped: 
working out the predominant conventional use of the word and comparing it to other 
minority conventions. So long as argument continues after this point all 's well that 
ends well. The trouble is 1 do not think this rather deflationary reading of Terms of 
Political Discourse is the right reading and the conclusions drawn (that have turned 
out to be very influential in political theory) suggest the claims are directed towards 
political argument in general. The trick for Connolly is to maintain political terms are 
necessary for political argument and cannot be done away with. 
In Terms of Political Discourse, references to 'clarification' and 'enlightenment' 
amount to descriptions of disagreement over political concerns. To my knowledge 
the book never makes it explicit whether or not picking out different usages of key 
terms just helps identify these differences or whether the key terms themselves also 
explain said differences, but 1 am not sure whether that really matters. What matters 
is that Connolly seems to think such descriptions give the theorist license to come 
down hard on one side of the contest. So long as the theorist does a good job giving 
an overview of the disagreements they can reasonably hold any side so long as they 
acknowledge it is not the only one. This is the old pluralist chestnut. The pluralist 
then expects those who they have a political disagreement with to reciprocate in 
agreeing to disagree or else be labelled unreasonable or (in Connolly-speak) 
unenlightened. This is entirely unconstructive and is often a 'get out of jail free' card 
for a position crumbling under reasonable rejections. Political argument gets cut off 
by those thinking they have the pluralist 'high ground', so to speak, when really 
nothing has been sorted out at all, with the cut off allowing the pluralists to avoid the 
burden of reasonable justification. Connolly thinks that such practice is political 
argument par excellence, whereas 1 think it an example of where political argument 
has been cut off despite what conversers (like Connolly!) might claim. Such an 
example, by my interpretation, is an instance where political argument has been 
hijacked. 
If we were to subject such high-grounded pluralists to the method of elimination, their 
dodge-ball argumentative tactics will be quashed. We can grant them their 
description of our disagreements and thank them for it since it gives us good clues as 
to which political terms would be expedient to eliminate first, but we must maintain 
that it has not ended the argument and it has only given weak prompts as to the 
direction it should take. Yet much of Connolly's argument in Terms of Political 
Discourse blocks such a move (see 1983: 129-130), particularly with his position that 
political terms are necessary for our political discourse (1983: 35-36). It is here that I 
think the book descends into debilitating confusion. 
He starts the descent with a curve-ball: confusing a word with a concept. Now some 
philosophers of language might nod approvingly to such a curve-ball (perhaps for 
example, Dummett, 1978). However, they surely would not approve of the way 
Connolly applies it. There are many passages in Terms of Political Discourse 
stressing the following, 
" T o explain [and discuss] the politics of a society we must be able to m a k e the actions, 
projects, and practices of its m e m b e r s intell igible. But a single act or pat tern of act ion 
embodied in insti tutions is not made intell igible merely by obse rv ing over t behav iour . 
Act ions and practices are constituted in part by the concepts and be l ie fs the par t ic ipants 
themselves have" (Connol ly , 1983: 38) 
Connolly (1983: 38) uses the idea of a protest to demonstrate his point, 
"Suppose we observed a line of people walk ing in a s low circ le a round a gove rnmen t 
bui lding. If those walk ing lacked the concept of protest ing g o v e r n m e n t po l icy , we could 
certainly not character ize their activity correct ly as an act of pro tes t . " 
This seems to be a flat-out mistake. If those walking in a circle around the 
government building were angry at the government and thought this might make the 
government listen to them, then this is a protest. If they wanted to get back at the 
government by inconveniencing it, then this is a protest (at least by some standards). 
It does not matter whether they have a word or term for what they are doing - or that 
they are aware that what they are doing can be described in a certain way - they are 
doing what they are doing! The term 'boycott' was not used until 1880. It was 
named after Captain Charles Boycott a land agent who represented English landlords 
that owned property in Ireland. In 1880 peasant members of the Irish Land League 
coordinated to isolate Boycott by refusing his business because of the exorbitant rents 
he charged. Their success was celebrated in the media and led to similar activities 
being henceforth described as 'boycotts ' . Connolly uses this as a further example of 
how terms enter into our vocabulary to constitute new actions and practices (see 1983: 
186-188). The term 'boycott ' was introduced to refer to these coordinated efforts to 
ostracise landlords in a way the peasantry could easily comprehend (words like 
'ostracism' were apparently too complex). Now, it would be ludicrous to say the first 
boycott happened only after the decision was made to call such events boycotts. All 
events involving the ostracism of landlords were boycotts, even those that occurred 
before the captain had been bom. The term might have made boycotts easier to 
mobilise among the peasantry, but it certainly was not a precondition for such 
mobilisation or for such mobilisation being amenable to being described as a boycott 
(since such action can be described in retrospect once the term has entered into our 
vocabulary). 
Actions and practices are certainly constituted in part by the beliefs of the actors, but 
only rarely the terms the actors have to describe their actions. A belief that picketing 
a fence around parliament house will force politicians to take notice of your cause is 
important to describe such fence picketing as an act of protest. However, it is not 
important that the actor has relevant terms for what they are doing. Connolly 
mistakes the content of a belief (a proposition) with a word. We have beliefs about 
politics, words to express those beliefs, and beliefs about those words. Connolly 
conflates these distinctions. 
If our political terminology were necessary for political argument, variant uses of 
political terminology might indeed lead to unbridgeable divides. Unbridgeable 
divides do occur over some terms that are necessary for certain types of discourse. 
For example, liberal political argument takes the (roughly) cognate predicates 'good ' , 
'x is better than y', 'moral ' , 'ought' and 'should' as bedrock and therefore necessary 
for moral claims. We cannot do away with them in when we are reasoning morally. 
Yet political terms are done away with all the time. For instance, Gallie's thesis of 
'essentially contested terms' (from which Connolly ultimately derives his core 
framework) suggests that speakers substitute political terminology for descriptions in 
a way that presupposes some moral framework. The description might not be 
acceptable to the audience, but the point is that a speaker can substitute the term in 
assertions and preserve the content of what they said as far as they are concerned. In 
so far as this is the case, there are probably going to be audiences out there that find 
such a substitution equally acceptable. 
I have paid the liberal concession when interpreting political argument (See 1.3). That 
is, I have remained agnostic to different conceptions of 'the good' with respect to 
solving the problem of peaceful coexistence. Once this move has been made there is 
not much room left for further concessions. Connolly wants to make room. There is 
a distinct danger with Connolly's approach that all political argument will end up 
being concession after concession; toleration after toleration; which will just turn into 
empty posturing and bar any mechanism of compromise getting some traction. Once 
again this serves the beneficiaries of the status quo. Perhaps some will defend 
Connolly by arguing that he is not a liberal. So be it. In so far as he does not describe 
what he means by political argument, enlightenment, and clarification though, we do 
not know what he is and therefore have no way to work out whether his brand of 
conceptual analysis has a point. I actually like to think of Connolly as a liberal since 
the problems he addresses in Terms of Political Discourse are problems principally 
for liberals. There are many passages in the book where Connolly expresses concerns 
very similar to mine. For example, 
"In such settings each party also accepts, though, often not in exactly the same way, a more 
basic set of understandings pertinent to the contest in question. They confront, say, a new 
situation that provides the occasion for conflict over the grammar of 'power ' or ' f reedom' , but 
the occasion itself can arise because they disagree about the import of more basic and partly 
shared ideas for this new, unanticipated setting. When the notion at issue is conceptually 
connected to shared ideas about [for example] persons and responsibility, the shared, more 
fundamental ideas provide a common court of appeal to which the conflict can be brought and 
within the confines of which the disagreement can be subjected to a measure of rational 
control." (Connolly, 1983: 191) 
I do not accept many of the points made in the above passage, but the principal idea 
that we can overcome disagreement by changing the vocabulary in which an assertion 
is made is one 1 wholly endorse. If we define power and freedom in terms of persons 
and responsibility though - which is what Connolly proposes - we must be able to 
substitute the terms back again to the original assertion in a way that preserves our 
new found agreement. In so far as the terms are "conceptually connected" we must 
be able to translate the assertions using the terms 'persons' and 'responsibility' back 
into assertions using the terms 'power' or ' freedom' in a way that preserves the 
measure of "rational control". Yet the above passage suggests that such control 
would not be preserved. My method of elimination overcomes this puzzle of 
substitution and - if my hunch about Connolly's liberal inclinations is correct - is one 
I think he should accept to avoid debilitating problems with his method. 
5.2 Cambridge School 
In describing different uses of the same term, there is the danger that the descriptions 
will use the exact class of terms that they are supposed to be a substitute for. This is a 
danger that is regularly toyed with by the Cambridge School's method of conceptual 
analysis. Note that this is not a critique of the Cambridge School method of the study 
of political texts, but an offshoot that applies the same argument to conceptual 
analysis in political theory. 1 have no problem with the method for studying the so-
called 'meaning' of political texts, but 1 do have a problem with this particular 
extension of it. 
Quentin Skinner's article 'Language and Political Change' (1989) is a strong 
exemplar of the Cambridge School's arguments with respect to conceptual analysis. 
In one sense, it is a superior position to Connolly's because it distinguishes between a 
word and a concept. Skinner (1989: 7) says, "if we wish to grasp how someone sees 
the world - what distinctions he draws, what classifications he accepts - what we 
need to know is not what words he uses but rather what concepts he possesses." He 
then goes on to say, "it cannot be a necessary condition of my possessing a concept 
that I need to understand the correct application of a corresponding word [i.e. term]" 
(Skinner, 1989: 7). Skinner follows this by making the point that the development of 
new terminology is the surest sign that a linguistic community is in the grips of a new 
concept. This all seems right. Indeed, it seems to be the point that Connolly is often 
trying to get at, just without making his confusing conflation: while the word is not 
the concept the word could well be evidence that there is a tendency to make 
conceptual distinctions of a certain kind in a certain linguistic community. 
Skinner goes on to express another distinction that should have elevated his account 
over Connolly's even further. He says. 
"So far I have tried to isolate the main debates that arise over the application of our appraisive 
vocabulary to our social world. I turn now to what I take to be the crucial question: in what sense are 
these linguistic disagreements also disagreements about our social world?" 
(Skinner, 1989: 11). 
Skinner (1989: 8) uses this notion of 'linguistic disagreement' to specify the aim of 
the Cambridge School with respect to conceptual analysis: "Our aim is to illuminate 
ideological disputes through the study of linguistic disagreements". Quite what 
Skinner means by 'linguistic disagreements' though is not obvious. For one, it is at 
first glance quite different to what Chalmers and I mean by a 'verbal disagreement'. 
Take the following passage, 
"[The disagreement over whether Duchamp's urinal counts as art] arises at the linguistic level. It 
centres on whether or not a certain criterion (the exercise of skill) should or should not be regarded as a 
necessary condition for the correct application of an appraisive term (a work of art). But this is 
certainly a substantive social dispute as well. What is at issue is whether or not a certain range of 
objects ought or ought not to be treated as having a rather elevated status and significance." (Skinner, 
1989: 11-12). 
If individuals disagreed about whether or not an object should have an elevated status 
in society this would be a substantive (non-verbal) dispute by my interpretation. 
Providing both individuals were aware that this is the implication of describing that 
object as art, then the dispute is not a verbal dispute. We could eliminate the term and 
rephrase in a way that preserved the disagreement. Yet this is not the issue in the 
above quote: the issue is purely whether or not Duchamp's urinal can be described as 
'art' and the dispute arises over different beliefs concerning whether the 'exercise of 
skill' is necessary for something to be labeled 'art ' . The dispute is irrespective of 
whether the disputants disagree that Duchamp's urinal should or should not have an 
elevated status or whether or not Duchamp demonstrated skill. Whether or not the 
term 'art ' applies when an exercise of skill is absent is a purely verbal dispute if this is 
what the debate over the artistic quality of Duchamp's urinal turns on. If both parties 
agreed that Duchamp displayed no skill with his urinal and also that it was 
nevertheless a praiseworthy artefact worthy of an elevated status, and yet still 
disagreed over whether it was a work of art then this is a paradigm example of a 
verbal dispute. It is a non-substantive dispute despite what Skinner says. Claiming 
that such a 'linguistic disagreement' is substantive conflates the consequence of the 
disagreement with the disagreement itself. Verbal disagreements obviously have 
social consequences. We might verbally disagree over what a just contract is because 
we have different beliefs about what the meaning of the word ' just ' is and you might 
consequently end up trying to fight me whereas I try and flee. Yet our disagreement 
did not range over our reactions to the disagreement, it ranged over the word 'justice' 
and its application to the contract we were trying to strike. 
The Cambridge School's aim then is to 'illuminate' ideological disputes by describing 
the history of the words used to state 'linguistic disagreements'. Such a history 
amounts to describing the way the terms' extension has changed through time to serve 
certain interests. Genealogies of this sort perhaps serve a useful function in 
identifying which parties have a vested interest in certain words used in contemporary 
debates and to encourage arguers to be wary of them. Yet the term 'illumination' 
here plays the same sort of fudge tactic as the term 'enlightenment' did in Connolly's 
analysis. It is not at all obvious what such a genealogy does for the disputes 
themselves. Such an analysis might well help out those arguing non-substantively 
over Duchamp's urinal but 1 do not see how such analysis can function on a 
"substantive social dispute" - descriptions of a term's causal history can only ever 
function on non-substantive social disputes. Part of the problem is that the notion of 
a linguistic disagreement is also underspecified, but even if we were to pry 
substantive and non-substantive disputes apart analytically (as per my interpretation) 
and then focus in on one, the word 'illumination' reveals no clues concerning why 
describing the contexts in which the terms are used is helpful. The way words are 
used are no doubt good indicators of changes in "social or intellectual attitudes on the 
part of those who use the language" (Skinner, 1989: 19) and this might well be useful 
to complement a number of investigations, but the status of any dispute arising in 
political argument remains unchanged in light of such analysis. 
One way to state my opposition to the Cambridge School is to say that describing the 
history of some word has no role to play in describing the semantic content of a 
disagreement. Skinner and his followers seem to think otherwise. I will defer analysis 
of a concrete case to Chapter 8 (particularly 8.3.2 concerning the republican rejection 
of negative freedom) and focus here instead on a parallel debate in the philosophy of 
language. It should be noted though that this debate focuses more on names and 
natural kind terms than terms referring to political values. If anything though this just 
implies that my scepticism towards proposing substitutions for political terminology 
in terms of causal-historical descriptions is justified. In extending the discussion I am 
admitting that the causal-historical thesis could plausibly apply though by no means 
think it definitely does. The discussion will require a brief detour that will retrace a 
few of the issues in semantics discussed in 2.4 but I think it is useful to state my 
opposition to the Cambridge School in a more analytical light. 
Saul Kripke introduced the idea of rigid designators to describe terms like 'Richard 
Nixon' and 'H2O': terms that designate the same individual or property in any 
possible world. Up until Kripke's Naming and Necessity (1974) the conventional 
view was that the meaning of a name was a description that picked out the unique 
referent of the name. A decent interpretation of 'clarification' and 'illumination' by 
this conventional view would be the substitution of terms for descriptions that 
preserved the truth conditions of the sentences in which the terms were used. The 
more descriptions given that can substitute in for the terms in sentences, the better an 
audience can fill in the relations between the sentences and reasoning of the speaker. 
Yet there is a dilemma at the heart of this conventional (Fregean) account. 1 know 
that Godel discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic and that this description is 
good enough to uniquely pick out the man Godel, but that is all 1 know about the man. 
I know nothing else about his life. Can we say this description suffices to give the 
meaning I attribute to the name Godel? If it did we could substitute 'Godel ' for 'the 
discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetic' in all sentences that use the name. We 
might then formulate following sentence, 
(a) If Godel existed, Godel discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic. 
We then substitute 'Godel ' for 'the discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetic' 
and get, 
(b) If the discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetic existed, the 
discoverer of the incompleteness of arithmetic discovered the 
incompleteness of arithmetic. 
Now, (b) is a necessary truth. That is to say, there is no possible world in which it 
would turn out false. However, (a) is not. It is a contingent truth. Godel might well 
have died before his mathematical powers had developed, he might have spumed 
academia for a life of dangerous adventure, or we could have faulty information and 
Godel did not in fact discover the incompleteness of arithmetic, and so on. It is 
possible that he did not. Once truth is relativised to possible worlds (see 2.4) 
substitution of names for descriptions does not suffice to give the meaning of a term 
anymore. It does not suffice because (a) and (b) have different truth conditions and (as 
per 2.4) the meaning of a sentence amounts to its truth-conditions. 
The Kripkean revolution holds that the meaning of Richard Nixon is the referent the 
name picks out. The name was baptised to refer to the individual i who actually 
became the S?"" President of America when that individual was first bom. When 
sentences use the name 'Richard Nixon' they refer to that individual, not necessarily 
the 37"' President of America. For instance, hat individual i might never have become 
an American president. In fact it was surely improbable at the point that individual i 
was baptized with the name 'Richard Nixon' that individual i would become 
president. Furthermore, it is (minutely) possible that we are all under a collective 
delusion and Richard Nixon never was the American President. We can make sense 
of all these claims when we talk about baptisms and re-baptisms of certain objects 
with names. Such a practice is called 'reference fixing' in the literature. It is one of 
the most crucial tenets to the Kripkean revolutions that there is a "distinction between 
semantic and pre-semantic senses of 'reference fixing'". The pre-semantic involves 
actions and decisions on behalf of individuals in a linguistic community to fix some 
term with a reference of some object. These actions and decisions will not necessarily 
be semantic descriptions like 'water is a chemical compound of oxygen and hydrogen 
with the formula H2O' but be demonstratives like but by demonstratives like 'This 
substance is water, that substance is water, but this substance is not water'. The 
reference-fixing usage of the term 'water' is then passed back and forth throughout a 
linguistic community until it becomes an established fact. In 1750 the term 'water' 
referred to the compound it now refers to even though in 1750 it was still unknown 
that water was H2O. We can explain this by assuming the term 'water' played the 
role of a rigid designator for the kind common to the standard exemplars we use - and 
have always used - for the term 'water'. Stalnaker (2007: 254-255) lucidly describes 
the overall lesson of the Kripkean revolution, 
"We describe possible worlds by referring to things, kinds, events, properties and relations that we find 
in the actual world and then stipulating that the possible situation we intend to describe shall contain 
them. There is no better way to do it. To the extent that we are ignorant or mistaken about the people, 
things, kinds, or properties that we use to describe a possibility, we will be ignorant or mistaken about 
what the possibility that we have stipulated is like. So, for example, if it is gold thai we have put into 
the possible world that we choose to talk about, then the world we have specified will be one 
containing an element with atomic number 79, whether we know it or not. This fact about the way we 
specify possibilities is, I think, the source of a posteriori necessity, and the fact that the only way to 
specify a possible world is by using materials that the actual world provides is the reason why the 
phenomenon of necessary a posteriori truth cannot be explained away, or factored into a part that is 
necessary, but purely conceptual, and a part that is empirical, but contingent." 
So the actual world plays an impoitant role in fixing terms to referents and individuals 
can quite competently use these words without having a description ready to 
substitute for it in a sentence in a way that preserves the sentence's meaning. It is not 
descriptions all the way down, so to speak, since at some point in our discourse we 
will need to rely on terms that designate referents by virtue of some social decision 
rather than some description. 
Every now and again though there is the suggestion that a description of this 
reference-fixing event of some name can substitute in for the name itself in sentences 
in a way that preserves the truth-value of those sentences. Scott Soames rejects this 
type of ambitious descriptivism. He argues that we must be careful not to conflate (i) 
and (ii), 
"(i) the facts that originally brought it about that water stands for what it does, and that have 
sustained the reference of the word since it was initially established, and (ii) the facts about 
the meaning of water that speakers must master in order to understand the word. . . What is 
uncontroversial is that since water didn't get its reference by magic, some facts of type (i) 
must exist, or have existed. If we knew these facts, they could, of course, be described. But it 
does not follow from this that such descriptions are parts of the meaning of the term, or that 
speakers who understand water must associate them with the word" (Soames, 2005: 182-83). 
I believe (i) and (ii), or the pre-semantic and semantic respectively, need to be 
distinguished in political argument. I have reasons over and above those of Soames. 
Principally, descriptions of the reference-fixing events of political terms - the 
baptisms and re-baptisms - are conducive to being described by the very class of 
terms they are supposed to be substituted in for. 
Kripke's examples do not attract much controversy in and of themselves. 'Water ' , 
'gold' , and 'electricity' are all pretty uncontroversial cases. We all have a rough idea 
of the exemplars of the terms and experts in mind to trust with determining their true 
referents (namely chemists and physicists). Given no significant (at least no 
significant social) controversy rages over the application of Kripke's rigid designators 
the terms can be translated from one tradition to the next without problem. This is 
rarely the case with political terms though. For example, part and parcel of describing 
some state of affairs as 'socially just ' is to appraise that state of affairs. Certain 
traditions will undoubtedly have differing exemplars for the term 'socially just ' and 
different experts responsible for determining the extension of the term. Furthermore, 
even within traditions the extension of terms like 'state' and its close synonyms 
change gradually through time. As R.G. Collingwood (1939: 64) puts it, it is just as 
absurd to translate the Ancient Greek 'polis' that Plato criticised into what Hobbes 
describes as 'the state' as it is to translate all Ancient Greek references to a 'trireme' 
as a 'steamboat' 'Water ' , on the other hand, has had a stable pattern of reference-
fixing from early on in (surely) every linguistic community. 
1 think one of the reasons political terminology has been so unstable is that political 
terms are usually bound up with appraisals of states of affairs. Consequently, there 
has been no fixed 'basic stuff that political terms refer to in order to correct 
misinformed parties using the terms. If 1 said 'Water is not H2O' or 'Richard Nixon is 
6 ft tail' there are certain things in the world that we can uncontroversially refer to in 
order to check whether the sentences are true or not. This rather bland fact renders a 
program of ambitious descriptivism completely - which seems to me to be exactly the 
Cambridge School's program - inappropriate for political terminology. Take the 
form of ambitious descriptivism for granted and imagine a disagreement between a 
fundamentalist Muslim and an atheist over whether or not the criminalization of 
apostasy is 'socially just ' . Understanding the educational curriculums the two 
individuals were subjected to during their schooling and the history of their respective 
cultures might provide a description of how the term 'socially just ' was fixed to a 
property that ranged over the criminalization of apostasy for one of them and did not 
for another. If we were to substitute the respective reference-fixing stories into the 
disagreement we seemingly have revealed that the two individuals were talking past 
one another and therefore we have 'clarified' the disagreement by demonstrating that 
there was none to begin with. Yet of course there is still a disagreement. It is absurd 
to think that the issue is here settled with two sets of causal descriptions. The point is 
that given both take the term 'social justice' to be appraisive, they both think their 
historical chain is the correct chain for determining the extension of the term. Yet in 
what sense is their historical chain 'correct'? The answer is inevitably, "My culture 
and the chain of learning 1 have been subjected to is the socially just one." The terms 
that the causal descriptions substitute in for still require the substituted terms to make 
their disagreement evident. This is in part due to the facts that have sustained the 
reference (or lack thereof) of political terminology are best described in terms of that 
terminology. 
The interesting descriptions the Cambridge School give for the contexts in which 
political terms are used are typically descriptions of power, class, markets, freedom, 
and so on. So the descriptions of the causal histories of political terminology are 
prone to utilising political terminology just as much as the political arguments that 
supposedly need 'clarifying'. Thinking that such histories can change the status of 
any argument relies on this circular brand of ambitious descriptivism. Historical 
analysis no doubt helps with destructive conceptual analysis given it gives arguers a 
clue which terms they might want to eliminate first. However, it is not necessary and 
my hunch is that it is more efficient just to eliminate blindly than to go into a detailed 
historical analysis of the terms used to state the disagreement and/or agreement. 
What is most important to stress here though is that it does not do the work of the 
method of elimination. Historical descriptions of a term's usage does not end or alter 
the running political argument (the descriptions are first-dimensional facts rather than 
second-dimensional). 
53. Elimination, not Substitution 
This chapter and the last have been concerned with substitution. That is, the idea that 
substituting terms in a political argument for descriptions can somehow improve the 
argument. It is the orthodox solution for problems of a conceptual nature in the 
literature. As we have seen with the examples of this and the previous chapter, when 
somebody suspects an argument hangs together because of sophistry and linguistic 
cunning the typical response is to substitute terms used in the argument for 
descriptions that preserves the truth-conditions of that argument. 1 have canvassed 
two different approaches to this description-giving exercise in political theory and 
have found them both wanting. The scientific programme that substitutes terms in 
political argument for those most amenable to political science commits the 
magnitude fallacy. The ordinary language approach substitutes political terms for 
descriptions of the way in which the terms are used but does not change the status of 
political argument despite what its proponents claim. Both approaches to substitution 
crumble when subjected to pretty basic issues in the philosophy of language: the 
demarcation of idiolects and the causal-historical thesis. 
The arguments I have reviewed defending these brands all under-describe their aims. 
In so doing they get dangerously close to running into Meno's paradox (see 1.1). My 
claim now is that these brands need to fudge their aims in order to make their 
conceptual analysis appear fruitful and impartial. Admittedly it is a generalisation 
from a small selection of the literature to a broad claim, but I think that all 
substitutionists need to engage in these fudge tactics if they want to import their brand 
of conceptual analysis into political argument. To my knowledge destructive 
conceptual analysis is the only available alternative. 
Here ends the 'methodological' considerations of the dissertation. What follows are 
applications of destructive conceptual analysis to demonstrate its use in political 
theory and political science. I think that the analysis in each chapter constitutes a 
useful contribution to the various literatures covered. The literature is typically quite 
sophisticated because 1 want to make the point that while the method of elimination 
can technically tear apart the arguments of charlatans and outright demagogues, it can 
also make a positive contribution to important and ostensibly substantive academic 
debates. In fact as 1 have already argued (3.3.2) this is probably where the method 




Howard Lasswell's definition of politics as 'who gets wiiat when and how?' is 
probably the most asked and rephrased question in all of political analysis. Robert 
Dahl's interpretation of the question 'Who governs?' is most likely the second. The 
two questions are the heart of empirical political science. The following chapter will 
analyse them conceptually. It will use the abbreviations WG for Dahl's question and 
WWWH for Lasswell's for brevity's sake. 
WG is often considered a part rephrase of WWWH where certain disagreements over 
WWWH may be explained in virtue of disagreement over WG. That is, if we want to 
know why certain groups get more resources than other groups, we should narrow our 
investigation to discerning which groups control government policy. This is simply a 
mistake. Rephrasing 'who gets what, when, how?' in terms of 'who governs?' 
narrows - quite unnecessarily - the scope for explanation. If an analyst is only ever 
looking for some agent or agents to lump responsibility for government policy onto, 
they will disregard the role structure can play in explaining why some get more than 
others and consequendy cloud the crucial issue of institutional change. What licenses 
the rephrase of 'who gets what when and how?' into 'who governs?' is fast and loose 
interpretations of the terms 'power ' and especially 'social power' . The aim of this 
chapter then is to apply destructive conceptual analysis as tonic. 
Dahl begins his book Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City with 
his question in full, 
"In a political system where nearly every adult may vote but where knowledge, wealth, social 
position, access to officials, and other resources are unequally distributed, who actually 
governs?" (200511961]: 0 
He elaborates further in the introduction: citizens may well be equal in the formal 
sense that they have equal voting rights, but given the vast inequality of resources 
"must there not also be great inequalities in the capacities of different citizens to influence the 
decisions of their various governments? And if, because they are unequal in other conditions, 
citizens of a democracy are unequal in power to control their government, then who in fact 
does govern?" (Dahl, 2005[196l]: 3) 
It is obviously an important question, one that cuts to the heart of our democratic 
aspirations, and one that attracts a lot of (usually healthy) disagreement. The answers 
range from each voter as much as the next, capitalists or other social classes, national 
elites, international elites, elite representatives, the state machine, special interest 
groups, and so on. 
Lasswell's book Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, on the other hand, is probably 
better known for its title than its content. The question is rephrased from the get-go as 
a study of the patterns of "influence and the influential" (Lasswell, 1950 [1936]: 25) 
where "the influential are those who get the most of what there is to get" (1950: 3). 
He takes the terms 'influence' and 'power' to be interchangeable (1950: 24). The 
powerful are those who have more of whatever the researcher happens to think is 
worth valuing in society. The answers are therefore somewhat arbitrary. As Lasswell 
says, "Political analysis could make use of other combinations [of values], and the 
resulting elite comparisons would differ" (1950: 6) and then "Different results can be 
obtained by using different values. An elite of deference is not necessarily an elite of 
safety" (1950: 18). Accordingly, an elite of resources is not necessarily an elite of 
governance. 
Most of the disagreements over Dahl and Lasswell's questions are by no means 
pointless. Yet it is troubling that those who agree on all the local facts (such as the 
raw empirical data) might still disagree on a respective answer. It is therefore 
tempting to conclude that disagreements over the questions are often due to non-
substantive argument. Such non-substantive argument seems to be in part due to WG 
and WWWH being conflated. Both questions are typically boiled down to different 
interpretations of the term 'power' and the conflations of the questions then occur 
when these interpretations are used interchangeably. Dahl introduced the term to 
measure the capacities of actors to control public policy whereas Lasswell used the 
term to designate who got more of whatever the researcher thought worth getting: two 
eminently distinct uses that are not interchangeable. 
The questions WG and WWWH should be translucent with respect to recognised 
empirical patterns. In so far as raw empirics cannot determine a decisive answer the 
questions are defective, a defection that should have been weeded out in political 
argument before it got onto the agenda of empirical science (see 4.8). Why should we 
bother about empirical patterns in the first place? Answer: they supplement our 
arguments concerning when we need to act and when we do not need to act - when 
we have justified a certain principle, we need to know whether or not the actual world 
comes up to snuff and whether it would be inconsistent not to do anything about it. 
Without empirical evidence there is no point to political argument and without 
political argument empirical evidence cannot be adequately interpreted. 
This chapter is concerned with rephrasing these questions in a way that weeds out 
non-substantiveness and gives empirical research a chance to yield decisive answers 
rather than simply replicating deadlocked propaganda. WWWH and WG can be 
rephrased by introducing the words 'power' and 'social power'. The standard and 
largely undisputed distinction in the power literature is between outcome power (or 
simply just power) and social power. Outcome power is the power to effect 
outcomes. Social power is the power somebody has over another agent in order to 
effect outcomes. The more social power somebody has the more power they have to 
bring about the outcomes they want and so social power is a subset of outcome 
power. If I were to manipulate you, I would be exercising social power over you as 
part of my power to bring about some desired outcome. Outcome power then is 
associated with the phrase 'power to' and social power with the phrase 'power over'. 
WWWH can be rephrased in a way that preserves a broad range of agreement profiles 
in terms of outcome power: 'who gets outcome power, to what extent, when and 
how?''® Given outcome power is a means to what one wants, it is a proxy way of 
saying those who get more outcome power can get more of what they want. On the 
" The government typically does not directly satisfy consumptive wants. It distributes resources by 
which agents can accordingly satisfy them. 
other hand, WG can be rephrased in terms of social power: 'Who has social power 
over government?'^" 
Rephrasing from this point on is not so easy, with many purported disagreements over 
assertions involving social power and (outcome) power appearing to be verbal. From 
the results of the destructive conceptual analysis applied in this chapter, I suggest that 
such disagreement often turns on the conflation of WG and W W W H . Both 
explanations do not justify the disagreement since the disagreement has got nothing to 
do with the way the world is. When the external world cannot be brought to bear on 
an answer, the answer will inevitably be either irrelevant or unconstructive to political 
argument. 1 tie my analysis off with a closer look at what constitutes an empirical 
pattern. 
6.1 Do Capitalists have Power over Governments? 
Brian Barry suggests the rosy image of North American and western European 
political-economic systems where consumers and voters have power over policy and 
market direction but capitalists do not is a pure hoax. It is "nothing more than 
ideology, in Marx's sense of a fantastical picture of the world designed by the 
beneficiaries of the status quo to protect their privileged positions against legitimate 
demands for revolutionary change" (2003: 323). If such a fantastical picture 
straitjackets us, then it is unlikely reality and science can do much to constrain our 
arguments. Governments give business what business wants because they fear being 
punished - losing economic investment or campaign contributions - and government 
gives this to business because business have power in the same way that voters and 
consumers have it. The unequal distribution of resources that Dahl acknowledges, 
therefore contributes to unequal representation in policy decisions. The 
disadvantaged do not seek to change the capitalist system - which supports scared 
governments that toady to the interests of capitalists - because the fantastical picture 
dupes them into denial. Who governs? Capitalists govern. 
'The government ' clearly refers to the group of politicians in a position to determine executive 
policy decisions. It does not refer to politicians elected to parl iament who are not in a position to make 
such executive decisions. 
Barry's purported concern is to constrain claims made about the distribution of power 
relations in society with empirical evidence. In a three-part exchange in the journal 
Politics, Philosophy and Economics he criticises Keith Dowding for introducing 
epicycles into the interpretation of social power by constantly redefining the notion of 
a 'resource' too broadly in a way that ends up encompassing "all the things that lie 
between the ability to change people's utilities and the ability to change their 
behaviour" (Barry, 2003: 339). His accusation is that whenever there is evidence that 
mass behaviour does not conform to the rational choice framework pioneered by John 
Harsanyi (1962a and 1962b), Dowding's strategy is to re-define what counts as a 
power resource to make it fit. He goes on to say that this "seems a completely 
pointless endeavor, and one that makes it impossible to say the right things in a 
straightforward way, because they have to be somehow contorted to fit the framework 
[Dowding] wants to impose" (Barry, 2003: 339). The accusation is that Dowding gets 
blind sighted with developing a strict framework for the interpretations of 'power ' 
and relations^' of 'social power' that are supposed to fill in all the empirical gaps. 
The rigidity of the framework is pushed to the point where the questions the analysis 
was trying to address in the first place are lost and never recovered. 
Some exposition is required to make a bit more sense of this accusation - particularly 
which questions were being addressed in the first place. As the reader probably 
guessed, Barry does not think the ability to change people's utilities is identical with 
an ability to change their behaviour. He considers social power to be a subset of the 
latter but not necessarily the former. It is common ground that A has power over B 
when A can make B do something B would not otherwise have done (see for e.g. 
Dahl, 1957; Barry, 1989; Dowding, 1991 and 1996; Morriss, 2002; Lukes, 2005). 
Different interpretations of social power typically turn on the means A has to do this 
that are to count. For Barry, social power is the ability of A to change B's behaviour 
by means of B's belief thai A can make B worse off. A persuading B to do something 
by way of rational argument is therefore not an exercise of social power over B. Nor 
is a hotdog vendor who hands over a bun to a paying customer - which the vendor 
would not have otherwise done had the customer not offered to pay for it - the subject 
' That is, relations that can be acceptably associated with the word. 
of social power. The customer offers money for the hotdog and so increases the 
utility for the vendor to hand it over, but does not exercise social power over the 
vendor. An important feature of Barry's interpretation of social power, then, is that 
individuals have a preference not to be subjected to it. He tinkers with Weber 's 
definition of social power^^ to neatly rephrase this interpretation as the ability to bring 
about desired outcomes despite the resistance of opposition. That is, "an actor has 
more power the greater the range of unfavourable distributions of preferences within 
which he is decisive, in other words the more opposition he can overcome" (Barry, 
1989: 272). A paradigm example of social power then is a threat where A gets B to 
do something B would not otherwise have done by means of B ' s belief that A will 
carry out the threat if B did not do the deed. B wanted to do something that A did not 
want her to (or wanted her to do something else) and so A was in opposition to B vis-
a-vis B's choice. Therefore, B 's threat was an exercise of social power. There is no 
such opposition in the case of the rational arguer or the hotdog vendor and so there is 
no relation of social power. The giveaway is that typically those being persuaded by 
the force of reason and those freely consenting to a market transaction do not have a 
preference not to be in such a relation. B, on the other hand, has a preference not to 
be threatened. 
This is apparently the most charitable interpretation of social power Barry can think 
of for those trying to defend the market order. It gives theoretical coherency to the 
claim that voters exercise power over government and that consumers exercise power 
over firms. If politicians believe members of their constituencies are likely to punish 
them for poor performance, they are less likely to slouch on the job or dabble in 
corrupt behaviour. Politicians believe that voters can make them worse off. When 
voters go to the ballot box they undertake collective behaviour that signals to 
politicians that if they behave in ways that they might otherwise have behaved, then 
the collective behaviour of voters will punish them. Granted, it is not rational for 
voters to punish poor performance^^ since voters should be looking to the future and 
to what the competing candidates can offer them during the next electoral term rather 
than looking back and punishing past performance However, it is commonplace that 
T h e defini t ion by one translat ion goes "any chance to impose o n e ' s o w n will in a social re la t ionsh ip , 
even against res is tance, regardless of wha t that chance is based on . ( 1922 , in Z i m m e r l i n g , 2005 : 31) . 
H o w e v e r , if we are to fo l low D o w d i n g ' s ana lys is , it migh t s o m e t i m e s be rat ional to sacr i f ice y o u r 
vote m such a way as to build a col lect ive reputa t ion . 
"voters use the past as a signal for future policy outcomes" (Jacobs and Shapiro, 
2000: 14). It therefore pays a politician to pander to their constituent's belief that 
they are the preferable candidate come election time by performing and legislating 
favourably. So far as this belief reins in the heads of politicians (and 1 think it is safe 
to say that it does), then voters have power over politicians and therefore government. 
Likewise with business: if firms start to lower the quality of their produce or hike up 
its price, consumers will switch to different products. In so far as a sufficient number 
of loyal customers notice the difference and switch to a competitor's product instead, 
this is incentive enough to keep produce at a reasonable quality and at a reasonable 
price. The belief that consumers will punish the firms deters those firms from 
behaving in a way they otherwise would and gives purchase to the term 'consumer 
power' . 
Of course, both these ascriptions of power assume that there is already a government 
and already an entrenched market with established businesses. We can accordingly 
infer that consumers can make firms worse off and that voters can make governments 
worse off. This inference allows us to reject some of the classic liberal arguments 
commonly deployed. For example, one defence of the seeming control and 
manipulation employers have over their employees is to argue that they do not really 
have any power over them at all. As Lindblom (1977: 48) puts it, "the classical 
liberal argument postulates a population not yet engaged in economic cooperation and 
asks how they might be organised by being drawn into mutually advantageous 
voluntary exchanges. Does such a method of organisation impair their liberties? Not 
at all, for each enters into exchange for his own advantage, hence voluntarily". 
Someone could quite reasonably raise this to argue that employers never really have 
any real power over their employees, which is an age-old strategy used against 
Marxian opponents to deny that the bourgeoisie had any power over the proletariat 
rather than the more modem strategy of problematising the demarcation of the classes 
(see 8.5). However, if they do they can no longer consistently maintain that voters 
have any power over government. If we postulate a population not yet with a 
government then we cannot postulate that voters will use the past as a signal for the 
future and that politicians will be fearful of voters punishing poor performance. If 
voters do not have any power then it is difficult to ascribe an electoral system with 
any sort of democratic credentials.' 
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In more modem times it would be odd to deny that employers did not have any power 
over their employees. It is not odd though to deny that capitalists exercise much 
power over government. Barry quotes Donald Wittman as one of the deniers, 
"The Marxists [who say capitalists exercise power] have it about 98 per cent right, but the 
remaining 2 per cent makes all the difference to the analysis. It is true that democratic 
governments are severely constrained in their policy choices by economic forces. But the 
Marxists are wrong in attributing these forces to capitalists or to capitalism itself. Capitalists 
don't control, markets do." 
The flight of capital can cripple budgets - not to mention nations - making it difficult 
for politicians to implement reasonable policy packages. Barry cites a few examples 
like the run on the franc in 1981-1982 where the French government started dabbling 
in light socialism and investment started bailing shortly after. The amputees in Sierra 
Leone are also a direct consequence of the financial aid the rebels received from 
capitalists who were after the diamonds from the mines the rebels controlled. 
Countless examples of the perils of capital flight can unfortunately be drawn from the 
developing world. Recently, the global financial crisis in 2008 has been the most 
prominent example of how concerns for the stability of investment can influence the 
policy of governments. The American government invested an estimated 80% of its 
GDP to prop up the financial sector by direct capital injections, the guaranteeing of 
loans, cutting interest rates, and ensuring liquidity provision. After Lehman Brothers 
filed for bankruptcy confidence in the market dwindled with other banks withdrawing 
their assets from and declining loans to any banks that might have been adversely 
affected by cancelled trades with Lehman Brothers. The US treasury then stepped in 
when the next wave of banks began to unwind. Policy makers got it in their heads 
that the banks were too big to fail and accordingly spent substantial amounts to bail 
them out. The belief was strong enough to make government do something they 
would not have otherwise done (nobody likes to empty their financial reserves) and so 
by Barry's interpretation the bailout can be partly explained in terms of the power of 
Barry notes the etymological link between democracy and the power of the people. In Greek, 
'demos' can be translated as 'the people' and 'kratos' as power. So literally, ascribing a measure of 
democracy is ascribing a measure of how much power the people have over the government. 
capitalists over government. Yet the more natural explanation - or at least the more 
common - is to maintain that the government was forced into their significant fiscal 
spending because of the signals of the market rather than the signals of capitalists. 
The argument in 'Capitalists Rule OK?' is that it may well be natural to talk in this 
way but such talk is inconsistent with the equally natural tendency to assert that voters 
have power over politicians that constrains their decisions over legislation (and 
likewise for consumers having any sort of 'consumer power' over firms). 
6.1.1 Verbal Attacks on the Liberal Democratic Picture 
The claim then is that there are no available linguistic resources that can justify the 
description of the distribution of social power-relations a champion of the free market 
and democracy might have. Typically, power theorists have developed their 
interpretations of the term 'social power' to attach it to a conceptual space they find 
particularly useful for answering either WG or WWWH. If there is a question to 
which Barry addresses 'Capitalists Rule OK?' the question concerns linguistic 
patterns and whether we can consistently assert the sentence 'Consumers have power 
over firms, voters have power over government, but capitalists do not have power of 
government' on any reasonable interpretation. His answer is no. Yet Keith Dowding 
offers an alternative framework that might well suggest otherwise - it marks out the 
territory one would need to take in order to pursue the alternative. Barry needs to go 
on the attack then to defend his thesis against the prospects of Dowding's rational 
choice interpretation of social power to explain why it is not a feasible alternative. 
The claim and argument in 'Capitalists Rule OK' can be summarised into two 
assertions. 
BI : The sentence, "Consumers have power over firms, voters have power 
over government, but capitalists do not have power over government' is 
inconsistent on any reasonable interpretation of the phrase 'power over' (i.e. 
social power) 
' See Barry (2003: 323). 
B2: Keith Dowding's interpretation of 'social power' is a candidate 
interpretation that interprets (or at least could interpret) B1 to yield a 
consistent sentence. However, the interpretation is unreasonable because of 
the epicycles it introduces into political theory with respect to what counts as a 
power resource and what does not.^ ® 
My argument is that the assertions B1 and B2 both rely on purely verbal inferences. 
B1 takes the sentence defending the fantastical picture out of context. It does not 
address the conversational context the sentence is embedded in and the flexibility of a 
converser's ability to rephrase their point. Dowding's interpretation of social power 
is intended to address the question of 'who governs?' whereas Barry appears more 
concerned with 'who gets what, when, how?' . Had the context of B1 been elaborated, 
this conflation of the two questions would have been avoided. The implications of 
this difference will be teased out with the method of elimination. B2 does not survive 
the pressures of elimination either. 
1 will begin with B2. Dowding (1991; 1996; 2003) tries to fill in the gap between the 
ability to get somebody to do something they would not otherwise have done with the 
ability to alter their incentive structure. More precisely, social power is the ability to 
achieve desired outcomes by deliberately changing the incentive structures of others. 
Consider again the case where A threatens B. Suppose t l is the measure of disutility 
B suffers if A's threat is carried out, u l is the utility of B carrying out their preferred 
action and u2 is the utility of carrying out the action coercively suggested by A. The 
threat would likely be effective if B is rational and t l > ul - u2. Agent A has 
exercised social power over B by changing the incentives B has for acting in various 
ways (i.e. B's incentive structure) such that B does something they would not 
otherwise have done. 
A credible threat is a means for social power. The greater ability an agent has for 
credible threats, the greater their means for social power. Likewise, the more an agent 
can make credible offers (like the promise of payment or a quid pro quo service) the 
more options they have to make others do something they would not otherwise do. 
The means for social power then are the tools by which we change the incentive 
structures of others. As Dowding puts it, "the difference u\ - u2 that A can make to 
'•^See Barry (2003:339). 
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B's welfare is a measure of A's power" (1991: 75). Note that this quote does not 
imply power is the difference but the difference is a good, albeit rough, measure of 
whatever power is. According to John Harsanyi (1962a, 1962b) these tools can be 
grouped into four types: conditional incentives or disincentives (offers and threats), 
unconditional incentives or disincentives (e.g. price subsidies for solar panels and 
taxes on cigarettes), provision of information, and appeals to legitimate authority. 
Such means are often costly for the individual exercising the social power (the one 
carrying out the threat, or paying out the offer, or securing the intelligence, etc.) and 
so will require resources to cover the costs. The more resources an agent has the 
greater their opportunities to exercise the means for social power. This gives us an 
explanation why certain individuals are in a position to make more credible threats or 
offers than others and so have more social power than others: they have more 
resources to punish non-compliance and/or reward compliance. For instance, money 
is a resource given individuals can use it to make offers or pay for punishment. While 
not equating power with resources and committing the 'vehicle fallacy' (Kenny, 
1975: 10; Morriss, 2002: 18)^^, the account does endorse resources as a good proxy 
for measuring social power. 
By Dowding's account of social power an agent's reputation is also a resource that 
can be used to cover the costs for the means of social power. A threat will be 
effective even if you do not have the resources to honour it so long as the threatened 
thinks you do and thinks you will honour it. So long as the agent believes the threat is 
credible, then they will act as desired, even if you do not have the resources to honour 
it. The Sicilian mafia, it is sometimes said, are all but powerless but for their 
reputation for harsh punitive action on two-timers and non-compliers (Gambetta, 
1993). 
It makes little sense to honour a threat were it not for rational concerns about 
reputation. Punishment costs time, effort and often money and unless you derive a 
good deal of pleasure out of inflicting pain or causing hardship, there is no rational 
reason to go through with it other than a concern for your reputation. Likewise, there 
Power is rightly taken to be a dispositional concept . Kenny and Morriss use the analogy of the 
disposition of whisky to introxicate to draw out what is at stake with the vehicle fallacy. 
is no good reason to honour a conditional incentive ("I'll pay you 5 million dollars if 
you blackmail that politician") other than a loss of reputation for delivering on future 
offers if there is no chance of reprisals from the agent you were incentivising. Losing 
reputation makes the tools of social power less credible and therefore less effective, 
weakening an agent's social power. Even when u l -u2 results in disutility an agent 
might not rationally comply with a threat or offer since having a reputation for 
stubbornness makes an individual less of a target for future would-be blackmailers. 
These factors introduce an element of rational indeterminacy into the interpretation of 
social power, particularly with respect to the relation between A 's ability to make a 
difference to B's welfare and A 's ability to get B to do something B would not 
otherwise have done. If an individual or group does not cede to a threat or take up an 
offer despite t l>u l -u2 , this does not necessarily render them irrational. Again, 
Dowding is interested in giving an interpretation of power that is framed by the 
methodology of rational choice. While individuals might not always act rationally, it 
is a good approximation for mass behaviour that most individuals will (even though 
there will undoubtedly be fluctuations from the norm). Once resources have been 
counted and preferences determined, if mass behaviour does not follow a utility-
maximising trajectory, then rationality can still be assumed and the explanation still 
given in terms of resources by considering the concern agents have for their 
reputation. In many circumstances it is rational to take a hit in welfare in order to 
develop resources for greater welfare returns in future circumstances. Such a strategy 
would explain why collective action does not occur even when t l > u l -u2 and when 
the assumption of rationality holds. To update B2 to account for the above 
discussion, 
B2: ... Interpreting social power to be measurable by an agent's resources 
introduces epicycles into the discussion of power. Including reputation as a 
resource is a case in point 
Barry thinks that counting reputation as a resource in Harsanyi's model is a "fudge 
factor" (2003: 325). The accusation is that treating reputation as a resource an agent 
has to make a difference to another agent's incentive structure introduces epicycles 
with respect to the definition of a resource. This definitional qualm gives destructive 
'See Barry (2003: 325-339). 
conceptual analysis a hook with the word 'resources' . If the problem is defining and 
re-defining resources to fill in any gap between the ability to change somebody's 
welfare and the ability to change their behaviour, then if we remove the word from 
argument and rephrase do we remove the problem? Since 'resource' is the word that 
seems to feature in the disagreement we should eliminate it from B2 and rephrase to 
begin the conceptual analysis. A disagreement-preserving rephrase is seemingly 
simple, 
B2A: ... Interpreting social power to be measurable by some property that 
agents can use to cover the costs of altering the incentive structure of other 
agents introduces epicycles into the discussion of power. Including reputation 
as a subset of that measurable property is a case in point.^' 
I am not completely sure whether Barry would have agreed with B2A, but for 
charity's sake we assume that he would have. However, where the epicycles in B2A 
come from is not immediately obvious. So long as there is some property that can be 
measured by a theorist and that can be utilised by some agent A to affect the incentive 
structure of some other agent B to A ' s desired effect, then Dowding's claim holds. 
There may be a few teething problems in working out what this property is (e.g. 
whether it is to include an agent's reputation or not) and how to measure it, but such 
problems do not introduce epicycles into the discussion. Reputation can be measured 
through elite interviews. Tabulating elite beliefs concerning the influence of other 
elite agents within a community was used as a proxy for measuring power in some of 
the early work on community power (Hunter, 1953). If we assume B2A preserves the 
agreement profile of B2, then the accusation of epicycles used to reject Dowding's 
interpretation must refer to his argument arbitrarily swapping the property that the 
term 'social power' refers to when faced with reasonable rejection. Indeed, if the 
accusation were to hold it would be a clear case of linguistic gerrymandering. 
The question then is whether Dowding's interpretation can still be made when we 
eliminate the term 'social power' . In order to rephrase B2A once 'social power' has 
been eliminated it is useful to know why the term was introduced in the first place. It 
was not - as it were - to defend the market order. It was to address the issue of 
governance (i.e. WG) which we can address in terms of the ability to intentionally 
See Barry (2002: 162-3) for a plausible vindication of this rephrase. Note, however, section 3.3.4 if 
this reference fails to convince. 
affect the incentive structure of actors involved in policy decisions (Dowding, 1996: 
5) and so drop the term 'social power' in B2A altogether, 
B2B: Interpreting the ability to intentionally alter the incentive structure of 
others to be measurable by some property that agents can use to cover the 
costs of altering the incentive structure of other agents introduces epicycles 
into developing a framework to answer WG and 
B2B does not preserve the disagreement profile of B2A. There was never any 
suggestion in 'Capitalists Rule OK?' that Dowding could not quantify whatever he 
was interpreting social power to be, only that his particular interpretation of the term 
was wrong. The subset of abilities that are relevant to governance are the subject of 
Dowding's interpretation, he just happens to name this particular subset 'social 
power'. Yet Barry suggests that Dowding's supposed epicycles lead to a degenerate 
paradigm in "Lakatosian terms" (2003: 325).®' This is where his accusation starts to 
unravel. There is no hypothesis Dowding is subjecting to empirical evidence where 
he could re-define the words 'resource' and/or 'social power' in order to avoid the 
hypothesis' falsification. Barry's accusation - boiled down - is not that empirical 
evidence can never update the questions Dowding seeks to answer with the rational 
choice framework, but that nothing allows Barry to trump Dowding's definition of 
social power with his preferred definition. This is a purely verbal complaint and does 
not amount to a reasonable rejection. It is a feature of supposedly decisive 
accusations of linguistic gerrymandering that if they do not to hold under the 
pressures of elimination then the accusation is itself a case of linguistic 
gerrymandering. Of course, if somebody can rephrase B2A is a way that preserves 
the agreement and disagreement profiles, then this analysis can be discarded. For 
now, destructive conceptual analysis has provisionally demonstrated that the 
accusation of epicycling in 'Capitalists Rule OK?' was hasty. This gives a hint that 
the analysis should be turned back on Barry to test the scruples of B1. 
So much for the attack on the Harsanyi/Dowding rational choice interpretation of 
social power. Assuming the interpretation is reasonable (and Barry has provided no 
Despite Barry not explicitly mentioning the questions framing the disagreement , in his follow-up 
article (Barry, 2003) he doesn't contest Dowding's (2002) characterization of it as such. 
Imre Lakatos' philosophy proposed a method for choosing when to abandon scientific research 
programmes and how far to push toleration of empirical irregularities. The method always needed 
evidence of success and failure of the paradigm's ability to predict/explain data. Barry provides little 
commentary on the capacities of either his or Dowding 's theories to predict/explain data 
substantive reason not to) the question is now how it interprets the power relations 
between capitalists, government, voters and consumers given the empirical facts that 
make up the common ground. Part of this common ground is presumably that 
capitalists get what they want from government more often than other groups in 
society. Barry says this is because they are socially powerful and have governments 
acting in ways they would not otherwise because politicians believe capitalists can 
dent their budgets and electoral chances (and sometimes their post-political careers as 
well). Dowding, on the other hand, suggests it is because capitalists are 
systematically lucky: "In a capitalist society, capitalists are systematically lucky 
because the welfare of everyone is dependent upon the state of the economy and 
capitalism is the motor of the economy" (1996: 80). Of course, they are also powerful 
since they often collude to force the government's hand when the government does 
not do as they wish, but as it happens this is not (or at least does not seem to be) the 
regularity. When the Australian government sought to impose a super profits tax on 
the mining industry, the industry collectively intervened, targeting the electorate with 
a 22 million dollar advertising campaign, which was not irrelevant to the overthrow of 
the then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. His replacement, Julia Gillard, subsequently 
negotiated a compromise tax, weary of the damage the mining companies would 
otherwise inflict on her party's electoral chances. This was an example of social 
power by both interpretations sketched so far. Yet the tendency for government to 
'listen to business' can also, to a significant degree, be put down to capitalists being 
systematically lucky that their interests happen to correspond with the government's. 
The capitalists are not themselves deliberately intervening to alter the incentive 
structures of politicians - the incentive structures are already thus rigged. Since there 
is no deliberate intervention or anticipated deliberate intervention, there is no social 
power being exercised. In this sense the social power capitalists have over 
government usually does not provide a sufficient answer to the question 'who gets 
what, when, how?' whereas systematic luck does. Nevertheless, this certainly seems 
like a reasonable interpretation of social power that undermines B1. Explaining why 
somebody or some group gets what they want or not can only sometimes be explained 
in terms of a concept that was designed to answer a question about democratic 
governance (i.e. WG). Remember, in Who Governs? Dahl was not trying to explain 
the inequality in New Haven; what he was trying to do was ascertain whether such 
inequality affected the governance of the city. 
If luck is technically whatever is added to decisiveness in a certain situation to equal 
success (luck + decisiveness = success) or "getting what you want without trying" 
(Barry, 1991: 300) then systematic luck is whatever is added to the decisiveness of 
individuals in a particular social position to equal the success those individuals enjoy 
as a function of being in their social position. Systematic luck is predictable but is 
analytically distinct from an individual or group's decisiveness. Systematic luck is 
predictable from the system of relations where "no single actor is necessary or 
sufficient for the continuance of the system, and if one or more actors fail to fulfil 
their roles there are strong incentives for others to take their place" (Dowding, 1996: 
74). This negative statement is precisely the proposition Dowding's interpretation of 
social power and systematic luck is set on bringing empirical evidence to bear upon -
to look for possible explanations beyond the deliberate decisions of actors. 
Sometimes individuals and groups will not act in a way that is in their best interests, 
not because somebody is there actively stopping them, but because of collective 
action problems. Those who gain from their inaction have not necessarily exerted 
social power over them; they could have been just lucky or systematically lucky. 
If capitalists are systematically lucky then I think it would be safe to say consumers 
are systematically lucky that prices are relatively constrained by their behaviour. 
There is no deliberate action consumers undertake (apart from a few narky letters of 
complaint about the quality of certain products) to alter the incentive structure of 
firms, all the individual consumer is usually interested in is getting what they want at 
the lowest price. Voters taken as a group, however, might be said to collude to 
exercise social power over government. They have the resource of legitimate 
authority to deliberately alter the incentive structure of politicians. So, if pushed, an 
apologist for the market could claim 'Voters exercise power over governments 
regularly, consumers do not exercise power over producers, and capitalists do not as a 
rule exercise social power over government policy.'®^ This is a genuine alternative to 
Barry's interpretation and one that gives market apologists a linguistic platform to 
consistently state their 'fantastical image' . So B1 is difficult to maintain. 
The distinction between a voter and consumer can be made by describing voters as deliberately 
actmg to effect a social outcome, whereas consumers effect the social outcome (prices and the profit 
margins of firms) but do not do so deliberately. 
The criticism can be pushed further with the method of elimination. B1 takes the 
sentence 'Consumers have power over firms, voters have power over government, but 
capitalists do not have power over government' out of context. This is problematic 
given the context of argument constrains what counts as a reasonable interpretation. 
For example, there is nothing in B1 to suggest social power cannot be interpreted as 
'a property that any group with a name that contains the letter o has over any group 
whose name does not and all groups with names starting with the letter v have over 
their governments.' Such an interpretation would render the sentence in B1 
consistent. We need a question or context of argument with which we can deem this 
proposed nominal interpretation of social power to be irrelevant (and therefore 
unreasonable). I suggest Barry is trying to propose an interpretation of social power 
that exhausts the 'how' in the question WWWH for all matters pertaining to the 
relations of social groups. Indeed, within this context perhaps his is the only 
reasonable interpretation that can make consistent work of the sentence in B l . 
However, Dowding first proposes a framework to address the question of WG using 
the term social power and only then introduces systematic luck to complete the 
framework to also address the 'how' in the question WWWH. These are two 
different uses of the term 'social power' and if we could eliminate the term then I 
doubt that many of the stated disagreements will be preserved. Furthermore, the word 
'social power' fudges the critical issue of institutional change that both authors were 
concerned with. 
If a Barry-deferring global socialist were to get into a political argument with a 
'fantastical image'-toting capitalist things could quite easily crumble into purely 
verbal disagreement. The two could well agree on all the brute empirical facts, 
understand the other's moral claims (both would probably agree that capitalists 
having x amount of power over government is bad), but still disagree about whether 
the other should endorse the current state of affairs since they have different linguistic 
descriptions of it. They would therefore have different opinions as to whether it had 
been justified. In such a situation reality is going to have a tough task constraining 
their argument. Rather than attacking the alternative definitions, then, the salient 
terms should be eliminated until the linguistic ideologies of the arguers are 
constrained to such a degree that the empirical facts and moral claims are the pivot for 
their agreement profiles rather than the definition of terms. The assumption Barry 
makes is that arguers attacking or defending the liberal-democratic order are working 
from a fixed set of terms to state their position and that there is no way the sentence in 
B1 could be rephrased without using the terms 'social power ' . Perhaps the sentence 
in B1 is a good first shot for making an argument for an individual subscribing to a 
more progressive tradition of political thought. However, from that point on 
adjustments need to be made and the arguer must be flexible with the words they use 
if they are to be open to reasonable rejection. Political arguments concerning 
WWWH in the market order do not need to be made in terms of social power. If 
somebody asked why it was that capitalists seemed to get more of what they wanted 
than other groups and the reply was that they exerted social power over governments, 
then perhaps Barry's interpretation is a reasonable one. However, if somebody 
wanted to ask why capitalists got what they want in a certain situation and what to do 
to stop it happening again, then it is not clear that Barry's interpretation of social 
power will do. A case in point is the global financial crisis (see next section). 
Once we eliminate the term 'social power' from political argument the import of 
Barry's case fizzles away. There is just as much reason to say Barry is entertaining a 
fantastical image as much as the brass neck apologists of the free market he chastises. 
If arguers were to be adequately reasonable and be open to the elimination constraint, 
there would be no point to 'Capitalists Rule OK?' other than offering another 
candidate interpretation of social power that is not much better than any other. There 
is little doubt that politicians believe that the tendencies of capital flight can devastate 
their budget, that CEOs of firms believe that consumers can make their firms less 
profitable by switching products, or that politicians believe that voters can kick them 
out of office if they do not come up to scratch. Indeed, it goes some way to 
explaining why capitalists get so many tax concessions and an unrevoked license for 
super profits to say they get it by means of the politicians' belief that the behaviour of 
capitalists could make their budget and electoral chances worse off. Yet capitalists 
did not necessarily engage in deliberate action to instil this belief nor do they engage 
in ongoing deliberate action to maintain it. The continuance of the capitalist system is 
not dependent on any single actor doing what they are already doing. In most cases 
though it is dependent on certain actors not doing what they are already not doing and 
so there is plenty of scope for individuals to think about the incentives the system 
distributes and consider doing something they had not already been doing in order to 
change it. Revolution is a live possibility in such calculations, which is obscured by 
Barry's language games. 
6.2 Responsibility and Institutional Cliange 
Until these debates are cleared up there will be a lot of hot air expelled in our 
empirical analysis of political events. In this section I will trace the ambiguity these 
debates have left open for institutional change. 
The explanations of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis are an interesting test for the 
discussion so far. One conspiracy theory 1 initially bought into was Hindmoor and 
McGeechen's (2013) conclusion that capitalists exercised their social power over 
government in order to establish the view that the banks "were too big to fail". I note 
quickly that labelling their conclusion a conspiracy theory is by no means an 
indictment - it is a victory for the defenders of the status quo that it is now regularly 
used as such - but only that they suggest the GFC bailout was in some part caused by 
collusion. The authors attribute the bailout package (estimated to be worth roughly 
80 per cent of America's GDP) to roughly three historical events that led to the banks 
being too big to fail since "a banking failure would have had a devastating effect on 
the American and global economy" (2013: 9). Policymakers did not just bail the 
banks out by being duped into it by lobbyists behind closed doors (although this 
might in part explain the extent of the bailout), they did it because global finance 
would have crippled their budget had they done otherwise. Yet the authors claim that 
the events that led to this situation were in part determined by the social power of the 
banks and that the bailout can therefore be explained, in part, by that power. The 
reason I decided to pick up from their analysis is because their interpretation of social 
power is derived from the Barry-Dowding debate (2013: 1). They side with Barry 
"but for different reasons" (2013: 2) - reasons related to intuitions concerning the 
connection between their analysis of the bailout and the word power. 1 suggest these 
intuitions obscure the process of reform set on ensuring such crises do not happen 
again. 
The three events identified as contributing to the bailout are as follows. First, the 
repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding Company Act in the United 
States (the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999) which relaxed financial regulation 
allowing commercial banks to subsequently engage in investment banking and enter 
the insurance business. The American banks lobbied for the regulation by nodding to 
the apparent danger London posed to the United States as an emerging financial hub 
with laxer restrictions on commercial banks. Such competition, it was argued, 
threatened employment and tax revenue in the United States with its potential to lure 
capital investment overseas. The deregulation led to a period of rapid financial 
growth. Yet Ritholz suggests that had "Glass-Steagall still been the law of the land, 
much of the damage banks like Citigroup [caused during the GFC] would have been 
minimised" (2009: 213). Second, the banks lobbied hard for the deregulation of 
derivatives trading. Derivative trading (rather loosely) consists of contracts designed 
to institute a swap of assets at some specified future point in time. By such a swap the 
parties' risk is consequently minimised by hedging their bets between the fortunes of 
two different markets. Consequently, all the banks became interconnected in a 
strikingly non-transparent way. 
Because banks largely traded with each other, because each trade required counterparties and 
because many trades were then reinsured with other banks via a credit default swap, the 
derivatives market generated staggering and completely opaque sets of liabilities between the 
banks themselves and between the banks and other financial institutions like AIG. . . The 
banks became too big to fail because these liabilities meant that the failure of one bank was 
likely to trigger the failure of other banks. (Hindmoor & McGeechen, 2013: 10) 
Indeed, when Lehman Brothers went under assets were quickly withdrawn from 
banks that might have been affected from void trades with them. This led to a quick 
evaporation of confidence in the market given the interconnectedness of the 
derivatives market. Finally, the government decided to reduce the capital banks were 
required to have to cover potential trading losses. The old 'net capital rule' was 
replaced by a policy that allowed the banks themselves to determine the risk 
generated from their investment using their own forecasting models. This, it is 
argued, led to laxer restrictions on risky behaviour. 
It is arguable that the direct lobbying of the banks was necessary for policymakers to 
commit to these three pieces of deregulation. Through the traditional means of 
campaign finance and lobbying, the banking sector got what it wanted. Yet it is 
wrong to conclude the above evidence suggests they collectively 'tried' to be too big 
to fail. They certainly lobbied for more opportunities to maximise their profits - to 
improve their choice situation - and in so doing changed their role in society, but it 
would be a leap to say that they colluded to make sure that when/if confidence in the 
market began to evaporate, the government would socialise their losses. 
Nevertheless, this is what Hindmoor and McGeechen seem to be suggesting with 
passages like the following, "The banks were not systematically lucky in 2008. They 
were powerful. They tried hard to ensure that they did not have to try hard to get 
what they wanted" (2013: 2). The contradiction is presumably in jest, however it 
reveals the problem with their analysis. The ' too big to fail ' mindset in policymakers 
was not intentionally created. It was an unintended and happy (for the bankers, at 
least) consequence of their profit-seeking behaviour. 'Lucky' seems to be a perfectly 
legitimate substitute for 'happy' in the previous sentence. Furthermore, had different 
players been involved (all the CEOs and chairmen had stepped down in one massive 
exodus) the same sort of lobbying would have occurred (given there were huge 
incentives for other players to step up into the vacant positions) presumably with the 
same results. So the process was unintentional but non-random. It is therefore quite 
right to call it a case of systematic luck. Hindmoor and McGeechen suggest that the 
banks were not 'lucky all the way down' and they had to create their luck. If 
somebody is not going out of their way to create their luck, then surely they are lucky 
that they have luck. Why not just call this luck all the way down? 
Of course, Hindmoor and McGeechen are free to use the word 'power ' any way they 
choose (so long as they give the reader fair warning). In fact they initially seem to 
condone Dowding's distinction between social power and systematic luck but then 
suggest that it does not pick out certain additional properties that they find salient. 
They want to make an additional distinction between those who are systematically 
lucky 'all the way down' and those who are systematically lucky only 'some of the 
way down' . In the 1940s the British government developed policy in the interests of 
farmers because the WWII naval blockade had emphasised the need to secure 
domestic agricultural production. The post-war currency crisis also played into the 
interests of farmers. Presumably, the farmers were systematically lucky 'all the way 
down' because they did not have any role to play (apparently) in the structure that 
suggested the policy. Despite the National Farmers Union having considerable 
power, the farmers got what they wanted because they were lucky. If, say, the 
National Farmers Union had been secretly financing the naval blockade or 
deliberately undermining the currency, then they would cease to be systematically 
lucky all the way down. If they were involved in such clandestine behaviour, then 
they would be exercising social power over the government (in a ludicrously 
roundabout way) and so trying to bring about the outcomes that they want. 
So Hindmoor and McGeechen disagree with the characterisation of the bailout as the 
banker's systematic luck, 
H&Ml : Capitalists got what they wanted with the bailout, but not because 
they were systematically lucky. 
H&M2: They got what they wanted because they created their luck. 
H&M3: They created their luck by exercising their social power over 
government. 
The three premises seem consistent. However, the disagreement between whether the 
bailout is a product of the capitalist's systematic luck or not hinges, it would appear, 
on the term 'social power' in H&M3. If we eliminate the term there are a number of 
candidate rephrases based on the interpretations discussed in the previous section 
(which is the literature H&M ground their argument with), 
H&M3A: They created their luck by it being the intentional outcome of 
altering the government's incentive structures.®' 
H&M3B: They created their luck by means of the government's belief that 
they could make the government worse off.®'* 
H&M3A is surely false. The three legislative acts that are said to have lead to the 
global financial crisis were primarily motivated by profit. Even if the banking sector 
had it in the back of their minds that they would collectively become too big to fail 
through such legislation, this was surely just a happy coincidence of behaviour 
motivated primarily for profit and the contentment of shareholders. On the other 
hand, H&M3B is probably true on a lax interpretation of the term 'created' . The 
American government was concerned that there would be more capital flight and 
See Dowding (2002). 
' "See Barry (2002). 
disinvestment. Such disinvestment would have made them significantly worse off 
and so they did something - the bailout - they would not have otherwise done. Yet 
somebody who disagreed with H & M l and thought capitalists were systematically 
lucky during the bailout could also quite reasonably agree with this (H&M3B) and 
H&M2 as well. Capitalists did not need to hook policymakers up to brainwashing 
devices or even lobby to create the belief that they could make them worse off to get 
what they wanted - market signals were enough for that. During the outbreak of the 
GFC a bailout was predictable. It was not random. Furthermore, at the time of the 
outbreak there was no deliberate behaviour the capitalists needed to undertake that 
was necessary for the bailout. On this interpretation, they were systematically lucky. 
If we assume H & M l is the conclusion and H&M2 and H&M3 are the premises, we 
can affirm all the premises but still deny the conclusion: the argument is therefore 
invalid. My conclusion then is that an acceptable rephrase of H&M3 is not 
forthcoming once the term 'social power' has been eliminated. Two ways to prove 
me wrong would be either to claim the three premises are not charitable enough or 
rephrase H&M2 or (more likely) H&M3 in a way that preserves the disagreement 
profile of H & M l . 
So we have a purely verbal disagreement until proven otherwise. Yet from this verbal 
disagreement, substantively different methodologies are derived. The three premises 
analysed above suggest a historical approach for explaining why some individual or 
group gets what it wants. That is, empirical researchers should look for some past 
observable action that in some way caused the structural properties that are relevant to 
the explanation. Adequate answers to W W W H , boil down to purging through history 
to find agents responsible for actions that are historically connected to the 
explanandum. The Dowding/Harsanyi framework, on the other hand, either explains 
some individual or group getting what they want in terms of an agent's social power 
or, failing that, luck and/or systematic luck. An agent getting what they want because 
they try to get it is a necessary element of many answers to WWWH, but to say that 
an agent got what they wanted without trying is not: an explanation is still begged. If 
I were to ask why I found my tyres slashed this morning, I would be somewhat 
peeved at the reply, 'because you were unlucky'. Luck is not an adequate 
explanation. I know 1 was unlucky; I want to know why 1 was unlucky (1 might have 
ticked off my neighbours by singing too loudly at 2 in the morning, for instance). 
Ascriptions of systematic luck do not comprise explanations of distribution either. 
What such ascriptions amount to is the claim that the distribution in question was 
predictable from the incentive structure of the political system and not because of the 
intentions and ambitions of particular agents. It closes off the possibility of 
describing the event in terms of agential responsibility or brute luck. The ascription 
of systematic luck therefore begs an answer to W W W H by way of a description of 
some distributional pattern derived from the particular incentive structure of the 
political system. In terms of explanation, ascriptions of luck and systematic luck are 
metatheoretical since they do not themselves constitute an explanation but rather say 
something about what the eventual explanation must look like. 
Hindmoor and McGeechen's approach leads to something like the unscientific regress 
of the old ruling elite model. As Dahl (1958: 463) put it, 
"If the overt leaders of a community do not appear to constitute a ruling elite, then the theory 
can be saved by arguing that behind the overt leaders there is a set of covert leaders who do. 
If subsequent evidence shows that this covert group does not make a ruling elite, then the 
theory can be saved by arguing that behind the first covert group there is another, and so on ." 
If there is no direct evidence for the theory that the bailout was the product of a ruling 
elite, then the theory can be saved by imputing the bailout to the particular choice 
situation policymakers face, a situation that the true ruling elite were covertly 
responsible for; if the actions of this so-called 'true ruling elite' then turn out to be 
better explained in terms of their choice situation rather than their deliberate action, 
then history can be perused again for another covert ruling elite that is responsible for 
that choice situation - and so on and so forth. A ruling elite responsible for every 
policy decision can therefore be posited in a way that is immune to falsification. The 
problem with this sort of regress is that it skirts around the problems with the system 
itself. Focusing on finding some agent responsible for the situation with no opt out 
clause for when there are no responsible agents leads to too much vengeance and not 
enough revolution. This is a prime example of what happens when WWWH is 
supposedly answered in terms of WG. As Morriss (2002: 41) puts it, "when we 
censure a set of social arrangements, all that needs to be shown is that it, rather than 
the sufferers themselves, is responsible for the sufferings that people have within that 
society. One does not need to establish that the harm is intended or foreseen by 
anybody". 
This could well be the problem with the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The reform was intended to rectify the 
problems that led to the GFC by reinstituting the Vockler Rule, which would have 
sanctioned federally insured banks from engaging in risky speculation and ensure 
bankers were never again bailed out by way of the public purse. Yet as of the 23rd of 
July, 2013, less than a third of its policy has been implemented. The agencies 
charged with its implementation have been criticised for attacking the banking sector 
specifically, and giving other firms easy rides. Even the attacks on the banking sector 
have been considered toothless. 
"Over the course of a ferocious year of negotiations in the House and the Senate, the rules on 
swaps were riddled with loopholes: One initially promising rule preventing federally insured 
banks from trading in risky derivatives ultimately ended up exempting a huge chunk of the 
swaps market from the new law. The Volcker Rule banning proprietary gambling survived, 
but not before getting its brains beaten out in last-minute conference negotiations; Wall Street 
first won broad exemptions for mutual funds, insurers and trusts, and then, with the aid of 
both Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner and Sen. Chuck Schumer of New York, managed to 
secure a lunatic and arbitrary numerical exemption that allows banks to gamble up to three 
percent of their "Tier 1" capital, a number that for big banks stretches to the billions." (Taibbi, 
2012: 2) 
It would appear that Wall Street has been systematically lucky even with respect to 
their punishment! The systemic patterns of congress that water down such 
negotiations and previously opened the door to the banking lobbies to push for the 
deregulation that lead to the GFC were never on the reform agenda. A first-shot 
argument could be made that the reform agenda focused too much on the 'fat cat 
bankers' themselves and not enough on the political arrangements that upheld a 
financial system that incentivised the banker's voracity to such a degree. For 
instance, a common complaint of the US political system is that it has too many veto-
players (see Chapter 7). A high number of veto-players gives financiers too many 
points at which they can lobby politicians on their 'friends'/payroll list to get what 
they want by controlling legislation. This feature of the political system is surely 
systematic luck as far as the financiers are concerned. 
It is almost intuitive to say capitalists got what they wanted during the Global 
Financial Crisis simply because they were powerful. However, as is often the case, 
intuitions obscure the issue. Inflating power in this way makes the question that is 
being asked ambiguous. Is it WG or WWWH? Applying destructive conceptual 
analysis reveals that the intuitive position trades on conflating the two questions. 
There is nothing wrong with asking WG and determining whether certain 
distributions can be explained in tenns of patterns of governance, but we need an opt-
out clause with which to move on and look for other (more systemic) patterns. 
Without it we are stuck in what turns out to be a relatively conservative cycle. 
Indeed, without it we fall short in the way Nelson Polsby (1980: 106) describes, 
"Even if we can show that a given status quo benefits some people disproportionately 
(as I think we can for any real world status quo), such a demonstration falls short of 
showing that these beneficiaries created the status quo, act in any meaningful way to 
maintain it, or could, in the future, act effectively to deter changes to it". 
6 3 The Third Dimension of Power 
The above analysis is directed at rather nuanced arguments. The more nuanced an 
argument, the less blunt destructive conceptual analysis turns out to be. As I hope 1 
have shown though, the arguments are no less important to sort out and the analysis 
no less decisive. Conceptual analysis written for general consumption like Stephen 
Lukes' book Power: A Radical View (2005) (PRV) tends to be an easier target. 
Nevertheless, it is still mandatory to unpack and analyse in a chapter like this because 
of Lukes' ubiquity in the social sciences. 
His book divides strategies of answering 'Who Governs?' into three dimensions. The 
first is a sort of naive behavioralism, 
"[The] one-dimensional view of power involves a focus on behaviour in the making of 
decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as 
express policy preferences, revealed by political participation." {Lukes, 2005: 19) 
The second is a reaction to the naive behaviouralist's insistence on focusing on 
observable conflict, 
"The two-dimensional view of power involves a qualified critique of the behavioural focus on 
the first view (I say qualified because it is still assumed that nondecision-making is a form of 
decision-making), and it allows for consideration of the ways in which decisions are prevented 
from being taken on potential issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) 
interests, seen as embodied in express policy preferences and sub-political grievances " 
(Lukes, 2005:24-25) 
The third is Luke's preferred strategy and one that eschews a focus on decision-
making, 
"[The] three-dimensional view of power involves a thoroughgoing critique of the behavioural 
focus of the first two views as too individualistic and allows for consideration of the many 
ways in which potential issues are kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social 
forces and institutional practices or through individuals' decisions. This, moreover, can occur 
in the absence of actual, observable conflict, which may have been successfully averted -
though there remains here an implicit reference to potential conflict. . . [i.e.] latent conflict, 
which consists in a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the real 
interests of those excluded" (Lukes, 2005: 28). 
Social systems can prevent certain demands from being expressed or (failing that) 
getting onto the political agenda. Individuals might be too fearful to make their 
demands or simply be resigned to their demands going unheard and reason that there 
is little point to wasting energy in making them. On the other hand, individuals might 
have been duped into believing their interests corresponded with the benefactors of 
the status quo when in fact they did not. This is a version of Marx and Gramsci's 
'false consciousness' thesis. This thesis holds that the particular views discussed and 
the language they are discussed in might seem neutral enough, but they are often the 
product of capitalist (or aristocratic, monarchic, etc.) dominance. As Marx puts it, 
when the aristocracy were dominant "the concepts honour, loyalty, etc., were 
dominant, during the dominance of the bourgeoisie the concepts freedom, equality, 
etc." (Marx, 1986 [1846]: 303). The favoured concepts supposedly rig the direction 
deliberation takes (which is to ultimately reinforce the status quo) and serve as an 
opiate constraining the expression of the interests of the working classes. The 
implication of the three dimensional view is that if somebody is not pursuing their 
real interests, they are subject to some power relation. Such an interpretation 
supposedly entwines the term power and the analyst's own views of the good life 
given we rely on them to fill out what the 'real interests' of individuals are (Lukes, 
2005: 37-38). 
Yet Polsby (1963: 96-97) suggests a wholly unsatisfactory view is one where 
"Certain non-events [are] stipulated by outside observers without reference to the desires or 
activities of community residents. The answer is unsatisfactory because it is obviously 
inappropriate for outsiders to pick among all the possible outcomes that did not take place a 
set which they regard as important but which community citizens do n o t . " 
This seems exactly what Lukes is recommending. He puts Matthew Crenson's book 
The Un-politics of Air Pollution (1971) on a pedestal as a paradigm example of how 
the third dimension of power can be analysed empirically. Crenson's book was a 
study of why the issue of air pollution got onto the political agenda early in some 
American cities, but relatively late in others. East Chicago, for example, started local 
programs as early as 1949 to clean the air, whereas the town of Gary waited until 
1962 for its anti-pollution ordinance and even then US Steel influenced its content. 
The relevant difference according to Crenson was that Gary was a one-company town 
dominated by US Steel (and strong party organisation) while East Chicago had the 
investment of multiple steel companies (and weak party organisation).®' US Steel had 
effectively built Gary and was responsible for its early prosperity. The reputation it 
subsequently enjoyed quashed any anti-industry legislation early on by the law of 
anticipated reactions, then, when its reputation began to weaken, effectively thwarted 
attempts to get the legislation onto the agenda without actively intervening. They 
thwarted such attempts from Gary 's anti-pollution activists by being sympathetic but 
at the same time evasive - a difficult posture to criticise when such public expressions 
of sympathy make the corporation into a media darling. Crenson takes it for granted 
that the citizens of Gary had an interest in clean air. That these interests did not get 
onto the political agenda was therefore a non-event that is explained in terms of the 
power of U.S. Steel over the citizens of Gary. US Steel is therefore part of an answer 
to the question of governance (WG): US Steel governed by ensuring policymakers did 
not do what they otherwise would have done (i.e. anti-industry/anti-pollution 
legislation). 
Crenson's book is probably a bad example of an empirical investigation of the third 
dimension. It could just as easily be explained as a collective action problem where 
the citizens of Gary could not mobilise sufficient support for pollution ordinances 
instead of the explanation that US Steel was explicitly exercising power over them 
(see Dowding, 1991). Other examples (which Lukes briefly mentions) include the so-
called untouchables, like the Dalit population in India. Untouchables converted to 
Islam, Christianity and Buddhism when they had the opportunity and this, according 
to Lukes, stands as evidence that they had been subjected to a power relation when 
Party structure presumably played some part in the timing of the anti-pollution ordinances. As 
Lukes says, "a strong and influential party organisation will also inhibit the growth of the pollution 
issue, smce demands for clean air are unlikely to yield the kind of specific benefi ts that American party 
machmes seek" (2005: 46) with such benefi ts presumably being those that are evident within an 
electoral cycle. However , "where industry has a high power reputation, a strong party will increase the 
pollution issue's life chances, since it will seek to purchase industrial inf luence" (Lukes, 2005: 46) 
they accepted their lot and did not express displeasure with the social hierarchy 
despite their severe inequality. However, this could have possibly been explained in 
terms of collective action problems (bottom-up) rather than governance (top-down) 
and this possibility is scratched out with Lukes' analysis. 
A better example of the third dimension of power is Mary Wollstonecraft 's 
masterwork, A Vindication of the Rights of Women. She argued that the institutions of 
education, marriage and the behavior of men in late 18th Century England led to a 
culture that cultivated women to be "foolish and vicious". These institutions 
produced social power - in the third dimensional sense of power - which men 
wielded over women. Such a culture was repugnant and the institutions that caused it 
were in dire need of change. Wollstonecraft proposed a national schooling 
curriculum that was co-ed. Her argument was ingenious in light of the trenchant 18"" 
Century dogmas she faced. She sets up an experiment. First, she argues that the 
beneficiaries of the status quo have nothing to lose from a co-ed curriculum. That is, 
the experiment is relatively costless. Furthermore, if it succeeds the beneficiaries 
would themselves gain from the arrangement since they would have the opportunity 
for more rewarding and fulfilling relationships with women of like-mind. This will in 
turn create healthier environments for children, given "children will never be properly 
educated till friendship subsists between parents. Virtue flies from a house divided 
against itself - and a whole legion of devils take up their residence there" (1792: 448). 
Secondly, if it turns out that a co-ed curriculum does nothing for the apparently vapid 
disposition of IS"" Century women, then her hypothesis is falsified and she would 
readily concede error. Her polemic was tailored to get even the most chauvinistic on 
board: if it is falsified, then "it will be expedient to open a fresh trade with Russia for 
whips.. . and without any violation of justice [the man should] reign, wielding this 
scepter, sole master of his house, because he is the only being in it who has reason" 
(1792: 451). If it withstands the pressures of falsification, however, the rights of 
women will be vindicated. Either way, she argued it is expedient to either confirm or 
falsify her hypothesis. This is political theory at its best, with history attesting to the 
vindication of her hypothesis. Wollstonecraft understood the trick to third 
dimensional ascriptions of power: costless experiments. With it, she set in motion 
one of the most important trends in modem political theory. 
The third dimension helps answer WWWH. US Steel got what it wanted in its 
unrestricted pumping of noxious fumes into the air around Gary, the higher castes in 
Indian society got what they wanted in that the untouchables took the necessary jobs 
(like rubbish collection) that none of them wanted on lower pay and IS"" Century 
women acted almost as trophies for and slaves to their husbands. This is simply to 
say that the intentional strategies of individuals to overcome conflict (that comprise 
the first two dimensions) do not exhaust an answer to WWWH. Such strategies do, 
however, add a lot to - and potentially exhaust - answers to Dahl 's formulation of 
WG. This is despite Lukes and Crenson using the third dimension to suggest that US 
Steel governed by stopping policymakers from doing what they would have otherwise 
done. My hunch is that every instance where the third dimension seems to do some 
work in answering WG, a better explanation is in terms of a collective action problem 
that suggests such non-action cannot be explained by way of social power ascriptions 
(see next section for further analysis). Considerations of the third dimension do not 
therefore add much to the question of governance. Yet Lukes critiques the 
interpretations of social power that were designed to answer WG as 'blind' and 
'superficial' because they do not refer to it. 
Why are the first and second dimensional interpretations of power blind or superficial 
in ignoring the third dimension? The question should be, blind or superficial for what 
end? An answer is not at all obvious in the first edition of PRV. The purported end of 
PRV (now included in the second edition) is to evaluate sets of social arrangements 
(2005: 68). This involves censuring the current distribution of power if a better 
distribution is available, 
"[P]ower should not be conceived narrowly as requiring intention, actual foresight and 
positive actions (as opposed to failing to act): the power of the powerful consists in their being 
capable of and responsible for affecting (negatively or positively) the (subjective and/or 
objective) interests of others. On this broader view of power, the issues of powerfulness and 
of domination will no longer seem so obviously separate and locked into distinct perspectives. 
(Indeed, if we think of powerlessness as an injustice, rather than as bad luck or misfortune, is 
that not because we believe that there are those in a position to reduce or remedy it?)... the 
powerful will include those who both contribute to and are in a position to reduce or remedy 
others' powerlessness" (Lukes, 2005: 68). 
So Lukes thinks the first two dimensions of power do not take considerations of the 
objective interests of individuals into account and therefore cannot adequately 
evaluate a set of social arrangements. Whether or not the first two dimensions are 
blind and superficial with respect to the evaluation of social arrangements depends on 
how one is going about their evaluation. For instance, Dahl's argument was 
unconcerned with the inequality of resources in New Haven - he took the inequality 
as a theoretical assumption. What he was concerned with in Who Governs? was the 
democratic credentials of New Haven. He measured such credentials by determining 
which groups won out in observable situations of policy conflict. Dahl could criticize 
the social arrangements if, say, a policy elite ruled New Haven. With a few more 
safeguards, this unappealing situation could be improved but to improve it we need to 
know whether it indeed exists! On the other hand, one could evaluate New Haven 
with respect to its inequality of resources, or, (as Morriss, 2002 suggests) the outcome 
power of the least powerful in society. The question 'Who gets what, when and how' 
is the kind of empirical question in need of an answer for these sorts of evaluations. 
Forgetting about the third dimension might well work for an answer to WG but it is 
probably blind to do so for considerations of WWWH. Evaluation comes in different 
types and it is an indictment of Lukes that he does not specify precisely what kind of 
evaluation he is interested in. The particular kind of evaluation should have been 
made plain earlier during political argument. 
We can state Lukes' position accordingly, 
LI: To evaluate a set of social arrangements we need to investigate the distribution of 
power. 
L2: Studying the distribution of power includes studying not only an agent's ability to 
influence the outcome of conflict but also the structures (e.g. the agent's culture) that 
generate such conflict. 
L3: In so far as the first two dimensions of power do not take this structure into 
account, they are (respectively) blind and superficial interpretations of power.'® 
In keeping with the chapter so far, the obvious word to eliminate is 'power'. Consider 
my proposed rephrase of LI , which just substitutes 'power' for Lukes' description of 
the "power of the powerful", 
LI A: To evaluate a set of social arrangements we need to investigate the distribution 
of agents' capabilities and responsibilities for intentionally or unintentionally 
affecting (negatively or positively) the (subjective and/or objective) interests of 
others.®^ 
^See Lukes (2005: 19-28). 
" See Lukes (2005: ( 
Nobody would deny that it is important to ascertain those who are in a position to 
reduce or remedy the suffering of the powerless (or, in light of the above elimination, 
those whose ability to achieve desired outcomes is severely limited). For starters, we 
need to know that there is an individual or group of individuals out there with the 
capability to bring about an alternative state of affairs. Otherwise, what is the point of 
investigating the current social arrangement if nothing can change? Whether we 
censure a set of social arrangements or not surely depends on whether the interests of 
individuals are being satisfied. We censure a particular social arrangement by noting 
that certain interests are not being met and demonstrate that they could be (Morriss, 
2002: 40-42). Whether or not there is an agent actively contributing to the specified 
interests going unmet is irrelevant. Indeed, if agents are going about their business 
and unintentionally affecting the interests of others, this is probably because of 
systemic factors and the question is whether or not there is an actor out there in a 
position to change such factors. It is therefore unclear why an agent's capabilities and 
responsibilities to unintentionally affect the interests of others are necessary for an 
evaluation of social arrangements. Nevertheless, if we concentrate on the intentional 
capabilities of agents to affect the interests of others, there is nothing patently false 
about LI A even if it happens to be a bit misleading. 
What LI A amounts to then is a restatement of Dahl 's formulation of WG. 
Considerations of the distribution of agents' capabilities and responsibilities to 
intentionally affect the interests of others is, essentially, a consideration of 
governance. The fact that inequalities exist can somewhat be tempered if it can be 
shown that they do not translate into unequal treatment in policymaking. That is, 
unequal distribution of agents' capabilities and responsibilities to intentionally get 
policymakers to do what they would not have otherwise done. This was the main 
concern in Who Governs? And we can attribute the concern to Lukes's book as well. 
However, Dahl did not adhere to L2A, 
L2A: Studying the distribution of such capabilities and responsibilities includes 
studying not only an agent's ability to influence the outcome of conflict but also the 
structures that generate such conflict."^® 
Again, see Lukes (2005: 68). 
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Now, the "qualified critique" the critics on the second Lukean dimension mount 
against Dahl is in relation to the narrowing of his study of New Haven to merely 
observable conflict and ignoring conflict that had been quashed by the law of 
anticipated reactions before it had to get onto the agenda of City Hall (e.g. see Barach 
and Baratz, 1970). This is quite different to what Lukes implies in L2A. Even when 
individuals have no quarrel with the government or, indeed, any other agency, they 
still might be subject to a power relation in the sense that their real interests (whether 
or not they know what their real interests are) are being affected. The "foolish and 
vicious" women Wollstonecraft described in The Vindication of the Rights of Women 
wanted to be trophies for their husbands, but she conjectured that most only wanted 
such a life because of the institutional structures of education, marriage and the 
behaviour of men. L2A seems above board if we want to find out what systemic 
features we would need to change in order to change the current pattern of 
governance if it is not to our liking. That is to say, there is no reason to accuse L2 of 
manufacturing acceptance through verbal gerrymandering. 
Yet consider L3A, 
L3A: In so far as the two approaches to answering WG (which Lukes calls the first 
and second dimensional approaches) do not take this structure into account, they are 
(respectively) blind and superficial interpretations of WG.®' 
I think any other candidate rephrase would caricature the position of the 
behaviouralists. If Lukes wants to maintain L3 as substantive, then 1 think the only 
way is for him to accept that L3A is an acceptable rephrase. The behaviouralists 
(Dahl, 1961, Bachrach and Baratz, 1970 Polsby, 1980) were not trying to 
exhaustively answer W W W H . Their studies take the inequality in the cities they 
study for granted. They leave the question of why the inequalities exist aside and 
instead investigate whether this translates into certain groups having a greater ability 
than others to get legislators to legislate in a way they would not otherwise have 
legislated. If so, then this constitutes an additional reason to criticise said 
inequalities. This is how Dahl formulated the question WG and it therefore only 
seems right to rephrase considerations of the particular interpretations of power back 
in terms of the question. If somebody rejects L3A for being even more obscure than 
' This seems the appropriate rephrase in light of the way Lukes (2005: 1-3) f rames his book. 
L3 since 'power' was introduced in the first place to describe and clarify 
'governance', I can rephrase L3A as L3B, 
L3B; In so far as the two approaches to answering who has the ability to get 
legislators to legislate in ways they would not otherwise legislate... do not take this 
structure into account, they are (respectively) blind and superficial approaches. 
Now, talk of such abilities is only appropriate for actual conflict - whether that 
conflict makes the political agenda or remains latent because of the law of anticipated 
reactions. The question is whether legislators have different policy preferences to 
another political actor and whether that actor has the ability to make the legislator 
legislate according to the actor's preference rather than the legislator's own. This is 
actual conflict. Whether or not those preferences are in the best interests of the 
individuals is beside the point. If Alcoholics Anonymous decided to abandon its 
mission to encourage sobriety and instead focus on reducing the tax on alcoholic 
beverages (to remove some of their members' financial strains), we would say they 
governed in some real sense if they could get the policymakers to legislate 
accordingly and the policymakers would not have reduced the tax had Alcoholics 
Anonymous not intervened. It is not in the long-term interests of the members of 
Alcoholics Anonymous to remove the tax if it functions as a deterrent, but that is of 
no consequence for the question of governance. They govern in this policy area, for 
better of for worse. L3A and L3B are false on this interpretation. I do not think 
Lukes could maintain their truth or, indeed, rephrase L3 once the term 'power' has 
been eliminated in a way that would preserve the agreement profiles that support his 
argument. 
Why does Lukes want to stretch the word power to apply to the third dimension? 
Presumably, it is because of his radical agenda. Such an agenda is perfectly 
acceptable, but imputing it into an interpretation of power blurs 'who gets what, when 
and why?' into the question of 'who governs?' The former seems to set the context 
for LI while the latter question seems to frame the context of L3. Institutional 
structures certainly affect what kind of conflict exists in society, but this is only 
relevant for answering WWWH not WG. The behaviouralists never suggest that we 
should let up investigating who gets what is in their best interests and who does not 
and why this might be the case. What they want to find out though is whether the 
ability to get policymakers to legislate something they would not otherwise legislate 
is also a function of the inequalities of society. This is an important question in 
addition to the question of WWWH but one that should not be confused with it. 
Indeed, if Wollstonecraft's argument had been introduced in terms of an argument 
over governance, I doubt it would have been as decisive as it was (and its 
decisiveness was of immense importance to the feminist movement). Calls for the 
suffrage of women were routinely dismissed in the 18"' Century with the very same 
evidence Wollstonecraft used to hypothesise the oppression of women. 
Wollstonecraft made no call for women's suffrage, but defended the policy for 
universal education to overcome the inexpedient distribution of preferences in 18"' 
Century E n g l a n d . H e r point was that these preferences were cultivated for 
rhetorical reasons based on an entirely arbitrary and unconstructive distinction. If she 
had been arguing for something like suffrage, the crusty old chauvinism of the day 
could have pointed to the distribution of preferences in society - particularly the 
ignorant, uninterested, and vicious women Wollstonecraft thought all too common -
as ammunition to reasonably reject her position. 
This gets at the truly confounding nature of Lukes' book. What is worrying is that he 
counsels social scientists to be concerned with 'power' and study 'power relations' 
rather than the more pointed empirical questions WG and WWWH. Asking questions 
about 'the nature of power in an American city' for instance does not look to confirm 
or falsify any clear truth conditions. An answer largely depends on the intuitions we 
have with respect to the conventions of our language - e.g. intuitions regarding the 
words 'power' and 'interest' - intuitions that should have been weeded out of 
empirical research beforehand in political argument. As such, empirical questions 
framed in terms of power - so interpreted - have a hard time constraining political 
argument in a substantive way since answers to the questions will be dependent on the 
values and intuitions of the individual researcher. 
6.4 Conclusion 
Value-independent empirical patterns exist (Dennett, 1991). We can communicate 
relevant information across traditions and value-systems without imposing those 
Although Millieent Fawcett claimed Wollstonecraft as the foremother of the suffragette movement. 
traditions and values on our audience. We do this by economising our description of 
data: if "the information required to describe (transmit) [data] accurately is 
incomprehensible: nothing shorter than the verbatim bit map will preserve the series" 
(Dennett, 1991: 32). Such economisation can be translated from one value-laden 
language to another in a way that preserves the series/pattern the speaker thought 
worth communicating. Of course, the audience might not agree that the series was 
worth communicating and their values might suggest looking for and remembering 
different patterns, but that does not change the fact that there is a real pattern the 
speaker describes. As Dennett (1991: 35) puts it, 
"When two individuals confront the same data, they may perceive different patterns in them, but since 
we can have varied interests and perspectives, these differences do not all count as disagreements. If 
two people have different betting manuals that account for patterns a and b in the data and both a and b 
are real patterns, then they would get rich on bets about the next datum in the series." 
The verbal disputes over social power make it seem like such differences are in fact 
disagreements. They conflate different ways of pattern identification with 
disagreement over the existence of particular patterns. For instance, Lukes dismissed 
the work of the behaviouralists as "blind and superficial" because he thought their 
studies indicated that there were no patterns associated with the third dimension. The 
behaviouralists though were trying to answer a question of governance rather than the 
question of who gets what, when, and why. They did not deny that there were 
important patterns concerning the way institutions keep certain issues out of the 
political agenda, but they maintained that such patterns did not directly identify which 
agents controlled policy within (rather than alongside) those institutions. Likewise, 
answering questions of governance by way of Harsanyi's rational choice framework 
does not imply that there is no institutional pattern for governments to unfairly 
privilege capitalists, only that such patterns are not necessarily a consequence of 
capitalists deliberately influencing policymakers to ensure that privilege - sometimes 
it is just luck and other times it is systematic luck. The framework looks to 
accommodate this contingency both theoretically and empirically. The disagreements 
with the approach sketched in this chapter suggest it implies that there are no such 
institutional patterns because such patterns fall under the extension of the disputants' 
interpretations of social power (because they use it to answer WWWH), This is a 
purely verbal point that hijacks political arguments over institutional change by 
making differences in pattern identification turn into deadlocked disagreements in 
argument. 
Real empirical patterns can constrain political argument and if conceptual analysis has 
been able to weed out non-substantive disagreement, the patterns should be able to 
decisively vindicate one side of the debate and disprove the other. Reality will 
constrain arguers and make them fallible in the same way scientists are fallible when 
evidence falsifies their hypotheses. Getting the conceptual analysis right is therefore 
crucial if political science is going to be in a position to explain away deadlocked 
political debate instead of simply replicating it behind the lofty label of 'science' . 
Chapter 7 
When Are Institutions Democratic? 
In this chapter I will be applying destructive conceptual analysis to a question 
concerning the nature of democratic institutions. Namely, when are sets of 
institutions appropriately described as democratic? I will examine William Riker 's 
claim in his book Liberalism Against Populism (1988 [1982]) that institutions are 
democratic so long as policymakers are elected by the vote and so long as there are 
sufficient constitutional provisions in place to protect the vote from being 
undermined. Such provisions amount to a state apparatus ensuring a minimal 
government, much like the checks and balances enshrined in the American 
Constitution. I argue that Riker's move from his interpretation of social choice theory 
and rejection of populism (comprising the first nine chapters of Liberalism Against 
Populism), which are in themselves quite reasonable, to his conclusion that 
governments should be constrained by a high number of veto-players (in Chapter 10) 
rests on a wildcard sentence of the sort described in 2.4.3.2. 1 suggest an alternative 
rephrase in terms of institutional competition that preserves Riker's rejection of 
populism and interpretation of social choice theory, but does not inevitably lead to a 
heavily restrictive state apparatus. 
There has been a strong reaction to the Rochester School (of whom Riker is the 
godfather and Liberalism Against Populism the sacred text) with suggestions that it is 
in cahoots with the Virginia School of political economy in endorsing the "right-wing 
rhetoric" for a minimal state and a reverence for the market (see Mackie, 2003: 432-
444).'°' Kuttner (1996: 333) describes the rhetoric accordingly, 
"The sacred economy is at constant risk of being violated by a profane polity. The core claim 
is that systematic error and opportunism are as endemic and logically inevitable in the 
political enterprise as self-purification is in the marketplace. That premise then gives Public 
Choices an all-purpose trump to any demonstration of market-failure: Yes, the market does 
perhaps fail from time to time, but political interference will only make it worse." 
The undersupply of public goods, monopoly, externalities, information failures, 
unemployment, inflation and deflation are therefore all quite tolerable using this 
"" This reaction is sometimes called the 'perestroika movement ' . 
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rhetoric since the alternative is worse: election-obsessed politicians disrupting the 
market's natural efficiency. The more checks there are protecting the liberal vote, the 
more veto players there are protecting the market from inefficient interference. This 
is certainly the conclusion Riker draws out in Chapter 10 and 1 agree with the 
reactionaries that it is done so by way of a rhetorical coup. 
However, the retaliation seems to be simply advocating another rhetorical coup, just 
this time in the opposite direction. The criticisms of the Rochester School centre on 
Riker's interpretation of social choice theory that he uses to reject populist 
democracy. This is simply the wrong place to mount an attack against state 
minimalism. Given Riker couches his arguments against populism in the austere 
vocabulary of social choice it is odd to accuse him of rhetorical bullshit. The social 
choice vocabulary is as close to the austere vocabulary destructive conceptual analysis 
aims at than just about any other (see 3.4). If we can eliminate words from Riker's 
interpretation, all the while maintaining relevant agreement profiles, and eventually 
boil the debate back down to the vocabulary of social choice, then his interpretation is 
reasonable. 1 argue that we can indeed reverse engineer it in this way. The attacks on 
Riker's rejection of populism amount to verbal disagreements that do not undermine 
the first nine chapters of Liberalism Against Populism. I apply destructive conceptual 
analysis to Gerry Mackie 's award winning book Democracy Defended (2003), which 
is a devoted attack on Riker's rejection of populism, to demonstrate the case. 
Mackie's disagreement with Riker's 'right-wing' conclusions is typical of the 
reactions to the Rochester School. It is merely verbal disagreement since it turns on 
terms like 'the popular will ' , 'what the people want ' , 'the public interest', ' the 
common good' , 'undermining the vote ' , and 'democracy' . Until such verbal 
gerrymandering can be overcome - and it is my view that only with destructive 
conceptual analysis can it be overcome - the two strands of rhetoric will be 
deadlocked. The strongest accent of infallibility will trump any attempt at genuine 
science. Such deadlock leads to programs attempting to (at least in part) approximate 
science instead running at cross-purposes with one another - producing rival 
suggestions for good democratic policy. I think the deliberative turn in democratic 
theory is a consequence of the deadlock, with the turn pitting itself as a rival doctrine 
to the doctrine espoused by the Rochester School.'"^ In the final section I attempt to 
reconcile the two traditions by rephrasing their claims in terms of institutional 
competition. 
7.1 Liberalism Against Populism 
In Liberalism Against Populism Riker distinguishes two different interpretations of 
the word 'democracy' that are relevant for answering the title of this chapter. Riker 
(1988: 241) thinks they jointly "exhaust the possibilities" of a reasonable justification 
of democracy. The populist interpretation is that "the opinions of the majority must 
be right and must be respected because the will of the people is the liberty of the 
people" (Riker, 1988: 14). The people supposedly reveal this 'popular will' in the 
outcomes of elections and deliberation. Populists appeal to it to argue that 
constitutional safeguards should not get in the way of governments implementing 
their election platform or their interpretation of the majority sentiment. The people 
have elected these officials and their policy programs and any legislative red tape just 
gets in the way of the popular mandate. In effect, the more red tape there is, the less 
democratic the state institutions are. The will of the people could even include 
dictators usurping the state's constitutional limitations (consider Vargas, Ghandi, 
Peron, Chavez). At the very least, the populist elements of a constitution support 
strong executive governments with few checks and balances like independent 
legislatures and upper houses. 
Social choice theory, on the other hand, proves that all voting systems are prone to 
cycling and disequilibria in an austere vocabulary close to bedrock (see 3.4 for my 
description of bedrock). Riker uses the proofs to argue that the populist interpretation 
of democracy is incoherent. Majority rule is itself a tenuous notion since unless 
extremely restrictive conditions apply (see Plott, 1967) there will always be incentive 
for a new majority to overturn the current majority, and then another majority to 
overturn that majority, and so on and so forth. The result of the social decision 
mechanism depends just as much on the way in which individual preferences are 
One of deliberative democracy's foremost proponents, for instance, calls the Rochester School 
generally, and Riker in particular, a "radically anti-democratic political cast" (Dryzek, 2000: 36). 
counted as it does on the preferences actually expressed. The social decision will be 
therefore in part determined by institutional constraints, which are "exogenous to the 
world of tastes and values" (Riker, 1988: 190). As far as the world of taste and value 
is concerned, then, the result of an election is arbitrary since those institutional 
constraints cut against a majority of tastes and values. Riker concludes that the 
populist interpretation of democracy is unfeasible given the logical impossibility of 
instituting the 'public will ' . Instead, democrats should ensure constitutional powers 
are separated to avoid tyranny: to avoid politicians sacrificing the long-term interests 
of a polity by pandering to the short-term desires of voters and the manipulation of the 
issue space. Strong executives are curbed and any tendency towards altering these 
executive-curbing safeguards is checked by the democratic vote: "Participation in this 
sense is then the act of placing a curb on policy, a veto at the margin" (1988: 245). 
This is the liberal interpretation of democracy, which according to Riker is the only 
coherent interpretation. While necessary, citizens rolling up to a ballot box every few 
years is not in itself sufficient to describe an institution as democratic since the liberal 
vote itself needs to be a lasting and genuine procedure. The true test is the number of 
checks and balances the executive faces to curb the various possibilities to undermine 
the vote. Consequently, the true test of democracy happens to be in keeping with the 
veneration of the market mechanism since these checks and balances will make it 
increasingly difficult for politicians to interfere with public expenditure. Critics like 
Mackie think that this conclusion is more the motivation for Riker 's liberal theory of 
democracy rather than its innocent consequence. 
7.1.2 Social Choice and the Rejection of Populism 
The interpretation of social choice theory advocated in Liberalism Against Populism 
amounts to a rejection of populism. The populist interpretation of democracy is 
compressed into two neat sentences. 
P I . What the people, as a corporate entity, want ought to be social policy. 
P2. The people are free when their wishes are law. '" ' 
' This is a close paraphrase of Riker (1988: 238). 
The feasibility of the 'ought' in PI is the subject matter of the first nine chapters of 
Liberalism Against Populism. Democracy, according to Riker, is an ideal of self-
realisation and respect that is achieved through a specific means. The means is the 
free and equal participation of individuals to engage in "whatever control of the social 
environment is possible" (Riker, 1988: 2). All this participation amounts to is the 
vote "where voting is understood to include all the ancillary institutions (like parties 
and pressure groups) and social principles (like freedom and equality) that are 
necessary to render it significant" (Riker, 1988: 8). The vote is the means for the 
ideal and both are necessary properties for a set of institutions if they are to be 
described as a democracy. No vote, no democracy; no ideal, no democracy. Yet 
there are different justifications given for how the vote approximates the ideal. PI 
and P2 constitute one such candidate. The vote aggregates individual wants and a 
mechanism is then used to translate those individual wants - weighted equally - into a 
decisive social choice that is responsive to those wants. Riker thinks this social 
choice is substitutable for the terms 'popular will ' , 'public will ' , and as in P I , 'what 
the people want ' . 
Yet there is no method of aggregation that treats each vote equally that can guarantee 
a decisive, unmanipulated, or equilibrium outcome. This leads Riker (1988: 239) to 
affirm the conclusion of the following, "If the people speak in meaningless tongues, 
they cannot utter the law that makes them free". Riker covers a broad range of formal 
proofs in Liberalism Against Populism to make the point, but 1 will restrict a brief 
gloss to Condorcet's paradox. Arrow's impossibility theorem (a generalisation of the 
former), and McKelvey's 'chaos' theorem. I do so in order to demonstrate what the 
ideal austere vocabulary of destructive conceptual analysis might look like (see 3.4). 
Consider the following preference schedules over states of affairs x, y and z for 




A 'Condorcet Winner' C is whichever alternative can beat (i.e. has a majority over) 
all the others in pairwise run-offs. So C{x,y) = x because both i and j prefer it to y and 
so they form the majority to return x as C(x,y). Yet now consider the following two 
winners, C(y^) = y and C{x^) = z. If the social choice needed to arrange these states 
of affairs, the arrangement would be arbitrary. A cycle exists: x beats y, y beats z, but 
z beats x. The social choice mechanism either yields no choice in such a situation or 
imposes one that will be unfair to certain individuals. We might only consider, say, 
C{xy) = X and CCy,z) = y and then deduce C(xz) = jr by a rule of imposed transitivity. 
Individual i would be "a kind of dictator" under such a rule because only i prefers jc to 
z (Riker, 1988: 18). This cycle is an example of Condorcet's paradox. 
Arrow's theorem (2012 [1951])) proves that any social ordering for more than two 
alternatives and more than one individual will have to flout an axiom associated either 
with fairness or logic.'"'' That is, there is no social welfare function that jointly 
satisfies non-dictatorship (D), Pareto optimality (P), the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA), and universal domain (U). There is no way to ensure the conjunct 
of these axioms. (D) assumes that there is no individual i who is in a position where 
their preference schedule determines the social choice irrespective of the preferences 
of others. (P) assumes that if everybody prefers x to j , then the social choice will not 
prefer y to x. (IIA) assumes that a social choice between x and only concerns the 
preferences individuals have for x relative to y. (U) assumes that any arrangement of 
preferences is acceptable input into the social choice function. Arrow shows that if 
these conditions are all satisfied then cycles can occur, implying that there is no social 
welfare function. The cycle does not have to be over all alternatives, just so-called 
'top cycles' (e.g. x > y > z > x > w > d > e > g > f ) where there is no Condorcet 
Winner. A social decision mechanism might sometimes produce a Condorcet Winner 
but Arrow's theorem demonstrates that there is no fair way to guarantee it and no way 
to prove that there was one in any given election. 
The result is similar to the one derived from Condorcet's paradox, only 
generalised to apply to all forms of strategy-proof aggregation. The proof gives us 
reason to be sceptical of any demagogue claiming to represent the 'popular will' and 
consequently claiming a mandate to suppress any opposition (either in argument, 
institutionally, or on the street) in its name. They owe their election, in large part, to 
the institutions that structure the way the votes were aggregated. There is no way to 
* See Vickrey (1960), rephrased in Mueller (2003: 584), for a simple version of the proof. 
decide between two different electoral mechanisms that yield different outcomes f rom 
the aggregation of identical sets of preferences other than by reasons exogenous to an 
aggregation of preferences. Consistency would therefore demand that government 
subsequently respect the state institutions curbing their ability to legislate. 
An important follow-up to the 'impossibility proofs' was Richard McKelvey's (1976 
& 1979) formal analysis of agenda-setting.'"^ It was, in part, a response to the 
continuing tendency, despite Arrow's proof, to assume majority rule was "a fairly 
well defined notion" (1979: 1106). The common assumption was that while a top-
cycle was possible it was unlikely and if one did occur it would not be overly 
problematic given the tendency for social outcomes to be pushed towards the median 
position means the outcome would cycle around points close to the median (see for 
e.g. Downs, 1957; Tullock, 1967). The top-cycle would supposedly cut off once the 
position got too far away from the median. McKelvey introduced a further proof for 
decisions over multiple dimensions: "the usual situation will be that majority paths 
exist between any two points in the space" (McKelvey, 1979: 1106) no matter how far 
away the point might be from the median. This has drastic implications for agenda-
setting: "Any one voter, with knowledge of other voter's preferences, and the power 
to set the agenda could, using binary, majority rule based procedures, arrive at any 
outcome he wants to" (McKelvey, 1979: 1106). The intuition behind the proof can be 
demonstrated in the following graph. 
"" The proof followed on from work by Plott (1967) that demonstrated the severity of the restrictions 
required to produce an equilibrium policy choice. 
Second dimension 
and 3 are the bliss points for the three voters and a, b, c, d, and e are the policy 
positions proposed by the agenda-setter (whose bliss point, say, is e). Any point can 
be reached in multi-dimensional space by the agenda-setter (with knowledge of the 
preferences of voters) when there are more than two agents in the electorate, even 
points that are Pareto dominated (McKelvey, 1976: 472). 
The agenda-setter can theoretically lead the majority decision to their ideal preference 
if they have knowledge of the preferences of the electorate. There is a common (to 
the point of standard) reading of Liberalism Against Populism that suggests while the 
implication of majority endorsement of winning candidates is not reasonable, the 
implication of majority rejection is somehow different. Yet if we are to take Riker's 
(1988: 190) maxim that any social decision is "exogenous to the world of tastes and 
values" seriously, the only reasonable implication is that rejection is just as much a 
product of institutional imposition as the so-called 'winner' is. With McKelvey's 
proof of global cycles we see that the rejected candidates could have just as easily 
been the winners if the only court of appeal were the preferences of individuals. 
There is always a 'losing' majority poised to overturn the 'winning' coalition from the 
input of raw preferences and it is possible a candidate despised by a super-majority 
will eventually get their foothold in a majority coalition by way of clever institutional 
strategising (Riker, 1988: 197-211). As Riker (1988: 243) puts it, 
"Suppose. . . that an official or candidate has. . . offended enough voters to be rejected. . . . What if the 
offending official or candidate wins? This might happen because he or she successfully manipulates the 
agenda or invents additional issues or sets up spurious opponents. Has the ideal of liberalism been 
violated?... Liberalism requires only that it be possible to reject a putatively offending official, not that 
the rejection actually occur." 
Quite what this possibility for rejection amounts to will be scrutinised in the next 
section. What we can unambiguously conclude from the theorem here is that 
institutions are necessary for stable outcomes. They impose order over what would 
otherwise be an ever-fluctuating majority rule. From such imposition, patterns of 
governance arise but with it vanishes any possibility of justifying those patterns in 
terms of the preference satisfaction of the electorate. The point is that justifying 
policy by way of the public will, which is a social decision that is responsive to all 
preferences weighted equally and is uncontaminated by any institutions that are 
opposed by a majority is always substantively unreasonable. It is a point about 
justification rather than empirical reality. 
Nevertheless, Riker catalogues a number of empirical examples where the agenda has 
been manipulated to underwrite majorities.'"® Whenever the issue-dimension was 
increased above the single dimension, the majority crumbled. In light of the theorem, 
there is always an incentive for losers to undermine majorities. The contingent 
empirical question is whether the losers can gain control of the institutional apparatus 
to get voters to think of the issues in the dimensions they wish or be in a position to 
set the agenda. Whatever the case, institutional opportunities will always determine 
who governs rather than majority decision. That there is an ever-present opportunity 
for losers to disrupt the incumbent majority implies that politics is an area 
There is presumably a broad range of feasible tax cuts that would be preferred by a majority to one 
givmg half the gains to the top one percent of income earners. That such a proposal is seriously 
considered in countries like the United States stands, I think, as strong evidence that the outcome of the 
vote is spun by clever manipulation of the agenda into something close to a global cycle. That such 
clever manipulation exists does not help corroborate the theorem though (see next paragraph), it just 
goes to show that there are powerful agenda-setters at play. 1 made a provisional suggestion concerning 
who the agenda-setters are and the institutional apparatus that gives them such power in section 6.4. 
characterised by disequilibrium with respect to other areas of social life unrelated to 
political institutions. 
Yet America's democratic history has been marked by parties endorsing a cluster of 
ideas maintaining office for marked periods of time, 
"From 1800 to 1856, the agrarian expansionism of Jefferson and Jackson won most of the 
t ime.. . From I860 to 1928, the Republican program of commercial development won most of 
the t ime. . . From 1932 to the present. Democratic welfare statism won most of the t ime.. . Can 
it not be said that these repeatedly endorsed clusters of ideas have been, though rather vague, 
the true and revealed popular will" (Riker, 1988: 239-240) 
The winners over these periods repeatedly beat an alternative multiple times. 
However, they did not win over all relevant alternatives. For example, the agrarian 
expansionist package was approved two-thirds of the time between 1800 and 1856 but 
never obtained a majority whenever opposition managed to highlight that such 
expansion required a simultaneous approval of slavery (1840, 1844, 1848 1856 and 
1860). The New Deal coalition struck by Roosevelt in 1932 worked to ensure a 
majority so long as welfare rather than statism dominated the issue space of the 
presidential election. Whenever war entered the issue-space (as it did in Truman and 
Johnson's presidencies) the welfare-statism lost out to a package of civil liberties and 
commerce (e.g. Eisenhower and Nixon both sought to mitigate the military draft). 
Sometimes Riker appears to think these empirical observations corroborate 
McKelvey's (and sometimes even Arrow's) theorem. As we will see, this is wrong 
and serves as grist for critics to compound the error. These examples demonstrate the 
intuition behind the proofs, but had the agrarian expansionist package won the 
election even when the electorate realised that it implied the tacit approval of slavery, 
this would not be cause to doubt the McKelvey theorem. The theorem is an argument 
from a set of premises rather than a model of reality awaiting empirical vindication. 
The point is that political institutions cannot solely rely on patterns of belief and 
desire for their justification. This amounts to Riker's rejection of populism. If we 
were to eliminate the term 'populism' or the 'public will' from Riker's analysis, the 
only feasible rephrase 1 can think of would be in terms of the aggregation of beliefs 
and desires that are exogenous to institutions into a majority. Of course, some 
institutions may well be just institutions but that does not mean they would not be 
defeated by the preferences (the beliefs and desires) of a majority.'"^ Populists are 
free to say that their ideal does not necessarily involve the vote and is more concerned 
with upholding principles of justice, but then their ideal is not a democratic ideal as 
defined by Riker (since it is not realised by way of democratic means), and any 
distinction between the two positions vanishes in a puff of smoke (see 7.3.1). 
7.2 Rochester Rhetoric 
With the rejection of populism, Riker thought the only option for the democrat was to 
revert back to the other possible interpretation of democracy - liberal democracy -
where the behaviour of politicians is constrained by the possibility of losing the next 
election. The liberal interpretation of democracy amounts to a popular veto rather 
than popular rule. As Riker (1988: 244) puts it, "Liberal democracy is simply the 
veto by which it is sometimes possible to restrain official tyranny". Sufficient 
conditions amount to a 'significant' popular veto coupled with safeguards protecting 
the durability of this veto (in order to ensure that the rejection of officials was not just 
some passing fad). Riker (1988: 249) says, "It seems clear to me that democracy 
cannot be preserved simply with the liberal interpretation of voting". His solution is 
the same as James Madison's 'auxiliary precautions' in The Federalist Papers: a 
series of checks and balances such as multicameralism, the separation of the executive 
from the legislature, federalism, and an independent judiciary. Without securing this 
laundry list Riker thought the vote could quite easily be ineffectual and license an 
authoritarian regime under the cloak of 'democratic' respectability. Singapore, 
Russia and Jordan, for example, all have the formal vote yet display distinctly 
authoritarian tendencies. 
However, it is a linguistic sleight-ofhand that forces the argument from the weakened 
ideal that "The threat of the next election retains its force" (Riker, 1988: 342), which I 
think is a good ideal that is coherent with the austere language of social choice theory, 
to a state with a high number of constitutional veto-players. The move is right-wing 
rhetoric of the sort described by Kuttner (quoted in the introduction) and Mackie in 
" " For ins tance, the insti tutional const ra ints of R a w l s ' veil of ignorance ( the restr ict ion of i n fo rma t ion 
individuals have about themselves) would be defea ted by a ma jor i ty w h e n f r a m e d in a cer ta in w a y . 
Democracy Defended. The more checks a government is constrained with the less 
they are able to expand government to follow their initiatives and the more they have 
to defer to the market. With a high number of institutionally demarcated veto-players 
we can predict a high level of policy stability (Tsebelius, 2002). 
The liberal interpretation can be saved from rhetorical flourishes by focusing in on the 
role the electoral threat plays with respect to institutional competition. The threat 
structures institutional competition. Ensuring such competition though does not 
reasonably entail Riker 's veneration of the checks and balances of the American 
Constitution. Competition for political office is equally likely {a priori) to lead to 
policy progress as it is to policy stability whereas an increase in veto-players is (a 
priori) more likely to lead to policy stability. The ideal of avoiding institutional 
monopolies seems to be a reasonable interpretation of democracy in light of Riker 's 
attack on populism. This section will apply destructive conceptual analysis to the 
agreement profile(s) typically associated with the Rochester School. The result 
indicates that the ideal of avoiding political monopolies amounts to the liberal 
interpretation purged of linguistic conjuring tricks. 
We cannot rule out the possibility of politicians violating the electorate's freedom in 
significant ways and still being re-elected come the next election, but violating 
individual freedoms certainly makes it more difficult to be competitive institutionally 
(typically tyrants have to resort to non-institutional means to secure re-election in 
formally democratic regimes). In Chapter 10 Riker focuses on non-tyranny as the 
ideal of liberal democracy and it is here that the move from the threat of the next 
election to a padded out constitution of veto-players is made. The significance of the 
vote is to depose tyrants and the constitutional checks and balances supposedly curb 
the ability of a tyrant to undermine the capacity of the vote to do this. The ideal is to 
stack the odds against a prolonged tyranny and the means is the vote. One of the 
more striking features of the chapter is an indictment of Westminster politics, 
particularly the form being practiced in 1980s Britain where the House of Lords had 
just rolled back its legislative purview, effectively rendering Britain a unicameral 
system. Riker thought that the absence of a second chamber with veto powers over 
legislation was a recipe for tyranny and made the prediction that Britain's electoral 
sanction would lose much of its significance in the subsequent years. Principally, 
Riker thought the unconstrained majority party (typically dominated by a strong party 
leader) in the House of Commons would progressively chip away at the significance 
electoral veto.'"^ 
7.2.1 Unravelling Rochester Agreement Profiles 
We can state the liberal interpretation of democracy accordingly, 
RSI: An institution is democratic by the liberal interpretation when it is possible to 
remove members of government from office with a significant electoral veto because 
it curbs the ability of tyrants and would-be tyrants to gain and maintain of f ice ."" 
RSI seems to me to be one of those wildcard sentences that are typically 'banked' 
within the first dimension of political argument and used to render substantively 
unacceptable conclusions acceptable (see 2.4.3). 1 think it is where ideologues get 
their foot in and introduce accents of infallibility into discussions about democracy, 
which allows them to make their move from the social choice proofs to their demands 
for a minimalist government. 
The word 'tyrant' first springs to mind as a candidate for elimination to test this 
hypothesis since it is difficult to substitute a description for the word in RS1. Riker 
leaves the term under-described in Liberalism Against Populism, but fortunately for 
the scientific credentials of the Rochester position not much turns on it. A rephrase is 
simple, 
RSIA: An institution is democratic by the liberal interpretation when it is possible to 
remove members of government from office with a significant electoral veto so that it 
might force the government to compromise by the threat of electoral defeat and/or be 
defeated. 
The ideal of democracy is non-tyranny, but it is not important to specify what tyranny 
precisely means (even what Riker thought it meant) just so long as whatever it means 
could be defeated come election time. This is an example where being unable to 
I am unsure what Riker would have said about the Thatcher Government. 
This is a terminologically correct - albeit highly condensed - paraphrase of the final chapter of 
Liberalism Against Populism. 
substitute a description for a term does not imply a non-substantive position and 
which, I think, is a unique feature of the destructive brand of conceptual analysis 
compared with its substitutionist rivals (see chapters 4 and 5). 
The conclusion that a constitution should be rigged up with an American-style system 
of checks and balances to protect the significance of the sanction seems to instead 
turn on what counts as a significant electoral veto. This is not limited to evidence of 
electoral corruption and suppression. It also includes evidence of fiscal policies that 
are directed to short-term economic returns at the expense of the long-term health of 
the market. As Riker (1988: 248) puts it, 
"More significant evidence of the populist elimination of electoral restraint, however, is the 
confiscatory and truly oppressive taxation and inflation by which rulers have financed their reelection, 
thereby acting against the society that they are supposed to serve." 
The flood of political advertising during an election campaign could also be thought 
of as a mechanism that 'undermines the vote' in a similar way. The veto-players in 
Riker's laundry list (e.g. separating the executive from the legislature, having a 
multicameral system, weakening the power of the mass parties, etc.) are all 
encouraged to make it more difficult for politicians to supposedly 'undermine' the 
electoral veto by such means. 
Let me sketch two candidate rephrases of RSI A that spring to mind after the 
elimination of the phrase 'significant electoral veto' (and close cognates like 'non-
undermined electoral sanction') that could conceivably endorse a minimal state. 
None that I can think of are sufficient (in the sense described in section 3.3.4). 
RSIB: An institution is democratic by the liberal interpretation when the probability 
of the government losing an election depends on the government's ability to 
compromise with respect to their policy direction. 
The thought here is that the more checks and balances there are, the more a 
government will supposedly have to constrain their ideal policy agenda. RSIB could 
entail a minimal state to ensure policy decisions are constrained institutionally. 
Assuming a high proportion of policy initiatives are tailored (at least in part) to help 
win the next election, governments will need to adjust their policy to appease the 
institutional veto-players if they want to reap the rewards. Yet the rephrase only 
applies constraint to a progressive government and says nothing about a conservative 
one. If a government's ideal policy direction is the status quo, then no compromise is 
required: a conservative government's probability of losing the next election does not 
depend on their ability to compromise their policy direction. This is because the 
higher the number of veto-players there are, we can predict conservative policy 
progress (Tsebelius, 2002). We either have to rethink the implication of R S I B for a 
minimal state or acknowledge that the Rochester ideal of democracy is a priori rigged 
to endorse the status quo and give a pleasant ride to its beneficiaries: a democracy is a 
set of institutions that curb the abilities of actors to change the status quo. Either way, 
RSIB does not preserve the Rochester agreement profile (assuming subscribers do not 
want to subscribe to a position that is essentially conservative rhetoric). Consider 
RSIC, 
RSIC: An institution is democratic by the liberal interpretation when competing 
parties are constrained from manipulating the vote. 
While RSIB was subtly unacceptable, RSIC is blatantly unacceptable. It advocates a 
minimalist state since the more checks and balances there are the higher the 
possibility attempts to manipulate the vote within the institutional arrangements will 
be vetoed. The lesson of the first nune chapters of Liberalism Against Populism 
though is that manipulation cannot be constrained in electoral systems. There will 
always be incentives for politicians to engage in wheeling and dealing to change the 
outcome of the election irrespective of their own policy track record. Anybody who 
has actually read Riker's book - and agrees with its principal message - will not 
accept RSIC. 
7.2.2 Rephrasing in Terms of Pluralism and Competition 
There is a rephrase of RSI once the word 'tyranny' and the phrase 'significant 
electoral veto' have been removed that preserves the agreement profiles developed in 
the first nine chapters of Liberalism Against Populism, but does not lead to the 
minimalist state sketched in Chapter 10. It amounts to a strong brand of pluralism. 
That is, 
RSID: An institution is democratic by the liberal interpretation when there is a 
sufficiently high possibility to remove members of government from office by way of 
the results of an election. The possibility is sufficiently high when it incentivises 
institutional competition to increase or decrease the possibility for interested 
parties."" 
This rephrase interprets democracy as an ideal pitted against the absence of 
institutional monopolies. If a government were to crush their opponents by illegal 
intimidation and violence then this would weaken the government's democratic 
credentials because institutional competition would be crushed extra-institutionally. 
The same goes for rigging elections and general corruption. 
What is precisely meant by institutional competition in RSID? Institutional 
competition involves agents being motivated (by the possibility of despised 
politicians losing office) to attempt to manipulate the vote either by attempting to alter 
the issue dimensions, logrolling, or attempting to set the agenda. Manipulation can 
also include attempts to change individual preferences by distributing information. A 
condition for a democracy then is that the incumbent government is forced to compete 
if they want to manipulate the vote; they must compete with other manipulators. 
There should be no incumbent advantages other than the advantages (or 
disadvantages) that the incumbent's policy track record brings to the table. 
Democratic institutions should be designed to avoid situations where those wanting to 
depose incumbent governments don't even bother attempting to manipulate the vote 
for reasons to do with the control the governments have over the tools of 
manipulation. The vote is necessary to structure this sort of competition. R S I D 
therefore fits comfortably with Riker's definition of democracy (where the vote is the 
necessary means to the ideal). 
Riker's laundry list of 'auxiliary institutions' that supposedly supplement the vote can 
be extended with this brand of pluralism. An independent electoral commission can 
' T h e introduction of the competition terminology here is my own. To my knowledge Riker did not 
toy with it at all. The rest of the rephrase, however, is essentially the position described in Riker (1988; 
250). To restate my position defended in 3.3.4, there is no harm introducing terminology ignored 
protect districts from being gerrymandered geographically by incumbents seeking to 
circumvent electoral sanction. If the government has such a strong advantage to 
secure re-election it could well discourage possible competition from bothering. An 
independent and powerful reserve bank might also be utilised to reign in gratuitous 
public spending like pork barrelling that would otherwise bolster the incumbent 
advantage and potentially discourage competition. Of course, this is all rather loose, 
but all I am trying to do is sketch a few provisional implications of RSID and defend 
its use as a reasonable interpretation of liberal democracy. It highlights salient 
concerns for liberal democracy free from the rhetoric typically couched in the phrases 
'significant electoral veto' and 'popular will ' . Possibly the most salient concern for 
liberal democracy, as interpreted in RSID, is that the current distribution of campaign 
finance in most countries effectively rules out certain groups from competing 
institutionally because it is financially untenable for them to do so. The distinct 
advantage this bestows on a small group of incumbent interests could well be 
construed as an institutional monopoly (or oligopoly) of sorts. 
The institutions suggested above seem to further support the state minimalist agenda. 
I doubt replacing politicians with bureaucrats (as with a reserve bank and electoral 
commission) venerates the market, but let us just suppose it does. My suggestions so 
far seem to amount to an increase in the stock of institutional veto-players. A 
constitution ensuring the executive is heavily restricted by veto-players would likely 
give an institutional monopoly of sorts to whichever political coalition represented the 
status quo interests. Yet this is simply an incorrect interpretation of RSID: if there 
are entrenched institutional blocks on certain progressive political positions, there will 
be no incentives for interested parties (i.e. those political entrepreneurs with a 
preference for progress rather than stasis) to engage in institutional competition. That 
is to say, there will be no liberal democracy. RSID implies more than just checks, it 
also emphasises balances, which - for all Riker's rhetoric about 'checks and balances' 
- are distinctly under-specified in Liberalism Against Populism. 
We need a way to balance status quo interests by forcing them to engage in 
institutional competition because they fear opponents otherwise lowering the chances 
of their re-election. An independent and balanced news media with the right mix of 
competitive impulses will go a fair way to constrain monopolistic tendencies in this 
way. Such constraint will probably require policies to stop smaller and more 
independent outlets facing high barriers to entry or from being bought out by the 
bigger corporations. These sorts of policies would cut against the state minimalist 
agenda and involve political intervention. In a strong democracy the press is 
nobody's lapdog. 
Free speech (with or without the soap box of the mass media) and deliberation in 
general are just as much a constraint on incumbent politicians seeking another term in 
office as constitutionally inscribed safeguards. As Riker (1988: 170) argues, non-
leaders can themselves set the agenda by introducing new dimensions into debate. 
Elites have to compete to secure the dimensions - the standards of judgement - that 
are important to the next election (see Riker, 1986). The methods typically associated 
with deliberative democracy, especially the mechanisms for developing deliberative 
capacities to constrain policymaking, entail a more expansive state. It is usually more 
difficult to set the agenda in a way that runs against the running total of political 
argument (see 1.5.1) or indeed extremely difficuU not to set an agenda (as might be 
the case with conservative interests) and still be re-elected. The running total of 
political argument could be construed as an institutional constraint just as much as an 
independent legislature (see 7.3.3). It is these sorts of institutions that balance out the 
checks of the veto-players and incentivise competition for the vote. 
In sum, having the vote as the (necessary) incentive for institutional competition does 
not imply a demand for an increase in veto-players to 'protect' the vote. A minimalist 
state is likely to minimise institutional competition and give an institutional monopoly 
to the beneficiaries of the status quo. Nominally opposing parties are often carbon 
copies of one another. A government's ability to change the state's pattern of 
expenditure (say, the introduction of new social policies) is increasingly unlikely the 
more veto-players there are. The compromises involved with the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform outlined in 6.4 demonstrate the point. Competition implies a plurality 
of distinct interests and trumpeting a rationale of 'protecting the significance of the 
vote with institutional checks' genuinely undermines this distinctiveness by making 
policy progress near on impossible. There is little incentive for certain interests 
competing institutionally if they have no hope of changing the system from within. In 
the previous paragraph I started connecting the liberal interpretation with assumptions 
and conclusions common in the deliberative democracy literature. 
I pursue this line further in 7.3.3, but a clearing-up exercise is first mandatory. It is 
mandatory because seminal books defending an expansion of the executive (or at least 
the policy-making capacities of a state) by way of the so-called 'deliberative turn' do 
so by way of defending populism and rejecting Riker's interpretation of social choice 
theory. If the will of the people can somehow be institutionalised within the 
executive, then an expansion of the executive is supposedly justified in the name of 
democracy. It is my view that this simply replaces one demagogic flourish for 
another. 
7 3 Disagreement with Liberal Democracy 
Gerry Mackie does just this in his award-winning book Democracy Defended (2003). 
He adheres to the 'minimalist' reading of Liberalism Against Populism - that the 
rejection of populism implies veneration for market proceedings and scepticism for 
democratic decisions. Mackie's main disagreement with Riker is over whether or not 
the populist interpretation of democracy is justifiable rather than with Riker's move 
from the rejection of populism to the endorsement of a heavily constrained 
government. This is the wrong place to criticise Riker's supposed veneration of 
market proceedings and leads to argumentative deadlock. 
A significant portion of Mackie's book is devoted to a strong reassessment of the 
empirical literature that is tonic to the confused idea (that seems to be a platitude in 
the Rochester School) that cycles are regularly observed in elections. Mackie argues 
that cycles are extremely rare in elections with an exhaustive analysis of the empirical 
literature. For example, he reassesses and revises the conclusion that Abraham 
Lincoln was elected on a cycle in 1860. From these empirical claims, he mounts his 
theoretical argument: we should stop taking Arrow and McKelvey's theorems as 
decisive rejections of interpretations of democracy that utilise terms such as the 
'public will' and 'what the people want' because, first, the theorems (apparently) 
imply the existence of cycles and there is scant empirical evidence corroborating their 
existence, and, second, the theorems do not disprove what individuals usually mean 
when they use those terms. Given populism supposedly can be defended from 
Riker's attack, Mackie thinks we do not have to accept the rhetoric-laden liberal 
alternative. Given my defence of the liberal interpretation (rephrased as RSID) in the 
previous section it is imperative now to apply destructive conceptual analysis to 
analyse the reasons Mackie gives against the liberal interpretation of democracy with 
his 'theoretical argument' and analyse whether it does indeed follow from his 
empirical reassessments. 
7.3.1 Mackie's Linguistic Qualms 
Mackie accuses Riker of a verbal fudge tactic. He says, "What the rest of the world 
calls democracy Riker calls populism; that way he can remain a democrat even 
though he rejects the idea that government should respond to what its citizens judge 
best" (Mackie, 2003: 418). The idea that there is actually some state of affairs that 
the aggregate of citizens judge best - in some raw sense that is independent of 
institutions - is the platitude Riker attacks. I think much of the motivation behind 
Mackie's theoretical disagreement is contained to a grumble about Riker's self-
description as a 'democrat ' . From this grumble Mackie (2003: 431) suggests there is 
very little constraint on the liberal interpretation moving - as Pareto had over a 
Century ago - from an open society towards a fascist state. This is a puzzling 
interpretation that demands investigation. 
The interpretation starts from a caricature of Riker's position: 
"A democrat may insist that there are essential preconditions to democracy, such as rights to life, 
liberty and personal property, regular elections, equal voting rights, freedom of association, and 
freedom of speech, such that violations of these preconditions by minorities or majorities should be 
constitutionally prohibited and that their violation would justify rebellion by aggrieved parties... When 
Riker takes on 'populism' he takes on all these conceptions" (Mackie, 2003: 418-419). 
This passage suggests that given these valuable properties are unspecified by Riker's 
interpretation of 'democracy' , he pickets a fence and takes up arms against them. 
This is a mistake. If anything, refusing to cram such properties in under the definition 
of 'democracy' makes us less likely to take such values for granted. The list of 
'democratic' properties quoted above is but a fragment of Mackie's total. He goes on 
to say that Riker's interpretation of 'democracy' is even pitted against Rawls ' 
principles of justice. This is just to conflate rival interpretations of one single 
property with two distinct properties. Riker surely does not think his brand of 
democracy is rival to Rawls' brand of justice, only that they are analytically distinct. 
The conflation is troublingly fatalistic. Assuming that justice is naturally secured by 
democratic institutions (or vice versa) makes for less vigilant political argument. 
There is no longer an imperative to question whether democratic institutions secure 
just outcomes or whether just outcomes require democratic institutions. That 
democratic institutions guarantee the properties Mackie lists (or vice versa) is nothing 
more than propaganda - a conjuring trick - with the implication that all countries that 
are legitimately described as democratic meet this intimidating list of virtues. Of 
course, we might take Robert Dahl's advice and concede that no institution can ever 
be called democratic because democracy is an ideal that more than likely can never be 
realised. Yet Mackie does not seem to take this advice and is quite open to describing 
countries that are called democratic by the layperson as just that. A feature of the 
liberal interpretation of democracy is that it describes institutions as democratic in a 
way that, at first glance, seems to accord with the layperson, whereas it is hard to 
know whether any institution warrants the name 'democracy' by the populist 
interpretation because it is ambiguous whether or not some institution is governing 
according to the popular will. This leaves to populist position open to rhetorical 
hijacking. Liberal democracy is still valuable even if it does not completely meet the 
demands of liberal justice. 
Mackie's conjuring trick needs to be made explicit because it is repeated often and 
gives undue weight to many of the modem developments in democratic theory. 
Whichever way the populist claim is made, I conjecture, it can be rephrased under the 
pressures of elimination only by arriving back at a sentence social choice theory has 
explicitly proven to be inconsistent. 
7 J.2 Mackie 's Theoretical Argument Discarded 
If we eliminate the 'public good' or 'what the people want' we can rephrase Riker's 
rejection of populism (PI and P2) in terms congenial to social choice theory (see 
7.1.2). Namely, there is no rational social outcome that is equally responsive to the 
(relevant) pairwise preferences of individuals, where individuals are weighted 
equal ly . '" Can we do likewise with Mackie's theoretical criticism of Riker's 
position? Mackie suggests Riker and the Rochester School have an overly pejorative 
interpretation of populism, 
"Populism is a theoretical category for Riker, but what does he think are its empirical referents? 
Populism in Riker 's pejorative sense perhaps originates with the experiences of the French Revolution, 
when Robespierre and his Committee of Public Safety in the name of people 's will instituted the Reign 
of Terror. Populism in this sense is any tyranny that claims to rule in the name of the people. Oddly 
enough such regimes often originate in or are periodically sustained by manipulated plebiscite, which 
by Riker 's theory would provide legitimacy so long as there is a regular but merely formal possibility 
for rejection of the regime" (Mackie, 2003: 420). 
The final sentence in the above passage is plainly a mistake. As we have seen, Riker 
is not content simply to enshrine a 'formal possibility' and wants to bolster the vote 
with a range of auxiliary institutions. My 'non-minimalist' rephrase of Riker (RSID) 
also explicitly states that a "formal possibility" is not enough and liberal democracy 
requires a sufficiently high substantive possibility. Indeed, part of institutionalising a 
sufficient electoral veto (for democracies) involves ensuring governments cannot 
hoodwink political agents with populist narratives justifying the establishment and 
maintenance of institutional monopolies as the expression of the people's will. Still, 
Mackie thinks that this attitude towards populism is a mistake. Riker, the Rochester 
School, and liberal democrats in general need not accept the passage quoted above as 
a rephrase of their position. 
Nevertheless, this is the rephrase that Mackie attacks. My claim in this section is that 
it is doubtful that Mackie himself would accept his theoretical argument once the 
terms 'populist', 'rule of the people' and 'democracy' have been eliminated from it. 
By 'rational social outcome' I mean a transitive social ranking over states of affairs, as defined by 
Arrow (2012 [1951]: section 2.4), where the choice between any set of alternative states of affairs can 
be determined by choices made between pairs (i.e. pairwise comparisons). I take the universal domain 
condition to imply all individuals are weighted equally since it guarantees all preferences over all states 
of affairs are included. 
I demonstrate this with destructive conceptual analysis. Mackie's caricature of liberal 
democracy's attitude towards populism is grist for the analysis. I take the subject 
disagreement to be between Mackie and Riker, but it could quite easily be extended to 
be between populists in general and liberal democrats in general. 
M l , M2, and M3 though all seem to be adequate rephrases of the position defended in 
Democracy Defended. 
M l : The populist interpretation of democracy is a coherent and self-sustaining ideal. 
Eliminate 'populist'. 
M2: Democracy as the rule of the people is a coherent and self-sustaining ideal.' 
Eliminate 'rule' and 'people' . 
M3: Democracy as a polity designed to legislate according to the public interest is a 
coherent and self-sustaining idea l . " ' 
Riker would obviously disagree with Ml and M2 and so M l and M2 are adequate 
rephrases of Riker and Mackie's respective agreement profiles. 1 am of the (less 
obvious) opinion Riker would have also disagreed with M3. This is not because 
Riker thought the public interest is meaningless or incoherent in the same way the 
'rule of the people' is, but rather that he argued that it had nothing to do with the 
democratic vote and therefore nothing to do with the truth-conditions of a sentence 
describing some institution as democratic. He says, 
"[T]he notion of a public interest, so cherished by populist propagandists, is not, technically speaking, 
rendered meaningless simply because the populist interpretation of voting is meaningless. A public 
interest is an interest attached to the collective body of society; and as long as society exists, it has, 
presumably, some interests, which are its common or public interests... By definition, however, a 
common or public interest is held in common, so voting is unnecessary to reveal it." (Riker, 1988: 291) 
The 'public interest' here is something similar to the property of unanimity (i.e. 
everybody must prefer the proposed state of affairs). By this account democracy does 
See Mackie (2003: 427), albeit via quotation. 
' " S e e Mackie (2003: 94,409-432) . 
not run against the public interest. However, the means for achieving democracy -
the vote - will not reveal it. Instituting a liberal democracy rather than a fascist 
tyranny, say, surely gets close to what is in the public interest, despite the subsequent 
majority-sanctioned legislation not necessarily tracking the public interest from then 
on in. Riker is quite certain that a tyranny is not in the public interest and that 
institutionalising his interpretation of democracy (as a set of institutional constraints 
on tyranny) therefore is. 
Now, what Mackie means (see 2003: 409-432) by 'public interest' in M3 is 
something that is at least approximated by the outcome of the electorate voting. It is 
therefore a completely different property to the one interpreted as the 'public interest' 
by Riker. Riker's property is close to the property of unanimity, whereas Mackie's is 
close to the property attached to the aggregate of individual votes, just tinkered a 
little. As he says, "A democrat may quite consistently and defensibly recommend 
broadly accepted institutions that neutrally refine and enlarge the will of the people. 
Raw political preferences may be poorly informed and may be contradictory even 
within individuals" [italics mine] (2003: 418). Nevertheless, it is still the 'will of the 
people' that is the significant input for Mackie's populism. We have already 
eliminated the 'will of the people', however, and if Mackie's interpretation of the 
'public interest' relies on it in a way that cannot be rephrased without using it, then 
M3 does not preserve substantive disagreement. 
My hunch here is that Mackie is arbitrarily broadening the extension of the word 
'democracy' in M3 to suit his agenda and preserve a disagreement that need not exist. 
This hunch can be tested by an attempt to eliminate the word 'democracy' from M3 
and rephrase. Rephrasing M3 by substituting the term for Riker's interpretation 
yields something like M4A, 
M4A: Ensuring that legislation approximately tracks the public interest by means of 
subjecting legislators to a significant electoral sanction is a coherent and self-
sustaining ideal.""* 
* Again, see the last chapter of Liberalism Against Populism, especially Riker (1988: 250-3). 
M4A would obviously preserve Riker 's disagreement if Riker interpreted 'public 
interest' in M4A in his terms. Legislation would track unanimous policy preferences 
even if there was no vote. Less obvious is whether it would preserve the 
disagreement using Mackie's interpretation of the 'public interest'. For Riker, the 
outcome of the vote is strictly underdetermined by the preferences of individuals. 
Even the institutions that "neutrally refine and enlarge the public will" into the 'public 
interest', for Mackie, will be defeated by majority preference. The ideal is therefore 
underdetermined by the vote, making it difficult to maintain the predicate 'self-
sustaining' in M4A. Furthermore, since 'public interest' here relies on the term 
'public will' it is an illegitimate rephrase in light of destructive conceptual analysis. 
I am not sure whether Mackie would find M4A an acceptable rephrase given he 
thinks the 'public interest' designates some distinct property that is approximated by 
the outcome of the previous election, rather than some legislative package that takes 
into account the threat of a future election's sanction. We can eliminate the term 
'public interest' without relying back on the 'will of the people' with the following 
rephrase, 
M4B: Having legislation approximately track the institution-independent outcome of 
the previous election is a coherent and self-sustaining ideal . ' " 
The dividing characteristic between Mackie's populism and Riker's liberalism is 
perspicuous in M4B. Populism is backwards looking, whereas liberalism is forwards 
looking. By the liberal interpretation, governments ideally worry about the next 
election and compete with opposition to manipulate the future vote accordingly, 
whereas by the populist interpretation, the elected government ideally looks back in 
order to carry out their electoral mandate. 1 think M4B has to specify 'institution-
independent' because otherwise the principle depends on ideals unrelated to the vote 
in the sense that the institutions that aggregate ("refine and enlarge") the votes will 
need to be justified independently of the vote. Without the term 'institution-
independent' 1 think it is highly likely the Riker would agree with M4B. For instance, 
the 'veil of ignorance' (Rawls, 1999) could be construed as institutional imposition 
' " S e e Mack ie (2003: 442-3) f o r a rough vindicat ion of this in terpre ta t ion , even though no such 
vindicat ion is required (see section 3.3.4) . 
that structures the way individuals vote (i.e. express their preference for certain social 
states) and Riker gives hints that he endorses Rawls' theory of justice. I just doubt he 
would call the idea 'democratic' ( ' justice' perhaps) since it relies on justification 
exogenous to the vote. In other words, if we do not insist on specifying 'institution-
independent' the disagreement between Mackie and Riker is not preserved. 
The acceptability of M4B relies on there being an unambiguous outcome of a prior 
election that is independent of any institutional imposition to track and this is exactly 
what social choice (certainly under Riker's interpretation) proves to be incoherent. 
Given the strong possibility of global cycling there are likely going to be as many 
descriptions of the electoral outcome as there are alternatives. This amounts to an 
incoherent ideal. Granted, Mackie argues against the lessons that most people derive 
from the social choice proofs, but his arguments all turn on empirical evidence that is 
irrelevant to the conceptual point. He says, "The theorems are, of course, logically 
true, given their initial premises, but the theorems fail as models" (Mackie, 2003: 
174) and that the "problem with the chaos theorems is that they are not supported by 
experimental and empirical observations of instability" (Mackie, 2003: 185). The 
theorems do not predict instability in institutions governed by the vote; they predict 
instability if there is no (arbitrary) institutional imposition determining the 
institutional consequences of a vote. The conditional ' i f makes all the difference: 
given we observe stability we should assume institutional imposition. The arbitrary 
limits (arbitrary in terms of an aggregate of individual preferences) we impose on 
agenda-setting and the electoral system will determine the stable patterns of 
governance rather than a specific non-institutional outcome of the previous election. 
So falls M4B as an acceptable rephrase. I can think of no further (vaguely plausible) 
rephrase that might preserve Mackie's theoretical argument and so we can conclude it 
is either merely verbal or wrong."® 
Admittedly, I think some confusion over M4B can be in part traced back to Riker 
himself. Occasionally he seems to suggest the validity of Arrow and McKelvey's 
theorems can be bolstered by empirical evidence. This is simply wrong. The 
theorems come before political science and are not supplemented by it, let alone 
It is my view tliat Mackie starts with his verbal disagreement and then because of this disagreement 
feels it necessary to posit further disagreement with the technical prescriptions of the theorems. 
dependent on it. The theorems are poHtical argument from acceptable axioms 
(common ground) to surprising conclusions (see 1.3)."^ Political argument comes 
before political science (see 4.8 and 6.4). The theorems may well structure the 
empirical patterns we go looking for and the hypotheses we make, but the patterns we 
find will not change the consistency or relevance of those theorems. 
I see no other way to rephrase Mackie's position under the pressures of elimination 
detailed above. Mackie's theoretical argument dodges the implications of the social 
choice theorems by obfuscating with terms like the 'will of the people ' , popular will ' , 
'what people want' and 'democracy' . This is not to say Mackie does not have a 
substantive argument against Riker. He does with his revision of the empirical 
discoveries of electoral cycles. However, Mackie's trenchant debunking of empirical 
discoveries of cycles is an argument distinct from his theoretical claim to vindicating 
populism, as Riker's purported discovery of empirical cycles is distinct from his 
theoretical claim about populism's incoherency. 
7.3.3 Deliberative Democracy and Pluralism 
There is a platitude in democratic theory to distinguish the so-called 'deliberative 
democracy' literature from Riker 's liberal interpretation of democracy. However, the 
same verbal moves are made to dissociate the two as were made by Mackie in 
Democracy Defended to attack Riker. The divide between liberalism and populism is 
a platitude of the 'deliberative turn' but a platitude that is, for one, merely verbal and, 
for two, unwarranted given the liberal interpretation of democracy as institutional 
competition. The liberal interpretation can be broadened without inconsistency to 
encompass the deliberative claims. Deliberation or "the unforced force of the better 
argument" (Habermas, 1996: 305) is a form of institutional competition that is 
structured by the vote. That is to say, most deliberative democrats accept that the vote 
is necessary for there to be any point to deliberation - for there to be a decisive 
decision at the end of the process - given the ideal of consensus is rarely feasible 
' " For example, I find it difficult to believe that arguers would not take it as common ground that every 
governmental decision is mult idimensional . Even issues that are re fmed down to a single dimension 
are refined down, in part, by decisions made by political actors. 
(Elster, 1982; Goodin, 2008). Deliberators compete to manipulate the vote on their 
terms and this fits neatly within the rubric of liberal democracy. 
Institutions change and can be subjected to on-going change. The standard definition 
of institutions is North's "the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction" that is used to interpret the nearly trivial point that "Institutional change 
shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding 
historical chance" (North, 1990: 3). Institutions (including political institutions) are 
dynamic. McKelvey's chaos theorem demonstrates that a majority decision will be 
partly determined by the agenda and the dimensions under which policy is made. 
Riker suggests that such manipulation is determined by institutions and can 
accordingly be explained by those institutions. The constraints policymakers have to 
work with in order to manipulate the electoral vote will accordingly be subject to on-
going change. 
Deliberative democrats claim that agendas and dimensions are also partly determined 
through deliberation (Dryzek and List, 2003). There is little reason therefore to treat 
deliberation as any different to the stock-standard political institutions sketched by 
Riker in the final chapter of Liberalism Against Populism. Both function as 
constraints for policymakers and help overcome the instability the disequilibria of 
majority rule otherwise suggest. As Mackie (2003: 379) himself puts it, 
"Almost everyone in politics is a loser in some respect, so why don' t we observe millions of attempts 
to introduce new issues and dimensions? There must be constraints on such introductions. The 
constraint is that the speaker's introduction of a new issue or dimension must be freely rejected or 
accepted by the listeners. Deliberation is not subject to disequilibrium, and can indicate central 
outcomes such as the intersection of medians in multidimensional issue space; disequilbrium is a 
consequence only of the unfair assumptions of the McKelvey voting model." 
Again, I agree with everything Mackie says here up until the final sentence. 1 doubt 
McKelvey would claim that deliberation so construed has anything to do with the 
inputs of his model. The introduction of new issues and dimensions are the 
parameters of McKelvey's model, not its input. The input is the ideal points of n > 2 
individuals in n > 1 dimensions. Deliberation sets the particular dimensions but it 
requires certain individuals with certain preferences to react in terms of those 
preferences for the model to do its work and prove global intransitivities. Such 
preferences are exogenous to deliberation. Individuals compete with others in 
deliberative activities to have their issues and dimensions freely accepted by listeners. 
This constitutes institutional competition as described in RS ID. 
To compete individuals need to be compet ing/or something. The vote provides the 
yardstick - it provides a decision - even if at times it may be a perverse decision. 
Given the vote is a necessary precondition for competition the optimisation of 
deliberation falls under the liberal democratic imperative of institutional competition. 
It is generally accepted in the deliberative democracy literature that political 
deliberation will never produce consensus: consensus is the ideal but rarely the 
reality. Decisions will never be acceptable to everyone when we are dealing with a 
large enough group. Under such conditions there will be a point where the question 
must be put to a vote with respect to alternative answers. As Mackie (2003: 379) puts 
it, "democratic discussion is a complement of, not a substitute for, voting". Without 
this voting clause it is difficult to see that there is any point to deliberating when 
unanimity will only ever be an ideal and with it deliberation falls under the rubric of 
institutional competition. 
One manoeuvre remains to distinguish the deliberative democrat from the liberal 
democrat. For the latter, deliberation is good for democracy because it incentivises 
institutional competition and that is it, whereas deliberation serves a further 
normative function for the former (Cohen, 2006b: 163; Goodin, 2005; Dryzek and 
List, 2003). Namely, it alters the preferences of deliberators to trend towards 'the 
common good' or the 'public will ' . Liberal democrats are indifferent to the function 
of institutional competition on the preferences of individuals. Cohen (2006) goes on 
to make the case that preferences are not exogenous to institutions. Yet this just adds 
ambiguity where there need be none. Why not instead say that it is the institutions 
that are changing rather than the preferences of individuals? I think that once we 
eliminate the term 'public will' and close cognates it becomes impossible to rephrase 
the deliberative position without doing so. That is, the position that preferences are 
'better' post-deliberation and therefore better inputs for the voting mechanism. Why 
are they better? The standard answer is that they approximate the 'public will' but as 
we have seen such a notion is incoherent."^ 
Having a preference for a deliberatively unacceptable policy will not necessarily force 
anybody to change that preference. There are no acceptable reasons that I can think 
of to support a generous subsidy package (in the realm of millions of dollars) for 
yours truly, but that does not stop me having a preference for such a package. 1 have 
not exhibited 'adaptive preferences' (Elster, 1982) and changed my preference when 
the realisation dawned that I cannot - in a deliberative setting - defend any policy that 
grants me my preference. Despite consoling myself that I would probably be no 
happier with a million dollar surplus than with my current debt, I would still vote for 
such redistribution if it were on the table and I dare say you would too. The 
justifications for how preferences converge toward the 'public will' seem contrived 
since they suffer under the social choice proofs and the pressures of elimination. A 
far more plausible interpretation is that the content of deliberation - the particular 
arguments that have traction at the pub and in the media - are constraints on would-be 
tyrants, forcing politicians to compete institutionally for re-election. Such an 
interpretation closes the artificial linguistic divide between the Rochester School and 
the literature of deliberative democracy. 
Some deliberative democrats distinguish themselves from liberal democrats by 
utilising Condorcet's Jury Theorem to reach the conclusion that deliberation leads to 
beliefs that better tracks the truth (e.g. Cohen, 1986; Goodin and List, 2001). 
Preferences post-deliberation are supposedly better because they are better truth-
trackers. This well might be the case, but this is nothing that the liberal conception of 
democracy denies. Riker, for one, would be sceptical that such an ideal of truth had 
anything to do with democracy since the vote is not a necessary condition for 
realising it. Of course this is not to say that Riker did not value the truth; to infer 
otherwise would be to commit Mackie's erroneous verbal criticism discussed in 7.2.1. 
The concentration on truth might be a feature of deliberative democracy that 
distinguishes it from the liberal democratic programme, but such differences cannot 
Perhaps we could take a Habemiasian stance and say the 'public will ' is what all deliberators would 
accept in ideal speech conditions, but in so far as deliberation is not bound by such conditions we 
cannot make that assumption about real-world deliberation. 
be construed as a rival difference. In so far as it is so construed, the rivalry is purely 
verbal, turning on the word 'democracy'. If the two traditions would be upfront about 
their trivial verbal difference and take the subscript gambit - the Rochester School are 
using 'democracy!' and the deliberative school 'democracy2' (see 3.3.1), say - there 
would be far less theoretical tension (if any) left between them. 
7 3 Conclusion 
I have advocated a rephrase of the wildcard sentence RSI in terms of institutional 
competition. This is in line with Riker's liberal interpretation of democracy and 
rejection of populism but does not imply an American-style system of checks and 
balances. As we have seen with my analysis of the 'theoretical argument' in 
Democracy Defended, Mackie's attempts to argue against American minimalism by 
way of disagreeing with Riker's rejection of populism seem likewise to turn on non-
substantive reasoning. This is a move that is seemingly common in the deliberative 
democracy literature. The offending terms range over 'public will', 'will of the 
people', 'what the people want', and 'democracy'. Yet insofar as the attack centres 
on a defence of populism the concession to right-wing ideologues is already made. 
The linguistic trick that takes us from a rejection of populism to a minimal state and 
an endorsement of the market is the phrase 'significant electoral veto' and its close 
cognates like 'undermining the vote'. This step is the step needing scrutiny, not the 
rejection of classical populism. 
Chapter 8 
Liberty and Equality (and the Vibrations they 
Produce) 
Gwendolen. My own Ernest! 
Jack. But you don ' t really mean to say that you couldn't love me if my name wasn' t Ernest? 
Gwendolen. But your name is Ernest. 
Jack. Yes, 1 know it is. But supposing it was something else? Do you mean to say you couldn't love 
me then? 
Gwendolen. [Glibly.] Ah! that is clearly a metaphysical speculation, and like most metaphysical 
speculations has very little reference at all to the actual facts of real life, as we know them. 
Jack. Personally, darling, to speak quite candidly. I don' t much care about the name of Ernest. . . I 
don ' t think the name suits me at all. 
Gwendolen. It suits you perfectly. It is a divine name. It has a music of its own. It produces vibrations. 
Jack. Well, really, Gwendolen, I must say that I think there are lots of other much nicer names. I think 
Jack, for instance, a charming name. 
Gwendolen. Jack?.. . No, there is very little music in the name Jack, if any at all, indeed. It does not 
thrill. It produces absolutely no vibrations... I have known several Jacks, and they all, without 
exception, were more than usually plain. 
From The Importance of Being Earnest by Oscar Wilde. 
8.1 Introduction 
An old platitude in political analysis says that liberty and equality are incompatible 
values (e.g. Berlin, 1969; Steiner, 1981). That is, an increase in equality entails a 
decrease in liberty and vice versa. Any value package that does not treat liberty and 
equality as such is inconsistent. Call this the incompatibility thesis. Somebody might 
bristle when they watch the nightly news and see the increases in personal income tax. 
They think such increases violate the liberty of those citizens who worked 'hard' for 
their money only to have to hand back a portion of it to the government. They think it 
tantamount to theft. At the same time, however, they get equally angry when the 
bulletin shifts to a report on acute poverty and curse the government for not doing 
more to ensure equality of opportunity. Yet usually the reality is that only with more 
tax revenue can a government do anything to increase the lot of certain segments in 
society without reducing public expenditure in other areas. If the individual thinks 
any reduction in any of the current social services is unacceptable, then their value-
package is simply unfeasible and, we may well say, an inconsistent position worthy of 
reasonable rejection. The fact that they perhaps believe it to be consistent does not 
make it so. 
Such inconsistency is often left unresolved because of the semantic imprecision and 
emotive 'vibrations' that are so often attached to terms with bloody histories like 
liberty and equality. Section 8.3 below documents some of these historical vibrations. 
Indeed, Morriss (2012) suggests the conceptual distinctions that attract to the word 
' freedom' might never be separable from the word's revolutionary history. The 
'vibrations' that go with the words 'equality' and ' freedom' consequently make it 
difficult to ignore or dismiss the weight of whatever they might refer to in argument. 
As such, the refrain 'Of course 1 value liberty/equality, but situations ;c, y, and z do not 
have anything to do with liberty/equality' is all too common. Sometimes the refrain is 
innocuous, but it is just as often rhetorical with it distorting the first dimension of 
conversation. It is non-substantive perhaps in the same way that Gwendolen's love 
for Jack in The Importance of Being Earnest is non-substantive. Without the name 
attached to the concept, just as much as without the name ( 'Earnest ') attached to the 
person (Jack), there is no argument and no love. What is more, in the case of political 
theory, such non-substantiveness is one of the primary causes of inconsistent value-
packages ." ' 
I should stress that this is not necessar i ly an at tack on the ind iv idua l ' s p re fe rences . It is more jus t 
the suggest ion that their p re fe rences wou ld not be defens ib le in poli t ical a r g u m e n t (by my 
interpretat ion of it). T h e analys is of va lue -packages , then , is analys is a i m e d at g r o o m i n g an 
ind iv idua l ' s intuit ions and p re fe rences fo r express ion in polit ical a r g u m e n t . 
Measuring the feasibility of particular tradeoffs between equality and liberty has been 
a crossover subject for both empirical political science and economics. However, the 
coherency of the trade-offs has also been a subject of political theory as well. 
Typically political theorists have been concerned with the term's position in the 
second dimension of conversation and have sought to ensure individuals are strict 
with their definitions and interpretations of terms in order to correct any 
inconsistencies. For instance, those who subscribe to the republican interpretation of 
freedom like Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner, take increases in liberty and increases 
in equality to go hand in hand. Subscribers to the negative conception of liberty 
(particularly in its distributive s e n s e ) t y p i c a l l y take the two values to be practically 
incompatible, with Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia being the classic 
argument for giving fundamental value to liberty while admitting it comes at the 
expense of concerns for equality. On the other hand, some of the September Group's 
'non-bullshit Marxists' also interpret liberty and freedom in the negative sense (of 
self-ownership) but suggest its optimisation leads to egalitarian outcomes. Given 
there is such disagreement in the academy it is little wonder the words are used willy-
nilly in public discussion. This chapter will subject these arguments to the method of 
elimination to start a process towards distilling the substantive points in the literature. 
8.2 The Incompatibility Thesis 
Phillip Pettit and Quentin Skinner have resuscitated a certain interpretation of the 
word freedom from patterns of 17"" Century Republican thought. Proponents of 
negative freedom like Ian Carter (1999) and Matthew Kramer (2003) have resisted 
elements of this resuscitation. This resuscitation, while constructive in many respects, 
is deeply confused in others. It arbitrarily shifts between investigations of patterns in 
republican thought to full out political argument. The former is worthwhile and (in 
my view) important while the latter is not. The latter encounters the problems 
sketched in my analysis of the Cambridge School in 5.2). Before arguing this point I 
Throughout this chapter I make use of Brian Barry's ( 20 I I ; 43) distinction between distributive and 
aggregative values: "an aggregative principle is one which mentions only the total amount of want-
satisfaction among members of a reference group, whereas a distributive principle requires for its 
statement a mention of the way in which want-satisfaction is to be divided among the members of a 
reference group". 
will unpack the competing claims in this section and suggest the relation each claim 
has to the incompatibility thesis. 
Before Pettit and Skinner, academic discussion on freedom roughly revolved around 
Berlin's famous distinction between positive and negative liberty in his essay 'Two 
Concepts of Liberty' (1969). Negative freedom is freedom from interference. Bodily 
restraint, taxation and government creep might be all associated with violations of 
freedom in the negative sense. The giveaway for this sense is talk of freedom as the 
absence of something and (its grammatical accomplice) the phrase ' freedom f rom' . 
Hobbes is the classic exemplar of this interpretation. 
Liberty, or Freedome, signifieth (properly) the absence of Opposi t ion; (by Opposi t ion, I mean 
extemall Impediments of motion;) . . . For whatsoever is so t ied, or environed, as it cannot 
move but within a certain space, which space is determined by the opposit ion of some external 
body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further. (1996: 145). 
In a jail cell a prisoner is perfectly free to do as they please within that cell because 
there is an absence of any physical object preventing their movement (save for the 
odd piece of furniture.) However, given the presence of the cell walls the prisoner is 
not free to leave the jail. Laws restrict liberty in this sense since they mobilise the 
presence of force as a response to certain actions. So your freedom is restricted by the 
law 'Do not murder' in that if you do go and murder someone the police will arrest 
you and throw you in jail. Yet technically everybody is free to murder in so far as 
they have the brute strength or resources to do so and there is no physical object 
stopping them. The sort of freedom that is curbed by such laws then is a conjunctive 
sort of freedom: if your jurisdiction attaches a heavy jail sentence to murder, you are 
not free to both murder somebody and (in all likelihood) live the remainder of your 
life outside of jail. '^' Of course if an individual had the resources to overcome the 
police force as well, then they are free to pursue the conjunct. Berlin lumps a number 
of classical theorists in the negative camp with varying degrees of plausibility, f rom 
J.S. Mill to Tocqueville. 
Freedom as non-interference is not an egalitarian good if it is seen as a value 
constraining public policy. That is, if it is used in political argument as a 
This quality is perspicuously captured with Morriss ' (2002) concept of ableness, despite it not being 
directly related to f reedom (although he is now seemingly making the relation in Morriss , 2012) . 
distributional value to reject policy related to re-distribution. This was the way 
Nozick used it (see 8.4). As a distributional value it is possibly the conservative 
position par excellence. It is often the bottom line for those with affiliations to the 
likes of Edmund Burke. Non-conservatives also use it occasionally, especially when 
government policy uses vague and ambiguous terms like 'national security' as 
argument trumps for interventions into citizen welfare. Furthermore, if we were in a 
radically egalitarian society where no transactions took place (a bit of a strained 
hypothetical, admittedly) we could claim negative freedom as a distributional value 
against policy aimed at upsetting the (non-transactional) status quo. Negative 
freedom as a distributional value, then, is in tension with equality only so far as the 
value of equality needs re-distributional policy in order to be fulfilled or optimised. 
In this sense, the incompatibility thesis between liberty and equality is more a thesis 
by proxy. 
On the other hand, as an aggregative value, negative freedom provides a reason for, 
just as much as against, state intervention by licensing the various provisions given to 
the jurisprudence of tort law and perhaps competition law. That is, the license to 
work out the optimal limits of interference in a way that will maximise want-
satisfaction. The tort against trespass, for example, is thought to satisfy the wants of 
individuals for private property against the wants of individuals to have universal 
access to land without the disincentive of r e s t r a i n t . J e r e m y Waldron (1991) argues 
(persuasively) that the extension of trespass or 'public nuisance' laws to public 
property is an unreasonable intrusion on the want-satisfaction - and no doubt need-
satisfaction - of the homeless. He justifies this in terms of negative freedom as an 
aggregative principle. The original idea of trespass was introduced as a necessary 
(legal) interference to satiate the desires individuals had to not be interfered with on 
their properties. This want-satisfaction did not extend beyond private property and 
yet modern governments have increasingly interpreted it so. 
As Cohen (1979: 11-12) puts it, "Let us suppose that I wish to take Mr. Morgan's yacht, and go for 
a spin. If I try to, then it is probable that its owner, aided by law-enforcing others, will stop me. I 
cannot do this thing that I wish to do, because others will interfere. But liberty, Narveson reasonably 
said, is "doing what we wish without the interference of others ." It follows that I lack a liberty here. 
Patently the point is generalisable. Private property always limits liberty, as in the Morgan example." 
Such reasoning using negative freedom as an aggregate value suggests "the wish to 
carry out the acts in the area claimed for inviolable freedom is always as a matter of 
fact stronger than the desire to suppress such acts" (Barry, 2011: 142). Or, at least 
concerning the violable sorts of freedom, it is more often than not stronger than the 
desires to suppress the acts. This is the conventional justification of the free market 
that can be traced back to Adam Smith's metaphor of the invisible hand in market-
based societies. It is Rawls' concern when he suggests, "each society has a 
redistribution policy which if pushed beyond a certain point weakens incentives and 
thereby lowers production" (Rawls, 1999: 142). This is sometimes called the 
technical conception of freedom because freedom in this sense is only a value because 
it is the means or tool for valued outcomes (e.g. for Adam Smith this valued outcome 
was the maximisation of a nation's weal th . ) ' " 
The point to separating negative freedom into its distributive and aggregative senses 
is that it makes plain that the conceptual role typically played by negative freedom 
has nothing a priori (in the first dimension of conversation) to do with state 
interference, nor indeed equality. Devotees of negative freedom in the liberal 
tradition typically acknowledge this point (e.g. Rawls, 1999) and suggest the goal is 
not the maximisation of freedom as such (i.e. the relevant value is not an aggregative 
principle per se) but the maximisation of the equal distribution of freedom. That is, 
we can have the aggregative principle of negative freedom providing it is strictly 
constrained by the distributive principle of equality. The latter does not analytically 
entail the former, so it needs to be made to have it as its object. From this position, 
the question 'Equality of what?' is answered 'liberty' and the question 'Liberty for 
whom?' is answered 'Everyone, equally.' 
Now, the positive interpretation of freedom suggests that even if there is no physical 
interference impeding an agent's activity they still might not be 'truly f ree ' . 
Rousseau's phrase "Man is bom free but everywhere he is in chains" is almost a 
cliche now to describe how culture can make individuals choose poorly and be in a 
choice situation that is not a free choice situation, despite no overt interference 
Some republicans - Patten (1996: 26) calls them "instrumental republicans" - likewise suggest the 
state should interfere and persuade citizens to engage in active citizenship and civic duty because it 
contributes to the maintenance of a free society. 1 suppose then that the technical label could range 
over a few different interpretations of the word. 
limiting the possibilities open to the agent. Culture is surely not a physical 
obstruction. Not even Hobbes' materialist account of the mind can render it in 
physical terms for culture is a phenomenon distinct from brain states (or at the very 
least we treat it as though it is by the language that we use) which are only one of 
culture's vehicles along with other mediums like the written word and pictures. The 
standard interpretation of positive freedom is that the cultural conditions a theorist 
prescribes as the conditions under which an agent is free comes from the theorist's 
own conception of the good life. 
Liberal political theory has subsequently downplayed this conception (Pettit, 1997). 
It sneaks moral partiality into political argument and renders the context-set of those 
with different conceptions of the good defective. The negative sense of freedom 
though has persevered and has picketed a defence against what has been called a third 
type of freedom - republican freedom. This approach is not so much concerned with 
actual interference (the main concern for proponents of negative freedom) but in the 
capacity of agents to arbitrarily interfere with other agents. This concern with 
capacity applies irrespective of whether interference is actually taking place. So if an 
employee can be sacked at the whim of their boss because they have no legal recourse 
for unfair dismissal, then they might be considered unfree vis-a-vis their relationship 
with their boss. Their employer does not even have to exercise their power for the 
employee to be unfree; the simple fact that their boss could exercise it if it felt like it 
is enough. If the employee depends on their job and has no other means to secure an 
income then they are dominated. The employee will have to tiptoe around their boss 
and toady to their every desire because there are no structural (e.g. legal) 
(dis)incentives to protect them from their employer interfering with them in a way 
that does not track their interests or opinions. They must do exactly as their employer 
desires because there is nothing to stop the employer from firing them for some petty 
annoyance. On the other hand, if an individual is interfered with by some legislation 
in a way that supposedly tracks their interests, their freedom is not compromised. A 
smoker might have a long-term desire to quit, despite their short-term desires 
regularly winning out (to their chagrin), and a long-term desire for better social 
services. We would not say that the government violated their freedom by slapping a 
heavy tax on cigarettes in order to fund additional services. The government's 
interference reduced the choice situation of agents but reduced it according to the 
agent's own opinions. Yet by most negative conceptions freedom is violated by such 
a tax since hiking up the price of cigarettes restricts the range of actions an individual 
can engage in on a limited budget. This difference distinguishes the two 
interpretations. A further distinction is that negative conceptions are typically only 
concerned with actual interference and do not find a benevolent boss or master who is 
in a position to arbitrarily interfere but who refrains a problem in need of a solution. 
Republicans do. 
The Republican interpretation of the word ' freedom' is as an aggregative value with 
little concern about distributional constraints. 
"The natural way to cast freedom as non-domination is in the role of a value that the state should try 
and promote, not in the role of a constraint that it has to honour; this. . . is the way in which it is 
generally cast in the republican tradition: the tradition is consequentialist in nature." 
(Pettit, 1997: 80) 
There is the implication that distributional values - particularly those that attach to the 
label of negative freedom - are to be trumped by a concern for republican freedom. It 
is an aggregative value but a genuine "alternative" to negative and positive freedom 
interpreted in their aggregative senses (Pettit, 1997: 19). It is a "radically different 
way of understanding freedom and the institutional requirements of freedom" to the 
two other aggregative interpretations (Pettit, 1997: 19). By my reading, Pettit thinks 
it is a mutually exclusive choice between the republican and negative interpretations 
of freedom. 
Republican freedom indirectly satisfies certain common distributional demands along 
the way. A government solely concerned with promoting freedom as non-domination 
will incidentally promote 'equality' and a selection of other common values: 
"Those who hail freedom as non-interference and who think that the minimal state is not normatively 
satisfactory generally invoke other values as independent criteria of political evaluation: values like 
equality, or welfare, or utility, or whatever. Freedom as non-domination does not call for the same sort 
of supplementation since.. . it already requires institutions that perform well in regard to values like 
equality and welfare, thus those values do not have to be introduced as distinct desiderata" (Pettit 
1997:81). 
However, this is only equality of a certain sort. As Pettit puts it, "To want republican 
liberty, you have to want republican equality" [italics mine] (1997: 126). This 
'republican equality' is structural equality rather than material equality (1997: 113). 
The pursuit of republican freedom does not necessarily lead to the recommendation 
that the state ensures (within the realms of feasibility) that everybody has equal 
resources to aid in the extent of their undominated choice. Those who work hard, for 
instance, might deserve a larger pay packet than those who do not. The hard worker's 
money seems to entitle them to a larger degree of undominated choice than a lazy 
worker. For instance, individuals with money in reserve could take out a loan from a 
loan shark but be able to pull out by paying off their debt if the shark's demands on 
interest rose too sharply. Somebody who has absolutely no means and comes to the 
shark in desperation will not have the same luxury and therefore will be subjected to a 
dominating relation until they have been able to pay it off (and with the exorbitant 
interest some charge, this might be a long time coming). A richer person has more 
choices with which they are free from domination than a poorer person because of the 
difference in resources. They can accordingly engage in 'risky behaviour' more often 
and reap the economic benefits. Yet republican equality is not necessarily opposed to 
this sort of inequality; if it is, then it is only indirectly. 
Rather, republicanism recommends the equality of the intensity of non-domination. It 
is not a recommendation based off distributional concerns, but a recommendation for 
the optimal aggregation of non-domination overall. Framing the principle of non-
domination in terms of intensity gives the government a mandate to crack down on as 
many dominating relations in society as possible (and add to the aggregate of non-
domination) without creating further relations of domination as a byproduct - namely, 
without itself becoming a countervailing dominating force. As Pettit puts it, 
"As a state gains the powers necessary to be a more and more effective protector - as it is allowed a 
bigger and bigger army or police force or intelligence service, for example - it becomes itself a greater 
threat to freedom as non-domination than any threat it seeks to remove" (1997: 105). 
Guarding against such a threat arising will require a balancing of governmental, legal 
and voting power; a strong constitution emphasising a balance of power is therefore 
important for the republican. While this feature suggests formal institutions to 
constrain a government's ability to exorbitantly tax the electorate, a government 
committed to the intensity of non-domination will try and work their way through the 
checks and balances and tax the rich in order to equalise the distribution of resource. 
This is because the requisite resources to secure a base intensity of non-domination 
for an individual will be balanced by and therefore relative to the resources of other 
individuals and agencies in society.'^'' The particular distribution of resources that 
maximises the intensity of non-domination will therefore be relative to the way 
society is structured. Republicanism takes equality as a yard-stick for the distribution 
of such intensity simply because it is usually the most efficient way to increase the 
intensity of non-domination overall since "a person's power-ratio is subject to 
diminishing marginal productivity in its effect on their intensity of non-domination" 
(Pettit, 1997: 114). Any anti-equality initiative will decrease the overall aggregate of 
the intensity of non-domination since an increase in a poor person's power-ratio will 
improve the aggregate of non-domination more efficiently than that of a rich person. 
Perhaps that rich person will become slightly more vulnerable to domination, but the 
security the poor person reaps from such initiatives lowers the overall aggregate of 
social vulnerability. Republicanism is accordingly said to entail structural 
egalitarianism (Pettit, 1997: 113) and therefore contradicts the incompatibility 
thesis.'^' It recommends heavy taxation on upper income earners until a certain base 
intensity of non-domination is secured for everyone. In other words, it recommends a 
robust welfare state and at times "severe restrictions on sumptuary or luxury levels of 
affluence" (Pettit, 1997: 117; see also Dagger, 2006). The only constraints on such 
redistribution other than practical considerations are political institutions that are there 
in order to curb a government's ability to dominate the governed. 
Pettit (1997: 115) explains this point by way of a hypothetical: "Imagine that we are dealing with 
just two individuals, A and B. Suppose that A is sufficiently well resourced to be generally able to 
resist interference from B or to deter B from interfering. Suppose, in other words, that A enjoys a high 
intensity of non-domination in the society constituted by A and B, not being subject to interference at 
will and with impunity from B. In such a case, it will not do much for A 's non-domination to increase 
their powers even further; in fact it may do nothing at all: A may be at a point where extra power have 
zero marginal productivity. The increases might be more-or-less redundant , providing A with powers 
that are not really needed for the purposes of non-domination. The case contrasts with what those 
increases would have achieved had A been comparatively powerless and generally unable to resist B ' s 
interference or deter B from interfering. In such a situation, the value of the increases would be much 
p e a t e r . 
It should be noted that certain aggregative conceptions of negative freedom, when supplemented 
with the assumption of diminishing marginal utility of freedoms, likewise tend to contradict the thesis 
but I will concentrate on distributional conceptions of negative freedom and the mutually exclusive ' 
republican conception for the purposes of this chapter. 
8 J Arguments with History 
The republican claim in political argument translates as follows. A (or possibly the 
only) feasible solution to the political problem is policy directed to the ideal of 
freedom as non-domination. Any policy that can be demonstrated to increase the 
intensity of non-domination cannot be reasonably rejected unless there are other 
feasible alternatives that can do so more effectively. 
This idiom of freedom as non-domination was developed as a rejection of those who 
justified or dismissed inequalities - often mass inequalities - by appealing to freedom. 
The refrain of apologists for inequality tended to be that unequal wealth and 
opportunities did not entail any less liberty than equal wealth and opportunity. Thus, 
the exclusive rule of an authoritarian monarch, patriarch, or oligarch in the state, 
household, and market respectively, should be of no concern for those demanding 
liberty. This critique was thought to apply to the classical republicans since they were 
typically motivated solely by the value of freedom (Skinner, 1998). What neo-
republicanism has successfully done is show that the republican interpretation of 
freedom structurally suggests material equality once the thesis has been updated for a 
modem audience. What it has done less successfully (as I will argue) is suggest that it 
is an exclusive and better alternative to the orthodox liberal interpretation of liberty. 
Pettit's accusation of the early negative theorists is that they re-defined liberty for 
their own political purposes. This re-defmition has stalked the liberal tradition from 
the l?"" and IS"" Century through to the 21®'. Theirs was a linguistic conjuring trick to 
justify the vast inequality that made up the status quo. In effect, Pettit is suggesting 
that the problems of inequality have been nudged out of the liberal tradition through a 
verbal sleight of hand. The famous suspects here are Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy 
Bentham, along with a number of (less famous) authors writing in the wake of 
Bentham. The non-substantive reasoning of some of these less famous authors is 
rather obvious in retrospect. The case of John Lind who was a pamphleteer for Lord 
North's British government during the American War of Independence is particularly 
striking. His Three Letters to Dr. Price were (at times, abusive) attacks on Richard 
Price's radical support of the American Revolution. The support for the revolution 
centered on the Republican conception of freedom, which gave purchase to the 
argument that Britain's capacity to arbitrarily interfere (primarily with its taxation) 
with the American colonies violated the freedom of the colonies. 
Lind had a few good criticisms, pointing out stark inconsistencies in the republican's 
plight. For example, he argued that by Price's account women would be "degraded to 
slaves" (Lind 1776: 40). Unless every woman was to be her own "legislatrix" (Lind 
1776: 40.), they had the exact same status as slaves by republican mantra. In the 18"' 
Century women did not have the same powers of legal recourse and economic 
opportunities that they now have and accordingly did fit Price's description of a slave. 
Furthermore, all servants, however dignified, counted as slaves.'^® Such logic can 
easily be extended to apply to many of the revolutionaries' own employees. The 
republican Algernon Sidney (1990: 548-9), for example, thought his employees "must 
serve me in my own way, or be gone if 1 think fit, tho he serve me never so well; and I 
do him a wrong in putting him away, if either I intend to keep no servant [i.e. 
employee], or find that another will please me better". If Price and Algernon held 
these views about their wives, daughters and employees then their positions were 
inconsistent and open to reasonable rejection. Those revolutionaries arguing for 
republican freedom who at the same time forced the impoverished into exploitative 
working arrangements and did not grant their wives and daughters any legal recourse 
from abuse were being inconsistent. 
Modern readers will surely agree that these 18"' Century republicans had inconsistent 
positions worthy of reasonable rejection. However, it was their views on slavery, 
industrial relations and women to be the views that needed revising before any 
revision to their republican account of liberty was required. Every woman should he 
her own "legislatrix", likewise for employees and slaves. Lind's complaint was that 
the republicans maintained their position for American independence based on a 
notion of liberty that they could adjust at will to suit their preference, rather than a 
consistent argument that imposed constraints on them just as much as their opponents. 
Indeed, it is a standard modem complaint that the American revolutionaries only 
applied their political arguments to a reference group of land-owning white males. 
Such reference group gerrymandering allowed the revolutionaries to adjust the 
' ' " A c c o r d i n g to your own pr inc ip les , wha t are servants but s l aves?" (L ind , 1776: 156). 
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republican concept of liberty to suit their interests. Lind thought though that the 
republicans should skirt his rejection by dropping their particular conception of liberty 
rather than revising their behavior towards women and employees. 
The particular interpretation of Lind's rejection (i.e. the way to accommodate it) in 
the is"* Century was particular to IS* Century society. However, the rejection itself 
(that the position of Price and others was inconsistent) is a general statement that is as 
applicable now as ever. Political argument has a broad reference group - namely, 
anybody capable of engaging in it - and so the narrow reference group that was tacitly 
accepted in the IS"" Century is hopefully no longer acceptable given the rise of 
universal education and literacy (though there is still a way to go, especially in 
developing countries). The reference group gerrymandering in the IS"' Century 
appears to me to be one of the reasons why many thought the republican 
interpretation of freedom was just positive freedom ("the liberty of the ancients") in a 
new guise (Constant, 1988). Yet where positive theorists inject their moral point of 
view into the types of choice situation that constitutes freedom, the 18"" Century 
republicans injected their moral point of view in their choice of reference group. 18"' 
Century republicans then had inegalitarian views because of their reference group, not 
because of their particular interpretation of ' f reedom'. 
Since Lind thought the prospect of women being their own "legislatrix" absurd he 
used it to ridicule the republicans calling for American independence and found it had 
rhetorical purchase in IS"" Century Britain. If we were to accept his views on women, 
then we should reject the republican interpretation of freedom if we value freedom 
and want to remain consistent. Hopefully we no longer cave to such backward 
ridicule. Accordingly, the republican argument is a candidate linguistic glue to hold 
together a consistent and justifiable value-package. The only other rejection of the 
republican plight was verbal. In the first couple of letters he devotes considerable 
space to claiming that what the republicans see as freedom is not really freedom for 
freedom is "the absence of coercion" (Lind 1776: 67) and has nothing to do with 
independence. He used this definitional point to argue against the claims made by 
Price for the independence of America from British rule. Lind grants Price that 
liberty is perhaps a genuine claim but that the British government does not interfere 
with the colonies any more than it does with its own subjects, for it taxes its subjects 
just as much as it taxes the colonialists. This is non-substantive reasoning. If the 
term 'liberty' and 'coercion' were here eliminated, Lind does not have any rejection. 
That is, if we do not yield to his ridicule his rejection of the republican position is 
merely verbal. 
Pettit is therefore quite right to point out the ludicrous nature of Lind's arguments (not 
to mention the attitude he writes with is grating, tedious at best) and to suggest that 
we should reconsider the development of ideas he was attacking. However, in 
Republicanism Lind is used almost as a straw man for Bentham and Hobbes' position 
(especially Bentham's) with the suggestion that they shared Lind's reactionary and 
non-substantive conservatism. The danger, then, is that republican political argument 
proceeds along the lines of an equally verbal rejection that it fell victim to in the 18"" 
Century: rejecting orthodox liberal theory because of a bad interpretation of the words 
'freedom' and 'liberty'. Taking the popularity of liberal thought to be founded on 
non-substantive reasoning does not imply the tools and arguments that were 
popularised share the same conceptual poverty. 
To be sure, Hobbes had a conservative political agenda (Skinner, 2008). He wanted 
to claim that there were equal amounts of liberty under an authoritarian dictator as 
there were in republics and so defuse one of the primary objections to tyrannical rule 
(and the Stuart monarchy). Part of his strategy was to deflate the vibrations the word 
freedom had in 17"" Century Britain by re-defining it in the negative sense. He 
pacified a likely verbal disagreement pre-emptively. Likewise, Bentham did not want 
to push his utilitarianism to the radical extremes it technically should have been by 
recommending the emancipation of women and servants and so re-defined liberty 
accordingly (Pettit, 2001: 148) ' " although Waldron (2007) believes this to be an 
uncharitable reading. Bentham wanted to redefine liberty so that there was always a 
presumption against new laws - a tool he used to attack William Blackstone's 
'sloppy' legal thought - since all law violates negative liberty and hence there is a 
As Peuit (2001: 148) puts it, "Wha t is much more likely to have influenced Bentham and [William] 
Paley, however, is this. . . . If they said that the state should provide for the freedom of people in 
general and took freedom in the sense of non-domination, then they would have to argue in an 
impossibly radical vein that contemporary family and master-servant law should be overthrown; 
according to that law, after all, women and servants were inherently subject to their masters and" 
incapable of enjoying non-domination. Their solution to that problem was to give up the ideal of non-
domination in favour of the ideal of non-interference". 
constant demand for the justification of new policy. However, he could have done 
this in terms of wants rather than liberty. From these premises Hobbes and Bentham 
could deduce the conclusion they wanted: all laws coerce equally, all laws curb our 
liberty equally no matter their content, and mass social and political inequality is 
justifiable to the demands associated with the words ' f reedom' , 'liberty' and close 
cognates 
It would be ludicrous to suggest a claim against domination turned on a verbal sleight 
of hand. It would be ridiculous to pass off claims against slavery and vulnerability as 
non-substantive claims. The point though is that the liberal tradition does not pass it 
off either. Despite Hobbes and Bentham having their own agendas, it is possible to 
interpret the very same concerns of the republicans within the liberal framework. 
Concepts like Bentham's utility and Hobbes' stability are egalitarian concepts in the 
sense that they apply equally to all individuals within a reference group. Furthermore, 
the claim that other agents should track the ideas and interests of others when 
considering interference with legislation should be translatable into wants and the 
disposition for those individuals to rebel. 
8.3.1. Eliminating the Republican Idiom 
Destructive conceptual analysis strongly suggests this interpretation. Republicans 
claim freedom is the ideal the state and its institutions should be configured to 
maximise. Pettit claims this is a rival doctrine to standard liberal political thought 
since the liberal conception starts from the negative interpretation of freedom. 
However, their rival doctrine is - at least in its first instance -rival in a purely verbal 
sense. Republicans think freedom is non-domination whereas liberals think, roughly, 
freedom is non-interference. The simplest way to clear up the glob is to eliminate the 
word freedom from future analysis. We get a simpler and more substantive claim, 
R l : A feasible solution to the political problem is policy directed to the ideal of non-
domination.'^^ 
See Pettit (1997: 80) and countless other sources. 
Modem liberals influenced by either Bentham or Hobbes would probably disagree 
with R l . There is disagreement with this claim that may well be substantive but it is 
worth pushing further to investigate. I have defended the concepts of 'feasible 
solution' and 'political problem' in the introduction (1.2), so the candidates for 
elimination in R l , given 1 assume there is some plausibility to my prior analysis, are 
'policy', 'ideals' and 'non-domination'. I am going to begin by eliminating the latter 
because it is the concept republicans tend to devote the most time to defending. We 
get, 
RIA: A feasible solution to the political problem is policy directed to the ideal of 
agents without the capacity to arbitrarily interfere with other agents 
Framing the solution in terms of capacity implies that interference need not occur for 
the amount of domination in society to increase. That is, the solution to the political 
problem does not necessarily turn on the presence or absence of actual interference. 
This goes against the mantra of many modem liberals who think the key to an 
acceptable political solution is sufficient restrictions on actual (not hypothetical) 
interference obstmcting the pursuit of what individuals want.'^" The disagreement in 
Rl is therefore preserved in RIA. 
Saying an agent has the capacity to arbitrarily interfere implies that an agent can 
arbitrarily interfere. 1 do not think there is anything overly mysterious about 
capacities in RIA and so for brevity's sake I will not eliminate the word 'capacity' . 
There is a strong philosophical literature on capacities (e.g. Sen, 1993; Morriss, 2002) 
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SeePeUi t (1997:23) . 
Given the conjunctive nature of negative freedom (outlined in 8.2) some might suggest that the vast 
majonty of interference in the liberal sense is merely potential interference rather then actual. I think 
this IS just a case of philosophical overreach. If we were to refuse to pay our taxes and fail to attend 
court once the government takes out legal action against us, we might be greeted one morning by 
pohce officers and forced into a paddy wagon for incarceration. This is a paradigm case of actual 
interference. To call the demand for tax only potential interference because the interference is not 
happening then and there is to obscure the issue: / /you do not pay and you refuse to turn yourself in 
you will be forcibly incarcerated. One of the features of a dominating relation is that you do not have a 
concrete conditional of this sort: there is no binding contract between the dominator and dominated 
with respect to what the dominator can and cannot do. Strictly speaking, the use of 'potential ' and 
actual' here is slightly different to the interpretation given by modal logic, but I doubt republicans 
think they are appealing directly and strictly to modal logic with talk of potential and actual 
interference. 
and pursuing elimination of 'capacity' and cognates might yield some rephrases that I 
have failed to offer later on in this section. I cannot at present see where, but it would 
be an interesting result for republicanism in light of destructive conceptual analysis if 
there were any rephrases of this sort. 
There is something unmistakably odd though about arbitrariness and what counts as 
arbitrary interference rather than non-arbitrary interference. The OED suggests an 
arbitrary decision is a decision "based on random choice or personal whim, rather 
than any reason or system" and so we might infer a capacity for arbitrary interference 
is a capacity for interfering with another in a way that does not need to be justified 
and is independent of any institutional constraint. This seems to be exactly Pettit and 
Skinner's position. It is odd because independence from institutional and justificatory 
constraint are exactly the same conditions Bentham wanted to curb by defining 
freedom in the negative sense. By defining every law as an imposition on our 
freedom Bentham thought the burden would always be on the policymaker to justify 
their legislation in argument rather than arbitrarily choose whichever policy happens 
to be to their preference. This gives us cause for suspicion that the disagreement over 
PI really is preserved under the pressures of elimination. Despite the suspicion, a 
seemingly plausible rephrase of R I A is possible once 'arbitrary' has been eliminated, 
RIB: A feasible solution to the political problem is policy directed to the ideal of 
agents without the capacity to interfere with other agents in a way that is 
unconstrained by the interests or opinions of that agentP^ 
RIB though starts to unravel the republican position as perhaps not the genuine 
alternative to orthodox liberal theory its proponents would have us believe. We can 
take RIB on face value and grind it back down to modem liberalism. That is, we can 
deny that R I B preserves the disagreement profile of R1 and possibly also RIA . 
Capitalists might be of the opinion (trumpeted by their lobby groups) that taxation 
proportionate to income is justified, but that they should be exempted from paying 
because their services are more valuable because governments need their investment 
for economic growth. A low tax rate for capitalists is obviously in the capitalists' 
interests and it accords with their opinions, so by RIB the capacity for interference to 
The precise phrase is "without reference to the interests, or the opinions, of those affected" (Pettit, 
1997: 55). 
raise that tax limit would be a capacity that runs against a solution to the political 
problem. The republican could still stress the consequential (Pettit. 1997: 81) 
character of their policy directives such that the decision to tax capitalists is justified 
because it is an efficient tradeoff towards the solution even though it violates the ideal 
with respect to particular policy. Capitalists after all have sizeable capacities to 
interfere with other agents in ways that are unconstrained by the interests and 
opinions of those agents. Nevertheless this just seems to consequential considerations 
of modem liberalism. For example, Bentham primary concern was getting the 
tradeoff between legal interference and non-interference overall right. Having utility 
or wants as a political justification's bottom line, for example, seems to make it 
impossible not to consider an agent's interests and opinions during justification. 
Rigorous considerations of stability must also attend to the preferences, interests and 
opinions of individuals in order to consider the likelihood of certain policies 
destabilising patterns of individual behaviour. Capacities for individuals to interfere 
with others will therefore be central to the liberal calculation as well.'^^ 
On a closer reading though it appears Pettit adds a qualifier to RIB that perhaps 
preserves the disagreement profile of R l . He adds that the interests and opinions 
must be shared for them to be genuine candidates to constrain policy decisions. 
RIC ... actions directed to the ideal of agents without the capacity to interfere with 
other agents in a way that is unconstrained by the shared interests and opinions of 
that agent . '" 
So by RIC non-arbitrary interference (in terms of RIA) with an individual only tracks 
some of the individual's interests. This reading is evident in the following passage, 
I may have an interest in the state imposing certain taxes or in punishing eeitain offenders But I 
may still not want the state to impose taxes on me - 1 may want to be an e x c e p t i o n - o r I may think 
that I ought not to be punished in the appropriate manner , even though I have been convicted of an 
offence. In such a case, my relevant interests and ideas will be those that are shared in c o m m o n with 
others, not those that treat me as exceptional, since the state is meant to serve others as well as me And 
so m these cases the mterference of the state in taxing or punishing me will not be conducted on an 
arbitrary basis and will not represent domination. (Pettit, 1997: 55-56). 
Kramer (2008) has argued that most (if not all) of the republican concerns can be translated into 
concerns for somebody who only admits a negative interpretation. 
' " S e e Pettit (1997: 56). 
The question is begged then as to which interests and opinions are relevant. An 
answer requires a parallel elimination of the term 'shared' and a rephrase. There is no 
rephrase that immediately comes to (my) mind, so an investigation of the question is 
the prudent approach to investigate whether there is reason for my inability. 
Republicans seem to offer a roughly Kantian answer. A condition of our interests and 
opinions being shared is that they can be universalised into a general law. Such a law 
cannot treat my social groups, my loved/admired/valued others, or myself as 
exceptional since it must be possible to treat everybody else in like fashion for such a 
law to come up to scratch. Say I had an opinion or interest that I should have endless 
riches and claimed that I was dominated to the extent that multiple social agents 
(various financial institutions, say) have the capacity to interfere with me in a way 
that does not track this interest and opinion of mine. Republicans would only 
recognise my situation as problematic if the state could equally respect the interest of 
every other individual in its jurisdiction that also had an interest in endless riches. Of 
course though endless riches cannot be universalised since economies do not work 
that way. Being rich is a relative phenomenon. If the state printed trillions of bank 
notes to make everybody a millionaire, the price of goods would inflate and 
everybody's purchasing power would stand still (assuming the bank notes were 
distributed equally) apart from a few minor jolts in consumer behaviour. The interest 
to be endlessly wealthy is not shared because others do not have an interest that you 
should be rich even if they are of the opinion that they should be rich. The concern 
of the republican then becomes which interests can and cannot be shared by 
individuals. 
Can individuals share an interest in republican freedom? The republican must surely 
answer 'yes ' . The answer in light of destructive conceptual analysis, however, is 
surprisingly no. The republican cannot claim that individuals share an interest to be 
free from domination since we have already eliminated the terms ' f reedom' , ' f ree ' 
and 'domination'. This indicates that there is no non-tautological rephrase to 
substitute the above presentation of the question. We could ignore the dictates of 
destructive conceptual analysis by resetting and rephrase the question, eliminating 
' f reedom', 'domination' , 'arbitrary', etc. However, we would simply follow the exact 
same path of elimination that has (and here is the rub) already been taken in this 
section. We would bottom out once again at a rephrase in terms of 'shared opinions' 
and 'shared interests' or substitutable synonyms. As Pettit (1997: 56) puts it, 
"What is required for non-arbitrary state power . . . is that the power be exercised in a way that t racks, 
not the power-holder 's personal welfare or world-view, but rather the welfare and world-view of the 
public. The acts of interference perpetuated by the state must be triggered by the shared interests of 
those affected under an interpretation of what those interests require that is shared, at least at the 
procedural level, by those affected." 
A procedure for accommodating different world-views and interests though is 
precisely what we employed the republican ideal of freedom to address. We do not 
want to be led in a circle back to our initial question. This demonstrates one of the 
more important features of destructive conceptual analysis. It exposes circularity and 
renders it unacceptable in the process of justification. I suppose the question 'can 
individuals share an interest or opinion concerning their sharing of interests or 
opinions' does not scream tautology on first read. For example, an individual might 
have an interest to have better informed opinions and interests in the future, which 
seems to be an implication of the rephrase. However, this would require the qualifier 
'future': i.e. 'can individuals share an interest or opinion concerning their sharing 
future interests or opinions'. Yet this is not how the question has been rephrased and 
it would be a mistake to rephrase it so. Republicanism is concerned with current 
interests and opinions just as much - if not more so - than future possible interests 
and opinions. One might also claim that an individual might have opinions about 
their opinions. For instance, 'My opinions on art are not founded on the strictest of 
evidence' is itself an opinion. We can have certain opinions about certain other 
opinions but this again requires additional qualifiers: 'certain' and 'other'. I do not 
think it would adequately capture the rephrase. The question therefore is a tautology 
and does not add anything to conversation or argument. This explains why a rephrase 
of RIC was so difficult once the word 'shared' (and synonyms) had been eliminated. 
Republicanism leads to an unacceptable circularity when it tries to set itself up as a 
genuine rival to liberal orthodoxy. 
Working out the interests and opinions that we share looks suspiciously like the 
political problem done over (the political problem beta) An explicit account of these 
interests and a justification of them is the job for pohtical theory. As Pettit (1997: 56) 
again puts it, we work out whether an idea is an appropriate guide for state action by 
an operational test, namely, "recourse to public discussion in which people may speak 
for themselves and for the groups to which they belong... People must find a higher-
level consensus about procedures". There are very few ways of describing such 
discussion other than by describing it as political argument. Yet the point to 
appealing to republicanism in political argument is to make steps towards solving the 
problem (Rl ) and making some progress in political argument, not to be led in one 
big circle back to your starting point. 1 see no way of acceptably rephrasing R I C 
once the term 'shared' has been eliminated. Until somebody can provide a rephrase 
to prove me wrong 1 think this conclusion will hold. 
8.3.2 Weak and Strong Republicanism 
Republicanism is pushed into a comer by destructive conceptual analysis. If it does 
not conceptually add anything to say freedom as non-domination concerns the shared 
interests and opinions of individuals, what is the point of making republican claims? 
One deflationary answer is that the republican idiom is a way of restating the common 
opinion of the day and a suggestion for a way to institutionalise that opinion. Perhaps 
the revolutionaries used the idiom to capture the common opinion among the 
colonists (in America) and the proletariat (in France), whereas those wishing to 
institutionalise the strive for equality for disadvantaged groups considered 
disadvantaged in modem society use it as a coherent linguistic glue to state their 
claims. Such an answer does not suggest abandoning the republican idiom - on the 
contrary, it is a clear and general idiom to state one's claim - just that it is not a 
complete idiom to defend the institutionalisation of the common opinion of the day in 
argument and to subject that opinion to scrutiny. It certainly should not exclude other 
interpretations since it does not provide arguers with resources to check (i.e. be in a 
position to falsify) their interpretation of what the common opinion happens to be. 1 
certainly share the bundle of views Pettit strings together with his interpretation of 
freedom, but that does not mean the interpretation is well equipped to change the 
minds of those who do not; nor indeed to propose acceptable institutions to govern 
those who do not. 
Since Pettit's position maintains the republican interpretation should replace the 
negative interpretation of freedom, there is the implication that we cannot use the 
negative interpretation of freedom for 'second round' justifications of solutions to the 
political problem. This excludes an attractive proposal by Jeremy Waldron (2007) to 
treat republicanism as a molecular position, with the negative interpretation of 
freedom being one of its constitutive atoms. This is a role the negative interpretation 
might play for a variety of other molecular positions (Bentham's utilitarianism and 
Hobbesian realism among them.) Isaiah Berlin for example famously advocated the 
negative interpretation where freedom is "simply the area within which a man can act 
unobstructed by others" (1969: 122). While not explicit, Berlin seems to think such 
absence of obstruction is not a good in itself - obstructions can often function for an 
individual's own good - but a good in so far as a certain minimum area of non-
interference is secured, 
"There ought to exist a certain minimum area of personal freedom which must on no account be 
violated; for if it is overstepped, the individual will find himself in an area too narrow even for that 
minimum development of his natural faculties which alone makes it possible to pursue, and even to 
conceive, the various ends which men hold good or right or sacred. . . . We must preserve a minimum 
area of our personal freedom if we are not to "degrade or deny our nature" (Berlin, 1969: 124-6). 
So a certain minimum quantity of free action must be secured if an individual is to be 
considered to be in a normatively tolerable position - i.e. a 'free person'. This 
account of 'free person' is Berlin's molecule, with his negative interpretation of free 
action comprising an atom in its construction. By arguing that republican freedom is 
a strict alternative to negative freedom, Pettit rules out using negative freedom as an 
atom within the republican molecule. 
Yet 'free action' as action unobstructed by others is useful to make sense of shared 
interests and opinions. As Bentham put it, every law will obstruct some set of wants 
and so the burden is on the policy-maker to justify that law. We might make the 
reasonable assumption that everybody shares an interest that any new law needs 
justification - whether that is to the public, the parliament or in a committee. Berlin's 
suggestion that everybody has a minimum area of negative liberty also seems to be a 
shared or universalisable interest (with tort law working out the practicalities of 
securing this minimum). In fact, we can endorse a concern for domination by 
Berlin's molecule: an agent with the capacity to interfere with others in a way that 
violates anybody's minimum liberty is a dominating agent. 
We might think of negative liberty then as being an atomic element of the molecular 
account of republicanism rather than a competing value. The work of Bentham and 
Hobbes (especially Hobbes' justification of the state as a shared interest of all) is 
therefore complementary to Pettit's program. Waldron bristles at the reductivism of 
the Cambridge School approach to political texts, which bullies "students into treating 
works of political philosophy as nothing but politically motivated pamphlets, and into 
treating analytic or philosophical argument as nothing more than ad hoc and 
politically motivated rhetorical maneuvers" (Waldron, 2007: 148). Whether or not 
this bristling is warranted, this approach certainly makes it easier to pass off (at first 
glance) sound arguments as ill-willed rhetoric because of the perverse conclusions 
they entail and to drop any commitments to reasonable rejection (see 5.2). This is one 
of the implications of treating the republican interpretation of freedom as a rival 
language or discourse of legitimation (see Pettit, 1997: 2). Describing the history of 
the republican interpretation of the word ' freedom' and identifying an 
accommodation of a reasonable rejection that was particular to the time and place, but 
would have been accommodated differently in present-day contexts, says nothing 
about the status of current political arguments (again see 5.2). It certainly does not 
imply that we should turn back the clock, accommodate the rejection according to our 
modem intuitions, and start afresh. 
Any argument we can reasonably reject in the republican tradition we can also 
reasonably reject in the liberal. If the republican has to consider the whole trope of 
liberal theory to make their arguments, and if a solution can be found in terms of 
liberal theory, then parsimony would have us interpret the word 'freedom' in the 
negative sense rather than pay much philosophical attention to the republican 
interpretation. What is more, republicanism does not entail substantive equality as 
Pettit suggests; the concept that does the legwork for equality is 'shared interests' and 
maybe 'shared opinions' and this is ideally filled out by standard liberal theory. Why 
condemn the capacity of an agent revoking another agent's minimum of free action 
when you can condemn the revocation of the minimum of free action itself, or at least 
the possibility of such revocation. Why condemn the capacity of an agent to interfere 
" " The language of rights therefore seems to be suited to molecular constructions of what it is to be a 
' free person' rather than atomic descriptions of what constitutes ' f ree action". 
with another agent unjustly instead of condemning the possibility of injustice itself? 
The sceptical answer is that it puts the justification of such a minimum of free action 
to one side, with a view to instituting whatever the theorist intuitively thinks is unjust. 
Having said this, I think of myself as subscribing to Republican philosophy. I think 
the claim of domination is important for the state to address and possibly the best way 
to express one's grievances, but I do not think that claim should exclude justification 
in terms such as negative freedom and justice. It should not set itself up as a rival 
language or discourse of legitimation to liberalism (as suggested in Pettit, 1997: 1-
13). My position therefore might be called 'weak republicanism' rather than 'strong 
republicanism'. Strong republicanism holds out hopes that freedom as non-
domination is the sole value policymakers need (and perhaps should) use to justify 
their policy (Pettit, 1997: 80, Skinner, 1998.) '" Superficial or weak republicanism on 
the other hand simply holds that a claim of domination is a serious one that always 
demands justification whatever idiom might be used to do it. It does not make the 
argument that the state need only be concerned with the aggregation of non-
domination, only that the state needs to justify the existence of domination. A 
superficial republican might wish to justify it by way of the Rawlsian difference 
principle, a utilitarian calculus, or a theory of exploitation without an exclusive 
adherence to justifications solely in terms of the value of freedom or liberty. What 
they need to do, however, is justify it consistently. 
8.4 Anarchy, State and Utopia 
The typical policy divisions involved in the debate over the trade-offs between liberty 
and equality are those concerning taxation and the redistribution of resources. 
Republicanism suggests there is no trade-off because redistribution does not violate 
freedom if it is done in a non-arbitrary way and even that freedom often demands 
such redistribution. However, the assumption of the standard left/right-wing divide is 
'loJ^^fo"'^''"''''''''"" "Liberty is the Chiefest Good of Civil Society" (Gwyn, lyoSi oo). 
that there is such a trade-off.'^® I take Robert Nozick's book Anarchy, State and 
Utopia as the classic right-wing attack on Rawlsian policies of redistribution.'^^ 
Nozick's book has been controversial ever since its publication with conclusions 
thought by some to re-articulate "the prejudices of the average owner of a filling 
station in a small town in the Midwest who enjoys grousing about paying taxes and 
having to contribute to 'welfare scroungers' and who regards as wicked any attempts 
to interfere with contracts, in the interests, for example, of equal opportunity or anti-
discrimination... The only thing that is new is that these views are being expressed by 
someone who is a Professor of Philosophy at Harvard" (Barry, 1975: 331). In other 
words, it was a bad, old argument disguised by new definitions and jingoism. Barry 
conceded that his was an emotional response, possibly conditioned by his left-wing 
inclinations, but that in such a case it is the only intellectually honest reaction (1975: 
332).' '^ I disagree. Destructive conceptual analysis is an additional intellectual 
response that is equally as honest and, what is more, not itself immune to rational 
criticism. The question of how Nozick might claim anything more than a subjective 
'Midwestern' whine against Rawls without using his tailored vocabulary is begged 
under the pressures of elimination. My hypothesis (possibly likewise conditioned by 
a ' leftward inclination') is that he cannot. The hypothesis amounts to the claim that 
the origin of the debate was an academic conjuring trick for a reactionary political 
position that had a steady history of reasonable rejection in academic circles ever 
since the debates over the Elizabethan Poor Laws. 
Nozick argues for a minimal state in order to protect individual liberty. There are 
"two noteworthy implications", one "that the state may not use its coercive apparatus 
for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others" and two, the state may not use 
its apparatus "in order to prohibit activities to people for their own good or 
protection" (1974: ix). The first implication clearly endorses a version of the 
incompatibility thesis: a government has no justified argument for remedying 
It almost goes without saying that left-wingers advocate a higher degree of equality at the expense 
of freedom and right-wingers a higher degree of freedom at the expense of equality. 
Nozick was emphatic in the Preface that the book was not a political tract, merely a philosophical 
exercise. However, many of his philosophical ideas are now used in political tracts, so as the literature 
currently stands (and perhaps to Nozick's chagrin), the ideas have strong political implications and 
must be interpreted as such. 
Having said that, Barry draws out some counter-intuitive logical conclusions to Nozick's position 
that surely cannot be considered purely 'emotional ' . 
inequalities in resources because such policy can never be justified over concerns for 
the freedom of individuals. There is a trade-off between the two values and freedom 
wins out in the game of justification. If we treat the words ' f reedom' and 'coercion' 
in the sacrosanct way Barry accuses Nozick of then this is certainly true: however we 
need not. 
Nozick replaces the emphasis on the notion of a Rawlsian time-slice 'distribution' 
with that of a 'holding' and the suggestion that justice is whatever one is entitled to 
'hold' . In other words, there is no justification for any coercive removal of holdings 
through something like taxation'^' in the name of equality and/or most other values. 
One's freedom or liberty is violated by the coercive removal of one's holdings (see 
for e.g. Nozick, 1974: 160-164). The terms 'Liberty' and 'Freedom' in Anarchy, 
State and Utopia are therefore interpreted in a negative and distributive sense. The 
government concerned with distribution must be constrained by preserving the 
absence of such coercion since there is no reasonable justification (Nozick argues) for 
flouting such a constraint. 
So long as one's holdings have a 'historical shadow' of just transactions and 
appropriations, then one is entitled to their holdings by Nozick's theory of justice. 
The argument proceeds from the idea that a series of just steps from an initial just 
distribution must lead to an equally just outcome. If agents i and j transfer holdings 
between them in a non-coercive way, then that transfer is just, and if ; and / s initial 
holdings were also acquired in a like-manner, then their overall holdings might also 
be considered just. If all holdings of all individuals have been justly acquired, then 
that society might also be considered a just one. The complication of how holdings 
are originally acquired is treated in a fashion closely resembling Locke's account in 
Two Treatise of Government. Locke's (1821: 210) proviso is that there must be 
"enough and as good left in common for others" for somebody to justly acquire a 
holding. That is, if an individual - any individual - loses the opportunity to improve 
their situation through the use of an object by a particular appropriation of that object 
into a private holding, then such an appropriation is not a just one (Nozick, 1974: 
176). It is still a just acquisition though if all the individual loses is an opportunity to 
As Nozick puts it, "Taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced labor" (1974: 169). 
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appropriate that particular object themselves and where their situation (without the 
consideration of appropriating the object ever popping into their mind) is made no 
worse. So appropriating all of a particular substance (a town's water supply, say) 
either by buying up everybody's stake in it or laying an initial claim to it all would 
violate the proviso for just acquisition. However, if a medical researcher synthesised 
a new substance that would save millions of lives but refused to sell it, such a refusal 
does not make anybody worse off than they would have otherwise been and therefore 
such acquisition is just by Nozick's theory. Patents are a tricky complication - since 
they might deprive individuals who independently discover already patented 
inventions from owning the invention and distributing it as they see fit - which 
Nozick (1974: 182) tentatively gets around by suggesting strict time limits for patents. 
Concerns of physical protection and contract security under such a system of 
entitlement is tied off in the first section of Anarchy, State and Utopia with the 
description of the state of nature and a description of the protection agencies that 
would supposedly arise in it. From the state of nature, a state would naturally arise 
without anybody necessarily trying to bring it about and importantly {pace anarchists) 
without the violation of anybody's rights. Individuals would enlist with protection 
agencies so that if another individual or group of individuals targeted them, the 
agency would protect them. Each agency would have to draw up a schedule of rules 
to arbitrate between members who happen to get into conflict with one another since a 
policy of non-intervention is unsustainable (Nozick, 1974: 13). Furthermore, to save 
certain members from having to aid the bad eggs within the agency who aggressively 
pick fights and make unreciprocated demands for war efforts of other members, the 
agency must extend their rules to cover questions of intervention and non-intervention 
with other parties. Such rules begin to look like a legal system of a proto-state. A 
virtual monopoly in certain geographic areas is the result of competition between 
agencies, with individuals moving geographically towards their preference (Nozick, 
1974: 16-17). The only difference between such protective agencies and the state as 
we typically think of it is that the state punishes anyone who uses force without its 
permission, while protective agencies cannot make such announcements (Nozick, 
1974: 24). 
Nozick proposes an intuition pump to overcome any nagging egalitarian doubts. He 
encourages the reader to think up their ideal distribution of resources in a society and 
to call it Di. This might look something like equal resources for each individual or 
resources distributed according to certain qualities. Once distributed, individuals are 
able to transfer their resources as they see fit. It would defeat the point of holdings to 
suggest they cannot be transferred in some respect for some purpose. Say Wilt 
Chamberlain wants to charge each ticket holder an additional 25c to watch him play 
basketball, all the fans cheerfully pay Chamberlain 25c to watch him play from their 
holdings allotted to them in Di and go home happy that it was 25c well spent. If a 
million fans went through the turnstiles for the season. Chamberlain would have a 
season's salary of $250,000. Assume that no other transactions took place in the 
season. We now have a new distribution where a bunch of fans are down 25c and 
Chamberlain is up $250,000 - call this Dz, 
"If D| was a just distribution, and people voluntarily moved from it to D2, transferring parts of 
their shares they were given under D, (what was it for if not to do something with?), isn't D2 
also just? If the people were entitled to dispose of the resources to which they were entitled 
(under D|) , didn't this include their being entitled to give it to, or exchange it with. Wilt 
Chamberlain? Can anyone else complain on grounds of justice?" 
(1974: 161). 
The intuition is supposed to bring home the point that distributional values cannot be 
"continuously realized without continuous interference with people's lives" (1974: 
163). I might have a preference for a certain distribution Di but given individuals 
choose to act in various and diverse ways, I would have to constantly interfere in 
order to maintain Di. Any egalitarian pattern in distribution is "overtumable by the 
voluntary actions of individual persons over time" (1974: 164). Nozick thought that 
such distributional patterns were always - as a matter of principle - unstable, or too 
weak to satisfy. 
He argues the literature on distributive justice had rested on a cheap and dogmatic 
victory. The word 'distributional' in distributional justice is not neutral in its ordinary 
sense since it pays no attention to the historical 'how' in 'who gets what, when and 
how?' , 
"The situation is not one of something's getting made, and there being an open question of who is to 
get It. Thmgs come mto the world already attached to people having entitlements over them. . . those 
who start afresh [from a simple conception of distribution] treat objects as if they appeared from 
nowhere, out of nothing" (1974: 160). 
It is possible to talk of distributional concerns, of course, but only in so far as it is the 
same sort of concern we have for the distribution of potential mates for procreation in 
society (1974: 150). There is no central distribution where one sovereign is entitled to 
control all the resources and dole them out as they see fit, just as much as there is no 
sovereign doling out the ratio of males to females or their relative attractiveness. 
Instead, individuals get things from other individuals "as an exchange for something, 
or as a gift" (1974: 149). We are inclined to talk of distribution in this non-neutral''*" 
way presumably because of the Hobbesian fictions like the state and the sovereign 
building in the assumption that there is a group of individuals - even if those 
individuals do not themselves realise it - who ultimately control the distribution of all 
resources. This assumption is sometimes thought of as a fiction but not a lie: 
providing everybody adheres to the belief that there is such an authority, then there is 
such an authority in a theoretically real sense (see Runciman, 1997). 
All Nozick seems to do though is propose an alternate fiction, which is equally as 
arbitrary. The freedom or right to do what one wants with their holding is an 
implication from the notion of a holding. For example, we cannot claim object O is a 
holding for individual i if the state or any other agent has complete control over how 
it is to be used. Under such an arrangement i is not free and does not have a right to 
do what they want with O. The state might need individual i to keep the object O (say 
O is food stuff) temporarily in her larder for safekeeping. Under such an arrangement 
it is not f s resource to use as i pleases and so it is difficult to say it is f s holding. 
That is, given i is not free to use O as she chooses because of some interfering agent 
(the government), O does not count as i's holding. Yet the fact that object O is not i 's 
holding is not a natural, brute fact about the world. If O was going to be anyone's in a 
brute sense, then surely it would be ;"s for i has ease of access to O - it is, after all, 
just a few feet away in her larder. That there is some agency (the government) 
threatening her if she uses it in a certain way (in my example, consuming it or giving 
it to her family or friends to consume) does not necessarily negate it as hers in the 
It is non-neutral because it presupposes redistribution. If we consider political theory in this way 
we already assume there needs to be a redistribution in some way. At least, this is my reading of 
Nozick. 
brute sense. In many countries where gun ownership is legal there are strict 
conditions on when and where the gun is to be fired, with the threat of sanction if 
these conditions are not met. Yet we still maintain that the gun is somebody's 
holding and part of its worth is that it could be fired if things got dangerous, no matter 
the legality. The idea of a holding is a fiction that human beings have created for 
some outcome just as much as the state is. 
Why replace the fiction of the state or sovereign having control over distribution with 
that of an individual having holdings except for making attempts at redistribution 
unjustifiable by default? G.A. Cohen (2006a) suggests there is just as much reason to 
assume that natural resources were jointly owned in the state of nature as there was 
reason to assume nothing was owned with individuals originally acquiring their 
holdings from nature's unclaimed bounty. If the rights we have to our current 
property stock are stronger than any state claim for redistribution because such 
redistribution would be tantamount to theft, why was the original privatisation of 
natural resources not theft in the first place? As Cohen (2006a: 418) puts it, "In the 
prehistory of anything that is now private property there was at least one moment at 
which something privately unowned was taken into private ownership". A resource 
that is privately unowned does not imply it is publicly unowned. 
8.4.1 Nozick Under the Pressures of Elimination 
Let me try then to state Nozick's position to analyse it conceptually. 
(Nl) It is always coercive to get an individual ; to aid another individual ; against f s 
will by transferring a sum of ;"s holdings to j. 
(N2) It is coercive because it restricts i 's right and freedom to use their holdings as 
they want, a right and freedom they have prior to any political association, and a right 
and freedom that frame the choices that give rise (through an invisible hand 
explanation) to the proto-state. 
(N3) Such holdings are void if they were coercively acquired at some point in their 
history or m a way that violates the Lockean 'good enough' proviso. 
Coercion functions as the trump term in N l , N2, and N3. Barry (1975: 332) 
suggested it was here that Nozick won his cheap verbal victory by proving taxation is 
a form of coercion simply by defining taxation as coercion. To be fair to Nozick's 
earlier work on coercion (1969) though 1 think the use of it in N l , N2 and N3 should 
be qualified as 'morally impermissible coercion'. With this move Barry's definitional 
complaint begins to look misplaced. This misplacement is obvious in light of 
destructive conceptual analysis because 1 think it is possible to preserve agreement 
profiles when 'coercion' is eliminated from N l , N2 and N3 and so it is not Nozick's 
definition of coercion that is the cheap one. Since coercion functions as a trump term 
for Nozick the phrase 'taxation is coercion' is perfectly substantive. It can be 
rephrased as the strong claim that taxation (if an individual does not want to be taxed) 
has no justification. Anarchy, State and Utopia is a book devoted to arguing this 
negative thesis in light of an analysis of holdings (i.e. private property), rights and 
freedom. If Nozick's victories are nothing more than verbal sleights of hand then 
non-substantive reasoning must be located in the analysis of these three terms rather 
than with his thesis that taxation is coercion. 
So if we are to be charitable and deflect Barry's charge the above premises must be 
rephrased with the simple substitution of 'coercive' for 'unjustifiable', 
(NIA) It is always unjustifiable to get an individual i to aid another individual j 
against i's will by transferring a sum of f s holdings to 
(N2A) It is unjustifiable because it restricts f s right and freedom to use their holdings 
as they want, a right and freedom they have prior to any political association, and a 
right and freedom that frame the choices that give rise (through an invisible hand 
explanation) to the proto-state.'"*^ 
(N3A) Such holdings are void if they were unjustifiably acquired at some point in 
their history or in a way that violates the Lockean 'good enough' proviso. 
Coercion was substituted for 'unjustifiable' rather than 'unjustified' since Nozick's 
claim is not only that there is currently no justification but also that there can be no 
justification. So we have the strong claim that the state has no coherent argument to 
"" See Nozick (1974: ix). 
See Nozick (1974: 13,20). 
' " ' S e e Nozick (1974: 176). 
justify why a dissenting individual should ever forgo any of their holdings in order for 
the state to redistribute for the aid of others. 
Where I think our ability to rephrase the argument begins to wane (as hinted in the 
previous section) is in the reference to a holding. For example, resources cannot be 
substituted in Nl , N2 and N3 for Nozick's interpretation of a holding. John Harsanyi 
(1962a) took a resource to refer to an item that can be measured by its utility in 
covering costs involved with social power. As such, it has a strong conceptual role in 
both economics and political science and if 'holdings' could be substituted for it then 
Nozick's arguments would have a lot of purchase. Yet it cannot. Money is a resource 
in so far as I can use it to offer an agent reward for some action A. By offering the 
agent money I change their incentive structure with respect to A. Perhaps I could also 
threaten the agent with a punishment for not performing A and so alter the agent's 
incentive structure again, this time negatively. Resources would once again be 
needed to cover the costs for enacting that punishment. While not going so far as to 
equate power with resources, Harsanyi suggested resources could be used to measure 
power. However, the same cannot be said for holdings or property. 
Having a resource to exercise social power does not necessarily exclude others from 
using that resource. Public goods along with non-material goods (like reputation) are 
all resources that can cover costs. An apple that has fallen from a tree on public 
property is just as much my resource to back up a threat to chuck it at my friend's 
head as it is a resource for my friend to threaten to chuck it at mine. Exclusion, 
however, is in-built into Nozick's interpretations of holdings, property and ownership 
The aggregate freedom of others is restricted because the law obstructs them in 
utilising appropriated holdings that are not their own. The law is therefore 
constitutive of a holding. I think we can rephrase NIA and N2A, then, in terms of 
resources providing the resources are licensed to the individual by law, 
(NIB) It is always unjustifiable to get an individual i to aid another individual j 
against f s will by transferring a sum of resources that are licensed to i by the law to ; 
(N2B) It is unjustifiable because it restricts /'s right and freedom to use resources that 
are licensed to them by law as they want, a right and freedom they have prior to any 
political association, and a right and freedom that frame the choices that give rise 
(through an invisible hand explanation) to the proto-state. 
N2B should strike the reader as contradictory unless the law that is constitutive of 
one 's holdings is considered a natural law, which is to say it is not associated with any 
political association. This is a long shot and as mentioned there is just as much reason 
to think that natural resources are communal property in the state of nature as there is 
to think of them as unowned artifacts ready for appropriation. Thinking of them as 
unowned in a natural sense is not in itself contradictory though and so if we update 
N2B to qualify every reference to law and legality as a reference to natural law and 
natural legality, then N2C is acceptable. 
(N2C) It is unjustifiable because it restricts i's right and freedom to use resources that 
are licensed to them by natural law as they want, a right and freedom they have prior 
to any political association, and an ability that frames the choices that give rise 
(through an invisible hand explanation) to the proto-state. 
As we shall see though N2C cannot be rephrased when analysis turns to the terms 
'right' and ' f reedom' . 
This natural law account of holdings and property is (at least for secular political 
theorists) a bitter pill to swallow. N2C unravels into partiality once we eliminate the 
terms ' f reedom' and 'right ' . A superficially plausible rephrase is N2D, 
(N2D) It is unjustifiable because it restricts f s ability to use resources that are 
licensed to them by natural law as they want, an ability they have prior to any 
political association, and an ability that frames the choices that give rise (through an 
invisible hand explanation) to the proto-state.'"*^ 
Substituting rights and freedoms for ability does not capture the acceptance profile of 
N2C. N2D cannot explain what is so objectionable about the violation of natural 
law's license without appealing to either intuition or a conception of the good. They 
have to say something like 'We should not violate the natural law because that 's that 
good thing to do! ' By depending on such an appeal, we hit bedrock. That the arguer 
thinks the violation of natural law is bad according to their conception of the good 
Nozick refers to the natural law as a salient factor in the second chapter of Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia. 
The introduction of the terminology of resources here is, like my introduction of the term 
'competition' in the previous chapter, entirely my own. 1 am unaware of any specific instances the 
terminology was used by Nozick himself. 
isn't an acceptable reason for rejecting taxation or any sort of redistribution in 
political argument. I know of no rephrase or additional clause to Nozick's argument 
that can avoid this conclusion. Of course if there were such a rephrase or clause the 
above analysis would be falsified, which is to say it is fallible. However, I think it is 
safe to say that a particular conception of the good - one we need not hold and need 
not accept on pain of inconsistency - that seems reasonable only because of linguistic 
trickery the inclusion of words like 'coercion', ' f reedom' , 'right' and 'holdings' has 
on argument. 
Teasing out the dependence certain political arguments have on particular conceptions 
of the good is evidence that such arguments should be discarded. The above 
destructive conceptual analysis demonstrates that N l , N2 and N3 depend on a certain 
context-set where defective versions cannot be repaired (by conceptual analysis or 
fact giving) with mechanisms endogenous to the contract-situation. Nozikeans might 
cry afoul that I have used a particular account of social contract theory to make the 
case. I have, but I think the account is so weak (see 1.5.1) that Nozikeans would lose 
any kind of analytical power if they denied it. 
The arguments in Anarchy, State and Utopia are still trumpeted by right-wing 
ideologues as a philosophically coherent position. After Nozick's death in 2002 The 
Telegraph wrote that "It is no exaggeration to say that Nozick, more than anyone else, 
embodied the new libertarian Zeitgeist which, after generations of statist welfarism 
from Roosevelt's New Deal to Kennedy, Johnson and Carter, ushered in the era of 
Reagan and Bush, pere etfils." More needs to be done to first point out that the 
position is not impartial, and that Nozick himself changed his mind (Barry, 1996; 
Metcalf, 2011). It is perhaps a little harsh to apply a retort (Keynes, 1931: 394) 
directed at Hayek to Anarchy, State and Utopia but it is a decent summary of my 
position: the book is "an extraordinary example of how, starting with a mistake, a 
remorseless logician can end up in Bedlam." 
8 S Egalitarianism From Self-Ownership 
Two decades after his review of Anarchy, State and Utopia Barry squared the ledger 
by attacking an egalitarian response to the thesis of self-ownership. The response was 
G.A. Cohen's in his book Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (1995) where he 
criticised the presumption among the so-called 'September Group' - also known as 
the 'non-bullshit Marxists' - that the capitalist robbing the worker of the fruits of the 
worker's labour was unjustifiable. He thought this presumption, along with a few 
other egalitarian premises, tacitly relied on the thesis of self-ownership. He thought 
liberty as self-ownership could be spun to entail egalitarian outcomes as much as non-
egalitarian outcomes. Accordingly, taking self-ownership seriously did not entail the 
incompatibility thesis. 
While Barry and Cohen both disagreed with the thesis, they disagreed even more 
forcefully with each other. Consistent with his review of Nozick, Barry thought the 
thesis of self-ownership was a linguistic conjuring trick undeserving of academic 
response. He said, "[W]hatever arguments might be made in [support of 
egalitarianism] cannot include the claim that it can be deduced from self-ownership, 
because self-ownership is an artefact of linguistic confusion" (Barry, 1996). Cohen, 
on the other hand, thought that the thesis was a substantive one and that if it could be 
inferred from certain brands of Marxism and egalitarianism, then those brands need 
revision. It is important to subject this disagreement to the pressures of elimination 
since when the opponents of ideologues cannot agree it is a boon for the ideologues. 
G.A. Cohen's book directly targets Nozick's argument that "non-contractual 
obligations to serve other people" like taxation are illegitimate because they violate 
the principle of self-ownership (Cohen, 1995: 230). He takes the concept of 'self-
ownership' as a substantive conceptual prong in the "vernacular thought-complex 
which has helped to power the rightward political shift of the past quarter-century" 
(Cohen, 1996) alongside the belief that market economies achieve efficiency.'"*® He 
thought that the anti-redistribution position could be reasonably rejected but in doing 
Given market socialists share the belief in marlcet outcomes and so it is the thesis of self-ownership 
that Cohen thinks distinguishes the thought-complex with the affirmation of the right to be selfish. 
so, consistency demands rejecting significant brands of egalitarianism as well 
including the sort advocated by Barry himself in Culture and Equality (2001). 
The question then is whether the egalitarian thought-complex unravels into the same 
sort of partiality as Nozick's did when subjected to the pressures of elimination. Can 
we rephrase Cohen's interpretation of the egalitarian position once we eliminate the 
terms with which the self-ownership thesis is typically described? If we can and there 
is still something of substance resembling Nozick's partiality, then Barry's argument 
is again misplaced. 
Cohen suggests that the implication that taxation is illegitimate can be derived from 
standard accounts of Marxism and egalitarianism because of tacit acceptance of the 
thesis of self-ownership. Can we eliminate the terms typically used to describe the 
thesis of self-ownership and rephrase in a way that preserves the implication that 
taxation is illegitimate? Cohen thinks the illegitimacy of taxation is an implication 
from the presumption of capitalist exploitation, 
M l : Capitalists exploit workers by stealing their labour-power because the 
worker owns their labour-power."*^ 
The thesis of self-ownership is supposedly necessary in M1 to cash out the notion of 
exploitation and the charge against capitalists. Cohen (1995: 147) thinks the thesis 
"undergirds the [standard] Marxist case for the proposition that the capitalist relationship is 
inherently exploitative. The underlying idea is that a person should be sovereign with respect 
to what he will do with his energies. He should not deploy them under another person's 
orders in the manner of a slave and have part or all of his product taken from him for nothing 
in return." 
In so far as individuals are taxed, they are ordered "in a manner of a slave" to have 
their product taken from them in aid of others. While this is a positive affirmation of 
the thesis of self-ownership, there are two additional areas where both Marxists and 
egalitarians fail to explicitly reject the thesis, 
" " S e e Cohen (1995: 17). 
M2; The initial distribution of inequality reflects the unjustness of the 
capitalist order and a rectification of original resource inequality should 
suffice to overcome this injustice.'"*® 
Cohen thought that M2 left open the possibility of individuals being divided into 
buyers and sellers of labour-power because of differences in natural talent. It rejects 
only "capitalisms with dirty histories" (Cohen, 1995: 16) but not necessarily 
capitalism itself. He thought that in order to reject capitalist relations the principle of 
self-ownership needed to be explicitly rejected. The second area where Marxists have 
failed to reject self-ownership is in descriptions of the communist ideal, 
M3: While all productive resources are publicly owned in the ideal communist 
society, the individual is sovereign over themselves and conducts themselves 
'just as they have a mind ' , without interfering with others as a 'condition' for 
the free development of others. ' '" 
In the ideal communist society individuals are sovereign over themselves and nobody 
is in a position to force others to refrain from doing what they otherwise would have 
done. Taxation therefore does not exist in such a society, but the thesis of self-
ownership holds and sticks for societies that do not have an abundance. The reason 
Marx did not feel he needed to reject the thesis was because he had a 'technological 
fix'. He thought the ideal communist society would exist in a state of abundance, 
where such abundance would make it "unnecessary to press the talent of the naturally 
better endowed for the sake of establishing equality of condition, and it is therefore 
unnecessary to trench against or modify self-ownership, in order to achieve equality" 
(Cohen, 1995: 16) With our growing awareness of ecological constraints though we 
can no longer expect that the developing worid will simply 'catch up' with modem 
industrialised countries. The world is never likely to reach a state of total abundance 
that Marx describes: scarcity will always exist and the levels of scarcity in different 
countries (and also different classes within countries) will be unequal. If we have a 
genuine concern for equality, we must therefore reject the thesis of self-ownership in 
our conceptions of the ideal society. 
""See Cohen, 1995: 16). 
See Cohen, (1995: 122) and Marx (1975: 47). 
I will focus on the positive affirmation of self-ownership (MI) as it is the premise 
Cohen and Barry use to state their disagreement. It also offers a nice contrast to 
Republican freedom as a position that (like republicanism) rejects the incompatibility 
thesis but also (unlike republicanism) explicitly rejects any analytic connection 
between common opinion and freedom. The disagreement Cohen registers with M2 
and M3 serve as a marker that must be preserved with rephrases of M l . The terms 
and expressions 'their labour-power', owns' , and 'stealing' are surely cognate terms 
to the ones used to describe the thesis of self-ownership. Let us start then by 
eliminating the word 'stealing' and its cognates. Probably the most common rephrase 
of sentences using 'stealing' is in terms of breaking the law, 
MIA: Capitalists exploit workers by breaking the law... 150 
We can stop there and discard M I A straight away because in so far as we are dealing 
with a capitalist legal structure it is doubtful that workers will be being exploited by 
way of illegal behaviour. It is still exploitation regardless of whether or not workers 
sign legal contracts to work: "no law of bourgeois property is violated in the wage 
relationship" (Cohen, 1995: 148). A more promising rephrase is in terms of market-
value. 
MIB: Capitalists exploit workers by paying less than market-value for the 
worker's labour-power because the worker owns their labour-power at full 
market-value.'^' 
Market-value is the price a product would be expected to get in a competitive auction. 
This rephrase gets its purchase from the ubiquitous Marxian slogan that capitalists 
have a monopoly over the means of production. Capitalists though pay market-value 
for labour-power given such a 'competitive auction' does not have to include 
everyone: it can exclude a number of social groups and still remain competitive. A 
penniless labourer putting a family heirloom up for auction to pay their electricity bill 
does not make the auction any less competitive by being compelled to do so by 
economic circumstance. Capitalists will compete with other capitalists. Affirming 
M2 would perhaps add subtlety here since we could talk of the market-value as per 
J™ This could be construed as the setup in Cohen (1995: 147-8). 
This is the terminology used in Cohen (1995: 148). 
the initial distribution of resources, but we cannot affirm it if we want to preserve 
Cohen's disagreement profile. 
We can move on to one of Cohen's own suggestions. In his article 'More on 
Exploitation and the Labour Theory of Value' he suggests that the Marxian charge of 
exploitation cannot be cashed out in terms of a labour theory of value. With this in 
mind, it might be possible to eliminate 'their labour-power' alongside 'stealing' from 
M l by using Cohen's own terms to rephrase. He criticises the labour-theoretic 
argument that yields the following rephrase, 
MIC: Capitalists exploit workers by accruing value despite workers being the 
sole creators of value. 
Cohen ridicules this argument by noting that the desire individuals have for a product 
creates that product's value. Since capitalists desire products, they also create value. 
Workers in other words are not the sole creators of value. Furthermore, 
"If labor's creation of value would give the laborer a claim to value because he had created it, 
then so would the desirer 's creation of value give him a claim on that basis. Yet would we say 
that desirers are exploited because they create the value of the product, and the capitalist 
receives part of that value? The suggestion is absurd." (Cohen, 1980: 154) 
He replaces this version with what he calls the 'Plain Argument ' , 
MID: Capitalists exploit workers since workers are the sole creators of 
products and capitalists receive value from those products. 
The 'Plain Argument' appears to rephrase M l without any linguistic left-overs from 
the thesis of self-ownership. However, one could interpret from M I D that those who 
are unable to work exploit those that do. You would be hard-pressed to make the 
argument that the severely disabled exploit those that support them. Who counts as 
being a 'capitalist' cannot be left to intuition and so the word 'capitalists' is best 
eliminated from M I D , 
MIE: A certain group in society (that is non-inclusive of workers) exploits 
workers with an indefensible monopoly over the means of production. This 
^ The argument in Cohen (1983) explicitly suggests this rephrase. 
creates an unfair bargaining situation such that the group can receive value 
(desire-satisfaction) from products despite workers being the sole creators of 
those products.'^' 
The question is begged then why this monopoly is indefensible. There are three 
options for an answer. The first is to recite the self-ownership conception of the good. 
That is, the worker creates product with their naturally endowed resources and the 
labour should therefore be theirs to transfer as they will. The 'should' here derives 
from a distinct conception of the good and is therefore partial. While the self-
ownership thesis does not itself K\y on linguistic conjuring tricks, the argument that 
defends its impartiality and acceptability for institutionalisation does. Cohen was 
therefore right to take steps to rid egalitarian thought of any conceptual residue from 
the thesis and Barry wrong to scold him for it. 
At first glance, it may seem that an answer purged of a partial conception of the good 
will have to rely back on M I B since in arguing for the indefensibility of the 
monopoly over the means of production we seem to have to refer back to the 
exploitation of the worker. This would make M I B circular and would be dependent 
on linguistic trickery for acceptability. This is the second option for defending the 
Marxian claims of exploitation and is the one Cohen favours. His defence is to 
demonstrate that the circularity is only apparent and non-substantive. We can quickly 
demonstrate its apparentness by eliminating 'monopoly' and rephrasing M I E as 
Cohen does, with M I F , 
MIF: 
(i) The worker (W) is exploited by a certain group in society (non-
inclusive of workers) (C), since C gets some of what W produces (for 
no return) by virtue of differential ownership of the means of 
production, and where that causes C to get some of what W produces, 
C 's getting it is indefensible. 
(ii) Unequal distribution of means of production is indefensible because it 
causes the indefensibly unreciprocal transfer described in (i). 
It is true that the description of (ii) does not refer to (i) but this does entail circularity 
according to Cohen (1995: 197). The initial unequal distribution of resources is 
' " S e e Cohen (1995: 195-209). 
""See Cohen (1995: 195-209). 
indefensible because it gives rise to forced extraction and this forced extraction is 
indefensible because such extraction is explained by an unacceptable necessary 
condition. The unreciprocated product transfer from W to C is explained by the 
original unequal distribution of resources. This begs the question as to what are 
acceptable conditions. Cohen (1995: 199) suggests that an acceptable transfer could 
involve an (unforced) altruistic preference-based decision by W. The forced 
extraction of holdings through an income tax is surely also acceptable if it is to relieve 
the misery of the suffering or increase equality of opportunity for those who are not 
directly responsible for their misery and inequality - i.e. transfer for the right reasons. 
The third option is to concede to the circularity and reject the notion of exploitation in 
egalitarian arguments. For instance, Roemer (1986: 275) argues "the proper Marxian 
claim... is for equality in the distribution of productive assets, not for the elimination 
of exploitation". This seems to be a position that affirms M2 (and possibly M3) and 
one that was shared by Barry (2001), which perhaps explains his unwillingness to 
accept any vindication of the ideal of non-exploitation. Either way, Cohen thought 
that this position also relied on the thesis of self-ownership (Cohen, 1995: 120-121; 
Cohen, 1995b). Whether this is correct and whether or not Cohen's 'acceptable 
reason' for unreiprocal transfer and, indeed, exploitation rest on a particular 
conception of the good would require further analysis. Preferably this analysis would 
start with destructive conceptual analysis. What the analysis in this section has 
proven though is that Barry's definitional criticism is just that - definitional - and 
misses the substantive features of Cohen's position. Barry did not reasonably reject 
Cohen's position. 
8.6 Conclusion 
The title of Barry's review of Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality is 'You have 
to be crazy to believe it ' , referring to the thesis of self-ownership. He justifies the 
title by claiming "the remaining believers [of the thesis] are holed up in the 
backwoods of Montana or Idaho surrounded by large caches of heavy weapons" 
(1996). In his review of Anarchy, State and Utopia he suggests that the argument 
proposed is nothing more than prejudice, the likes of which we might expect of a 
Midwestern pump attendant but which was inappropriate for an Ivy League professor. 
In both reviews he thought the authors treated the thesis seriously by virtue of a 
linguistic trick but had no way to call them out on it for their reply was that his refusal 
to take the trick was just as arbitrary. This is a deadlock with no side committing any 
blatant inconsistency. In the contract-situation policies pertaining to redistribution 
would be rejected by those defining freedom and rights in terms of the self-ownership 
thesis and policies bereft of distributional concerns would be rejected by egalitarians 
with their definitional assumptions. This is an impossible situation. Applying 
destructive conceptual analysis I have demonstrated a way to prove consistency and 
overcome the deadlock. Readers might wish to propose new rephrases for Nozick or 
push the elimination method further for Cohen. Either way, I have made a few 
preliminary steps to decisively demonstrating the reasonableness and 
unreasonableness of their respective claims. The litmus test is now to test these 
provisional hypotheses by way of the rephrasing capacities of others in positivist 
fashion. 
In its 'strong' version republicanism likewise accuses modem liberal theory of 
rejecting arguments by way of a linguistic sleight-of-hand. As I have argued though, 
this misses the point of the 18"' Century rejections to republicanism. The liberal 
rejection of republicanism was substantive despite being clouded by misogynistic and 
nationalistic fog. Liberals were correct to point out that the same standards 
republicans used to justify America's independence from Britain should have been 
applied to women and employees, and yet they were not. The 18"' Century 
Republicans were being inconsistent. The liberal rejection pointed out an 
inconsistency that is an inconsistency in all times and in all places. The misogynistic 
and nationalistic accommodation of the rejection (proposed by Lind and his allies) 
was particular to the time and the place-, a re-defmition of freedom that made it folly 
to be aggrieved by Britain's ability to arbitrarily tax the American colonies and 
affirmed the slave-like statuses of women and some workers. '" Over time liberalism 
has adjusted and it is now consensus that arbitrary taxation, the unequal status of 
women, and the lack of legal redress for workers is unacceptable. A modem liberal 
See Dowding (2013) on the time/eontext-dependence of certain reasonable rejections. 
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looking back on the 18"" Century republicans should reject these conditions, rather 
than focusing in on the republican's particular definition of freedom. 
As it happens though our modem vocabulary has developed in terms of the liberal re-
definition of freedom in its negative sense. There are now precise quantitative 
measures for the concept designated by the term (e.g. Carter, 1999; Kramer, 2003) 
that provide arguers with a lot of analytical scope. Strong republicanism however 
rejects this idiom and thinks the aggregation of non-domination is a value that can 
serve as a trump in political argument. It rejects the idiom because the idiom got off 
and running for contingent and prejudicial reasons, not because of any genuine 
inconsistencies in the liberal position. Rejections of this sort were criticised in 5.2. 
Furthermore, under the pressures of elimination strong republicanism needs the 
orthodox liberal vocabulary to make coherent claims. Too much turns on the words 
'arbitrary' and 'shared' when referring to arbitrary interference and shared interests. 
It appears then that the contemporary linguistic trick is played more by republicanism 
than liberalism. Of course, I might have missed a rephrase but the burden is to find 
one. Perhaps a promising path would be with the elimination of the term 'capacity' 
supplemented with a thorough reading of the philosophical literature (e.g. Sen, 1993; 
Morriss, 2002). As far as my provisional conclusion holds though the ideal of non-
domination gives parties a nice linguistic glue to make their initial claims and start a 
political argument, but the idiom cannot be used to trump all rejections, particularly 
rejections of certain policies. For one, it would simply codify the prevailing common 
opinions, opinions that a Marxist like Cohen found deeply exploitative. 
Chapter 9 
Conclusion: The Veil of Anal Retentiveness 
The conclusions so far sketched in the second half of the dissertation are by no means 
definitive. I readily concede that I might have either misinterpreted an argument or a 
possible rephrase might have been missed. While the conclusions are not definitive, 
they beg questions and beg them in a structured way: where have I misinterpreted the 
argument or what rephrase could I have possibly used? Until an answer can be given 
within the constraints proposed in the first half of the dissertation, such arguments can 
be reasonably rejected. This does not rule out overturning such rejections later down 
the track if somebody thinks up a new rephrase or notices a misreading. They are free 
to re-interpret the arguments as much as they like so long as those re-interpretations 
are likewise subjected to the pressures of elimination. The main point is that 
destructive conceptual analysis is both falsifiable and positivist. Somebody can come 
along and falsify my conclusions in a perspicuous and structured way and in so doing 
make a positive contribution to the literature. 1 am aware of no other brand of 
conceptual analysis that boasts such features. 
I have not thought up 'new' topics to apply this analysis to. All the questions covered 
are old questions and the trade-offs covered are features of existing debates. This 
certainly made things easier, but it was a structural (rather than convenience-driven) 
decision that followed from the interpretation of political argument developed in the 
first half of the dissertation. I will expand upon this rationale here in the conclusion 
and then finish by tying it into what I call 'the veil of anal retentiveness' - the label 1 
favour for my overall framework since it is a genuine alternative to Rawls' 'veil of 
ignorance' and Buchanan's 'veil of uncertainty' for political liberalism (see 3.1). I 
choose the somewhat unorthodox title because it seems to best label the 'nit-picking 
pedanticism' 1 think should be encouraged in political theory (see 3.3.3). 
The OED defines anal retentive as an adjective to apply to a person who is "excessively orderly and 
tussy Indeed, if somebody were to co-opt an argument about the dishes with excessive use of the 
method of elimination, they would be being excessive. However, my point is that there is a place for 
the profess.onalization of this fussiness with respect to political argument in order to sort out 
deadlocked disputes in everyday discourse. 
Political argument is a device to sort out our articulated differences. It is not a device 
used to state additional differences. It does not coordinate individuals to upset 
platitudes, but coordinates them to establish new ones. Political argument, in other 
words, is not philosophy. David Lewis opens his first book Conventions with one of 
the most lucid descriptions of what philosophy is all about, 
"It is the profession of philosophers to question platitudes that others accept without thinking 
twice. A dangerous profession, since philosophers are more easily discredited than platitudes, 
but a useful one. For when a good philosopher challenges a platitude, it usually turns out the 
platitude was essentially right; but the philosopher has noticed trouble that one who did not 
think twice could not have met. In the end the challenge is answered and the platitude 
survives, more often than not. But the philosopher has done the adherents of the platitude a 
service: he has made them think twice." (Lewis, 1969: 1) 
Such a profession is of the utmost importance. The philosopher notices problems that 
could cause agreement (grounded in the platitudes they are studying) to come 
unstuck. Philosophy looks to possible disagreements that individuals could bring to 
bear on things we typically take for granted. A good thing too, for if we did not have 
some of our philosophical frameworks, it would be extremely difficult to adjust to 
certain changes in our environment that make previously held platitudes redundant. 
By this description political philosophers challenge our stock political opinions in 
order to pre-empt and accommodate potentially destabilising disagreements in the 
future. But what of the process of establishing platitudes in the face of current 
disagreement? Philosophy only gets off the ground if there is a platitude to react 
against whereas political argument attempts to establish platitudes where there are 
none. This is my rationale for treating political argument as different, strictly 
speaking, to political philosophy. Ideally, 1 would like to co-opt the term 'political 
theory' to apply to the discipline of political argument and distinguish it from political 
philosophy, but 1 realise this would be an uphill battle. My instinct is that the 
conflation of the two disciplines has actively perpetuated non-substantive agreement 
profiles - although there is no room to go into this claim now. Suffice to say the 
above serves as a rationale for the subject matter covered in the second half of this 
dissertation. 1 wanted to try and make a contribution towards clearing up the existing 
ground rather than creating new ground of my own. 
With the rise in access to the internet information is now shared in vastly different 
ways to how it was a decade or so ago. The internet has largely superseded the old 
mediums of the morning newspaper and nightly TV news bulletin. With Twitter and 
Facebook the 'Arab Spring' and Syrian civil war have had vastly more coverage than 
they would have had had they occurred before these websites were up and running. 
Such extensive coverage of these events is surely a desirable development. However, 
with the quantity of new information ever increasing, the standards of impartiality 
have arguably waned. Opinions are more in demand and to keep one's opinion 
interesting one needs to make them unique. There are increasing incentives for being 
controversial. Aside from a few crusty conservatives, nobody would condemn 
individuals for having controversial opinions per se. Controversy though is becoming 
the new orthodoxy. 
There is a tinge of elitism in claiming that there can be an academic discipline that 
serves as a constraint on such opinion giving. Some opinions might well be 
reasonable and some might not but who are we to say? The same sorts of 
controversies rage in the pages of academic journals as much as in the newspapers or 
during opinion segments on TV. Those mediums do not claim institutional privilege, 
so why should academia? In fact the media personalities are usually more popular 
than academics and the viewers they bring in justify their salary in a strictly 
commercial sense. What justifies the salary of academics concerned with political 
argument? My answer is that academia can have a privileged position vis-a-vis the 
other mediums so long as it subjects its output to more rigorous constraints than the 
other mediums and makes those constraints perspicuous to the general public. 
This dissertation has focused on a methodology to subject political argument to such 
constraints. A decisive brand of conceptual analysis supplemented by a systematic 
theory of language is the missing cog for interpretations of political argument that 
currently structure political theory and political science. This has led to messy 
disciplines with messy constraints to the extent that theorists and some scientists do 
not have any obvious method to gauge the success of their work (see chapters 4 and 
5). In such a setting the triumphant are not necessarily the most reasonable and are 
often merely those who can command the 'accent of infallibihty' the best by playing 
with words in persuasive ways. 
Political theorists should not play with words; they should play with arguments and 
eliminate words. Political theorists should eliminate words from arguments they are 
analysing and ascertain whether acceptable rephrases are possible. In so far as these 
methodological maxims are followed, political theory will be constrained by a veil of 
anal retentiveness. Behind the veil the substantiveness of political arguments can be 
analysed in increasingly austere vocabularies and the profession of political theory 
can decisively curb the accents of infallibility that politics inevitably attracts. 
Of course the rhetoric of statesmen like Barack Obama cannot be preserved in austere 
logical vocabularies. If Obama's keynote address to the Democratic National 
Convention in 2004 had been given in first-order modal logic, much of its resonance 
would obviously have been lost. However, I think the political argument Obama's 
presentation addressed can be captured in such austerity in so far as there were 
substantive reasons being given for his position. 1 have given a rigorous description 
for this property that 1 call political argument. By doing so I have presented a way of 
ascertaining when agents are engaging in political argument and (more importantly) 
when political argument is being hijacked and suspended in conversation to serve 
certain interests (despite what the interested parties might say). 1 think it is an activity 
that approximates what is usually referred to by 'political argument' and is something 
that just about all of us desire to be judged to be capable of doing. It is what 
contractors engage in when they are defending vetoes of contractual provisions. 
The political theorist is a specialist with respect to political argument. They identify 
common non-substantive manoeuvres and unreasonable arguments (despite however 
persuasive those arguments might be). Ideally, contractors would hold themselves 
accountable to the judgement of those experts in the contract situation and stand 
corrected if those experts rejected their arguments. In reality though it is doubtful that 
there will be many who hold themselves accountable in this way, but if they do not 
they have to devise a way to prove that what they are saying is genuine political 
argument. This is no easy task given the problems - most notably the problem of 
rhetoric (see Chapter 2) - that need to be overcome. My description of political 
argument and with it political theory provides a ready-made proof: the veil of anal 
retentiveness itself or deference to experts who spend their professional lives 
subjecting arguments to increasingly thick veils of anal retentiveness. 
Contractarians typically assume those in the contract-situation are motivated by a 
common desire for agreement. Yet it is not at all obvious whether individuals are 
actively seeking substantive agreement in conversation. This seems to be a weakness 
with much of the social contract literature. For one, there are certain parties that 
benefit from persistent disagreement - namely the beneficiaries of the unjustifiable 
elements of the status quo - that we can expect to try and maintain disagreement by 
dodging ascriptions of inconsistency. For two, the tide is gradually changing to think 
of the contract-situation not as some hypothetical or mythological one-off event 
where individuals have a definite goal of agreement in mind, but as an on-going and 
actual one where there is no great losses when two friends cannot agree over a beer 
(see 1.5.1). My contribution to the reasonable rejection canon suggests an alternative 
assumption: a desire to be believed to be capable of engaging in political argument to 
defend one's political position. That is, capable of defending their veto decisions. 
This is a far weaker criterion for it includes individuals who do not want substantive 
agreement, but just want to seem like they do. We can empirically test whether this is 
the case though by simply asking 'Are you engaging in substantive political 
argument?' If the answer is in the affirmative, then we can state our interpretation of 
political argument and ask them to engage in the method of elimination (either by 
deference to political theorists or there and then on the spot) to prove their argument 
meets the standards of consistency sketched in Chapter 3 (i.e. C I , C2 and C3). There 
may well be different ways to describe political argument and contractors might not 
like the description 1 give (particularly if their supposed arguments crumble behind 
the veil). However, I maintain that whatever you call the activity I label as 'political 
argument', it is a safe assumption that contractors will want to be thought capable of 
engaging in it to justify their vetoes. Of course contractarians might still feel a need 
to assume a desire for agreement and they are free to do so, my only point is that they 
do not need to in order to make sense of reasonable rejection. 
1 used a liberal theory of politics to delineate political argument from any old 
argument. We do not need a theory for every phenomenon. Dennett does not think 
we need a theory of mind just as much as we do not need a theory for riding a bike (in 
Jahme, 2013). A theory of politics though is necessary in order to hold individuals 
who would otherwise hijack conversation and trip the problem of rhetoric to account. 
We need a theory to pinpoint what it is that individuals want to be judged to be 
capable of doing in (for one-such example) the contract situation. Given the distinctly 
liberal flavour of the theory outlined in section 1.2 non-liberals may think they need 
not concern themselves with the methods advocated in this dissertation. Yet most 
non-liberal positions are reactions to liberalism - they get off and running from a 
criticism of features they take as endemic to liberalism. By spelling out a liberal 
interpretation of political argument 1 think the thesis of reasonable rejection has been 
completed. While critiques of John Rawls' 'veil of ignorance' and James Buchanan's 
'veil of uncertainty' are common in the literature, an additional burden is now on the 
non-liberal to explain what is wrong with the thesis of reasonable rejection in light of 
the veil of anal retentiveness' analytic prowess. 
A.J. Ayer was once accused of hypocrisy for saying grace when out to dinner despite 
being an outspoken atheist. He curtly replied, "1 will not utter falsehoods, but 1 have 
no objection to making meaningless statements" (in Dawkins, 2010). Endorsing such 
a quote might strike the reader as bizarre given everything that has been said. One 
might be under the impression that if there was a take-home lesson from this 
dissertation it is to be vigilant with meaningless nonsense. Not exactly and exactness 
here is crucial. So long as there is no presupposition 3 between conversers that they 
are engaging in (political) argument, then there is no harm in uttering meaningless 
nonsense. Some of the best poetry might be strictly meaningless (in a truth-
conditional sense) but that certainly does not mean it is harmful - quite the reverse! 1 
have been concerned with the activity of political argument where there is just such a 
presupposition 3 , namely, 'S can be reasonably inferred from the context of the prior 
conversation'. When S cannot be reasonably inferred because it is meaningless or 
ambiguous, then the assertion is strictly a falsehood and is objectionable by Ayer's 
mantra. The real problem of rhetoric is not babble, strictly speaking, but infallible 
hypocrisy. 
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